The strategic framework agreement, if
agreed, is intended to replace the current U.N.-mandate under which U.S. and U.S.-led forces are responsible for
contributing to the security of Iraq. That mandate was specified in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004,
and many of the provisions of the Resolution will no doubt be revisited in the
negotiations on the strategic framework agreement. The Resolution:
! Most notably, authorized the U.S.-led
coalition to contribute to securing Iraq, a provision interpreted by
many observers as giving the coalition responsibility for security. Iraqi forces are “a principal partner” in
the U.S.-led coalition, and the relationship between U.S.
and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The U.S.-led coalition
retained the ability to take and hold prisoners.
! Endorsed the U.S. handover of sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government, an action that was completed on June 28, 2004, and
which, as endorsed by the Resolution, ended the state of formal
occupation. The Resolution also
reaffirmed the responsibilities of the sovereign interim government and
endorsed the proposed timetable to produce a fully elected Iraqi
government.
! On security issues, which are a main
focus of the hearing today, the Resolution reaffirmed the authorization in
Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003) for a multinational force under unified
(interpreted as U.S.)
command and that the presence of this force is at the request of the (then)
incoming Iraqi interim government. The
Resolution interpreted the “rights” of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq as
“[having] the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters
annexed to this resolution...so that the Iraqi people can implement freely and
without intimidation the timetable and program for the political process and
benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities.”
! The Resolution stipulated that the security
responsibilities of the U.S.-led coalition would include “building the
capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a program of
recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring.”
! Regarding the duration of the mandate, the
Resolution stipulated that the coalition’s
mandate would be reviewed “at the request of the government of Iraq or
twelve months from the date of this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the
mandate would expire (subject to renewal) when a permanent government is sworn
in at the end of 2005; and that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi
government so requests.” U.N. Security Council Resolution 1637 (November 11,
2005) and Resolution 1723 (November 28, 2006) each extended the coalition
military mandate for an additional year (now lasting until at least December
31, 2007), unless an earlier termination was “requested by the Iraqi
government.” The renewal resolutions
also required review of the mandate on June 15, 2006 and June 15, 2007,
respectively, and no adjustments were made at either of those reviews. Some U.S. law also applies. Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28, the FY2007
supplemental, says that the President shall redeploy U.S.
forces if asked to officially by Iraq’s government.
! The
Resolution deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces (Status of
Forces Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi government. A Status of Forces Agreement stipulates whose
authorities and courts deal with infractions by employees of the sending
country. U.S. military personnel, as well as
contractors, are now immune from Iraqi law under the U.N. mandate and a
separate CPA order (Order 17) issued on June 27, 2004, one day before the
handover of sovereignty. P.L. 109-289 (FY2007 DoD appropriations)
contains a provision that the Defense Department not agree to allow U.S. forces in Iraq to be subject to Iraqi
law. However, a draft law now pending
before Iraq’s Council of
Representatives would end that immunity for contractors; the law was drafted
because of the controversy surrounding the September 2007 incident at Nisoor Square in Baghdad involving the
Blackwater USA security company, in which 17 Iraqi civilians died.
Future of the Mandate
On December 10, 2007, with the
deadline for the mandate for the U.S.-led coalition set to expire by December
31, 2007 – and in line with the November 26 agreement between President Bush
and Prime Minister Maliki – the Iraqi government sent the United Nations
Security Council a letter supporting another one year extension of the
U.N. mandate. This one year extension is, according to U.S. and Iraqi
officials, intended as a “holding action” to keep the mandate in place until a
U.S.-Iraq bilateral agreement replaces it.
The
December 10 letter appeared to represent a determination by the Maliki
government to avoid any COR oversight or involvement in the decision. In April 2007, 144 members of the 275 seat body approved a
draft proposal letter circulated by the faction of Shiite Islamist cleric Moqtada
Al Sadr, to require the Iraqi government to seek parliamentary approval before
asking that the coalition military mandate be extended. The letter, which also asked that a future
extension of the mandate include a timetable for U.S.-led forces to withdraw
from Iraq, was reportedly handed to the office of the U.N. Assistance Mission
in Iraq (UNAMI) but was not formally considered by the U.N. Security Council, according to
several accounts. In June 2007, the
same voting majority in the COR approved a formal resolution to that effect,
and some argue that it became law because Iraq’s President, Jalal Talabani, of
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) faction, did not veto it. However, the United Nations referred to the
resolution in its October 15, 2007 report as a “non-binding resolution.” In requesting the rollover of the existing
U.N. mandate, Maliki argued that there is no requirement for COR approval
because the mandate represents a Security Council decision, not a treaty or agreement (which requires two-thirds
parliamentary approval). I will defer
to other witnesses as to how the Iraqi constitution addresses this
dispute.
Although the motion was supported by
Sunni and secular groups as discussed further below, it demonstrated the
growing power of the Sadr faction, which holds at least 30 seats in the COR, and
confirmed the split between Sadr and
Maliki. Sadr had supported Maliki’s
accession to the Prime Ministership in the May 2006 government formation
process – support that helped Maliki overcome the insistence of Maliki’s Da’wa Party superior, Ibrahim al-Jafari, to
remain as Prime Minister. Perhaps in return, Maliki had largely
shielded Sadr and his Mahdi Army (“Jaysh
al-Mahdi” JAM) militia from U.S.
combat operations in Baghdad. Much of the sectarian violence in 2006 was
attributed to the acts of the JAM against Sunni civilians, including efforts to
force them from their homes in mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.
In part because Maliki insisted during 2006 that U.S. forces not work against Sadr and the JAM, U.S. and Iraqi stabilization efforts in Baghdad in 2006 (“Operation Together Forward I and II)
were declared to be failures by the U.S. military. As a result, the 2007 U.S. “troop surge” was based partly on a pledge
by Maliki that the augmented U.S.
force in Baghdad
would be able to take action against the JAM without political
restrictions. That pledge, in the view
of many, contributed to the severing of the alliance between Sadr and Maliki
and to Sadr’s related September 2007 withdrawal from the broader Shiite
Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance”
(UIA). The UIA dominated both
the January and December 2005 elections and won 128 seats in the COR in the
December election.
It should be noted that not all
senior Sunnis insisted on parliamentary approval of the extension of the U.N.
mandate. The highest ranking Sunni in
the government is deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi, of the Sunni Consensus
Front bloc. He leads the largest party,
the Iraqi Islamic Party, within that bloc.
Hashimi, who has remained in government despite the pullout of his bloc
from government, is trying to play a brokering role in overall Sunni-Shiite
political reconciliation in Iraq. He supported the governmental decision to
request the extension of the U.N. mandate without conditions.
Issues for the Strategic Framework
Agreement
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari has
said the Iraqi government will submit for parliamentary approval a draft
strategic framework agreement with the United States. It would be difficult to argue,
constitutionally, that such an agreement does not require COR approval as
defined in the constitution. Gen.
Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, said in his
November 26 press briefing, cited above, that the Administration would likely
have dialogue with the U.S. congressional leaders on the framework agreement,
but that any agreement would not likely rise to the level of formal treaty that
would require Senate ratification. The
issues that will likely be controversial in the strategic framework agreement
include:
! A Status of Forces agreement. As noted above, the most significant
provisions of any SOFA are civil and criminal jurisdiction over the facilities
where U.S. personnel will be
based, as well as over U.S.
personnel, including security contractors.
The agreement might also address issues such as entry or exit into Iraq, tax liabilities, postal services, or
employment terms for Iraqi nationals working for the U.S. military.
! Freedom of action for U.S. military forces in Iraq, including rules of engagement
and status of prisoners taken. Under the
current U.N. mandate, U.S.
forces have the power to arrest and detain Iraqis perceived as threatening Iraq’s
security, and to hold them without charge.
A key issue in negotiations on the strategic framework agreement will
undoubtedly be the degree to which U.S.
forces in Iraq
must coordinate with or obtain Iraqi approval for specific combat
operations.
! U.S. Presence, Duration, and
Missions. According to General Douglas
Lute, Assistant to the President for
Iraq and Afghanistan, in his press briefing on November 26, 2007, the “size and
shape” of any long-term U.S. presence would be part of the negotiations on a
strategic framework agreement. He
denied that any agreement would specify time lines or goals for the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Iraq, but it might spell out the types of
missions to be performed by U.S.
forces and how many U.S.
troops might be required to perform those missions. Among the likely missions to be discussed
are continued U.S. combat against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and other insurgent
groups, as well as training the growing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that, by
all accounts, will not be ready to secure Iraq by themselves until at least
2009.
! Permanent Basing. The facilities used by U.S. forces in Iraq do not, by most assessments,
formally constitute “permanent bases.” Some of these facilities conceivably
could be made permanent U.S.
bases if there were a U.S.-Iraqi agreement to do so. Gen. Lute said that the negotiations on a
2008 bilateral agreement would discuss the issue of permanent bases. Major facilities that might be considered in
the strategic framework agreement include such well-developed facilities as
Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad air bases, as well as the arms depot at Taji; all
have been built up with U.S.
military construction funds in various appropriations.
! Some comments by Iraqi officials suggest that
permanent bases might not be included in a long term agreement. On December 12, 2007, Iraqi National
Security Adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubai said in a press interview in UAE that
“permanent forces or bases for any foreign forces is a red line that cannot be
accepted by any nationalist Iraq.” Some U.S.
law might constrain U.S.
options on the permanent bases issue, and might therefore further complicate negotiations. The Defense Appropriation for FY2007 (P.L.
109-289); the FY2007 supplemental appropriation, (P.L. 110-28); and the FY2008
Defense Appropriation (P.L. 110-116), and the conference report on a FY2008
defense authorization (H.R. 1585), contain provisions prohibiting the
establishment or the use of U.S.
funds to establish permanent military installations or bases in Iraq. These provisions comport with Recommendation
22 of the December 2006 “Iraq Study Group” report, which recommends that the
President should state that the United States
does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.
! Related Issues. The Administration release on the November
26, 2007 Declaration of Principles, cited above, states that the strategic
framework agreement would also include a “political,diplomatic, and cultural”
component, and a component dealing with economic affairs, in addition to the
security issues likely to be outlined, as discussed
above. In the economic section, the
Declaration commits the United States
to “[Support] the building of Iraq’s
economic institutions and infrastructure with the provision of financial and
technical assistance to train and develop competencies and capacities of vital
Iraqi institutions.” The section also
commits the Unite Sates to encourage foreign investment, particularly U.S. investment, into Iraq,
to help Iraq obtain debt
forgiveness and forgiveness of the compensation payments mandated by U.N.
resolutions following the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait,
and to support Iraq’s
efforts to obtain trade preferences and accession to the World Trade
Organization.
Politics of a Strategic Framework
Agreement
The same political dynamics that colored the reaction
in the COR to the Maliki request to renew the U.N. mandate are likely to
re-emerge if and when the two countries
agree to the broad bilateral strategic
agreement under discussion. Some
analysts describe the debate over renewing the mandate, and over a new
strategic framework, as pitting those favoring a strong central government
against those who support “federalism” – or strong powers for sectarian or
ethnically-based regions. The “battle
lines” of the debate are, in many ways, the same as those that characterize
ongoing debates over new national hydrocarbons laws and over a major bloc of
amendments to the constitution. In
addition, the negotiations on a strategic framework agreement, and depending on
how some key issues such as permanent basing are treated in any agreement, are
likely to harden the positions of those, inside and outside Iraq, who believe the United
States always intended a long-term occupation of Iraq as part of its effort to control Iraq’s natural
resources.
Generally, Sunni Arabs in the COR,
like most Sunnis in Iraq,
support a strong central government.
Sunni regions have few known major oil or gas deposits and will be
dependent indefinitely on the distribution of Iraq’s oil revenues by a central
government. The Sunnis in the COR
consist mainly of the Consensus Front bloc (44 seats) and the National Dialogue
Front (11 seats). They have sought
parliamentary review of mandate renewal; they are likely to insist on strict
conditions governing the U.S.
presence in any strategic framework agreement.
Some Sunnis outside the COR, including the hardline Muslim Scholars
Association (MSA), whose members have been widely accused of ties to the Sunni
insurgency, denounced the extension of the current mandate and will likely
oppose any U.S.-Iraqi bilateral agreement.
Many Sunnis, both within and outside the COR, have viewed U.S. forces as
an instrument wielded by the Shiite-dominated government and will want to limit
U.S. freedom of action, such as the ability to take prisoners.
On the other hand, there is a growing
body of Sunni leaders outside the COR that
might look more favorably on an
agreement that gives wide latitude to U.S. forces. These Sunnis are associated with the various
“Awakening Movements,” led mostly by tribal leaders, that began in Al Anbar
Province in 2006 and have now spread to other Sunni provinces. These Sunnis are united by opposition to
AQ-I and other extreme insurgent movements that have committed abuses against
other Sunni Iraqi citizens. These
movements have produced about 60,000 Sunni recruits, some of whom are former
insurgents, that are now working with U.S. forces to expel AQ-I from
their neighborhoods. These Sunnis view U.S. forces as
limiting the excesses of the Shiite-dominated government and the ISF, which
many Sunnis distrust. However, because
these Sunnis are not widely represented in the COR, their role in any review of
a strategic framework agreement will likely be limited.
Two important Shiite blocs have sided
with the Sunnis on issues concerning the mandate for U.S. forces – the
Sadr faction (30 seats) as discussed above, and another party called the
Fadilah (Virtue) Party (15 seats).
Both broke with the UIA bloc in 2007, and both generally represent
poorer Shiites, although they themselves are in competition in Basra
and other cities in southern Iraq. The Sadr faction’s views on the December
2007 mandate rollover were discussed above, but many experts also attribute the
Sadr views to its advocacy of Iraqi nationalism. Many Sadr supporters see U.S. troops in Iraq as occupiers rather than
liberators. In the view of many Sadr
supporters, a SOFA that allows U.S.
forces to remain essentially under U.S.
law, and extensive facilities housing U.S. forces would constitute an unacceptable
infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. Part
of the premise of the Sadr faction’s insistence on a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal is its ongoing battle with U.S. forces in Baghdad and elsewhere, as noted above. Sadr’s JAM is perhaps the largest Shiite
militia, with as many as 60,000 fighters throughout Iraq. Sadr might calculate that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq – or at least a limited
mandate to conduct operations against the JAM – would benefit Sadr politically
in his competition against other Shiite factions. Fadilah is politically strong in oil-rich Basra Province
because many of the security forces (Facilities Protection Service) that
protect the oil infrastructure are purportedly loyal to Fadilah. The governor of Basra Province,
Mohammad Waili, is a Fadilah member and successfully has resisted efforts by
Maliki and Maliki allies to replace him.
The purported fears of many Fadilah supporters are that an extensive,
long term U.S. presence
would help Maliki and its other Shiite allies - mainly the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) - to gain full and undisputed control of Iraq’s oil
infrastructure and revenues.
The bloc of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi opposes the unilateral
governmental mandate renewal but, by contrast to some of the other blocs, is
not anti-U.S. or anti-U.S. presence. The
bloc has 25 seats in the COR. Allawi is considered a staunch opponent of Maliki
and he has, by many accounts, been campaigning to organize a vote of no
confidence against Maliki. Allawi has
tended to support the United
States; the opposition of his bloc to the
mandate renewal might reflect Allawi’s efforts to obstruct Maliki on virtually
any issue where Allawi can do so. The
bloc pulled out of the cabinet in August
2007, joining the Consensus Front which pulled its ministers out in June 2007
and the Sadr bloc, which pulled out of the cabinet in April 2007.
On the other side of the political
equation in the COR are the blocs that support the Maliki government. These blocs – including Maliki’s Da’wa
Party, ISCI, Shiite independents within the UIA bloc (which now has about 83
seats, down from 128 before the Sadr and Fadilah defections) and the two main
Kurdish factions – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) – supported the governmental request to extend the U.N.
mandate and are likely to support extensive concessions to the United States in
any long-term bilateral agreement. Most
of these blocs tend to support the concept of federalism, primarily because
they consider themselves politically and financially stronger in their regions
than as part of a central government. At
the same time, together, these blocs are dominant in the central government,
and any agreement that keeps U.S.
troops in Iraq
helps preserve their grip on power.
These blocs are not as concerned with the perception that a bilateral
agreement with the United States
would erode Iraq’s
sense of sovereignty and national pride.
On the other hand, there are some divisions
among these blocs that could emerge in the strategic framework agreement
negotiations and on other issues. ISCI
supports a large Shiite region in southern Iraq, whereas the Da’wa Party
opposes that concept. In addition, ISCI
has a militia, the Badr Brigades, that has burrowed into the ISF, particularly
the National Police and other police forces.
A bilateral agreement with the United
States could therefore benefit ISCI more so than Da’wa,
since the U.S. forces would,
under such agreement, presumably remain in Iraq to train the ISF and thereby
strengthen ISCI. The Da’wa Party does
not have a militia force. It should be
noted that it is not the stated intent of U.S. policy to benefit any one
political faction in the effort to build up the national security forces.
The Kurds already exercise control
of their own legal region consisting of
Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces. They are the most supportive of the United States of all the sects and ethnicities
in Iraq. The Kurds, like many Shiites, see U.S. forces as
having liberated them from Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. All available data indicate that the Kurds
do not see U.S.
troops in Iraq as occupiers,
whereas many Shiites, who tend to identify with oppressed Palestinians and with
mostly Shiite Iran, which is at odds with the United
States, have come to see the United States this way.
