PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAN FATA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
APRIL 23, 2008
“THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATO”
Mr.
Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:
thank you for inviting me to testify about Defense Department objectives
and plans following the April 2-4, 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
In the
months ahead, we will be working to move NATO forward in the four main areas
addressed by Heads of State and Government at Bucharest: Afghanistan,
Missile Defense in Europe, Defense
Capabilities, and Enlargement.
There is no
doubt that the number one issue for NATO today is the success of our
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At Bucharest,
Allies agreed that Euro-Atlantic and broader international security is tied to Afghanistan’s
stability and democratic future.
Allies also
agreed that ballistic missile proliferation is an increasing threat to Allies’
forces, territory, and populations; that missile defenses form part of a
broader response to counter the threat; that the planned deployment of U.S.
missile defense assets in Europe will substantially contribute to Allied
protection against that threat; and that the Alliance should develop options
for a “comprehensive missile defense architecture.”
NATO defense
ministers agreed to pursue all of Secretary Gates’ recommendations for
improving defense capabilities, including those related to multinational
arrangements such as the C-17 consortium and the NATO Alliance Ground
Surveillance system (AGS), using NATO common funding to help fill military
requirements for ongoing operations, and commitments to increase defense
spending and deployability targets.
Although the
UNITED STATES was disappointed that Allies could not reach a consensus on
offering Membership Action Plans to Ukraine
and Georgia,
Allies agreed for the first time that “these countries will become members of
NATO.” The UNITED STATES supported NATO
membership invitations for all three Adriatic Charter countries: Croatia,
Albania, and Macedonia; and we are pleased that accession
talks have begun for Croatia
and Albania. Allies agreed that Macedonia
is also ready for membership, pending resolution of its name dispute with Greece. We are hopeful
that Macedonia’s
negotiations with Greece
under UN auspices will resolve outstanding issues so that accession talks can
proceed as soon as possible.
Afghanistan
NATO’s
fundamental purpose remains collective defense.
The missions that flow from this responsibility are adapting to meet 21st
century challenges. Nowhere is that
transformation more apparent than in Afghanistan,
where NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
since 2003. This major operation is the
first NATO mission beyond the geographic confines of North America and Europe. ISAF now
includes approximately 47,000 troops from 40 nations including more than 19,000
from the UNITED STATES. The Bucharest
Summit came at a critical time for the Alliance’s
transformation as a larger alliance working with global partners to counter
threats around the world. At the NATO
Summit in Riga
in November 2006, Allies pledged to ensure that ISAF would have the forces,
resources, and flexibility needed to ensure the mission’s continued
success. Between Riga
and Bucharest,
Allies contributed 7,100 additional forces to ISAF. However that is still well short of what the
Commander of ISAF, U.S. Army General McNeill, believes is required to win the
fight. The shortfalls are compounded by
the fact that some Allies continue to keep “caveats” on their forces,
restricting the commander’s flexibility in employing the forces at his
disposal. Some Allies are also reluctant
to employ counter-insurgency tactics because of concerns about blurring the
lines between “civilian” and “military” responsibilities. At Bucharest,
Secretary Gates stressed that although NATO is a military organization, it also
is undertaking civilian activities in connection with security assistance
operations in Afghanistan,
the Balkans, and elsewhere. While
working in cooperation with other organizations, such as the European Union and
United Nations, NATO needs to be capable of performing a full range of security
and civilian tasks.
Part of the
problem stems from flagging public and parliamentary support in Allied nations
for the ISAF mission. To help Allies
shore up domestic political support, the UNITED STATES pushed for a public
“Strategic Vision” for ISAF to explain how Allied security is directly linked
to stability in Afghanistan
and to lay out a vision to guide ISAF’s role in Afghanistan over the next five
years. This Strategic Vision was endorsed
by the Heads of State and Government from Allied and other ISAF troop
contributing nations at Bucharest.
In the
Strategic Vision, Allies and partners agreed that Afghanistan
is the Alliance’s
key priority. The Strategic Vision
incorporates four guiding principles:
1)
a
firm and shared long-term commitment;
2)
support
for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility;
3)
a
comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together
civilian and military efforts; and
4)
increased
cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s
neighbors, especially Pakistan.
What is required now is for Allied
capitals to use this Strategic Vision as the basis for generating national
support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan.
At Bucharest, France
announced that it will send an additional battalion to eastern Afghanistan. This will permit the UNITED STATES to assign
more troops to the South where Canadian, UK, Dutch and others have been
engaged in challenging combat operations against resurgent Taliban forces. Also at Bucharest,
Russia offered
land transit for NATO’s non-military
or non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan.
A key
component of ISAF’s operation is training and equipping the Afghan National
Army (ANA). Three years ago there was no
ANA to speak of, but today the ANA stands at approximately 55,000 and is
engaged in or leading major operations alongside ISAF forces. ISAF partners have fielded or pledged approximately
50 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to help build a more
effective Afghan National Army. However,
this still falls short of the 71 OMLTs required by March 2009. Thirteen ISAF nations have donated equipment
to the ANA through NATO and a trust fund has been established to cover
transportation and installation costs for the donated equipment.
Missile Defense
Ballistic Missile Defense
was one of the President’s top issues going into the Bucharest Summit, and we
are very pleased that the Alliance agreed to a strong statement of support, not
only for the planned U.S. missile defense assets in Europe, but for additional
missile defenses that would defend all Allies against the growing ballistic
missile threat.
The Bush Administration
believes strongly that ballistic missile proliferation poses a threat not only
to the UNITED STATES, but to our European Allies as well. This is why we moved from a “national”
missile defense policy under previous Administrations to a broader-based
approach. The idea was to ensure that
missile defenses are capable of protecting the UNITED STATES and its Allies to ensure that the
security of the UNITED STATES and its Allies remains indivisible and that
adversaries are not able to use the threat of ballistic missile attack to drive
a wedge between us.
For the past eight years,
the UNITED STATES has been working with Allies to explain our plan to field
missile defense interceptors in Poland
and a missile defense radar in the Czech
Republic. These assets will provide coverage to many,
but not all Allies from long-range ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. While
explaining the benefits of these assets, we have also encouraged NATO to think
about ways to provide coverage to those Allies who would remain vulnerable to
shorter-range ballistic missiles.
Given this, we were very
pleased that at the Bucharest Summit, all 26 Allies agreed to the following
points in the final Summit Declaration:
·
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to
Allies’ forces, territory, and populations; including a growing threat from intermediate range and
long-range ballistic missiles;
·
Missile defenses form part of a broader response to counter this
threat; NATO welcomes
the fact that European-based U.S. assets will protect most Allies against
long-range ballistic missiles and supports territorial missile defense as one
means of safeguarding Alliance territory and population centers against the
risk associated with ballistic missile proliferation;
·
Planned U.S.
missile defenses in Poland
and the Czech Republic will provide a “substantial
contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles;”
and
·
The Alliance should develop options
for a “comprehensive missile defense architecture” that provides coverage for
those Allies not covered by the U.S.
system. The Alliance
will develop options to safeguard those Allies who remain vulnerable to
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for consideration at the 2009
summit.
In addition to these
critical points, Allies also acknowledged at Bucharest
the work being done by the UNITED STATES and by the NATO-Russia Council to
address Russia’s
concerns about missile defense. Missile
defenses in Europe, whether they are U.S.
or Allied assets, pose no threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. The UNITED STATES has proposed wide-ranging
transparency and confidence building measures that are intended to address Russia’s concerns, and we remain hopeful that Russia
will accept these measures.
NATO still has much work
to do, specifically with respect to completing the Bucharest tasking to develop options for a
comprehensive missile defense architecture.
As we have done in the past, the UNITED STATES is prepared to support
and contribute to these efforts in the hope that all Allies will one day be
able to enjoy the benefits of missile defense.
In addition, Allied Heads of State
and Government agreed to explore ways to link the U.S.
missile defense capability with NATO missile defense efforts, encouraged Russia to take advantage of U.S. missile
defense cooperation proposals, and are ready to explore the potential for
linking UNITED STATES, NATO, and Russian missile defense systems.
Defense Capabilities
Secretary Gates proposed and NATO
Defense Ministers at Bucharest
agreed to pursue seven recommendations for improving NATO defense
capabilities:
·
Examine
and fully pursue multinational arrangements to address capability shortfalls.
·
Participating
nations in the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) program need to sign the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as soon as possible so the first C-17 can be
operational by the end of 2008.
·
Applaud
the UK
initiative to establish a trust fund to assist nations in upgrading helicopters
and training air crews, and direct the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to examine
ways to use common funding to better support operations and establish a common
logistic base.
·
Participating
nations in the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program should agree to the
final cost shares and sign the MOU so that AGS is operational by 2012.
·
Encourage
nations spending considerably less than two percent of GDP on defense that cannot
achieve that level, to commit to increasing defense spending by 0.2 percent of
GDP within five years.
·
Prioritize
the provision of forces to fill the remaining holes in the Combined Joint
Statement of Requirements (CJSORs) for ongoing operations.
·
Commit
to increase NATO forces’ deployability target from 40 to 50 percent.
There have, for many years, been
persistent problems with inadequate levels of defense spending on the part of
most Allies and inefficient use of available defense funds. Although even a modest increase such as that
proposed by Secretary Gates may be difficult to achieve within many European
cabinets that may have other funding priorities, Defense Ministers do have a
great deal of influence over how available defense funds are spent. Many Allies could use their available funds
more efficiently by shifting investment out of non-deployable capabilities and
into transportation and support capabilities to make forces more usable.
Significant inefficiency is caused by
the inability of many of the smaller nations in Europe
to achieve economies of scale in their defense expenditures. Some Allies and Partners are already
participating in creative multinational arrangements to use available defense
funds more efficiently and address capability shortfalls that they would not
have been able to address unilaterally.
One of the best examples of this is the Strategic Airlift Capability
Program, in which a consortium of nations is procuring shares in C-17s that
will be used to satisfy NATO, EU, and national strategic airlift requirements. The consortium has currently committed to
acquiring three C-17s, but there is no reason that other airframes, such as the
A400M, could not be added to the pool in the future.
Enlargement
The UNITED STATES supported NATO
membership invitations for all three Adriatic Charter countries -- Croatia, Albania
and Macedonia
at the Bucharest Summit. Each country has made significant progress over the
past eight years and each is now a force for stability in the Balkan region and
beyond. Their forces serve with us in Afghanistan
and other global peacekeeping operations, and they continue to play important
roles on Kosovo. In short, they already
have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of NATO
membership. Just as importantly, each of
them shares our values of democracy, human rights, and freedom.
These countries have worked hard to earn a
NATO invitation and, like all the other recent new NATO members, they will
strengthen the Alliance.
Eventually bringing all three, not just two, of these countries into NATO will
permanently extend NATO's zone of peace and stability into the Western Balkans.
It will also set a positive example for other countries in the region.
Accession
talks will be conducted in April to May 2008 with the aim of finalizing
Accession Protocols in time for signature by NATO member countries by the end
of July 2008. Allies agreed at Bucharest to complete the
ratification process “without delay.” As accession talks begin, we will continue to
engage Albania and Croatia to
encourage them to complete remaining reforms to achieve NATO membership.
Croatia has a proven track record of
political and economic maturity and it is also an important Partner on the
battlefield. Today, it is a net exporter
of stability. It is an active Partner in
the Adriatic Charter with Albania
and Macedonia,
provides military and police forces to eleven United Nations (UN) peacekeeping
operations worldwide, and is also a strong contributor to ongoing NATO
operations. It has a contingent of approximately
two hundred troops in ISAF that is scheduled to grow to over three hundred by
the end of this year. Additionally, it
already is a strong supporter of NATO exercises. Last year’s amphibious exercise held in Croatia
was the largest ever held in a non-member state.
Albania is also a net provider of security
and stability throughout the region. It
currently provides troop contributions to both Iraq
and Afghanistan and supports
the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. In fact, it is one of the greatest per-capita
contributors to NATO and Coalition operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Additionally, its strong support and
leadership on Kosovo has been significant.
It consistently has called on all parties to negotiate and to avoid
resorting to violence. Just as
importantly, it has made steady progress on combating corruption, with arrests
of high-level government officials among others, substantial progress on
judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase transparency and efficiency
within the court system.
Macedonia also is with us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its soldiers are fighting alongside ours,
keeping the peace and defending freedom. This is the best evidence that Macedonia, like Croatia
and Albania,
is ready to be a full NATO member. Macedonia
has already successfully completed nine MAP cycles and MAP reviews. Consequently, we were greatly disappointed
that Macedonia did not
receive an invitation to join NATO because of the dispute with Greece over its
name.
When Macedonia
and Greece arrive at a
solution to the name issue, Macedonia
will take its place within NATO. At Bucharest, the
Administration and NATO Allies agree that Macedonia is ready for membership
based on NATO’s performance-based standards.
NATO enlargement continues
to play a vital role in supporting the cause of freedom in Europe
by promoting democratic values and giving countries a road map for military and
political reforms. Ukraine and Georgia’s
aspirations to join the Alliance
are closely connected to these same values as they seek to solidify their
democratic reforms and join the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies. We believe strongly that Georgia and Ukraine both deserve to participate
in a Membership Action Plan (MAP). This
was the message the President and the Secretary of Defense took to Bucharest and will be the
message we continue to send to Allies in the coming weeks and months.
MAP provides an
opportunity for countries to continue their efforts towards defense and civil
society reform by providing stringent goals to be completed before membership
can be considered. As we all know, MAP
is not membership, and Georgia
and Ukraine
have some time to go before membership is even a possibility. Yet MAP can provide vital tools for Ukraine and Georgia to continue to pursue
democratic reform and consolidate their robust reform agendas.
The President
strongly urged Allies to approve Ukraine’s
and Georgia’s
requests for a MAP. Although Alliance
Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the principle that NATO’s doors remain
open to European democracies and that both Georgia
and Ukraine “will become
members of NATO,” we were disappointed that a few Allies were not ready to
approve MAP for Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest.
All Allies agreed that no nation outside
of NATO should be able to block an aspirant’s progress toward membership.
Alliance members will now begin a period of intensive high-level engagement
with both Ukraine and Georgia to
address questions pertaining to their MAP applications of some Allies. The Department of Defense will continue to
work with our USG colleagues and with those in the Alliance
who continue to have reservations about extending MAP to ensure that Ukraine and Georgia get the support they need
to continue reforms and progress toward NATO membership. Foreign Ministers will further assess the MAP
requests at their meeting in December and have been empowered by Allied leaders
to approve the requests.
Conventional Forces in Europe
Given prior
UNITED STATES and Allied contacts with Russia
on the CFE Treaty, there were no expectations that President Putin would arrive
at the Summit
with a new position. We have been
waiting for a response to the so-called “parallel actions package,” which
includes proposals designed to break the impasse over ratification of the CFE
Adapted Treaty and Russia’s fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments to withdraw
Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova, that are there without the consent of
the host countries. Russian suspension
of its implementation of the current CFE Treaty last December only complicated
negotiating efforts. Shortly before the Bucharest
Summit, the North Atlantic Council issued the first public description of the
package’s main elements and strongly endorsed the package as the basis for
moving forward.
In
Bucharest, President Putin repeated complaints that NATO States had not
ratified the Treaty and that the Baltic states had not joined the Treaty
regime, something that could legally only occur under the Adapted Treaty. Putin’s remarks showed that Russia’s problems with the Treaty regime also
extend to the updated or Adapted CFE Treaty, which Russia has already ratified. Putin repeated demands for elimination of
flank restrictions for Russia,
without which Russia
could theoretically mass its entire force on its northern or southern
periphery. At the same time, Russia demands
that NATO and other states in the flank zone accept strict limits on their
forces and outside reinforcements.
No Ally has
suggested that NATO members withdraw from the Treaty. The Defense Department
will continue to work closely with the State Department to support efforts to
work with our Allies and Russia
on a negotiated solution. At the same
time, NATO has stated that the current situation where Allies are implementing
Treaty requirements, such as data exchanges, while Russia is not, cannot continue
indefinitely. The timing and content of
next steps will be a matter for multilateral discussion in NATO. During suspension, Moscow has also indicated that it would exercise
restraint in deploying additional combat forces near its borders. We see no
imminent threat to European security.
But CFE has provided important predictability and transparency, and, if
we lose the Treaty regime, we may also lose some of the sense of security that Europe has recently experienced.
Operations in the Balkans
The largest NATO
presence in the Balkans is the Kosovo Force or KFOR. Since establishing the mission in 1999,
several thousand service members from NATO and non-NATO countries have served
in Kosovo, helping to maintain a safe and secure environment for all the people
living there.
Kosovo’s declaration of
independence on February 17th ended one chapter and began another. We must deal with short-term challenges to
security and longer-term challenges of Kosovo’s development. Emotions continue to run high and
unfortunately, last month, a few Serb extremists attacked international police
and military forces, killing one and injuring more than 60. However, KFOR did a superb job in limiting
the violence and defusing the situation. Kosovo’s independence brings Europe closer to the goal of being whole, free and at
peace. In the future, we look forward to NATO helping establish a small,
lightly equipped Kosovo Security Force and its civilian oversight ministry as
well as dissolving the Kosovo Protection Corps.
The UNITED
STATES pledged to keep about 1,500 U.S. service members in KFOR
through the transition period from the UN Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) to the EU-led International Civilian Office. Our forces, mostly National Guard personnel,
are doing a fantastic job in Kosovo.
Serbia strongly opposes
Kosovo’s independence. We understand
that, and we continue to reach out to Serbia diplomatically during what
has been a painful period for them. We
support maintaining the NATO Liaison Office in Belgrade
and hope that Serbia
will continue to take advantage of the opportunities it offers.
With NATO’s
offer of membership to Albania
and the commitment to invite Macedonia
as soon as the name issue is resolved, the NATO Headquarters in Tirana and Skopje have accomplished
the majority of their tasks. NATO will
continue to help these countries implement the defense reform programs they
undertook several years ago.
The work of
NATO Headquarters Sarajevo helped Bosnia-Herzegovina reach a point where the Alliance decided to begin an
Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and
security issues relating to its aspiration to membership.
NATO Way Ahead
Our vision of NATO’s future is one in
which NATO remains the premier transatlantic security institution with
collective defense as its core function, while continuing to embrace new
challenges and reach out to new partners.
At the dawning of the new millennium there was an extraordinary amount
of uncertainty and discussion about the future challenges to the Euro-Atlantic
area and appropriate future roles and missions for NATO. Some who viewed NATO as a purely military
alliance believed that NATO was no longer relevant. Others recognized that NATO still had a
useful role to play, but thought that role should be limited to the collective
defense of the territory of its members.
There were some who perceived the European Union efforts to develop a
security and defense policy (ESDP) to be in direct competition with NATO for
resources and political support.
Today, NATO’s assumption of new
security tasks and new partnerships, especially its operations in Afghanistan, is transforming the Alliance at the political
level as well as the military level. The
views of European political leaders have converged on the realization that
“Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to
Afghanistan’s future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human
rights and free from the threat of terrorism.”
They now also share a realization that a full range of policy
instruments, both military and civilian, must be coordinated to achieve many of
our security aims including a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that will not endanger
its neighbors, the Euro-Atlantic area, and the wider international
community. They must now convey these
realizations to their constituents, many of whom do not appreciate the
importance of NATO’s operations in Afghanistan as central to
countering the global threat of terrorism and Islamic extremism.
The experience of our real world
operations has shown us that we cannot afford to allow institutional rivalry to
impede cooperation between NATO and the EU.
At the Bucharest Summit, French President Sarkozy indicated a desire to
achieve closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union. Secretary of Defense Gates indicated that he
thinks the time is right to try to bring the two organizations into closer
cooperation, while recognizing that they each need a mix of military and
non-military instruments. President
Sarkozy announced that France
and Germany will host the 60th
Anniversary NATO Summit in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany in April 2009, and he gave positive
indications that France
might announce its reintegration into the NATO military structure at the 2009 Summit. The full reintegration of France into Alliance military structures and better
cooperation between NATO and the European Union in which each has access to needed
capabilities, both military and civilian, will be a focus of our efforts over
the next year.
Conclusion and DoD Plans for
Follow-up
In conclusion, with the exception of
the disappointment on Macedonia,
we think that Bucharest
was a success for the UNITED STATES by accomplishing the following:
·
Allies’
official acknowledgement of a NATO role in operations outside of the
Euro-Atlantic area by agreeing that Euro-Atlantic security is tied to Afghanistan’s
stability and future;
·
a
firm and shared long-term commitment
by Allies to a comprehensive approach, bringing together civilian and military
efforts to prevent Islamic extremists from regaining control of Afghanistan;
·
approval
by Allies of the extension of the ballistic missile defense system to Europe;
·
invitations
to Albania and Croatia to join the Alliance;
·
agreement
by NATO defense ministers to pursue Secretary Gates’ seven-point plan to
improve defense capabilities and agreement to provide forces and capabilities
needed for ongoing operations; and
·
acknowledgment
by Allies that Ukraine
and Georgia will join NATO – it is a matter of when, not if, and foreign
ministers will address the issue before the end of the year.
The Department of Defense intends to
follow up on these successes over the next year by:
·
encouraging
Allies to use the Strategic Vision approved at Bucharest to improve political support to
more fully support ongoing ISAF operations;
·
engaging
with French counterparts to reinforce France’s increased commitment to ISAF,
its possible reintegration into the NATO military structure, and exploring
possible improvements in the defense and security relations between NATO and
the EU; and
·
working
with Allied counterparts to improve defense capabilities by:
o
implementing
the U.S. ballistic missile
defense sites in Europe and continuing to work
with Allies to develop a comprehensive missile defense architecture;
o
highlighting
ongoing multinational arrangements to address capability shortfalls efficiently
by completing arrangements necessary for an initial operational capability for
the C-17 consortium by year end and for AGS by 2012; and
o
achieving
Allied agreement to Secretary Gates’ targets for increases in defense spending
within the next five years for Allies spending less than two percent of their
GDP on defense and increased deployability targets.
·
Continuing
to work with the State Department and Allies to initiate accession talks with Macedonia immediately after the name issue is
resolved and to approve Membership Action Plans for Ukraine
and Georgia
as soon as possible.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
opportunity to present the Defense Department’s view of the Bucharest Summit
and the way ahead for NATO. I would be
honored to answer any questions you or the Committee may have. Thank you.