Administrative Actions 2004

1. Monica Lynn Smedley, D.P.M.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 1314 (January 08, 2004)

DEA issued an Order to Show Cause on May 5, 2003, as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked, but Respondent did not reply nor request a hearing. Respondent was licensed to practice podiatry in Tennessee. On November 14, 2002, the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners issued an Agreed Order, suspending Respondent’s podiatry license for a period of six months and placing her on one year's probation based on charges of violating the Board’s statutes governing the dispensing and/or prescribing of controlled substances. Specifically the Board found, among other things, that the Respondent prescribed Codeine and Butalbital after her podiatry license had expired and on an almost daily basis from January 31, 2002 through April 9, 2002, wrote prescriptions for and picked up Tylenol 4, a controlled substance, from various pharmacies in the Nashville area. These prescriptions were not dispensed, prescribed or otherwise distributed in the course of Respondent’s professional practice. As a condition for reinstatement of her license, Respondent was required by the Agreed Order to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and demonstrate to the Board that she was in compliance with any of the evaluator’s recommendations. However, the investigative file contains no evidence that the Respondent’s podiatry license has been reinstated

DEA does not have statutory authority to maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authorization to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked her registration based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

2. Brenda J. Lightfoote-Young, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 1311 (January 8, 2004)

DEA issued an Order to Show Cause on May 5, 2003, as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked, but Respondent did not reply nor request a hearing. On March 31, 2000, Respondent signed a Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order with the Medical Board of California revoking her medical certificate. However, the revocation was stayed and she was placed on five years probation under certain terms and conditions. The disciplinary order provided she was to enroll and participate in the Division of Medical Quality Diversion Program until it was determined that further treatment and rehabilitation were no longer necessary. Furthermore, the order provided that quitting the program without permission or being expelled for cause would constitute a violation of Respondent’s probation. During January 2001, Respondent refused to participate any further in the Diversion Program. Subsequently, a hearing was held and on December 5, 2002, the Board indefinitely revoked Respondent’s license to practice medicine in the State of California.

The investigative file contained no evidence that the Board's Decision had been stayed or that Respondent’s medical license had been reinstated. DEA does not have statutory authority to maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authorization to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked her registration based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

3. John F. Hildebrand, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 1310 (January 8, 2004)

On May 5, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause to Respondent as to why his DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not licensed to practice medicine in California, the state in which he was registered by the DEA. By his letter of June 30, 2003, Respondent waived his right to a hearing in this matter, but requested that DEA delay revoking his registration until an appeal of the state board's revocation of his medical license was adjudicated. The evidence reveals that the California Physicians and Surgeons Board revoked Respondent’s license on July 30, 2001, for engaging in sexual abuse/misconduct with a patient and gross negligence, in violation of California Business and Professions Code, sections 726 and 2234(b). Respondent obtained an ex parte temporary stay of the revocation so that the court could review the submitted documents. On September 20, 2001, the court lifted the stay and the Board's Revocation Order took effect. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

4. Marlou D. Davis, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 1307 (January 8, 2004)

On October 12, 2001, the DEA issued and Order to Show Cause to Respondent as to why his DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration was inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent timely requested a hearing. DEA’s initial Motion for Summary Disposition was denied and on July 24, 2002, it filed an Interlocutory Appeal.

The evidence revealed that on October 18, 2000, Respondent was arrested and charged at the state felony level with 14 counts of attempt to deliver a controlled substance and three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. On November 25, 2000, Respondent notified the Missouri Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug that he was moving his office/practice from his registered location in Bridgeton, Missouri to a new location in St. John, Missouri. Pursuant to Missouri law (19 CSR 30-1.030(1)(J), the state controlled substance registration of any person terminates when that person changes his/or her address as shown on the registration. Respondent has not obtained state authorization to handle controlled substances at the St. John location. Additionally, Respondent’s Missouri controlled substance registration had not been suspended or revoked by any authority in that state nor has such action been recommended.

While there is no dispute that the Respondent lacked state authorization to handle controlled substances the primary issue for resolution on interlocutory appeal was whether DEA has the authority to revoke a Certificate of Registration when the lack of state authorization arose by operation of law rather than adverse action. Citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsil, 47 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), the Deputy Administrator determined that administrative agencies have broad discretion in construing their own regulations and that it was clear from precedent that DEA "has broadly construed section 824(a)(3), and extended its provisions beyond situations involving adverse actions taken or initiated by state licensing authorities." DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. It was clear that Respondent was not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Missouri. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

5. Jong H. Bek, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 1304 (January 08, 2004)

On August 16, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension to why Respondent’s registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest, and that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Indiana, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent was personally served with the Order to Show cause and did not reply nor request a hearing.

The evidence indicated that Respondent repeatedly prescribed controlled substances to undercover law enforcement personnel without a legitimate medical purpose and was arrested on state felony murder charges after prescribing Xanax (a Schedule IV controlled substance) to two patients who subsequently overdosed on a combination of Xanax and heroin. Furthermore, on July 25, 2002, the Indiana Medical Board issued a 90-day emergency suspension of Respondent’s medical license. On October 24, 2002, Respondent and the Board entered into a Stipulation and Agreement to Extension of Summary Suspension, agreeing that the suspension would be extended until the criminal charges were resolved and the Board took final action on his license. The investigative file contained no evidence that the suspension order had been lifted nor that Respondent’s medical license had been reinstated. Therefore, Respondent was not authorized to practice medicine in the State of Indiana.

DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3). Because Respondent had no authority to handle controlled substances under state law, it was not necessary to determine whether Respondent’s registration was inconsistent with the public interest.

6. Annette Antonsson, M.D., Denial of Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 5579 (February 5, 2004)

On June 4, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s application for registration should not be denied on the grounds that she is not authorized to handle controlled substances in California, the State in which she applied to be registered. In her request for a hearing, Respondent admitted that she voluntarily surrendered her state license to practice medicine to the California Medical Board on May 24, 1999, and was currently not licensed in California. In lieu of filing a pre-hearing statement, the Government filed a request for Stay of Proceedings and Motion for Summary Disposition on the grounds that Respondent was without authorization to handle controlled substances in the State of California. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without State authority to handle controlled substances in the State in which she conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s motion for summary judgment on these grounds was granted, and DEA revoked her registration based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

7. Thomas G. Easter II, M.D.; Denial of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 5579 (February 5, 2004)

On August 29, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s application for registration should not be denied on the grounds that he had been convicted of a felony offense relating to controlled substances by the State of Texas; that he materially falsified his registration application; that his registration would not be in the public interest; and that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in Texas, the state in which he practices. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause or request a hearing.

The investigative file revealed that on April 23, 2001, Respondent pled guilty to an eight count indictment alleging violations of Texas Penal Code Sec. 481.129, Possession of Controlled Substance by Fraud, a Third Degree Felony. On May 24, 2001, the court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Respondent on 10 years Community Supervision. The Terms and Conditions of the probation stated Respondent was allowed to prescribe medications, if done under the supervision of another physician. However, the court's order specifically prohibited him from prescribing "scheduled narcotics.'' 

While Respondent holds a Texas medical license allowing him to prescribe, administer and dispense scheduled drugs, as of the date of this final order, there is no evidence that the Order of the District Court dated February 14, 2002, has been modified, revoked or otherwise terminated. The State court's order thus remains in full effect, prohibiting Dr. Easter from prescribing scheduled narcotic substances in Texas as a condition of his criminal probation. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without State authority to handle controlled substances in the State in which he conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s denied Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3). Furthermore, since Respondent had materially falsified his application for registration and was convicted of eight State felonies relating to the distribution or dispensing of controlled substances, denial of his application of registration was independently appropriate under 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)(1), 824(a)(2), and 824(a)(4).

8. Ernesto A. Cantu, M.D., Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 7014 (February 12, 2004)

On January 9, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would not be in the public interest and that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances by the State of Texas, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing.

The evidence revealed that Respondent entered into a financial relationship with Pill Box Pharmacy (Pill Box) to provide controlled substances and dangerous drugs to individuals in Texas and throughout the United States via the internet. Between January 1, 2000 and July 2001, Respondent issued "well over 10,000 prescriptions'' for controlled substances and dangerous drugs through Pill Box, without establishing a proper physician-patient relationship or performing a mental or physical exam. Furthermore, he was found to have issued a fictitious prescription for injectable Demerol, a Schedule II controlled substance, in the name of a patient that never received the prescription or the drug, giving the Board probable cause to believe that Respondent and/or his girlfriend were abusing Demerol. As a result the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners entered an order suspending Respondent’s license to practice medicine in that state for no less than one year or until such time as Respondent requests in writing to have the suspension stayed or lifted and personally appears before the Board to demonstrate his fitness to practice medicine. There is no evidence that his license to practice medicine in the State of Texas has been reinstated. 

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). In this instance, however, it was unnecessary for DEA to reach a conclusion on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

9. Donald W. Kreutzer, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 7015 (February 12, 2004)

On October 7, 2003 DEA, issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to practice medicine or handle controlled substances by the State of Missouri, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing.

On July 18, 2003, the Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts revoked Respondent’s license to practice medicine in the State of Missouri for a period of five years. The revocation was based in part on findings that Respondent had been convicted of fourteen felony counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance and one felony count of Public Aid Vendor Fraud. The investigative file contains no evidence that the Board's Order has been stayed or that Respondent’s medical license has been reinstated. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

10. Mark Wade, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 7018 (February 12, 2004)

On October 4, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration was inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent’s registered location is Memphis, Tennessee. By letter dated October 28, 2002, Respondent waived his right to a hearing in this matter. The investigative file revealed that from January 1, 2000 through June 12, 2001, Respondent authorized a total of approximately 21,199 prescriptions for an on-line pharmacy’s ("Pill Box") referral operation. Approximately 14,029 of those prescriptions were for brand name Schedule III controlled substances (including Lorcet, Lortab, Vicodin and Zydone) and other generic hydrocodone products. Another 1,113 of the prescriptions were for Valium. Respondent also performed paid consultations for three other Web-based pharmacies. DEA investigators found Respondent did not examine any of the patients to whom he prescribed controlled substances.

Additionally, on October 4, 2002, Respondent entered into a plea agreement in response to a criminal action in which he was listed as a defendant before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. As part of the agreement, he pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to dispense Schedule IV controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D)(2), by prescribing controlled substances for Pill Box’s Internet referral customers without any "face-to-face contact with these customers." Respondent admitted to receiving a sum in excess of $27,858.30 for illegally dispensing 42,750 dosage units of diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, and agreed to forfeit and surrender his DEA Certificate of Registration.

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) and 824(a)(4), and requires that the following factors be considered: (1) the recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board; (2) the applicant’s experience in dispensing or conducting research with respect to controlled substances; (3) the applicant’s conviction records under Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution or dispensing of controlled substances; (4) compliance with applicable State, Federal, and local laws relating to controlled substances; and (5) such other conduct which may threaten the public health or safety. Consequently, DEA found that Respondent’s unlawful authorization of controlled substance prescriptions for use by Internet customers and subsequent conviction directly related to factors two through five and revoked Respondent’s registration for being inconsistent with the public interest.

11. Rory Patrick Doyle, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 11655 (March 11, 2004)

On May 13, 2002, the State of Florida, Department of Health issued an Order of Emergency Suspension of Respondent’s medical license based in part on allegations that in 1994, 1995, and 2000, he committed improper acts with two minor female patients. Respondent’s conduct resulted in his being charged with one count of first degree felony, lewd and lascivious molestation of a child less than twelve years of age, and two counts of second degree felony, handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen as defined under Florida law. Respondent failed to appear for his criminal trial of these matters and attempts to locate him have been unsuccessful.

On July 31, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension as to why Respondent’s DEA registrations should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing. The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). In this instance, however, it was unnecessary for DEA to reach a conclusion on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. The State of Florida, Department of Health suspended Respondent’s medical license and therefore, he is not currently licensed to handle controlled substances in the state where he maintains a DEA registration. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

12. John A. Frenz, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 11657 (March 11, 2004)

On June 4, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to practice medicine or handle controlled substances by the State of Missouri, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing.

On February 13, 2002, Respondent voluntarily and unconditionally executed a Voluntary Surrender of his Mississippi State Medical License to the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure after being charged with dishonorable or unethical conduct likely to deceive, defraud or harm the public arising from patient claims of sexual misconduct. The Board accepted the surrender of Respondent’s license on February 21, 2002, and there is no evidence of a subsequent stay of the surrender or reinstatement of his license. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

13. Marvin L. Gibbs, Jr., M.D.; Revocation of Registration. 69 Fed. Reg. 11658 (March 11, 2004)

On July 28, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent waived his right to a hearing.

The evidence revealed that Respondent was an integral participant in Myprivatedoc, an Internet business which had contracted with him to prescribe narcotics and other controlled substances to requesters after reviewing on-line questionnaires. Initially he evaluated 10-15 customers per day and was paid $20 per consultation. No physical examinations were performed nor were attempts made to obtain the medical records from the treating physicians of these customers. After terminating his relationship with Myprivatedoc, Respondent began conducting similar consultations with Medsworldwide and was paid $70 per consult. By August 2001, Respondent started his own website (Expressmedcare.com), charging $100.00 to $125.00 per consult. During approximately a fourteen month period, Respondent prescribed 14,500 controlled substances prescriptions totaling over 1,018,000 dosage units. The controlled substances he prescribed included, but were not limited to: hydrocodone, benzodiazepine, Xanax, Vicodin, and codeine.

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). The factors to be considered include (1) the recommendation of the appropriate state licensing board or professional disciplinary authority; (2) the registrant’s experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled substances; (3) the respondent’s conviction record under State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled substances; (4) compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local law relating to controlled substances; and (5) other conduct which may threaten the public health or safety. After considering the totality of the investigative record, DEA found that the large amount of controlled medication prescribed by Respondent to customers without physical examination or adequate consideration of the possibilities for diversion related to factors two, four and five above. Consequently, DEA concluded that Respondent’s continued registration was inconsistent with the public interest, as the term is used in 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) and 824(a)(4).

14. Stephen J. Graham, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 11661 (March 11, 2004)

On June 25, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to practice medicine or handle controlled substances by the State of Idaho, the state in which he was registered by DEA and that his continued registration would not be in the public interest. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing. The evidence revealed Respondent was employed by Prescibus and during his employment there issued approximately five thousand prescriptions outside of the usual course of professional medical practice. Many of these prescriptions were for controlled substances. As a result, on June 6, 2003, Respondent entered into a Stipulation and Order with the Idaho Board of Medicine in which he agreed to surrender his Idaho medical and controlled substance licenses and to not practice medicine or write prescriptions in Idaho for a minimum of five years. The investigative file contained no evidence that the Stipulation and Order had been modified or lifted or that Respondent’s medical license had been reinstated or returned to him. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

15. James W. Phillips, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 11663 (March 11, 2004)

On June 25, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to practice medicine or handle controlled substances by the State of Florida, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing. On December 23, 2002, the State of Florida Medical Board revoked Respondent’s medical license based in part on findings that he engaged in malpractice with three plastic surgery patients, failed to submit necessary paperwork with the insurance company of a fourth patient, filed for bankruptcy and closed his office without notifying his patients or the Board, and failed to respond to his patients' requests for their medical records. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

16. Daniel A. Maynard, D.O.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 22563 (April 26, 2004)

On June 23, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to practice medicine or handle controlled substances by the State of Texas, the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing. The evidence reveals that on June 20, 2003, the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners temporarily suspended Respondent’s medical license based on findings that he ``exhibited a pattern of conduct involving improper non-therapeutic and medically unnecessary prescribing of narcotics, controlled substances and dangerous drugs to patients'' and that such conduct ``appears to have resulted in patient harm and is related to their deaths from apparent drug overdoses.'' Additionally, on June 20, 2003, the Texas Department of Public Safety revoked Respondent’s controlled substance registration. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

17. Alton E. Ingram, Jr., M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 22562 (April 26, 2004)

Respondent’s Florida state license to practice medicine was indefinitely suspended by the State of Florida Department of Health on September 11, 2002. DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked, and respondent requested a hearing. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s motion for summary judgment on these grounds was granted, and DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

18. Timothy Norray; Denial of Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 22564 (April 26, 2004)

On June 4, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why his pending DEA application for registration as a researcher should not be denied on the grounds that his continued registration would not be in the public interest. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on December 30, 2001, Respondent sought registration for Schedule I and II controlled substances in order to allow him to "train and handle Labrador Retrievers to detect narcotics in schools and business throughout the New York Area." However, Respondent was not certified as a dog trainer, has never worked for an organization that trains dogs, and lacked relevant experience in training canines for drug detection purposes. DEA investigation also revealed that Respondent planned to store the controlled substances in an unalarmed wooden structured garage which was detached from his main residence. Furthermore, the New York State Police provide canine detection services and have narcotics detection canines in sufficient numbers to service the community. The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to deny registration when the registration is not in the public interest. Since Respondent has failed to demonstrate a need for, or the ability to perform, the activity for which he seeks a registration to handle controlled substances and there are genuine security concerns with the manner in which he proposed to store them, DEA denied his application for registration as being inconsistent with the public interest.

19. Merlin E. Shuck, D.V.M.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 22566 (April 26, 2004)

On January 15, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why his pending DEA application for registration as a researcher should not be denied on the grounds that his continued registration would not be in the public interest. Although Respondent timely requested a hearing, his failure to file a Pre-hearing Statement resulted in a waiver or the right to a hearing.

The evidence revealed that on March 1, 1999, the State of Tennessee, Department of Health, Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners entered an order placing Respondent’s veterinary license on five years probation as a result of Respondent’s guilty plea to two counts of solicitation to commit aggravated kidnapping and one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder (for events taking place in 1983). Respondent had developed an obsession with a female employee and hired a "hit man" to help him murder her and her husband by lethal injection. A review of Respondent’s DEA renewal application of January 7, 2000, revealed he provided a "no" response when asked whether he ever had a state professional license placed on probation.

Additionally, it was found that Respondent stored and dispensed sodium pentobarbital, a Schedule II controlled substance, at a non-registered location in Tennessee.

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registrant materially falsifies an application and when continued registration is not in the public interest. In determining whether an individual’s registration is inconsistent with the public interest DEA will consider the factors set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). DEA found Respondent demonstrated conduct which reflects poor judgment and questionable character by his solicitation to commit murder and kidnapping. Respondent also demonstrated an unfamiliarity with, or refusal to abide by, controlled substances laws and regulation by distributing and storing sodium pentobarbital at an unregistered location. Consequently DEA revoked Respondent’s registration as inconsistent with the public interest and for materially falsifying his application. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 824(a)(1), and 823(a)(3).

20. Mark G. Stallman, M.D., Denial of Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 22569 (April 26, 2004)

On July 18, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why his DEA registration should not be revoked and his pending application for change of business address should not be denied, on the grounds that his continued registration would not be in the public interest and that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances by the State of Georgia the state in which he was registered by DEA. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause nor did he request a hearing.

The evidence indicates that on April 2, 2003, Respondent was convicted of eight felony counts of illegally dispensing a controlled substance in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, section 16-13-30(b). Subsequently, on June 2, 2003, the Composite Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Georgia indefinitely suspended Respondent’s medical license. The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration for felony convictions related to controlled substances and when registration is not in the public interest. In this instance, however, it was unnecessary for DEA to reach those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration and denied his pending application for change of registered location based on Respondent’s lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

21. Lewis B. Boone, M.D., Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 33664 (June 16, 2004)

On March 23, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why his DEA registration should not be revoked and his pending application for change of registered location should not be denied on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, his current place of registration, or Ohio, his proposed State of registration. Respondent requested a hearing in this matter.

On June 20, 2003, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Board of Medical Licensure indefinitely suspended Respondent’s authority to practice as a physician in the Commonwealth. Similarly, on August 14, 2002, the State Medical Board of Ohio permanently revoked Respondent’s license to practice medicine in that State. As a result, Respondent is not authorized to prescribe, dispense, administer, or otherwise handle controlled substances in Kentucky, the place of current DEA registration, or in Ohio, the location of proposed registration. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and denied his pending application for registration in Ohio based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances in either location. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

22. Deborah Y. Strauss, D.V.M., Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 33666 (June 16, 2004)

On August 1, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that she was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Iowa, the state of her DEA registration, and that her continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent requested a hearing in this matter.

On May 9, 2003, the Iowa Pharmacy Board issued an order suspending Respondent’s State controlled substance registration based on evidence that during a thirteen-month period, Respondent wrote 176 prescriptions for Demerol, a Schedule II controlled substance, purportedly for animal patients, but instead obtained for Respondent’s personal use. Additionally, the Board found that Respondent did not maintain the required records for dispensing controlled substances. The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when registration is not in the public interest. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). In this instance, however, it was unnecessary for DEA to reach those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked her registration based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

23. Miles J. Jones, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 40655 (July 6, 2004)

On August 11, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Missouri, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent requested a hearing in this matter.

On July 26, 2002, the North Dakota Board of Medical Examiners revoked the Respondent's medical license in that state, based in part upon information that the Respondent repeatedly wrote prescriptions for patients over the Internet without first examining the patient or obtaining appropriate patient information. In response to the revocation action of the North Dakota Board, on February 5, 2003, the Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disciplinary Order revoking Respondent's medical license and further ordering that he be prohibited from applying for reinstatement of his license "for two (2) years and one (1) day from the date of [the Missouri Board's] order.'' DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

24. Simon J. Trueblood, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 40656 (July 6, 2004)

On June 13, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Illinois, the state in which he intends to move his practice, and that his continued registration was inconsistent with the public interest.

On March 10, 1998, the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana ("Board") placed Respondent’s medical license on indefinite probation. As grounds for this action, the Board found that he had prescribed controlled substances to a number of members of his family. On February 22, 1999, Respondent entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DEA in lieu of the agency taking action to revoke his registration. On January 17, 2001, DEA investigators conducted an inspection of his office and found that he had violated the MOU and numerous controlled substances regulations by ordering controlled substances in violation of the MOU, maintaining controlled substances at an unregistered location, and failing to keep and submit to DEA records of the controlled substances that he dispensed and prescribed. On January 19, 2001, Respondent surrendered his DEA registration for his Indiana location, yet continued to write prescriptions for Schedule II (OxyContin, Percodan, Dilaudid, and methadone), Schedule III (Vicodin), and Schedule IV (Xanax and Ambien) controlled substances. The Board revoked Respondent’s Indiana medical license on May 30, 2001, and forbade him from reapplying for seven years. Respondent continued to write prescriptions for controlled substances.

Moreover, the investigative file revealed that Respondent’s Illinois controlled substance license expired on July 21, 1999, and is currently in "Non-Renewed" status. Although the Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, it is unnecessary for the DEA to reach its decision on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without State authority to handle controlled substances in the State in which he conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

25. Steven A. Barnes, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 51474 (August 19, 2004)

On September 16, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Texas, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent did not reply to the Order to Show Cause or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that, on April 5, 2002, the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners ("Board") and Respondent entered into an Agreed Order, restricting his practice of medicine for a period of five years. Respondent agreed to abstain from "the consumption of alcohol, dangerous drugs, or controlled substances in any form unless prescribed by another physician for legitimate and documented therapeutic purposes.'' However, on February 25, 2003, Respondent tested positive for cocaine from a head hair sample. Additionally the Board found that Respondent had a "negative dilute drug test on June 4, 2002 and October 2, 2002." As a result, on May 27, 2003, the Board suspended Respondent’s medical license. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

26. David A. Hoxie, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 51477 (August 19, 2004)

On August 21, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he materially falsified information on his DEA application and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. After a hearing on the merits, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration as inconsistent with the public interest.

The record indicated that the Respondent falsified two DEA applications and two State professional licensing applications, and was not forthright regarding his arrests or conviction in a discussion with a DEA investigator and in a subsequent letter to the agency. These findings were based in part on Respondent being charged, in August of 1983, with unlawful possession of PCP, a Schedule II controlled substance, the result of which was two years probation. Subsequently, Respondent answered "No" to a question of whether he had ever been arrested or convicted for a felony with respect to a controlled substance. Furthermore, Respondent violated California State law by unlawfully (1) being under the influence of controlled substances in the 1980's, including marijuana, (2) possessing PCP, (3) being under the influence of PCP, and (4) violating probation given as a result of these infractions. Although many of these incidents occurred more than two decades ago, Respondent repeatedly engaged in "dishonest conduct" and demonstrated "questionable candor" in subsequently providing false responses to questions for medical licensure in Ohio and Virginia and in renewing his DEA registration. After a hearing on the merits, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration as inconsistent with public interest and for materially falsifying his renewal of registration. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 824(a)(1) and 824(a)(4).

27. Gilbert C. Aragon, Jr., D.O.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58536 (September 30, 2004)

On January 5, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Texas, the state of his DEA registration; that he materially falsified his renewal application; and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent did not respond to the Order to Show Cause or request a hearing.

The evidence indicated that Respondent was arrested, charged and convicted with driving while intoxicated and illegal possession of dangerous and controlled substances. Additionally he was found to have written fictitious prescriptions in the names of family members. As a result, on May 15, 2002, Respondent entered in an Agreed Order with the Texas Board of Medical Examiners, suspending his medical license. Furthermore, during the pendency of the investigation, Respondent’s medical license became delinquent for non-payment and his Texas Department of Public Safety Controlled Substances Registration expired.

Although the Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke registration for a felony conviction related to controlled substances, when the registration is not in the public interest, and when the registrant materially falsifies his or her registration application, it is unnecessary for the DEA to reach its decision on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

28. Rodolfo D. Bernal, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58537 (September 30, 2004)

On December 8, 2003 DEA, issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Illinois, the state of his DEA registration, and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent did not respond to the Order to Show Cause or request a hearing.

On October 21, 2003, the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation indefinitely suspended Respondent’s certificate to practice medicine and handle controlled substances. The evidence revealed that Respondent ordered large quantities of Lortab (a Schedule III controlled substance), Xanax (Schedule IV controlled substance), and Ambien (a Schedule IV controlled substance) for his personal use and failed to keep proper records. When questioned by DEA investigators, Respondent admitted to ingesting Lortab during office hours and while engaging in the practice of medicine. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

29. Paramabaloth Edwin, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58540 (September 30, 2004)

On April 24, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent timely requested a hearing. The evidence revealed that in August of 2001, Respondent purchased excessive quantities of controlled substances and prescribed or sold controlled substances for non-therapeutic uses. In response, on April 17, 2003 the Illinois Department of Professional Regulations suspended Respondent’s state medical and controlled substances licenses.

Although the Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, it is unnecessary for the DEA to reach its decision on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

30. Saeed Saleh, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58546 (September 30, 2004)

On December 8, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Michigan, the state of his DEA registration, and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent did not respond to the Order to Show Cause or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on June 2, 2001, the State of Michigan, Department of Consumer and Industry Services, Board of Medicine Disciplinary Subcommittee suspended Respondent’s medical license based on a finding that he suffered from "a mental or physical inability reasonably related to and adversely affecting [his] ability to practice medicine in a safe and competent manner." DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

31. Anne C. Mason, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58544 (September 30, 2004)

On March 2, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that she was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Alabama, the state of her DEA registration. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on January 30, 2003, Respondent’s Alabama medical license was revoked by operation of law for failure to renew. Furthermore, the Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama denied Respondent’s application for reinstatement based, in part, on finding that she suffered from "opiate abuse and major depression." DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

32. David C. Phillips, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58545 (September 30, 2004)

On December 17, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Ohio, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on September 17, 2001, Respondent voluntarily surrendered his medical license to the Ohio State Medical Board. Additionally, on January 24, 2002, the Michigan Board of Medicine Disciplinary Subcommittee suspended Respondent’s medical license for inappropriate behavior with patients. By Consent Order dated August 21, 2002, the Michigan Board dissolved the summary suspension of January 24, 2002. The parties further agreed however, that Respondent’s state medical license would be suspended for a period of three years. DEA therefore discovered that Respondent is not licensed to practice medicine in either state. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

33. Sheldon Kantor, D.P.M.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58541 (September 30, 2004)

On March 28, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. The Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension were issued based on evidence that Respondent purchased large quantities of Schedule III and IV controlled substances, failed to maintain proper records of controlled substances, and refused to consent to an inspection by DEA investigators. Additionally, Respondent had been convicted in federal court for his involvement in a scheme to defraud Medicare for over one million dollars. Over a seven month period, Respondent distributed 19,200 dosage units of hydrocodone and four prescriptions of OxyContin to a single patient.

Subsequent to the issuing of the Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension, the State of Florida, Board of Podiatric Medicine permanently revoked Respondent’s license to practice podiatry. Although the Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke registration for a felony conviction related to controlled substances and when the registration is not in the public interest, in this instance the DEA does not have to reach a decision on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

34. Gabriel Sagun Orzame, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 58959 (October 1, 2004)

On October 7, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Michigan, the state of his DEA registration. The evidence revealed that on November 17, 2002, the State of Michigan, Department of Consumer and Industry Safety, Board of Medicine revoked Respondent’s medical license based upon his conviction for altered records and prescribing controlled substances for purposes other than a legitimate medical purpose. While the Respondent maintained a valid medical license in the State of New York, his DEA registration was for his Michigan practice. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she is registered with DEA. After a hearing on the merits, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

35. Kathy A. Morall, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 59956 (October 6, 2004)

The investigative file revealed that Respondent committed numerous violations of the Controlled Substances Act including, but not limited to: (1) failure to maintain a record of her return of Schedule IV controlled substances to a supplier, as required by 21 C.F.R. 1307.12; (2) failure to obtain a DEA registration for a location prior to dispensing controlled substances from that location, as required by 21 C.F.R. 1301.11 and 1301.12; (3) failure to store Schedule IV controlled substances in a securely locked, substantially constructed cabinet at her former registered location at 128 Steele Street, Suite 202, as well as the modified registered location at South Marion Way, as required by 21 C.F.R. 1301.75(a); (4) failure to maintain complete and accurate records with respect to the receipt and dispensing of controlled substances, as required by 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(3), and 21 C.F.R. 1304.03, 1304.04 and 1304.21(a) (these statutory provisions are further relevant to Respondent's failure to account for between 7,000 to over 11,000 dosage units of, phentermine, Redux, and Pondimin, all Schedule IV controlled substances); (5) failure to take an initial inventory of controlled substances on hand on the date she engaged in the dispensing of controlled substances as required by 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(1) and 21 C.F.R. 1304.11; and (6) failure to maintain inventories and records of controlled substances, either separately from all other records, and in a readily retrievable fashion, as required by 21 C.F.R. 1304.04(f)(2) and (g). 

Moreover, Respondent repeatedly made false statements regarding the transfer of drugs, the possession of controlled substances in her house, the existence of a safe in her house in which to store controlled substances, the treatment of patients from her house, the maintenance of patient records at her office, and the true identity of a friend for whom she had written prescriptions for controlled substances.

On September 28, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that her continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest based on factors including, but not limited to: the registrant’s experience in dispensing or conducting research with respect to controlled substances; compliance with applicable State, Federal, and local laws relating to controlled substances; and other conduct which may threaten the public health or safety. Although, DEA did not necessarily find that these controlled substances were diverted, the lack of proper documentation to account for the shortage of large quantities of drugs; the Respondent's admission to the use of phentermine; her demonstrated lack of candor; and empty drug vials around her home of which she was unable to account for their origins or disposition, all suggested possible drug use on the Respondent's part, or by someone close to her. Consequently, DEA revoked her registration as being inconsistent with the public interest. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(4).

36. Michael J. Schwartz, MD.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 59960 (October 6, 2004)

On January 5, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on July 30, 2003, the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners suspended Respondent’s state medical license. However the underlying basis for the suspension was not specified. Subsequently, on August 4, 2003, DEA received information that the Louisiana State Department of Health and Hospitals suspended Respondent’s State Controlled Dangerous Substance License. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she is registered with DEA. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration and denied his application for renewal and modification based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

37. Roland F. Chalifoux, Jr., D.O.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62080 (October 22, 2004)

On April 9, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Texas, the state of his DEA registration. The evidence revealed that on July 19, 2002, the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners temporarily suspended Respondent’s state medical license. Subsequently, on March 20, 2003, the Texas Department of Public Safety revoked Respondent’s state controlled substances registration. While Respondent argued that he was licensed to practice medicine in jurisdictions other than Texas, there is no evidence that he has applied for or been granted a reinstatement of his Texas controlled substance or medical license, the only state where he holds a DEA registration. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she is registered with DEA. After a hearing on the merits, DEA’s motion for summary judgment was granted and Respondent’s registration was revoked based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

38. Imran I. Chaudry, M.D.; Revocation and Denial of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62081 (October 22, 2004)

On February 6, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked and his pending request for renewal and modification should not be denied on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. The evidence reveals that on April 24, 2001, Respondent was arrested after purchasing fourteen grams of methamphetamine and charged with possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Upon arrest, Respondent admitted that he had unlawfully used methamphetamine three to four times in the preceding six month and that he had previously distributed it to a fellow local physician. However, there was no evidence in the record whether Respondent was ever tried or convicted for the charges. Shortly after his arrest, Respondent checked into the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center and entered into a monitoring contract with the Physician’s Health Program ("PHP") to determine whether he had developed a chemical dependency. According to the PHP, since 2001, Respondent passed all random drug screening and demonstrated continued avoidance of substance abuse.

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the registration is not in the public interest, 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) and 824(a)(4), and requires that the following factors be considered: (1) the recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board; (2) the applicant’s experience in dispensing or conducting research with respect to controlled substances; (3) the applicant’s conviction records under Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution or dispensing of controlled substances; (4) compliance with applicable State, Federal, and local laws relating to controlled substances; and (5) such other conduct which may threaten the public health or safety. After a hearing on the merits, the DEA concluded that Respondent’s illicit purchase and use of methamphetamine were particularly serious acts of misconduct. Although the record demonstrates Respondent was not chemically dependent, it shows he exercised unhindered judgment to illegally obtain and use what he as a physician knew to be an insidiously dangerous controlled substance. This motivation to violate the law and risk his reputation and livelihood evidenced a cavalier and irresponsible attitude toward his responsibilities as a DEA registrant and could potentially put the public at risk. Furthermore, Respondent’s conduct was found to be more egregious because he intended to illicitly distribute the controlled substance to another physician. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration and denied his application for renewal and modification as being inconsistent with the public interest citing factors two, four and five. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(4).

39. Juan Pillot-Costas, M.D. Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62084 (October 22, 2004)

On February 20, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on that grounds that he has been mandatorily excluded from participating in Federal health programs. The evidence revealed that Respondent was convicted of conspiring to solicit and receive kickback in relation to Medicare referrals. As a result of the conviction, the Department of Health and Human Services excluded the Respondent from participating in the Medicare program for a five-year period. Exclusion from Medicare is an independent ground for revoking DEA registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). Accordingly, DEA revoked his registration.

40. John A. Cronk, D.O.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62085 (October 22, 2004)

On May 21, 2003, Respondent pled guilty to unlawfully possessing methamphetamine after DEA investigators recovered several vials containing residual amount of methamphetamine, forty-five tabs of methadone, two vials of testosterone, ninety-five tabs of alprazolam, thirty-six tabs of Ambien, eight tabs of Vicoprofen, six bottles of Lortab elixir, five bottles of Histex, six tabs of ecstasy, several marijuana cigarette butts and assorted drug paraphernalia from Respondent’s home. Additionally syringes with a brown liquid later determined to be methamphetamine were recovered from the trash of Respondent’s residence.

On January 5, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he had been convicted of a felony and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Subsequent to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause, Respondent entered into an Agreed Order with the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners whereby his license was suspended until he could demonstrate fitness to safely practice medicine. Despite findings of the Board regarding Respondent’s felony conviction with respect to the unlawful possession of controlled substances, and notwithstanding the other public interest factors for the revocation of his DEA registration, the most relevant consideration is respondent’s lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

41. Sarfraz Mirza, M.D. Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62091 (October 22, 2004)

On March 2, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Florida, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent timely requested a hearing. The evidence revealed that effective July 29, 2003, the State of Florida, Department of Health issued an Order of Emergency Suspension of License, indefinitely suspending Respondent’s license to practice medicine. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s motion for summary judgment on these grounds was granted, and DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

42. Richard Daniel Price, MD.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62092 (October 22, 2004)

On March 15, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Alabama, the state of his DEA registration. Acting pro se, Respondent timely requested a hearing. The evidence revealed that on March 31, 2003, the Alabama Medical Licensure Committee issued an order revoking Respondent’s license to practice medicine based on his conviction of a felony related to controlled substances. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s motion for summary judgment on these grounds was granted, and DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

43. Ivan D. Garcia-Ramirez, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62092 (October 22, 2004)

On August 11, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was convicted of a felony related to controlled substances and that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent timely requested a hearing but failed to file a pre-hearing statement, thereby waiving his right to a hearing.

Following an investigation by the DEA San Juan Field Office in conjunction with the Dutch Coast Guard, on June 16, 2002, Dutch authorities boarded the Sea Brave, a Puerto Rico vessel owned by Respondent. Upon searching the vessel, 549 grams of heroin were recovered from a hidden compartment in the cabin area and Respondent was immediately arrested. When questioned the next day, he admitted that he had been told at least nine kilograms of cocaine and six kilograms of heroin were placed on board the ship. However, another search revealed that someone had boarded the ship at night and removed these items.

On September 19, 2002, Respondent pled guilty to one felony count of Possession With Intent to Import Heroin. 21 U.S.C. 952(a). The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke registration for a felony conviction related to controlled substances and when the registration is not in the public interest. By his own admission, Respondent used his vessel to knowingly transport cocaine and heroin and attempted to conceal the drugs in a hidden compartment. After a hearing on the merits, DEA revoked Respondent’s registration for his felony conviction and found that the egregious nature of his conduct lead to the conclusion that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 824(a)(2), and 824(a)(4).

44. Daniel Ortiz-Vargas, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62095 (October 22, 2004)

On March 2, 2004, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on that grounds that he has been mandatorily excluded from participating in Federal health programs. Although Respondent requested a hearing, he failed to timely file a pre-hearing statement, thereby waived his right to a hearing. The evidence revealed that Respondent was convicted of conspiring to solicit and receive kickback in relation to Medicare referrals. As a result of the conviction, the Department of Health and Human Services excluded the Respondent from participating in the Medicare program for a five-year period. Exclusion from Medicare is and independent ground for revoking DEA registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). Accordingly, DEA revoked his registration.

45. Serge V. Verne, D.D.S. Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 62096 (October 22, 2004)

On October 3, 2003, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of California, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. The evidence revealed that on May 8, 2003, the Dental Board of California revoked Respondent’s license based upon findings that he provided false and misleading information regarding his continuing education and his use of fraud in his procurement of his dental license and general anesthesia permit. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

46. Nilvio R. Aquino, M.D. Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 67760 (November 19, 2004)

On February 25, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that he was not authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Florida, the state of his DEA registration. Respondent did not reply or request a hearing. In 1998, Respondent was indicted on Federal charges involving inappropriate billing of the Medicare program. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a 51-month term of incarceration. On June 20, 2001, as a result of this conviction, the Florida Board of Medicine revoked Respondent’s medical license. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA revoked his registration based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

47. Deborah Bordeaux, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 69399 (November 29, 2004)

On June 8, 2001, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be revoked on the grounds that her continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension alleged that during February 2000 though February 2001, Respondent routinely and continually prescribed controlled substances, including Oxycontin, Lortab and Lorcet, to patients without adequate medical testing, validation of patients' complaints or consideration of more appropriate alternative treatments. Respondent timely requested a hearing.

The evidence revealed that that on February 10, 2003, Respondent had been convicted for Conspiracy to Unlawfully Distribute Controlled Substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In response to the conviction, the State Board of Medical Examiners of South Carolina issued an Order of Temporary Suspension of Respondent’s license to practice medicine in South Carolina and she was no longer authorized to handle controlled substances in the State in which she maintained her DEA registration. Although the Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke registration for a felony conviction related to controlled substances or when the registration is not in the public interest, it is unnecessary for the DEA to reach its decision on those grounds. DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he or she conducts business. Consequently, DEA’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and Respondent’s registration was revoked based on her lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

48. Dan E. Hale, D.O., Denial of Registration, 69 Fed. Reg. 69402 (November 29, 2004)

On March 21, 2002, DEA issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Respondent’s DEA registration should not be denied on the grounds that his continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest, he materially falsified his application for registration, and he was excluded from participating in Federal health care programs. Respondent timely requested a hearing.

The evidence revealed that on March 21, 1995, Respondent was convicted of 21 felony counts related to wrongful billing under Medicaid, Medicare and TennCare programs from 1980-1993. Respondent encouraged and allowed patients to undergo unnecessary diagnostics tests, so that he could defraud Federal health care providers. This scheme included providing clients with injections of controlled substances without any medical necessity. As a result, on June 20, 1995, Respondent surrendered his DEA Certificate of Registration and on January 26, 1996, the United States Department of Health and Human Services mandatorily excluded Respondent from participating in the Medicare program for fifteen years. Upon being released from incarceration, Respondent had his medical license reinstated and on June 19, 2001, he executed the application for DEA registration at issue. In his application, Respondent answered "no" to each of the standard liability questions asking about prior convictions or adverse action being taken against Federal or State licenses. When questioned by DEA investigators, Respondent claimed he had "simply forgotten he surrendered his previous DEA registration."

The Controlled Substances Act authorizes DEA to revoke a registration when the applicant has materially falsified his or her application (21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(1)); when the applicant has been excluded from a Federal health care program (21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(5); or when registration is not in the public interest (21 U.S.C. § 823(f)). After a hearing on the merits, DEA denied Respondent’s registration for materially falsifying his application and for being excluded from participating in Medicare for fifteen years, both of which constitute independent grounds for denial. Furthermore, he was convicted of charges that he provided controlled substances to drug abusers because those persons were willing to undergo unnecessary diagnostics tests. Consequently, DEA found that Respondent’s registration would be inconsistent with the public interest and denied his application for registration under 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f)(2), 823(f )(4), and 823(f )(5).