Mr. President, I rise today as we debate the Farm Bill to remind my colleagues of the vulnerability of American agriculture to acts of biological terrorism directed against livestock and crops, commonly known as "agroterrorism." In December, I addressed the need for new technologies to detect biological agents that could be used in malicious attacks against our nation's agricultural industry.
The hard-working men and women who provide our meat, poultry, and dairy products, our fruits and vegetables, and our lumber and fibers now have a renewed sense of urgency when they consider potential threats to American agriculture. Responding to diseases in plants and animals has always been a fact of life for American farmers and ranchers. Now they are confronted with the possibility of intentional acts to release biological agents that cause disease in crops and livestock.
The impact of an animal or crop disease outbreak could be swift and devastating to the U.S. economy. Although the threat to our nation's food supply is a serious concern when discussing agroterrorism, we must remember that the primary purpose of agroterrorism is to inflict economic damage. The combined annual sales from the U.S. agricultural sector exceed $100 billion. American agriculture accounts for 13 percent of the gross domestic product and nearly 17 percent of domestic employment. The U.S. accounts for about 15 percent of all global agricultural exports.
The impact of agroterrorism is not a just concern for rural America alone. All of America benefits from a healthy agriculture sector. Therefore, all of America must share in protecting our critical agricultural resources.
Agricultural security for American farmers and protection from the intentional release of biological agents that cause disease in crops and livestock are essential features of the agroterrorism legislation I am drafting. My legislation will help American farmers and ranchers protect their investments and livelihood by providing grants or loans for security measures on their farms and ranches.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services I have held hearings on the need for enhanced coordination of the federal agencies that respond to acts of conventional bioterrorism. The same is true for agroterrorism. By strengthening agency coordination and emergency response planning, we will also be preparing the American agricultural sector to deal with both intentional and natural crop and livestock disease outbreaks when they occur.
Many of the diseases that potentially threaten American crops and livestock have been virtually eliminated within the U.S. borders, or have never appeared on American soil. For this reason, a crucial element of agricultural security will involve the surveillance of plant and animal disease outbreaks in foreign countries. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) already serves as an agricultural disease watchdog at our borders and around our farms. We must support ongoing APHIS efforts to detect and eradicate diseases at home by establishing stronger connections to the international community of agencies and organizations that monitor plant and animal disease outbreaks.
A critical component of this legislation will involve establishing a legal framework for agroterrorism, including penalties for those who perpetrate destructive acts against crops and livestock. Indeed, acts of biological terrorism are not limited to the intentional release of disease agents to harm humans, livestock or crops. Deliberate and destructive acts against agricultural and forestry research programs are also routinely perpetrated by extremists who oppose biotechnology. These acts of domestic terrorism do not involve the direct use of biological agents, but they can be just as destructive as the intentional release of disease-causing agents.
Recently, states from Washington to Maine have experienced destructive attacks on agricultural research projects. Reports of these acts of vandalism are often suppressed to avoid drawing further attention to the vulnerabilities of federal and private agricultural research projects. Quite frequently, these attacks fail to destroy biotechnology experiments. Instead, the hard work accomplished by researchers who use traditional crop breeding methods is wiped out in these senseless and illegal activities.
In closing, I would strongly urge my colleagues to lend their attention and support to legislative efforts that will benefit all segments of the U.S. agriculture economy. American farmers, federal, state and local emergency managers, law enforcement officers, agriculture researchers, and consumers require our help in addressing concerns about the intentional or inadvertent spread of exotic and emerging agricultural diseases and the economic security of the United States' agriculture industry.
