Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing.

The future of our nuclear forces is one of the most important subjects before this Committee.

There are two critical points which need to be emphasized and re-emphasized about the Administration's nuclear posture review:

• First, no substantial reduction in nuclear weapons is being proposed in this review.

• Second, it is not clear why we insist on maintaining such large stockpiles of available weapons given the threat which our military is being prepared to defend us against.

First, on the number of nuclear weapons : the Administration sets up two categories of nuclear warheads. The first category is for 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads to be "operationally deployed" by the year 2012.

By "operationally deployed," does the Administration apparently means warheads actually mounted on missiles? I hope that this point can be clarified today.

The Administration sets up a second category of warheads which are part of a "responsive capability."

These weapons, as Secretary Crouch, stated in his press briefing on January 9th, would be maintained with their "critical components." It appears as if the only difference between "operationally deployed" warheads and "responsive" warheads is that the responsive warheads would not be mounted on missiles. This is a distinction without much of a difference.

The number of warheads in this "responsive capability" might number in the thousands, according to press estimates, with the total number between 3,500 to 4,000 warheads.

What would our nuclear posture review have looked like before this review if arms control agreements had entered into force?

START II would have brought the number of warheads down to 3,500 by 2003. START III would have projected 2,000 to 2,500 by the year 2007.

In the Bush plan we will have 3,800 "operationally deployed" warheads by 2007 (and an additional number in the "responsive capability" category) and by 2012, 1,700 to 2,200 "operationally deployed" and perhaps thousands still in the "responsive capability." I say this is not a reduction but an increase.

Secondly, why do we need to maintain substantial nuclear warheads when we are reducing our force structure to cope with only one major war at a time and restructuring our forces to deal with the new threat of global terrorism and homeland defense?

The Administration argues that we need to walk back the nuclear weapons reductions envisioned in the first Bush Administration and in the Clinton Administration because we need to deal with "multiple contingencies and new threats."

It is unclear which new threat requires maintaining such a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. For example, the Russians, who for so long were the justification for us maintaining a large retaliatory capability, are no longer our enemy and are reducing more substantially than we their nuclear weapons. The Chinese are building up their warhead inventory but will still be far below the thousands in our own.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, the Administration will clarify these issues in today's hearing.

Our nation's resources are being strained as we work to improve our homeland security, fight a war against terrorism, and maintain programs which ensure our country's continued economic prosperity. The burden is upon the Administration to justify maintaining a large and costly nuclear weapons arsenal that is not commensurate with the threats our military faces and the missions they are designed to perform.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.