Thank you, Senator Cantwell, for calling this hearing to explore the future of the Coast Guard’s dive program.  As Ranking Member on this subcommittee, I am personally vested in the operations of this noble service, and I am pleased to be here today as we review the policies currently being developed to increase oversight of this inherently dangerous specialty of the service.

We are all aware of the tragic events that claimed the lives of two crew members of the Coast Guard ice-breaker Healy on August 17, 2006.  Before I continue with my statement, I would like to express my deepest condolences to the families of Lieutenant Jessica Hill and Petty Officer Steven Duque.  While it is inexcusable that such a tragedy had to occur to expose the cracks that have developed in the foundation of the Coast Guard’s dive program, in its aftermath, I pledge to do everything in my power to minimize the possibility of such an incident occurring again.

I would also like to thank Admirals Justice and Higgins for being here today to share with us how the Coast Guard plans to revise its dive training–both for divers and for shipboard command cadres–to ensure that future missions are treated with the same level of caution and gravity as are the Coast Guard’s other high-risk missions such as aviation and rescue swimming.  I extend my thanks as well to Admiral Tilloston for being here today to discuss how similar operations are handled in the Navy.

The Coast Guard has relied on divers to carry out elements of its missions since 1940, and until last August, had experienced only a single fatality, in 1974.  However, when the service was asked to take on additional homeland security responsibilities following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, its dive program grew from a total of five teams to seventeen.  There are clear risks inherent in expanding capability and building experience concurrently, which is what the Coast Guard was forced to do in this case.  Experience and oversight are complimentary, and as one dissipates, the other must increase.  Tragically, in the case of the Coast Guard diving specialty, this did not occur.  While the program expanded significantly, only one additional person was added in an oversight capacity.  Naturally, inspections and policy development fell behind mission execution.

I have served on this subcommittee for over twelve years, and during that time, I have developed an understanding for the culture under which the Coast Guard operates.  When issued a new task, no matter the magnitude, the immediate reaction of service men and women at all levels is a rousing “can do.”  What more is to be expected of an organization whose motto is semper paratus–always ready–and whose main responsibility is to deploy into the teeth of nature’s most furious storms.   Your service’s reluctance to shrink from any task is what makes it so valuable to our Nation.  So I understand how the Coast Guard could increase its dive force by more than three hundred percent and choose to allocate nearly all of that personnel increase to the front lines of our national security rather than hold some assets in reserve to ensure the safety of the divers. 

But just as we must protect our Nation’s shores, we must also protect those who serve.  The responsibility falls on a ship’s command cadre, the program managers, Coast Guard leadership, and ultimately, this Committee to ensure that the management and oversight is in place to keep an inexperienced but highly motivated young diver safe.