Radiological Response:
Assessing Environmental and Clinical Laboratory Capabilities
Staff Report to Chairman Bart Gordon and
Subcommittee Chairman Brad Milller
By the Staff of the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
House Science and Technology Committee
October 25, 2007
Summary
To prepare the nation for potential catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks, the White House's Homeland Security Council has developed fifteen planning scenarios for use by Federal, State, and local homeland security officials in order to help them prepare for, respond to and effectively recover from these potential incidents. National Planning Scenario #11, developed under this inter-agency process, envisions the detonation of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" in a major downtown urban area. That scenario was just played out in a national counterterrorism exercise called TOPOFF, mandated by Congress and conducted every two years.
This year, TOPOFF IV (T4) took place from October 14-24, 2007. In the exercise, involving thousands of Federal, state and local officials and sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorists detonated an RDD in Guam, Portland, Oregon and Phoenix, Arizona. The exercise tested the handling and flow of operational and time-critical intelligence between agencies and the existing procedures and policies for domestic incident management of a major radiological event.
One of the key assumptions in National Planning Scenario #11 is that all potentially exposed individuals (an estimated 100,000 people, including 20,000 victims with detectible contamination) will be tested for radiological exposure and/or contamination and that a valid method exists for testing these clinical specimens. Yet today, validated methods to test clinical specimens in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the 13 highest priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario. For those isotopes for which "validated" methods do exist, screening 100,000 individual clinical specimens in the wake of a radiological attack could take more than four years to complete due to the current shortfall in radiochemistry laboratories, personnel and equipment. Environmental sampling could take as long as six years to complete given the current capacity and capabilities of the U.S. radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure.
The analytical requirements for responding to a potential radiological emergency are in stark contrast to the nation’s existing capabilities. This drastic shortfall in current radiochemistry laboratory capacity, capability and competency is magnified by bureaucratic inertia in addressing this critical issue and the lack of clear lines of authority and responsibility for responding to a radiological event. A 2005 Department of Homeland Security report on radiological response needs highlighted the potential public health implications of these weaknesses. "Individual dose assessment is essential for predicting the clinical severity, treatment, and survivability of exposed individuals and identifying those with minimal or no exposure," it said. But, despite the best efforts of many of the radiological experts in the trenches at agencies throughout the Federal Government the overall government effort to close these gaps has been slow, meek and cumbersome.
Read the full staff report »
