Comments on the International Regulation of Biotechnologies: 

Preserving hope and value

 

 

 

 

 

 

By

 

Paul R. Billings MD, PhD, FACP, FACMG

President and Chief Executive Officer

Cellpoint Diagnostics, Inc.

265 North Whisman Road

Mountain View, CA 94043

paul@cellpointdiagnostics.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade at a hearing entitled “Genetics and other Human Modification Technologies:  Sensible International Regulation or a New Kind of Arms Race” to be delivered on June 19, 2008 at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, DC

 


Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Royce, and other distinguished Subcommittee Members, I am Dr. Paul R. Billings, President and Chief Executive Officer of Cellpoint Diagnostics, Inc. a biotechnology company seeking to develop tests that will revolutionize the management of cancer worldwide.  Among other professional activities, I am also awaiting final appointment as a member of the HHS Secretary’s Committee on Genomics, Health and Society and am past Chair and President, now Director, of the Council for Responsible Genetics, the oldest biotechnology “watchdog” organization in the United States, based in Cambridge, MA.  I have supplied the Subcommittee with my current Short Biography and also a relevant publication I co-authored a few years ago in the LANCET on germline genomic modification.  I am honored at the invitation to testify before you today.

Science is a hopeful and creative human activity.  Scientific discovery while mostly incremental--building on previous work that is known and shared--is also serendipitous.  No one who knows the history of the discovery of penicillin can not take away two points:  luck is a great thing in science and success comes to those who are prepared.  It is crucial that scientific freedom, the ability to inquire broadly about the natural world and to create understanding about our vast experience in this amazingly varied universe, not be fettered unreasonably or unnecessarily.  In fact, we should cherish scientific freedom and look for ways to unleash science and scientists more.  Insights and advancements should be nurtured for a whole range of demanding human concerns.  Even reforms of our policy and law generating practices, to accommodate more easily and quickly  proven scientific facts, should occur; they are likely to yield a system that produces more rational and appropriate tenets and legislation than other historical systems we have applied over the course of human culture and history.  A good example of this is the evolving role of DNA identification methods in our system of investigation and criminal justice.  This method, a result of basic study of human DNA variation, is fostering revolutionary changes in how we conduct criminal investigations, allowing criminals who might have escaped prosecution to be brought to trial, and also revealing injustices committed by our less scientifically informed justice system in the past.  We are still learning how to balance these powerful methods and facts with other cherished principles of individuality, privacy, and freedom from unwarranted governmental suspicion or coercion.  We need to generate more examples of improvements in our varied lives through good science.

            What is good science?  Even more important the uniqueness of its discovery component is the rigor applied to the design of experiments, the critical view of the purported facts generated by applied methods, and the absolute necessity for independent and multiple verification of results by unconflicted researchers.   Openness, publication, sharing in professional settings, verification across labs, geographies and other sources of variability are all essential to good science and for the production of true and applicable scientific fact.  Any consideration of international scientific policy must first enforce values and principles that will enhance the production of good and reliable science; where the applications and limitations of scientific facts are sought and made known.

            What is possible, particularly in the biotechnologies?  As Niels Bohr, the famous physicist is said to have noted, “Forecasting, particularly about the future, is difficult”.  What can be said reliably is that the conduct of basic research in the human biotechnologies is now more common than ever before, is produced by more skilled and motivated scientists, and that its pace and accomplishments are dizzying.  The speed that we have accumulated basic knowledge about the components of our genes, cells and bodies, and then the creativity demonstrated in taking that core information and manipulating it (or the methods used to derive it) to produce more hypotheses, studies and hopefully insight and progress, are breathtaking.  Take for instance my current field of interest, circulating tumor cells (CTC).  We have known for centuries that cancer often killed people by spreading to distant sites in our bodies.  Even after the invention of anesthesia and aseptic surgical methods, with some people being cured by simple removal of their tumors and surgical recovery, many others succumbed eventually to distant recurrences.  We hypothesized, long ago, that the initial tumor spread via the blood stream and lymphatic system (and possibly by other yet to be discovered routes), seeding distant sites in the body.  But no methods for studying this imaginary phase in cancer human biology existed.  We now have such tools and these are beginning to reveal new facts in oncology.  In addition, the methods are being translated in to clinical tests that may disrupt current assessment paradigms and revolutionize cancer management.  We have discovered for instance that there is heterogeneity in the characteristics of CTC.  Some of the cells we can now identify may be cancer stem cells.  An ability to access those cells and deliver them for assessment may yield very significant advances in management and treatment.  The rapidity by which new methods are changing our views of cancer, and the speed that basic work is being verified and then translated in to clinical effort, would have been unimaginable even 10 years ago.

            Mass DNA sequencing of human genes and genomes;  isolating and studying stem cells; imaging, measuring and modifying aspects of human brain activity; accurately measuring and predicting complexity using the approaches of systems biology; and creating new solutions to biological or other problems with synthetic biology programs; these are all now possible projects of biotechnology inquiry and are underway.  As scientific methods for these and other programs are created, and mixed with rapidly evolving protocols in engineering (for instance, nanotechnologies), the potential to translate some of this basic science work in to attempts by scientists, physicians or other components of society (for instance the Raelians), to alter the human germline, engage in reproductive cloning, create animal/human chimeras or human/machine hybrids, or attempts to create new human subspecies with enhanced or curtailed traits for some instrumental purpose, may occur.  One of the byproducts of greater understanding and developments in engineering is that some approaches are very simple and thus might disseminate in society in unpredictable ways.  Eugenics in varying new guises, for instance, to protect national interests might be attempted.  Techniques that may provide benefit like those employed in prenatal and preimplantation clinical settings could be perverted towards some eugenic or instrumental aim.  For instance, the use of ultrasound during pregnancy has improved the health of many fetuses and mothers, while also resulting in the abortion of millions of female conceptions worldwide.  Despite this fact, success or even effectiveness of such programs on a significant scale is generally unlikely, but attempts may be made and intermediate but unfortunate outcomes could occur.  Even endorsement by powerful governmental elements of such programs is conceivable.  We must consider carefully how to lessen the probability of these occurrences and the resulting harms.

            How should we proceed to enhance scientific efforts that can benefit people around the world even in the face of risks for abuse and harms?  First, we must all agree that the biotechnologies have great value particularly as they produce insight in to individuals and illnesses.  For societies with a variable history of respect for individuals, and that includes our own, this will likely generate new power and respect for ALL individuals.  A good example of that result is the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 recently signed by President Bush.  Along with federal Civil Rights legislation, and protections for the disabled, that law continues to modernize and broaden our traditions of inclusion and acceptance of individuality and human difference.  Other societies, cultures and nations should take note as international bodies have.

            Scientists and scientific communities should be more transparent about how projects are created, funded and how individual scientific careers are motivated and incented.  Conflicts of interest, political coercion and other differences in international scientific cultures should be well known.  Harmonization with internationally accepted values ought to be attempted.

            When scientific facts and methods are translated in human societies, particularly powerful basic biotechnologies, multidisciplinary assessments and approaches to studies should occur.  It is a very interesting development that research groups comprised of basic and applied scientists, engineers, social scientists with historians and others are now common in many biotechnology investigational settings in the developed world.  This development may help curtail premature applications and point out more limitations of knowledge or potential for misuse.

            In balancing other human values with the goal of fostering scientific insight and progress, international policy and laws may be necessary to generate some uniformity (a baseline) and prohibit rogue behavior.  This should only be pursued after significant study by multiple broadly constituted bodies and determination of need (including that based on real risk not just precaution). Then recommended policies should seek narrow applications and provide flexibility in crafting (“sunsetting” of provisions) so as to accommodate new facts as they develop.  It should be clear that while prohibiting methods and applications may be necessary, individuals who are suffering may find relief delayed by these actions.  This is a harm too and should be minimized.

            Finally, as biotechnologies gain more momentum in discovery, development and delivery in our societies, and as we consider policies to control the inevitable ways these powerful insights will alter how we consider human life--the individual and our experiences, we should reemphasize in international policy two traditions that are already codified in the UN Charter and other global documents.  First, that citizen safety, whether those individuals are patients or research participants or in other ways engaged in applications of science is paramount.  Their knowledge and consent are required.  Our abilities to alter aspects of human life with biotechnologies need to be matched by powerful new ways to assess safety and optimize this crucial value.  Then after we assure our neighbors that scientific facts and applications are safe, we must then strive to deliver them with equity to ALL those who need or desire them.

            Mr. Chairman and members, only when science is allowed to be fully creative in an international environment of optimal individual safety and equitable delivery of needed progress, will the great potential of advances in biotechnology be realized. With broad and careful study, novel policy crafting, and a healthy sense of how limited scientific knowledge is, how unlikely bad translations are, along with a recommitment to all those in need and to better monitoring of harms--good international science policy and good science will arise.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I would be delighted to answer any questions I can.