Remarks of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Gen. Michael
V. Hayden
at the Intelligence and National Security Alliance Dinner,
Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947
(as prepared for
delivery)
September 18, 2007
Thanks for inviting me to speak here
tonight. I admire all the good work INSA
does to inform the public on issues of intelligence and national security—and
on what CIA and other agencies are doing to protect the American people.
A better public understanding of the
foreign threats we face and of CIA’s role in meeting those challenges is vital to
my Agency. Ultimately, we work for our
fellow citizens, and—like anyone else—we want the boss to be comfortable with
what we do—in secrecy, but in their name. In a public setting, though, it’s difficult for us to clarify, explain,
or defend our actions in detail without potentially harming sources and methods.
That’s why INSA makes such a positive
difference in framing issues of critical importance to the safety of our
Republic. The value you add to the
public debate derives from your unique experience, insight, and judgment. And I can tell you that your efforts are very
much appreciated at CIA.
I was asked to speak tonight about the
National Security Act of 1947, which was enacted sixty years ago to the
day. On a personal and professional
level, it’s extremely significant to me—it created the two organizations I currently
represent: the Air Force and CIA. Today
is a double anniversary, so I’ve been invited to a lot more celebrations than
usual.
On Friday night, I attended an Air
Force birthday party at Ft.
Meade hosted by the 70th
Intelligence Wing. I know the 70th
very well—they’re a terrific group of Air Force SIGINTers attached to NSA,
another organization that’s very important to me. Not a direct creation of the National
Security Act, but a certainly a close descendant some five years later, in
1952.
On Saturday morning, we kicked off
CIA’s 60th anniversary celebration as part of our annual Family Day
out in Langley. Everyone knows CIA is a unique place, but
once in a while you see a stark reminder of what sets us apart.
If you were to visit this week and
drive past the North Lot, you’d see the usual
rows of compacts, sedans, and SUVs parked there—along with a very large A-12
OXCART reconnaissance aircraft. If OXCART
doesn’t ring a bell, you might be more familiar with the Air Force version, the
SR-71 Blackbird. Tomorrow we’re going to
host a reunion of the pilots, Lockheed Skunkworks guys, Air Force people, and
some of our Directorate of Science and Technology officers who had a hand in
creating the most remarkable plane built since the 1903 Wright Flyer.
Tonight, I’d like to talk about the Act
that set in motion a decades-long mobilization of America’s boundless
energy,
creativity, and technological prowess—all on behalf of our national
security. To this day, it defines how a democracy can
respond decisively to a serious, long-term, foreign threat, fulfill
global military
responsibilities previously attributed only to empires, and still
remain
faithful to its identity and principles. I’ll also talk a bit about how it’s evolved to meet our changing
threats,
and finish up with the important role our society must play in
sustaining that mobilization. Then I’ll be happy to take your
questions.
A couple of weeks ago, I had the
pleasure of addressing the Council on Foreign Relations up in New York. I talked about my Agency’s contributions to the war on terrorism, the extraordinary
work of our officers, and about CIA’s operating space…the space we’re given in
a free society to do our vital work.
I said that CIA operates only within the space defined by the policymakers we elect and
the laws our representatives pass. But
once the laws are passed and the boundaries set, the American people expect us
to use every inch we’re given to protect them.
The National Security
Act of 1947 was the big bang that created not only CIA and the rest of the modern
national security galaxy, but that initial pocket of space in which a civilian
intelligence service could function in peacetime. Our Agency’s founding was part of a huge decision
for this country—one that was not taken lightly.
Theodore White called 1947 the “Year
of Divergence.” It forms the clearest
divide between our past reluctance as a nation to engage in the affairs of great
powers, and our assumption of the responsibilities that come with being a
superpower. In 1947, thanks to the
vision of gifted leaders, America
made the tough decisions it had to. Those
actions might seem obvious or even easy in hindsight. But for a war-weary nation that longed to return
to something approaching pre-war normality, they were anything but.
The year saw groundbreaking foreign
policy initiatives that were decidedly activist in outlook. The Marshall Plan was a great and enduring
act of foresight and statecraft, and there were others that helped chart a bold
new course for our country. Foremost
among these was President Truman’s decision to assist Greece and Turkey against Communist
subversion. For our nation—and in
peacetime—it was an unprecedented intervention in European affairs.
From that point on, America
committed itself to project our strength—both soft power and hard power, to
borrow from Joseph Nye—not just as a last resort, but consistently and as a
matter of doctrine, to contain a dire threat to our interests and an affront to
our founding principles. We no longer
merely supported the cause of freedom—we championed it.
The National Security Act was the
legislative cornerstone that laid out how our government should organize itself
to deal with these new global responsibilities. It created a National Military Establishment—soon renamed the Department
of Defense—that could more effectively manage a military whose mission was no
longer confined to active war and preparations for it. It established a National Security Council
that would assist the President with the foreign threats that would now occupy
more of his attention. And it
recognized, for the first time in America’s history, that a central
intelligence agency—its staff civilian, its place in government central, and
its judgments free of departmental influence—was an essential component of
national security.
As visionary as the document was, its
directives—especially those regarding CIA—were necessarily incomplete and
largely a work in progress. At the
threshold of a new era, nobody had a good feel for the full scope of
authorities that would be needed—nor could they have.
And there was an acute understanding
of the stakes involved that encouraged a careful, deliberate approach. President Truman’s writings at the time show
that he was especially eager that no one ever be able to compare CIA to anything
remotely resembling the services of the fascists we had just defeated—or of the
Communists we faced. This Agency would
be a servant of democracy.
The Act set a trajectory that has
served my Agency and our nation well. It
created an intelligence service focused on external threats, bound by law, and
responsive to oversight. It also built a
sufficiently flexible structure that would allow our Republic to adapt to new
threats and new national security requirements as they emerged.
An early and critical modification of
CIA’s authorities was the addition, in June 1948, of covert action to the
Agency’s charter missions of espionage and analysis. I’d like to read an excerpt from National
Security Council Directive 10/2 that not only reflects a crucial milestone in
my Agency’s history, but conveys a sense of urgency and resolve that I think
resonates in our own era:
The
National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities
of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and
defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers,
has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security,
the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by
covert operations.
…It
therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency
for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for
them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency…under the overall
control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
That drive to adopt new tools to fight
new threats, to match capability to mission, and to organize ourselves for the
battle ahead in the most effective and efficient way, continues in our own
time. Since 9/11, we as a nation have
reorganized the Intelligence Community to better address the challenges we face
in the war on terrorism.
Most notably, we have sought to make
it more collaborative and cohesive by creating a Director of National
Intelligence with a total focus on managing our Community as a whole. But even as the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created our Community’s new architecture, it
gave CIA the decisive part to play in supporting the DNI model. For while our Community is no longer directed
from the seventh floor of our Headquarters Building—which gives me the time and
the freedom to devote myself entirely to CIA—no other agency has more
connective tissue to its colleagues than mine, which began building those
relationships in 1947, and has never stopped.
We still manage the core missions
originally assigned to us under the National Security Act. As the manager of HUMINT, the DNI Open
Source Center,
and covert action, CIA remains the leader in human intelligence. Our capabilities in all-source analysis,
science and technology—as well as our global infrastructure and reach—keep us
central to the work of the Intelligence Community. In coming years—perhaps as many as it took to
contain the Soviet threat—our chief mission will be to help prosecute a new form
of war, essentially an intelligence war, against al-Qa’ida and its affiliates
worldwide.
An imperative in this war—and the clearest
lesson learned in the wake of 9/11—is to better share intelligence both within
the Community and with the military and law enforcement agencies. The US Government has taken many steps to do
that, not just through legislation and Executive Order, but through the actions
of thousands of officers, who each day see the benefits of smart sharing across
organizational lines.
The Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, and again, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, were landmark acts of Congress that contained important
provisions for greater information sharing. No less than three Executive Orders have reinforced this effort. And at my Agency, our Strategic Intent places
a very high premium on improving the flow of intelligence with our colleagues
throughout government and with our foreign liaison partners—all while ensuring
that our sources and methods are secure.
Let me take a moment to underscore the
key role CIA’s liaison relationships play in the war on terrorism. Counterterrorism, by definition, requires a
team effort. Since 9/11, our global collaborative
campaign has thwarted a number of al-Qa‘ida and al-Qa‘ida affiliated
operations. I spoke first this morning
with counterparts in Denmark
and Germany,
congratulating them on recent successes.
CIA
has close partnerships with many services. That group includes our European allies, the Australians, and friends in
this hemisphere. Pakistan also
has been critical to global efforts against al-Qa’ida, rounding up a host of terrorists,
among them the mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. We are all aware of the challenge the tribal
areas pose. And we continue to work with
the Pakistanis to meet that challenge. But, while keeping our focus on what needs to be done, we cannot forget
what has been done. We have to build on
the successes we’ve had.
Our
Middle Eastern partners too have been central to targeting the group’s
operatives in the region. The Saudi
security forces have dismantled the al-Qa’ida leadership in that country, responsible
for a series of terrorist operations in recent years against Saudi and American
targets—including the December 2004 strike against the Consulate in
Jeddah. The Saudis are vital partners,
countering regional threats, working against terrorist financial networks, and
disrupting al-Qa’ida’s plotting against Western nations, including America. We appreciate the valor, hard work, and
dedication of the nations that stand with us in facing what truly is a global
threat.
As I said, we’re engaged in a long
fight. I fully expect further evolution
in the national security structure that came into being six decades ago. But some things can’t be ordered or
legislated into existence. Our free society
must respond to the requirements of this fight as it has done in others
throughout our history. And that
includes responses in industry, in academia, and elsewhere.
At the end of the day, we in government are a
reflection of the nation we serve. Our
country has the greatest universities in the world and the most accomplished
scholars. The types of graduates available
to CIA—and the skills and knowledge they possess—are determined by what we as a
society decide best meet our needs. Maybe “decide” is too strong a term for our market-based culture, but
the fact remains that the talent pool is set by forces larger than CIA’s recruitment
office.
We can see the various points when a national
emergency has roused our Republic to respond quickly by emphasizing certain research
and certain academic fields, and America has followed through with
the kind of intellectual firepower nobody else can match. But this time, so far at least, I don’t think
that we as a nation have shifted our weight enough.
Let’s consider the era that produced the
National Security Act. After the Soviets
tested their first nuclear device in 1949, and Paul Nitze drafted NSC-68 a year
later, any lingering doubt that we were locked into a long-term struggle with
the Soviet Union had vanished. Run the clock forward six years, and America’s
academic landscape is loaded with Soviet studies, Russian classes, and all the
other liberal arts and technical programs that fed our Cold War effort.
Well, it’s been six years since our national
epiphany. I don’t think we’ve come close
to matching the academic mobilization we saw in the fifties.
We need a lot more Americans fluent not just in
Arabic, but in Pashto, Urdu, Farsi, and a host of other hard languages. We need more experts in Islamic studies and
in Middle Eastern politics, culture, and society. Add South Asia,
too. That’s a tall order, and it’s going
to take time.
What I’m suggesting is that if we as a country
are really serious about this—if we as a people really believe we’re at war,
and, from my vantage point, we most certainly are—we have to act
accordingly. A big part of that effort
is to know that we’re engaged in what is primarily a war of ideas. This war requires us to better understand cultures
and societies that traditionally have not been as well represented as others in
our immigrant nation.
But accomplishing that level of
understanding—and the academic mobilization it requires—is well within our capacity
as a people, and absolutely critical to our security as a nation.
Thank you for the important contributions your alliance makes to that
national effort, and for all your good work on behalf of our Agency and the
Intelligence Community.
