Questionnaire D 10

# BW LY I. Verification (Part 1)

The panel (N = 19) gave the following responses to the question, "Do you think that it is possible for the United States to monitor the development, production, or stockpiling of microbial agents in another country? YES NOT ANSWERED NO Development: 5 11 3 Production: 3 Stockpiling: Your response to this question was: Development: No Production: Answered Stockpiling: Answered

following reasonable measures were specified by the panel as The a means to monitor development, production, or stockpiling of microbial agents in another country. Please place an "x" in the space provided to indicate your judgment of the effectiveness of the measure for monitoring development, production or stockpiling.

Note: E = effective, NE = not effective, ? = do not know.

		EFFECTIVENESS OF MEASURE FOR MONITO DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION STOCKPI									
MEASU	RES	E	NE	?	Е	NE	?	Е	NE	?	
(internation)	spections ational teams, e, & on demand)										
	gence gathering		/					/			
	ing of research										
<ul><li>d) defector</li></ul>											
to detec	g (technical means ct microorganisms)		1			/					
f) self-ins										~	
g) internat	tional cooperation										

Please reconsider and respond to the question: "Do you think that is possible for the United States to monitor the development, production, or stockpiling of microbial agents in another country?

Development? Yes No 🗸

Production? Yes\_\_\_No\_\_

Stockpiling?

Comments about this page:

"Sufficient to wound confidence in compliance mode cumut plisted conditioned..." approximates my answer.

If USSR were more forth coming, my answer would shipt.

(? = some use but limited.

## Ia. Verification (Part 2)

	Th	ne j	par	nel	(N	=	19)	gav	/e	the	foll	owir	ıg	respon	ses	to	the	question:
Do	you	thir	ak	it	is	po	ssik	ole	to	mor	itor	an	in	cident	of	BW	use?	?

YES: 14

NO: 4

NOT ANSWERED: 1

Your response to this question was  $\frac{\sqrt{e_5}}{}$ .

The following reasonable measures were specified by the panel as a means to monitor an incident of BW use. Please place an "x" in the space provided to indicate your judgment of the effectiveness of the measure for monitoring BW use. Please indicate if you believe the measure would be effective for monitoring small scale and large scale use of BW.

Note: E = effective, NE = not effective, ? = do not know.

	EFFECTIVENESS OF MEASURES FOR MONITORING BW USE								
	SMALL	SCALE	USE	LARGE SCALE USE					
MEASURES	E	NE	?	E	NE	?			
a) epidemiologic investigations									
<ul><li>b) medical examination of casualties</li></ul>				/					
<pre>c) site inspections d) sampling (technical   means to detect organism   at a site)</pre>	s								
e) analysis of organism and "vehicle"	~								
f) international committee g) intelligence gathering									
h) international inspection teams									

Please reconsider and respond to the question: Do you think it is possible to monitor an incident of BW use? Yes No\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Comments about this page:

IF we had fue access to sugriconio sites!

## II. Secrecy (Part 1)

	The	issue	of se	crecy in	1 BW	research	h in	the	United	State	s arose
from	the	first	quest	ionnaire	· •	When you	ı anı	swer	questi	ons	In this
surve	y reg	arding	secre	cy in BV	i re	search,	are	you	assumir	iga)	the U.S.
does	cond	uct s	ecret :	BW resea	rch	, or b)	the	U.S.	does	not	conduct
secre	t BW	resear	ch? D	oes		Does	not		<u>/</u> .	•	

The following statements were made by panelists in the first round questionnaire. Please indicate (by placing an "x" in the space provided) if you agree or disagree with each statement.

		AGREE	DISAGREE
1.	There is no secret research on BW in the U.S	~	
2.	Secrecy may increase the potential for violations of the 1972 BW Convention.	~	
3.	Secrecy may increase the potential for violations of the 1972 BW Convention in other countries but not the U.S	~	
1.	Secrecy is probably perceived by the Soviets as necessary for national security.	~	
•	Secrecy is not necessary for U.S. national security.	/	
•	Secrecy is necessary only for offensive, not defensive research.		
7.	The U.S.S.R. will not comply with plans for increased exchanges of information on BW.	WAITE	Nt to c
•	The U.S. Department of Defense does not sponsor any secret BW research.		
•	In the U.S., it is the right of microbiologists to conduct secret research, if they so choose. (It won I not of least of	/	
ø.	It is reasonable to expect microbiologists to "avoid" secret research, but not realistic.		
1.	Secrecy in defensive BW work is not justified.		
	Secrecy excludes the opportunity for critical scientific review by the scientific community.		
3.	High quality peer review is still possible within secrecy restrictions.	-	

secret BW OFFENSIVE Resemble in Violeting of truty.

i.e., other than reported to Engress. Some defension resumb.

15 classified and so reported,

II. Secrecy (Part	2	)
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II.	Secrecy	y (Part 2)	)						
	st rour	response nd questi Please i	lonnaire	are indic	cated aft	er each	of the	follow	ing
		he previou						.0010115	, 411

YOU	ELISTS RESI R ROUND 1 F R ROUND 2 F	RESPONSE:	Yes: 3 Yes Yes	No: 6 No	Not Answered: 10 Not AnsweredX
5. Do yo		is reasonal			iologists to "avoid" or your answer.
YOU	R ROUND 1 I	PONSES: RESPONSE: RESPONSE:	Yes		Not Answered: 2 Not Answered X
1) sh will	aring of Buublication	W information of BW resetly decrease	on, 2) scie earch. Do y e secrecy in	entist ex you think n BW resea	
YOU		PONSES: RESPONSE: RESPONSE:		No: 2 No	Not Answered: 8 Not Answered X
3. Do y secur		secrecy in	BW research	n is nece	essary for national
YOU	R ROUND 1	PONSES: RESPONSE: RESPONSE:	Yes Nes		Not Answered: 1 Not Answered
	ou think so BW Conve		eases the po	otential :	for violations of the
YOU	R ROUND 1	PONSES: RESPONSE: RESPONSE:	Yes You		Not Answered: 1 Not Answered
signi	ficantly	adverse ef	cy surround fect on the	ing some e qualit	BW research has a y of the research?

#### III. BW Research

The following key elements were suggested by the panel in the round 1 questionnaire to DISTINGUISH offensive BW research from defensive BW research. The elements listed here may or may not be measurable. Please indicate (by placing an "x" in the space provided) if you believe the element is effective or not effective for distinguishing offensive from defensive BW research, and if you believe the element is measurable or not measurable.

### INSTRUCTIONS:

CHOOSE ONE: (E) - Effective for distinguishing offensive from

defensive BW research

(NE) - Not effective for distinguishing offensive but on site

from defensive BW research

CHOOSE ONE: (M) - Measurable (can be observed externally)

(NM) - Not measurable

	KEY ELEMENTS	CHOOSE	ONE	Сноо	SE ONE
		E	NE	М	NM
1.	Research design criteria				
2.	Extremes of research				
3.	Purpose in the mind of researcher				
4.	Observation that BW agents have been made into weapons (ie. placed into delivery systems)	/			
5.	Evidence that research is to protect against BW			/	
6.	Evidence that research is to produce vaccines				
7.	Quantity of BW agents		I		
8.	Form of BW agents	~			
9.	Evidence that research is to increase virulence and length of survival of organisms	/		~	
10.	Evidence that research is designed to increase infectivity				
11.	The degree of secrecy involved				
12.	A committee using hindsight to determine the purpose of the research				
13.	A neutral third party to make a judgment to distinguish offensive from defensive BW research	W	no (5 rentro)?		
14.	An evaluation of the purpose of the research, after an incident of BW use			/	

PLEASE WRITE ANY COMMENTS ON THE BACK OF THIS PAGE.

# IV. Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful Purposes (Part 1)

The following examples of Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful Purposes were generated from the round 1 questionnaire. In the space provided, please indicate if you believe the example CLEARLY represents a prophylactic, protective or peaceful purpose. A CLEAR example would be a purpose that could not be construed as non-Prophylactic, non-protective or non-peaceful.

YES NO DO NO	T KNOW
2a. Epidemiologic or immunologic research.  3a. Any defensive measure except retaliation.  4a. Study of organisms that occur naturally.  5a. Working with organisms for the purpose of education  Research or development on:  1. Rapid detection systems  2. Vaccines  3. Drugs  4. Treatment  5. Protective devices  6. Physical protection  7. Antibiotics  8. Serum monoclonal antibodies  9. Counter agents  10. Shelters and decontamination methods  11. Detection and microbial identification systems  12. Blocking the entry of released	
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Il. Detection and microbial identification systems I2. Blocking the entry of released	ſ
identification systems  12. Blocking the entry of released	
12. Blocking the entry of released	1
organisms into target population	
organisms into target population	i
13. Industrial applications	
14. Food Production	
15. Assay systems	
16. Impeding an organisms spread	
17. Immunoaugmentative immunomodulation	
18. Defensive measures	
19. Nitrogen fixers for plants	<del></del>
20. Improving the health of a population	j
	1

PLEASE WRITE ANY COMMENTS ON THE BACK OF THIS PAGE.

# IV. Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful Purposes (Part 2)

Your response and the responses of the panel (N = 19) in the first round questionnaire are indicated after the following question. Please indicate how you would answer this same question in light of the previous page and the responses of the panel.

Do you believe that clarifying the concepts of "prophylactic, protective and peaceful purposes" would weaken or strengthen perceived strength of the 1972 BW Convention.

#### PANELISTS RESPONSES:

Strengthen: 9 Weaken: 1 Neither: 5 Not Answered: 4

Not Answered YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE:

YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE (Please check one):

Strengthen Weaken Neither

Comments about this page:

The convention 18 clear in authorizing all of the above.

#### V. BW and Recombinant DNA Technology (Part 1)

Your response and the responses of the panel (N = 19) in the first round questionnaire are indicated after each of the following questions. Several comments made by panelists regarding each question are listed. Please indicate how you would answer the same questions in light of these comments and the responses of the panel.

The following comments are based on responses of panelists.

- -Existing organisms are sufficient.
- -Recombinant DNA technology will increase the chance of BW being used in the future, especially if the engineered agent will weaken the enemy and not kill.
- -The inability to guarantee the safety of one's own personnel has been a disincentive to BW use in the past, therefore the availability of increased defenses against BW, provided by recombinant DNA technology, will increase the chance of BW being used in the future.
- -It is not necessarily a disadvantage that genetically engineered organisms do not survive well in the environment.

PLEASE RECONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND INDICATE YOUR SECOND ROUND RESPONSE IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.

1. Do you think that the capability of designing organisms to the specifications of military planners will increase the chance of BW being used in the future?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 10 No:6 Not Answered: 1 Do Not Know: 2
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes No Do Not Know

2. Do you think that the availability of increased defenses against BW, provided by recombinant DNA technology, will increase the chance of BW being used in the future?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 6 No: 10 Not Answered: 1 Do Not Know: 2
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE No Do Not Know
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No Do Not Know

3. Do you think BW agents produced by recombinant DNA technology offer any significant advantage over conventional agents in a conflict situation?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 9 No: 6 Not Answered: 1 Do Not Know: 3
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE No
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No Do Not Know

(Today)

V. Recombinant DNA Technology (Part 2)	
4a. Do you think that genetically altered organisms survive well i the environment?	n
PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 1 No: 10 Not Answered: 2 Do Not Know: 6 YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE No Do Not Know YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No Do Not Know	
4b. If you answered "no" in 4a. above, do you think this trait can be easily "overcome" by genetic selection? $(N = 18)$	е
PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 4 No: 6 Not Answered: 4 Do Not Know: YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE Yes YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No Do Not Know	4
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR OUESTIONS	