Related Material: CIA Cold War Records -- CORONA: America's First Satellite Program [PDF Only 18.42MB*]

Published by The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, Bethesda, MD

Introduction

The Geostrategic Context

The Corona Story

Conclusion

References

Abstracts of Chapters

This material has been reviewed by the CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA authentication of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.

Introduction

This article is based on the monograph copyrighted and published in 1997 by The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS), located at 5410 Grosvenor Lane, Suite 210, in Bethesda, MD, USA. The ASPRS has been America's professional society dedicated to the development of the art and science of photogrammetry, remote sensing, and geographic information systems since its founding in 1934 (see the forward to the text by former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms). On February 22, 1995, President Clinton authorized the declassification and public release of imagery acquired by Corona, the first US reconnaissance satellite, America's earliest successes in taking pictures of the earth's surface from space. What follows are extracts from the introduction and chapter abstracts. They give the flavor of the text but are not meant to be a replacement for reading the whole, exciting story. The comprehensive collection of articles in the ASPRS monograph opens the formerly classified Corona story, first to historians and remote sensing specialists, but more importantly to those in the general public who have an interest in the Cold War and space technology.

These copyrighted extracts are reproduced with the collaboration of the editor, Dr. Robert A. McDonald, of the National War College, National Defense University, Washington, DC, by permission of the ASPRS.

For information on purchase of the hard-cover text of the monograph, contact the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS), located at 5410 Grosvenor Lane, Suite 210, in Bethesda, MD, USA.

In 1965 there was a Broadway hit, Man of La Mancha, in which Don Quixote, the illusion of protagonist, Miguel de Cervantes, sang of an impossible dream. At this same time during the 1960s there was a national security intelligence "hit"--a secret, US intelligence program for space reconnaissance. This program, Corona, grew out of imaginative thinking and appeared to be an impossible dream. It was designed to "right the unrightable wrong" of being denied information by the Iron Curtain. It was targeted to help "fight the unbeatable foe" of the Cold War Soviet Union. Launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, it reached out into orbit and became an unreachable star that could watch the Soviet Union.

Corona was the world's first imaging reconnaissance satellite and operated during the height of the Cold War to collect pictures over the denied areas behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. During its operational life, this satellite program collected over 800,000 images in response to the national security intelligence and mapping requirements of the time. On the average, individual images covered a geographic area on the Earth's surface of approximately 10x120 miles. Corona had sister programs, Argon for mapping imagery, and Lanyard, a short-lived program designed for higher-quality imagery.

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The Geostrategic Context

The 1950s had been uncertain and dangerous times. In 1953, the Soviet Union tested a hydrogen bomb; in the summer of 1957 they successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile; and in the fall of that year they launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik. US policy makers were uneasy about what they were seeing and hearing from the Soviets about their military and space successes. There even were those who suggested that the Soviets might drop bombs on the US from space (Studeman, 1995). But the US Intelligence Community had very little hard evidence of the true Soviet military capabilities. "In the absence of reliable information about the nature of the Soviet threat, we had no choice but to build up our own forces" (Deutch 1995). The USSR--with its satellite countries--had become a disciplined, closed society that was suspicious and demonstrated a penchant for controlling the flow of information. At the same time there was growing US public concern over the potential Soviet threat, especially from nuclear weapons. The Soviets had a formidable security service that proved difficult for Western intelligence to penetrate (Helms, 1983). Reconnaissance attempts with high-flying balloons and aircraft only could provide the US with limited useful information. Corona would change all of that with its burst of images. "[T]he intelligence explosion of the century was on, a relentless stream of detailed data which turned analytical work on these so-called ‘denied areas' from famine to feast:" (Helms, 1983).

The objective of the Corona program was to use a space platform to acquire photographic intelligence to help satisfy the requirement for what was viewed as much-needed information. Its engineering was based on theoretical concepts that were yet to be demonstrated and used a technology that was based on neither confident data nor proven hardware. Questions that we take for granted today had yet to be answered: If you successfully launched a camera into orbit, would it work? If you took pictures from a satellite, could they see through the Earth's atmosphere? Could you launch, control, and recover a spacecraft?

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The Corona Story

The Man of La Mancha, and the life of its protagonist, Miguel de Cervantes, are metaphors for the Corona program. De Cervantes' life ``... was a catalogue of catastrophe... What sort of man was this...who could suffer unceasing failure and yet...produce the staggering testament..."? (Wasserman, 1976). What sort of program was Corona? What kind of people were behind it? Who could suffer the unceasing failures of 13 shattered mission attempts before they finally could produce a testament to their quest--before they could launch an artificial satellite that would fly in a 100 nautical mile polar orbit above the Earth and from there take pictures that ultimately could show objects that were as small as 2 meters?

Man of La Mancha "had its inception in Madrid in 1959" when author Dale Wasserman was in Madrid (Richards, 1976). This was the same time that Corona was being conceived on the launch pad. Its first failed mission was in February of 1959. The play and musical went on to be written and were first presented at the ANTA Washington Square Theatre in New York City on November 22, 1965. It was a tremendous success and considered one of the best musicals of the 1965-66 season (Richards 1976). By then, Corona had gone on to become an operational satellite that was flying Mission 1026 over the USSR. It was being hailed a tremendous success and was considered one of the best sources of intelligence on the Soviet Union.

Corona was built from 1959 to 1972 by the Space Systems Division of Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space (formerly Lockheed MSC Space Systems Division). Lockheed was awarded the prime contract in 1956 for Weapons System 117L, an umbrella classified program. The Corona project evolved from WS-117L, and Lockheed became the prime contractor and served as technical adviser and integrator for all Corona equipment other than the Thor booster. Lockheed developed the Agena upper stage and integrated and led the test, launching, and on-orbit control operations of Corona (Star, 1995).

The first successful Corona flight, which acquired 3,000 feet of film and covered more than 1,650,000 square miles of Soviet territory, was making its mark. During this August 1960 flight, the Corona program had acquired more overhead photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all of the U-2 flights to that date. From a technological perspective, it was the first space program to recover an object from orbit and the first to deliver intelligence information from a satellite. It would go on to be the first program to employ multiple reentry vehicles, pass the 100 mission mark, and produce stereoscopic space imagery. Its most remarkable technological advance would be the improvement in its ground resolution from an initial 40-foot capability to an ultimate 6-foot resolution.

Corona would provide evidence that the Soviets had made exaggerated claims of their military capability. The "heart" we heard about in Joe Darion's lyrics for "The Impossible Dream" could "lie peaceful and calm" knowing that the Cold War threat was not as great as we had thought. This monograph tells the story of the quest for photosatellite reconnaissance through 22 articles organized into seven sections:

1. The Prelude to Space Reconnaissance
2. The Beginning of Space Reconnaissance
3. The Technology Behind the Pictures
4. The People and Their Organizations
5. Declassification and Opening Secrets to the Public
6. The Impact of Space Reconnaissance
7. The Future

Prelude to Space Reconnaissance

The first section has two articles that describe American strategic reconnaissance capabilities and policy issues that preceded Corona. Jonathan Lewis discusses the U-2 story that was a model for the development of Corona. He looks at the evolution of the U-2 from the perspective of Richard Bissell, who also played a key role in the development of Corona. Lewis pays particular attention to the organizational dynamics and management style that were fundamental to the U-2's development. The focused, business-oriented mission; the single-line, streamlined management structure; the risk-taking innovation; and the need for secrecy all previewed Corona's development. In his conclusion, Lewis leaves us with questions to consider as we examine the Corona story.

R. Cargill Hall offers insight into how a concept for a strategic reconnaissance capability ultimately led to the birth of Corona. This is an essential explanation that sets the stage for telling the story of Corona as it occurred during the Cold War. Hall describes how strategic reconnaissance evolved out of attempts to acquire intelligence in response to national security fears and crises. In his article we see the impact of President Eisenhower's leadership and legacy for American, national-level strategic reconnaissance.

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The Beginning of Space Reconnaissance

This section has three articles that outline the performance characteristics of the earliest imaging reconnaissance satellites. The article on Corona, Argon, and Lanyard explains what these first US reconnaissance satellites were and how they performed operationally. The article by Frederic Oder and Martin Belles offers an explanation of Corona's development from a programmatic perspective, while Peter Gorin explains the Soviet Union's imaging reconnaissance program that paralleled these early US accomplishments.

Gorin's insight into the Soviet's Zenit satellite is important if we are to know the complete story of early Cold War space reconnaissance. From him, we learn about what the Soviets were doing in the development of their counterpart to Corona. His article makes it clear that the appetite for information in the USSR was as strong as it was in the US. More importantly, Zenit--just as Corona--provided policy leaders with information that was essential to build confidence levels that were necessary to maintain peace during the Cold War.

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The Technology Behind the Pictures

The third section discusses the technology of the camera and spacecraft. Dow Smith, from his own experience, offers insight into the technical aspects of Corona's optics. He explains how experiences from the high-altitude balloon reconnaissance era and the technological culture of the time were able to be adapted to the complex challenge of space imaging. Bob Powell draws from his first-hand observations to explain the evolution of the Agena vehicle, the spacecraft that carried the Corona camera into orbit. Powell also talks about the recovery sequence for getting the film back to Earth. His explanations demonstrate the tremendous complexity of the Corona endeavor: from launching the vehicle, to operating it in space, and recovering the film payload.

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The People and Their Organizations

Probably the most important part of the Corona story is the people and organizations that made it happen--without their dedicated efforts there would have been no Corona. This section features four articles that recognize the contributions of those who made Corona possible. For 20 to 30 years they had to remain anonymous because of the classification and security measures that were required throughout the life of the Corona program and many years afterward.

Two individuals were driving forces behind the decision to build a photoreconnaissance satellite for the US. They were James Killian, Jr., president of MIT, and Edwin Land of the Polaroid Corporation. Killian chaired a committee that was established to examine the threat of a surprise attack on the United States. Land chaired a panel that was responsible for finding approaches to monitor the military capabilities of the USSR (Deutch, 1995). Their names come up in a number of the articles in the monograph. A third name, related to implementing the decision, also appears often in Corona's story--Richard Bissell. He was a visionary of the 1950s who saw that the assessment of international tensions during in the Cold War--with its nuclear weapons threat--required more than simply accurate political intelligence, but also accurate factual information to determine the practical effects of tactical and strategic political moves. Bissell saw that the way to collect this kind of information was by applying technology to intelligence problems (Ranelagh, 1987). As a CIA program manager in the U-2 and Corona era, he brought technology to bear on the decisions associated with creating a national-level strategic reconnaissance capability for the US.

Donald Welzenbach opens his article with the influence of Edwin Land in the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and Bissell's role in implementing the program. Welzenbach goes on to discuss the involvement of many other government and contractor personnel who were associated with the early development of strategic reconnaissance in the US. He makes it clear that these individuals laid the foundation for Corona, with many of them continuing to be affiliated with the Corona program. What at first might seem to be independent programs is actually a continuum of technological development.

The Corona program depended heavily on the technological and management experience of the earlier airborne strategic reconnaissance programs. Corona's managers reached out and found the best technology and expertise that was available in government and private industry. They organized a talented team that came together with an ability to foster innovation. In a collegial way they turned concepts into reality--and did that in a relatively short time (Deutch, 1995). These early Corona pioneers--those who built, launched, and operated Corona--were honored at CIA headquarters as part of the 35th Anniversary Commemoration of the program in 1995. The article on these pioneers offers a brief outline of who they were and the contributions they made.

Corona's success was not only a result of those who built and operated the satellite system, but also of those who found ways to exploit and use Corona's imagery to extract intelligence information. Ronald J. Ondrejka's article identifies another group of pioneers who were members of the American Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS) and who focused on the exploitation of what was a new reconnaissance capability. He writes from the perspective of a long-time ASPRS member and his personal involvement in the Corona program at Itek Corporation. He makes the point that these ASPRS members, both corporate and individual, were "invisible Corona partners" from the Society. They were invisible to the public and others in the professional world of remote sensing because of the inherent secrecy of the Corona program. Through these partners, ASPRS provided the Corona program with a source of knowledge about photogrammetry and remote sensing that had been a part of the Society's professional tradition.

That tradition of imagery exploitation can be personified in Arthur C. Lundahl who was the Society's president in 1954. A Washington Post obituary for Lundahl described him as "a pioneer in photographic intelligence and the art of photographic interpretation" (Barnes, 1992). Lundahl was widely known for his work with U-2 imagery, but he also was a major player in the use and exploitation of Corona imagery. He founded the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), which became the Director of Central Intelligence's center for the analysis of Corona imagery. It was Lundahl's years of experience in photographic interpretation of airborne imagery that enabled NPIC to make its contributions to national security during the Corona era. Dino A. Brugioni's and Frederick J. Doyle's article provides a biographical overview of Lundahl's life and his contributions to the fields of photointerpretation and national security. The article puts the exploitation of Corona imagery in the context of a life experience.

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Declassification and Opening Secrets to the Public

When the president declassified Corona imagery in February 1995, 23 years after Corona's final mission, it breathed new life into Corona. The four articles in this section discuss the decision to declassify and the actions to make Corona available to the public. The article on the declassification decision explains the nature of the Talent-Keyhole Control system that President Eisenhower directed for the protection of satellite imagery and the gradual evolution of removing its security constraints. Also reported is the background for Vice President Gore's announcement of the decision at CIA Headquarters. The next two articles in this section are more technical than descriptive. The article by J. Michael Selander offers insight into how the declassified satellite reconnaissance imagery was prepared for transfer from the Intelligence Community holdings to the public archives. Specifically, he explains the mathematical camera models that were developed so that the transferred imagery would be more useful to the public. The article by Jon C. Leachtenauer and his colleagues offers a technical analysis of the benefits of digitizing Corona imagery, which was acquired before the era of imagery digitization. The full Intelligence Community archive of Corona, Argon, and Lanyard imagery now has been transferred to the public archive at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Data Center. Donna K. Scholz's article provides some background on the transfer of the imagery and explains how the public can gain access to the imagery.

The Impact of Space Reconnaissance

Corona's technological potential became apparent after recovering pictures of its first intelligence target--the Soviet military airfield near Mys Schmidta on the Chukchi Sea. Along with Argon and Lanyard, Corona imagery would go on to have major national security and cartographic impact in the worlds of foreign intelligence and map-making. The three articles in this section focus on these impacts. In his article, Robert A. McDonald cites specific examples of how, in a revolutionary way, Corona contributed to exposing the missile gap, monitoring arms control, detecting nuclear proliferation, and monitoring the Soviet threat. Roland S. Inlow analyzes how the Intelligence Community used Corona as a unique tool to respond to the foreign intelligence challenges of the Cold War. He offers his analysis from the perspective of a former intelligence analyst and senior manager for the collection and exploitation of satellite reconnaissance imagery.

Not only was Corona the beginning of a revolution in the way intelligence was gathered and reported to senior national security decision makers, but it also became the foundation for a revolution in map-making. Joseph A. Baclawski discusses that aspect of Corona's impact on national security. He points out how the mapping of the Soviet landmass was probably one of the most technologically challenging tasks for those who used Corona materials. Baclawski makes it clear that Corona imagery provided the key to break through the obstacles of the Soviet Cartographic Iron Curtain.

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The Future

The four articles in the last section of this monograph link Corona's past with the future. Robert McDonald's article on potential new applications for Corona imagery addresses how this 20- to 30-year-old satellite reconnaissance imagery has the capability to contribute to the analysis of a variety of current and future remote sensing and scientific problems. Not only can it be useful for a retrospective analysis of environmental problems, but it also can be used to deal with resource management and archaeological problems.

Corona not only offers something for the future through the exploitation of its 30-year-old imagery, but there are policy lessons that can be learned from the Intelligence Community's experience with it. Corona's experience demonstrates that technology can be a force multiplier for intelligence, and it is necessary to understand existing technologies if we are to apply them to the problems at hand. "At the right time, taking advantage of an advance in technology can revolutionize the business of intelligence" (Deutch, 1995). The article on policy lessons briefly outlines the range of these lessons that includes needing a strong industrial base to be able to take advantage of technology, needing good intelligence in an uncertain world, using the benefits of our national security investments in nondefense areas, and finding value in innovative approaches for management and teamwork when dealing with complex problems that have short deadlines.

Richard Bissell made it clear that developing Corona, ``... was a most heartbreaking business...[Y]ou fire the damn thing off and you've got some telemetry, and you never get it back... So you have to infer from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it fails again you know you've inferred wrong. In the case of Corona, it went on and on" (Bissell quoted in Mosley, Dulles quoted in Ranelagh). The development of Corona broke new ground. It was a solution-oriented approach. Unique managerial concepts were developed. Corona set the stage for a fundamental new way to do things for its day, as well as for the future. Sam Araki's article discusses the legacy of these inventive technical practices and innovative management approaches that Corona offers the aerospace industry for the next millennium.

Jeffrey K. Harris's final article in the monograph looks back to Corona's heritage and forward to the challenges of the information era. He reviews Corona's story as a backdrop for space and the information age of the future.

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Conclusion

Wasserman (1976), in his preface to Man of La Mancha, repeated a quote he found long ago in Unamuno, "Only he who attempts the absurd is capable of achieving the impossible." And that is what the Corona pioneers did. They attempted the absurd, sent a camera into space, took pictures from 100 nautical miles, ejected the film and snatched it by an aircraft in midair--absurd! But it worked, and they accomplished the impossible! US intelligence analysts and senior national security policymakers were able to analyze pictures of the Soviet threat.

For the 1960s, Corona was a technologically remarkable program. Not only was it the first photoreconnaissance satellite, but during its initial missions it acquired images at a resolution of 8 meters. And that quickly improved to 2 meters. An extraordinary achievement in that when France launched its first commercial remote sensing system, SPOTI--over 25 years later--it was only providing 10-meter imagery! Even by Corona's thirty-fifth anniversary, commercial space images generally were available at something worse than 2 meters (e.g., Landsat Thematic Mapper at 30m; the Japanese Earth Resources Satellite, JERS, at about 18m; and the French SPOT satellite still at 10m). Even the Russian KFA-1000 imagery generally was offering no better than 2.5-meter imagery (Doyle, 1991).

In reflecting on Corona, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch (1995) observed that it "... profoundly altered the course of the Cold War and was probably instrumental in keeping us back from the nuclear threshold." Project Corona was the US Cold War intelligence project that prevented the Iron Curtain from denying the US a view into the Communist Bloc and provided the US Government with much-needed reconnaissance-derived intelligence.

What kind of conclusions can we draw? Looking across the articles in this monograph, we clearly can see that Corona's development resulted in at least four revolutions (the word "revolution" consistently is used throughout the monograph). There was a revolution in the way intelligence was collected--the availability of concrete intelligence, hard evidence and tangible information that could be seen and used by policymakers to develop a rational national security strategy. There was a revolution in map-making--a new source of data could be used to produce thousands of reliable maps of large geographic areas previously inaccessible for data collection. There was a revolution in aerospace technology--a new capability for launching, maneuvering, and recovering spacecraft. Finally, there was a revolution in how to manage a complex program--focus on the goal, with an environment of commitment, empowerment, risk-taking, cooperation, and teamwork.

After you learn about the Corona story, you come to know what Corona is all about. It was an impossible dream that came true after 13 unsuccessful attempts. It was risk-taking by pioneers in space flight and intelligence operations. It was those who were on a quest and followed the Corona star of strategic reconnaissance that became a basis for national security during the second half of the twentieth century. It was a look into the Communist world that could not be blocked out by the eclipse of the Iron Curtain. The fundamental contribution of Corona was keeping the Cold War cold. US policymakers were able to acquire information, learn from it, gain insight, share knowledge, and make the right decisions without overreacting. They could see reality through the hard evidence of Corona's photographs. Perhaps the final conclusion is that Corona played a major role in determining how we would think about national security strategy during the second half of the twentieth century and then set the stage for how we are going to confront information in the domains of foreign intelligence and remote sensing in the next millennium.

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References

1. Barnes, B. "Arthur C. Lundahl, 77, Dies; Photo Interpreter for CIA." The Washington Post 25 June 1992: D4.
2. Deutch, J. Remarks. Corona and the Revolution in Intelligence. CIA Headquarters, Langley, VA, 23 May 1995.
3. Doyle, F. J. "Comparison of Civil Remote Sensing Capabilities of the USA, France, USSR, and Others." In R. A. McDonald, ed., Space Imagery and News Gathering for the 1990s:
4. "So What?" Proceedings of Symposium on Foreign Policy and Remote Sensing, 24-25 Feb. 1989.
5. The Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, U of Kentucky, Lexington, KY. Bethesda, MD:
6. American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1991.
7. Helms, R. Quoted in J. Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon Schuster, Inc., 1987:327.
8. Leigh, M. Man of La Mancha. Dale Wasserman, lyrics by Joe Darion, music by Mitch Leigh. New York: Random House, 1966.
9. Ranelagh, J. The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon Schuster, Inc., 1987.
10. Richards, S., ed. Great Musicals of the American Theatre, Vol 2.
11. Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Company, 1976.
12. "Veil of Secrecy Lifted on Corona Imaging Reconnaissance Satellite: Missiles Space Program Spanned 13 Years, 145 Launches." The Star 2 June 1995, 40, 11:1.
13. Studeman, W. O. "Praise for the Corona Pioneers." Ceremony Honoring Pioneers of the Corona Satellite Program, CIA Headquarters, Wash., DC, May 1995.
14. Wasserman, D. Man of La Mancha. Lyrics by Joe Darion, music by Mitch Leigh. In S. Richards, ed., Great Musicals of the American Theatre, Vol 2. Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Company, 1976.

Reproduced with permission, the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing. Dr.
Robert A. McDonald, Corona Between the Sun and the Earth:The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space, 1997.

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Abstracts of Chapters

1.The Prelude to Space Reconnaissance

Jonathan E. Lewis 

Directed by Richard M. Bissell Jr., the rapid development and deployment of the U-2 spy plane was one of the great triumphs of the Cold War. This article will explore the management techniques Bissell used to build the U-2 project organization, coordinate a confederation of civilian and military interests, and overcome repeated Air Force attempts to gain control of the program, Bissell's choice and development of the organization's structure, culture, and personnel will be examined in the context of his broad mission not only to deploy the plane, but to build a photo interpretation capability, and produce an intelligence product that satisfied consumer needs.

Post War Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of Project Corona
R. Cargill Hall

Strategic reconnaissance and peacetime overflight were new concepts in the post World War II period. The Soviet Union's detonation of nuclear devices, Communist victory in China, and war in Korea stimulated development of a strategic reconnaissance capability. The early pioneers in strategic reconnaissance came out of industry, the military, academia. During this early period, the US and Britain would conduct reconnaissance overflights of portions of the USSR using converted bombers (e.g., RB-47s and RB-45s). These aircraft were vulnerable to Soviet attack. The Eisenhower administration determined to develop high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and ultimately reconnaissance satellites.

2.The Beginning of Space Reconnaissance

Corona, Argon, and Lanyard: A Revolution for US Overhead Reconnaissance Robert A. McDonald

Corona, Argon, and Lanyard were the first three US operational imaging satellite reconnaissance systems. They were developed during the Cold War as highly-classified programs, and all three were film return systems. Corona was the most indispensable from a national security perspective. It initially operated under the unclassified Discoverer Program, which had its first successful mission on August12, 1960, when an experimental recovery bucket was retrieved from space with an American flag in it. August 18, 1960, marked the first successful mission that returned film from space. The quality of Corona's reconnaissance imagery improved over the life of the program from about 40 ft. for the original KH-1 camera to somewhat better than 6 ft. for the final KH-4B camera. The final Corona mission was flown on May 24, 1972.

Corona: A Programmatic Perspective
Frederic C.E. Oder and Martin Belles

The Corona program grew out of US Air Force Project Weapon System II7L (WS-117L), for which Lockheed was the prime contractor. Lockheed went on to serve as technical adviser and integrator of all Corona equipment other than the Thor booster. It developed the orbiting Agena upperstage and integrated and led the testing, launching, and on-orbit control operations. The initial Corona vehicles were launched under the cover of the Discoverer series. The earliest missions experienced difficulties, and it was not until Discoverer XIV that reconnaissance imagery was first collected. The Corona program provided a legacy for the US to become a space leader.

ZENIT: Corona's Soviet Counterpart Peter A. Gorin

This article describes the development of the first two types of the Soviet photoreconnaissance satellites, Zenit-2 and Zenit-4. Apart from the satellites themselves, the political background and development of the Soviet space reconnaissance infrastructure are discussed. The article provides a short comparison of the Soviet Zenit and the US Corona programs. This article represents the author's personal opinion based on available sources.

3.The Technology Behind the Pictures

The Design and Engineering of Corona's Optics

F. Dow Smith The Corona camera and its optics grew out of the technological state-of-the-art of the post World War II period; the geopolitical events of the period led to a decision in the late 1950s to fund the Corona program. Work at the Boston University Physical Research Laboratory was critical to the Corona camera, which was subsequently developed at the newly-founded Itek Corporation. The camera was a classic panoramic type that used a Petzval lens configuration. There was an atmosphere of teamwork that was critical to the development of the camera.

Robert M. Powell

Between February 1959 and February 1987, 362 Agenas were launched. This is the spacecraft that was used to fly the Corona photoreconnaissance satellite. Three basic Agena configurations were developed: A, B, and D. Only 19 were flown in the A configuration; the rest, Bs and Ds. The Bs and Ds were longer (20 ft. 8 in. vs. 14 ft. 3 in.) and heavier (14,100 lbs. vs. 8210 lbs. at launch) than the As. All were 5 ft. in diameter. The Agena consisted of three basic subsystems: Propulsion, which consisted of nested tanks for fuel and oxidizer, and a gimbaled engine that used UDMH for fuel and IRFNA as oxidizer; Guidance and control, which consisted of sequence timers, an inertial reference package, infrared horizon sensors, a velocity meter, and cold gas thrusters for pitch, roll, and yaw control; and communication and control, which consisted of telemetry, radar tracking beacon/command receiving transponder, and an orbital sequence of events programmer adjustable by ground command. Agena was Thor-boosted from the Pacific Missile Range and its recovery vehicle recovered in mid-air over the Pacific or from the ocean as back-up.

4.The People and Their Organizations

From the U-2 to Corona and Those Who Searched for Invisibility
Donald E. Welzenbach

This article reviews the involvement of government and contractor personnel who were associated with the development of the U-2, SR-71, and ultimately Corona. Edwin Land and James Killian were very active among an elite group of scientists who advised President Eisenhower, as well as the CIA leadership during the 1950s. Richard Bissell, Jr., initially chief of CIA's special projects element, was a major CIA player during this period. Bissell brought Richard S. Leghorn and personnel of the Boston University's Optical/Physical Research Laboratories (BUORL) into the projects. Contractors, such as Lockheed, Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Fairchild Camera Company, and Itek Corporation became involved in the history of these reconnaissance programs. By the time Corona was being developed, RAND personnel such as Amrom Katz and Merton Davies became involved in the camera aspects of the reconnaissance challenge. The serendipity of the various developments at the time provided Dick Bissell the best of all possible worlds to bring together resources to meet Eisenhower's challenge of the time to meet the threat of surprise attack.

Corona's Pioneers
Robert A. McDonald

Pioneers in the scientific and intelligence world took the intellectual, scientific, and political risks to create the US Government's first imaging reconnaissance satellite, Corona. They came from government and industry, and there were thousands over the life of the program. Forty-eight pioneers were selected from the early years of the program and were honored during the Thirty-Fifth Anniversary Commemoration of the Corona program on May 24,1995. This article outlines a brief summary of their contributions to the success of the program.

Corona's Invisible ASPRS Partners
Ronald J. Ondrejka

Without the American Society of Photogrammetry (ASP)-- now known as the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS)--during the years centered on 1960, the Corona program would not have readily located and accessed the resources of responsive technologies that were needed to expedite the acquisition and exploitation of Corona satellite reconnaissance imagery. Both individual and corporate sustaining members of the Society contributed to the program's success. The technologies necessary for creating and using Corona imagery--technologies that included photo-optical sciences and engineering, photointerpretation, photogrammetry, geodesy, and cartography--describe the professional ASP membership in 1960. The contributions of the many individual and corporate members at that time helped Corona meet its goals. The achievements of these members are reflected in the health and professional influences of ASPRS today.

Arthur C. Lundahl: Founder of the Image Exploitation Discipline
Dino A. Brugioni and Frederick J. Doyle

Art Lundahl, as the founder of the image exploitation discipline, was a major player in the interpretation and use of Corona imagery. During World War II Lundahl encountered aerial imagery by interpreting photographs of enemy targets in the Pacific Theater. He started his civilian career with the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center in 1946. In 1953, Lundahl became the first chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Photographic Intelligence Division, which later became the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). As the NPIC director, Lundahl was responsible for the analysis of U-2 photography, and then after 1960, imagery acquired by the Corona reconnaissance satellite. Lundahl enjoyed the confidence of four US Presidents and briefed many other high-ranking officials from around the world. During his career, he received many awards for his work in photointerpretation and was universally admired by his colleagues in the intelligence and remote sensing communities.

5. Declassification and Opening Secrets to the Public

The Declassification Decision: Opening the Cold War Sky to the Public
Robert A. McDonald

Executive Order 12951 declassified Corona, Argon, and Lanyard satellite reconnaissance imagery. This action was the result of a long history of studying the question and relaxing security controls. Vice President Gore announced the signing of the order in a ceremony at CIA on February 24, 1995. The more general executive order on protecting national security information (E.O. 12958, April 1995) also directs declassification of information that may include additional satellite reconnaissance imagery. Continued national security concerns may require the continued classification of more recent imagery. After the Corona program's national security sensitivity question was resolved, former Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey declassified and authorized transfer of a Corona camera artifact to the Smithsonian. Gore symbolically gave the camera to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution during the February 1995 ceremony. The camera was displayed at the Air and Space Museum during the 35th Anniversary Commemoration of the Corona Program, and is to become a part of the museum's collection.

Image Coverage Models for Declassified Corona, Argon, and Lanyard Satellite Photography--A Technical Explanation
J. Michael Selander

This article describes the construction of mathematical camera models for the Corona, Argon, and Lanyard United States photoreconnaissance satellite imagery systems. Imagery acquired by these systems from 1960 to 1972--approximately 860,000 frames total--is being declassified and made available to the public through the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The camera models described in this article were used to augment a legacy database of image coverage coordinates. This database is used by the Global Land Information System (GLIS) at the EROS Data Center (EDC) to allow users to interactively locate images of interest.

Digitizing Corona Imagery: Quality vs. Cost
Jon C. Leachtenauer, Kenneth Daniel, and Thomas P. Vogl

Corona, Argon, and Lanyard imagery, unlike more recent satellite imagery, was collected on film. For many potential applications in fields that include environmental research, archaeology, and history, it would be desirable to convert the data into a digital format. The National Exploitation Laboratory at the former National Imagery Interpretation Center of the CIA conducted a 1995 study that was designed to determine the impact of digitizing resolution on the information content of converted digitized products. As part of the study, the investigators used a sample of digitizers (at various digitizing spot sizes) to digitize images that were on a sample of duplicate positive film. They displayed the digitized data in softcopy format, and imagery analysts compared the digitized softcopy images with the original hardcopy film products. They measured information loss by using the National Imagery Interpretability Scale (NIIRS). The results of the study provide a basis for selecting digitizer resolution as a function of information/bandwidth trade offs.

Declassified Intelligence Satellite Photographs Available from the US Geological Survey
Donna K. Scholz

An Executive Order, signed by President Clinton on February 22, 1995, authorized the declassification of satellite photographs collected by the US intelligence community during the 1960s and early 1970s. Products from this collection include film negatives, positives, and paper prints, which are available to the public at the cost of reproduction. Photographs are available from the US Geological Survey's National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive and the National Archives Record Administration. The images were declassified incrementally, and the first ones made available for public purchase on March 1, 1996. All images were made available by September 1996. An online catalog and browse images for the entire collection are accessible at no charge on the USGS's Global LIS [Land Information System].

6. The Impact of Space Reconnaissance

Corona's Imagery: A Revolution in Intelligence and Buckets of Gold for National Security
Robert A. McDonald

It was difficult for the US intelligence community to acquire information about the denied areas of the USSR and its communist satellites during the early days of the Cold War. Corona's satellite reconnaissance spacecraft opened a new view into the communist bloc for both intelligence analysts and US policymakers. Corona contributed to exposing the myth of a "missile gap," built confidence in monitoring arms control, helped detect nuclear proliferation, and supported the SS-9 Debate during the 1960s.

How the Cold War and its Intelligence Problems Influenced Corona Operations
Roland S. Inlow

Corona was introduced into the Cold War at a time when there were many gaps in intelligence, and US/Soviet nuclear capabilities were increasing dramatically. It took several years for Corona to provide the initial imagery needed to "search" the Soviet land-mass. The process involved two functions: (1) finding and cataloguing all significant activities; and, (2) confirming the absence of activity when that was the case. Corona has made a lasting contribution, and by any criterion, the Corona program was an outstanding intelligence success in a time of great national need.

Corona: The Foundation for a Mapmaking Revolution
Joseph A. Baclawski

The materials collected by the formerly classified Corona intelligence satellite program became an important resource for US mapping applications on a worldwide basis. The 1995 declassification of the Corona program permits an analysis of how its photographs and ephemeris data were used in two drastically different mapping situations--one on the USSR area where the available mapping data base was poor, and the second on the US area where the existing mapping data were better but needed major updating.

Mapping the Soviet landmass was undoubtedly the most technologically challenging task to which the Corona and the associated Argon materials were applied. Achieving success required development of various types of foreign area mapping specialists, and massive investments in research and development of unique production equipment, all supported by complex computer programs. US mapping organizations overcame these obstacles to map over one-sixth of the Earth's land surface at a medium scale in just over a decade.

7. The Future

Potential New Applications for Declassified Early Satellite Reconnaissance Imagery
Robert A. McDonald

Imagery experts in the intelligence community have suggested that declassified satellite reconnaissance imagery can answer remote sensing questions that go beyond national security problems. The superior spatial resolution of Corona imagery, when compared with the civil remote sensing systems of the 1970s and 1980s, can be used to complement information that was obtained earlier by the civil systems of the time. Corona imagery can significantly extend environmental timelines and fill gaps in civil records. It has the potential to meet Vice President Al Gore's objectives to recognize, measure, and assess global changes. Corona imagery also can be employed to address traditional remote sensing problems, such as resource management, agriculture, forestry, and archaeology. It also can find applications in the social sciences. Corona imagery, a valuable intelligence source during the early Cold War, now has the potential for making significant contributions to the civilian community.

 
Lessons and Benefits from Corona's Development
Robert A. McDonald

Experience with the Corona program suggests five lessons with policy implications for the future and benefits for today: (1) a strong industrial base is a key to technological success; (2) innovative management is fundamental to organizational success; (3) security may be necessary for success in an intelligence activity; (4) reliable intelligence is an integral part of developing sound national security policy; and, (5) national security investments provides dual-use opportunities. We need to consider these lessons as we move through the transition of the post-Cold War period into the Third Millennium.

Corona's Legacy for the New Millennium
Sam Araki with Robert A. McDonald

The development of the Corona imaging reconnaissance satellite was a challenge during an era of limited knowledge about space physics and limited experience in space operations. The Corona engineers met the challenges and left us with a legacy of space technology and program management concepts for future aerospace development. When the Corona legacy meets the modern challenges of the information revolution, there are new, unknown opportunities to explore.

A Look Back to Corona and a Look Forward to the Information Era
Jeffrey K. Harris

The information era can be seen as an opportunity to build on the technological heritage that Corona forged in the 1960s. Corona grew out of the necessity to acquire information about the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and it achieved a number of firsts in space helping set the technological standard for future US space programs. Corona offers a lesson that a small group of empowered people can explore options and, with risks, achieve their goal. At the same time, Corona left a technological and information legacy that presents new opportunities for the information era. Information technology is evolving at an ever faster rate, and the US begins the information era with a distinct advantage. In this age of the ever-increasing use of technology we need to recognize that some amount of system failure may be inherent because of the complexity of the technological systems. Tomorrow's future is bright, and knowledge from our technological heritage can be the catalyst.

Reproduced with permission, the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing. Dr. Robert A. McDonald, Corona Between the Sun and the Earth:The First NRO Photoreconnaissance Eye in Space, 1997.

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