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DEA
Congressional Testimony
Statement
by:
Michael S.
Vigil
Special Agent in Charge
Caribbean Field Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before
the:
Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Date:
April 12,
2000
Note: This document
may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Mr. Chairman, Members
of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss
the issue of drug trafficking throughout the Caribbean and specifically,
Haiti. I would first like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued
support of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and overall support
of drug law enforcement.
As all of you are
aware, the international drug syndicates operating throughout our hemisphere
are resourceful, adaptable, and extremely powerful. These syndicates have
an unprecedented level of sophistication and are more powerful and influential
than any of the organized crime enterprises preceding them. Traditional
organized crime syndicates, operating within the United States over the
course of the last century, simply cannot compare to the Colombian and
Mexican drug trafficking organizations functioning in this hemisphere.
These drug trafficking organizations have at their disposal an arsenal
of technology, weapons and allies, corrupted law enforcement, and government
officials enabling them to dominate the illegal drug market in ways not
previously thought possible. The leaders of these drug trafficking organizations
oversee a multi-billion dollar cocaine and heroin industry that negatively
affects American life.
Trafficking
through the Caribbean to the United States:
The Caribbean has
long been an important transit zone for drugs entering the United States
and Europe from South America. The drugs are transported through the region,
to both the United States and Europe, through a wide variety of routes
and methods.
The primary method
for smuggling large quantities of cocaine through the Caribbean to the
United States is via maritime vessels. Go-fast boats (small launches with
powerful motors), bulk cargo freighters, and containerized cargo vessels
are the most common conveyances for moving large quantities of cocaine
through the region. Drug traffickers also routinely transport smaller
quantities of cocaine from Colombia to clandestine landing strips in the
Caribbean, using single or twin-engine aircraft. Traffickers also airdrop
cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles and/or maritime vessels.
Couriers transport
smaller quantities of cocaine on commercial flights from the Caribbean
to the United States. Couriers transport cocaine by concealing small multi-kilogram
quantities of cocaine on their person or in baggage. Couriers also transport
small quantities (up to one kilogram) of cocaine by ingesting the product.
Compared to cocaine,
heroin movement through the Caribbean is limited. Heroin is generally
not consumed in the Caribbean, but rather is transshipped to Puerto Rico
or the Continental United States. Almost all of the heroin transiting
the Caribbean originates in Colombia. Couriers generally transport kilogram
quantities of Colombian heroin on commercial flights from South America
to Puerto Rico or the Continental United States, concealing the heroin
on their person or in baggage. Couriers also transport smaller quantities
(up to one kilogram) of heroin by concealing the heroin through ingestion.
The couriers sometimes make one or two stops at various Caribbean islands
in an effort to mask their original point of departure from law enforcement.
Jamaica remains
the only significant Caribbean source country for marijuana destined to
the United States. Go-fast boats from Jamaica often transport multi-hundred
kilogram quantities of marijuana through Cuban and Bahamian waters to
Florida.
The Caribbean also
plays an important role in drug-related money laundering. Many Caribbean
countries have well-developed offshore banking systems and bank secrecy
laws that facilitate money laundering. In countries with less developed
banking systems, money is often moved through these countries in bulk
shipments of cash -- the ill-gotten proceeds of selling illicit drugs
in the United States. The ultimate destination of the currency and/or
assets is other Caribbean countries or South America.
Haiti:
Drug Trafficking Crossroads of the Caribbean:
Haiti is strategically
located in the central Caribbean, occupying the western half of the island
of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. At 27,750
square kilometers, the country is slightly larger than the state of Maryland.
With the Caribbean to the south, and the open Atlantic Ocean to the north,
Haiti is in an ideal position to facilitate the movement of cocaine and
heroin from Colombia to the U.S. DEA is represented on the Island of Hispaniola
by the Port-Au-Prince Country office in Haiti and the Santo Domingo Country
Office in the Dominican Republic.
The island of Hispaniola
is just under 430 miles from Colombia's most northern point, and easily
accessible by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilos
of cocaine. The two countries on the island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
share similar coastal features, facilitating intra-island boat traffic.
Just as is the case with the Dominican Republic, Haiti presents an ideal
location for the staging and transhipment of drugs. Furthermore, there
is effectively no border control between the two countries, allowing essentially
unimpeded traffic back and forth. In addition, there is no effective law
enforcement or judicial system in Haiti, so there are few legal impediments
to drug trafficking. Recently, DEA has significantly increased manpower
on Haiti (from one to seven Special Agents) and increased interdiction
efforts to counter air drops and identify freighter shipments. However,
recent statistics released by The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement
(IACM), in which the DEA participates, indicates that approximately 15
% of the cocaine entering the United States transits either Haiti or the
Dominican Republic.
Due to the numerous
uncontrolled points of entry and internal instability, vast amounts of
narcotics from South America arrive in Haiti after being transported across
the porous border with the Dominican Republic, and then shipped on to
Puerto Rico. Just 80 miles from the East Coast of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico
is easily accessible from Hispaniola by plane or boat. The key to the
drug trade in Puerto Rico is the island's U.S. Commonwealth status. Once
a shipment of cocaine, whether smuggled from Haiti or the Dominican Republic
by maritime, air, or commercial cargo, reaches Puerto Rico, it is unlikely
to be subjected to further United States Customs inspections en route
to the continental U.S.
Trafficking
Routes and Methods in Haiti:
Drug smuggling through
Haiti is aided by the country's long coastline, mountainous interior,
numerous uncontrolled airstrips, its 193-mile border with the Dominican
Republic, and its location in the Caribbean. Haiti's thriving contraband
trade, weak democratic institutions, and fledgling police force and judiciary
system, contribute to its utilization by drug traffickers as a transshipment
point.
As is the case throughout
much of the Caribbean, the primary method for smuggling cocaine into Haiti
is via maritime vessels. Traffickers also smuggle cocaine from Colombia
into Haiti via general aviation; either by airdrops at sea or by landing
at clandestine strips. Other common conveyances for smuggling cocaine
into Haiti include cargo freighters, containerized cargo vessels, fishing
vessels, and couriers on commercial aircraft.
As cocaine enters
Haiti, it is usually stored locally until it can be shipped to the United
States or other international markets. Cocaine is often smuggled out of
Haiti in containerized cargo or on bulk cargo freighters directly to Miami.
The cocaine shipments aboard cargo freighters are occasionally off-loaded
to smaller vessels prior to arrival in the Continental United States (CONUS).
Cocaine is also sometimes transferred overland from Haiti to the Dominican
Republic for further transshipment to Puerto Rico, the CONUS, Europe,
and Canada.
There are three primary
smuggling routes for cocaine through Haiti. The first brings cocaine from
Colombia into Haiti via general aviation conducting airdrops at sea. The
second route is from source countries, via Panama or Venezuela, by commercial
shipping. The third route is from source countries, via Panama or Venezuela,
in coastal vessels or fishing vessels.
The Toll
of the Drug Trade in Haiti:
As in most locales
where the cocaine trade flourishes, competition for control of the local
market has resulted in an escalation of drug-related crime and violence.
Tragically, as we have seen in Colombia, Mexico and the United States,
violence and corruption are attendant to the drug trade. Reports of drug
corruption are widespread and numerous. Haiti's long history of economic
and political instability has increased the attractiveness of the country
as a significant transit point. Furthermore, Haiti lacks a functioning
judicial system and a credible law enforcement element, making traffickers
feel safe from potential arrest and prosecution.
Since the inception
of the Haitian National Police (HNP) in 1996, limited progress has been
made. As presently configured, the HNP lacks logistical support and training,
a unified drug intelligence system, command and control capability, and
resources. Furthermore, several incidents have occurred which have further
destabilized the leadership and effectiveness of the HNP. Firstly, on
October 7, 1999, the Haitian Secretary of State for Public Security Robert
Manuel formally resigned and left Haiti with his family for Guatemala.
Following this, on October 8, 1999, an advisor to HNP Director Pierre
Denize and confidante of President Preval and former President Aristide
was assassinated. It was learned shortly after the assassination that
the advisor, Jean Lamy was the potential successor to Manuel. Finally,
during the evening of October 14, 1999, an assassination attempt was made
against Mario Andersol, head of the Judicial Police.
To further exacerbate
this tenuous condition, the Haitian judicial system lacks any meaningful
criminal code or drug laws. Prosecutions move at a snails pace and convictions
are almost nonexistent. Defendants are oftentimes detained without any
legitimate cause and a number are still incarcerated despite being granted
orders of release. As a result, a significant obstacle for the DEA is
the lack of a law enforcement entity capable of conducting investigations
and making arrests and seizures that will stand up to judicial scrutiny.
Haiti has, regrettably, made only the most tentative steps in the direction
of viable drug laws or effective law enforcement.
A Hemispheric
Law Enforcement Response:
With the assistance
of state and local partners domestically as well as counterparts in foreign
governments, DEA works to build cases against, and ultimately incarcerate,
the leaders of these sophisticated criminal syndicates as well as the
underlings they send to other countries. Over time, this strategy serves
to steadily degrade a criminal organization's ability to conduct business,
leaving it even more vulnerable to law enforcement strategies. Successful
cases against the leaders of international drug trafficking groups most
often originate from investigations being conducted in or having a nexus
to, the United States.
As such, in an attempt
to augment this strategy, DEA enhanced the Port-Au-Prince Country Office
(PAPCO) in August 1998, by increasing manpower and immediately deploying
six Special Agents. Presently, the office is staffed by one (1) Country
Attache, six (6) Special Agents (S/A) and one (1) Administrative Support
Specialist. In an attempt to further enhance and invigorate counterdrug
activities in Haiti, the PAPCO office has established an Airport Task
Force, a Street Enforcement/Interdiction Task Force and a Maritime Interdiction
Task Force. Each of the respective task force groups has developed an
area of expertise for both the DEA S/A's and HNP officers alike. Primarily,
the long term goal of each of these units is to target, then immobilize
major trafficking organizations through the arrest, prosecution and conviction
of its' principal members. In addition, each group attempts to maintain
and foster cooperative efforts with their HNP counterparts.
In Haiti, a viable
counterdrug strategy must incorporate an interdiction component that is
furnished critical, time sensitive intelligence. The vastness of the Caribbean
Corridor, combined with traffickers' use of sophisticated compartments
utilized in freighters, and the sheer volume and variety of commercial
cargo flowing through the Caribbean, make a meaningful interdiction program
almost completely dependent on quality intelligence.
As a result, the
Caribbean Field Division, in an attempt to diffuse this intelligence void,
created the UNICORN system (Unified Caribbean On-Line Regional Network).
With this system, participating Caribbean law enforcement agencies can
share photographs, data, and information concerning various targets, locations,
and groups involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. The Drug
Enforcement Administration loans the equipment to participating agencies
and provides training to host-nation counterparts, as well as installing
and implementing the system.
The UNICORN system
has already reaped tremendous benefits, as exhibited in the success of
Operations Columbus, Genesis, and most recently, Conquistador. These enforcement
operations, planned and coordinated by the Caribbean Field Division, have
severely disrupted drug trafficking organizations throughout the Caribbean
region. The first of these operations, dubbed Genesis, was a bi-national
initiative designed to foster cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Due to a mutual, long-standing mistrust, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic had never before coordinated anti-drug efforts. The second action,
titled Operation Columbus, was a multi-national operation, comprised of
fifteen nations and their respective law enforcement agencies. The final
initiative, the recently concluded Operation Conquistador, was a multi-national
regional operation designed to expand upon the successes realized in Operation
Columbus. The following is a brief synopsis of each operation:
Operation
Genesis:
In concept, Operation
Genesis was designed to foster and maintain cooperation between Haiti
and the Dominican Republic. This operation, which was conducted during
November 1998, resulted in 126 arrests throughout Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Prior to Operation Genesis, Haiti and the Dominican Republic
had never before coordinated their anti-drug efforts. However, the results
garnered through Operation Genesis will undoubtedly assist in improving
the ability to coordinate anti-drug efforts on the island of Hispañola.
The long-term objectives
for Operation Genesis were to promote the exchange of information between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, facilitate the integration and coordination
of Haitian and Dominican anti-drug efforts, establish a mechanism that
will support the counter-drug effort, develop institutional mentoring
and training, and disrupt drug trafficking operations that are being conducted
on the island of Hispañola.
The operation was
executed in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, using roadblocks at
strategic locations and border crossing points, interdiction operations
at the international airports and seaports, and United States Coast Guard
maritime interdiction along the southern coast of Hispañola.
Operation Genesis
resulted in unprecedented exchanges of law enforcement cooperation by
both the Dominican Republic and Haiti. As a result, the Haitian National
Police (HNP) assigned an officer and an analyst to the Dominican National
Drug Control Agency's (DNDC) Santo Domingo office, and four (4) more HNP
officers were stationed at Dominican border crossing points. DNDC officials,
on the other hand, were assigned to the HNP headquarters at Port-au-Prince,
as well as several Haitian border crossing points.
The exchange of information
was further expedited by the UNICORN system, which facilitated data base
checks of suspicious persons and vehicles that were stopped. The information
was sent to the Caribbean Field Division (CFD)/San Juan office where system
checks were performed. The information was then sent back to the HNP via
the UNICORN system.
Operation
Columbus:
Operation Columbus
was a multi-national regional effort involving the island nations of the
Caribbean, in addition to Colombia, Venezuela and Panama. The operation
focused on air, land, and maritime interdiction, eradication and clandestine
airstrip denial. DEA's Santo Domingo Country Office and Trinidad and Tobago
Country Office served as the northern and southern command posts. The
UNICORN system was used to facilitate the exchange of actionable intelligence.
Operation Columbus's principle objectives were:
- The development
of a cohesive/cooperative environment among source and transit countries,
- Disruption of
drug trafficking activities,
- The consolidation
of the counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean transit zone,
- The continued
development of a comprehensive regional strategy.
Operation Columbus
was planned and initiated by the CFD to severely impact the drug trafficking
activities in the Caribbean and source country areas. Columbus was implemented
through interdiction and eradication efforts, enforcement operations involving
the use of undercover agents, confidential sources, Title III intercepts,
and surveillance.
Operation
Conquistador:
Operation Conquistador
was a 17-day multinational drug enforcement operation involving 26 countries
of the Caribbean, Central and South America. The operation was simultaneously
launched on March 10, 2000, in Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis,
Antigua, Anguila, St. Martin, British Virgin Islands, Barbuda, Grenada,
Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Aruba, Curacao, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican
Republic, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The primary objective of
Operation Conquistador was to develop an effective regional strategy intended
to disrupt drug trafficking activities and criminal organizations operating
throughout the Caribbean.
Operation Conquistador's
main objectives were: 1) The development of a cohesive and cooperative
environment between source and transit countries; 2) The integration within
each country of all counterdrug entities; 3) The continued development
of a comprehensive regional strategy; 4) To facilitate the exchange of
information between the participating countries with the use of the Unified
Caribbean On-line Regional Network (UNICORN); 5) The mentoring and training
of counter-drug entities in host countries ; 6) To impact and disrupt
drug trafficking organizations in the Caribbean area and source countries.
Command and control
of the operation was executed from the DEA Caribbean Field Division in
San Juan, PR, with forward command posts in Trinidad & Tobago and
Dominican Republic. The U.S. Coast Guard provided expanded presence of
interdiction assets throughout the Caribbean and executed air and maritime
command and control of sea and airborne drug interdiction assets from
all countries. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) conducted
traces of all seized weapons. The operation concluded on March 26, 2000.
Although the arrests
and seizures in Operation Conquistador were extremely impressive, they,
however, were secondary to the cooperation and coordination among the
26 countries that participated in this endeavor. Despite limited resources
and infrastructure in many of the countries, all responded with notable
efforts and results. Throughout the duration of the operation, all participants
exchanged information with each other through the UNICORN system.
Conclusion:
The Road Ahead:
Haiti requires a
great deal of progress before they are able to effectively impede and
diminish drug trafficking. A working legislature is required to implement
counterdrug legislation. Conspiracy and asset forfeiture laws especially
deserve attention. The Haitian judicial system must be reformed and modernized
to uphold the rule of law.
Haitian law enforcement
requires extensive training and resources. The Haitian Coast Guard requires
more bases, especially on the south coast. Also, airport and port security
should be strengthened. Until such reform is undertaken, Haiti will continue
to be used as a significant transshipment point for illicit drugs.
Presently, the DEA
has an effective working relationship with key officials in the HNP, Judicial
Police, and other members in the Haitian government. With this in mind,
DEA will continue to aggressively address the trafficking threat in Haiti
and improve the ability of DEA personnel assigned to the island to confront
this threat. We will continue to plan U.S. law enforcement operations,
in conjunction with the HNP. These operations will include enhancing the
capabilities of drug units, investigating money laundering operations,
improving the HNP's drug interdiction capacity and providing the basic
framework for a drug intelligence system.
DEA will remain actively
engaged with our Haitian counterparts to develop a respectable, dedicated,
and corrupt free drug unit. Over time, trafficking organizations that
rise to prominence in Haiti can be effectively dismantled, provided the
Haitian National Police continue to progress and enhance their law enforcement
and judicial capabilities.
Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond
to any questions you or the members of the Sub-Committee may have.
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