Mr. President, I rise to express my support for a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. I do so with two cardinal prerequisites: first, that all possible means be exhausted short of war to enforce United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq and, second, that any attack against Iraq take place as part of an international coalition. That is why I am pleased to cosponsor the amendment offered by my colleague from Michigan [Mr. Levin], the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Before the United States wages war against Iraq, President Bush and the Congress owe it to the young Americans who face death or injury in that conflict to ensure that every effort has been made to obtain our ends without endangering them. Every ounce of preparation must be taken to ensure a swift and efficient outcome should war become necessary. As another President, Herbert Hoover, once said, "Older men declare war. But it is youth that must fight and die." The burden is on our leaders to justify why young men and women need to risk their future now.
Defense analysts suggest that anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000 troops will be necessary for an attack. There are already approximately 75,000 Reservists and National Guard troops on active duty, and even more may be needed to deal with the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan while not degrading military missions elsewhere in the world. An occupation force in Iraq might require at least 75,000 troops plus a civilian counterpart to the military presence. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the war will cost between $6 billion to $9 billion a month on top of an initial deployment cost of $9 billion to $13 billion and that an occupation force would cost $1 billion to $4 billion per month. Remember in the first Persian Gulf War, it was our allies who paid for the war. The cost of the war this time will be borne largely by the American treasury unless we are supported by an international coalition. With a battered economy, it will be difficult to fund two wars at once for an indefinite period of time. Already our funds are stretched. The head of the U.S. Special Operations Command has indicated that he requires an additional $23 billion over the next five years to maintain his global responsibilities.
The need to justify such a course of action is particularly critical in the case of Iraq as President Bush is advocating a pre-emptive strike against a potential threat to the American homeland. Traditionally, America has never sought war by striking first nor has America eagerly sought foreign entanglements. This would be a pre-emptive war and one in which we could have few allies. Not since the Spanish-American War would the United States be fighting a war so far from our borders with so few friends.
As we consider this war, we must also consider the implications of what we are doing. Saddam Hussein is not the only dictator who oppresses his people, attacks his neighbors, and is developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea's Kim Jong Il, Libya's Muammar Qaddaffi, Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei, Syria's Bashar al-Asad, and others, all pose threats or have posed threats to American interests. All are known for their human rights abuses.
American troops stand eye to eye with North Korean troops on the DMZ. Libyan agents blew up an American commercial aircraft; Iran has imprisoned American diplomats; and Syria has supported terrorist groups who have attacked and murdered Americans. All have or are developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. Some of these countries may already have nuclear weapons. Some have attacked - directly or indirectly through support for terrorist groups - their neighbors. In the case of Iran, recent reports indicate that it is sheltering and assisting Al Qaeda leaders.
In the case of other countries, we are working diligently, through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, to constrain their efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. However, in regard to Iraq, the President argues that Saddam poses a unique threat. His argument is convincing concerning the extent of devastation that Saddam has wreaked on his own people and his neighbors. He is truly, as the President notes, a "homicidal dictator," but he is not the only dictator addicted to developing weapons of mass destruction. Nor is the policy solely a choice between invading Iraq or standing hopelessly by while Saddam becomes ever stronger. Since the Persian Gulf War, we and our allies have worked to make Saddam weaker and, according to all reports, including that of our own military, Saddam's military capability is much less now than it was in 1991.
Congressional testimony, reports by the intelligence community and outside analysts, state that Iraq's WMD capability is much less now than it was before the Gulf War. A recent CIA public report states that Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) capability "is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war..." Although it is probable that Iraq's biological weapons program is more advanced than it was before the war, its delivery capability, according to the respected London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, "appears limited."
I agree that we must neutralize Iraq's WMD threat. The question is how to do that most effectively while minimizing the loss in American lives. The argument that an inspection system cannot guarantee the elimination of Iraq's WMD program is certainly true but misses the point. There are few absolutes in this world. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld insists that we need American troops on the ground, rummaging through every Iraqi nook and cranny for evidence of WMD. Even with our troops doing so, there would be no guarantee that every item would be uncovered or how long it would take. We are still finding traces of chemical weapons left over from World War I in the backyards of homes in Washington, D.C. Nor have our troops in Afghanistan, despite heroic efforts, been able to eradicate every Al Qaeda operative.
But what aggressive inspections can do is destabilize the Iraqi WMD program, keep it bottled up, frustrate efforts at gaining new technologies and additional supplies, and force Iraqi technicians to hide and keep moving constantly. It will not be disarmament, but, if implemented effectively, it will be dismemberment of the Iraqi WMD program, splitting it in parts and preventing it from becoming whole.
A new inspection regime has to be very aggressive, receive considerable support from the United States and its allies, have a fixed set of dates for marking compliance, and be backed by the threat of war. Iraq's record of evading inspections is well documented. Benchmarks for compliance will remove wiggle room for countries who argue for a softening of sanctions provisions. Putting in place an aggressive new inspection regime is not an insubstantial achievement, and it is does not undermine necessary preparations to develop an effective war-fighting strategy and strengthen international backing for a conflict.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration tell us that time is not on our side. But we must make the time to ensure that we minimize American casualties. Time is not on Saddam Hussein's side either. Our patience has been exhausted and a new UN resolution must be firm in its deadlines. Some in the Administration believe Saddam's hold on those responsible for guarding him is so tenuous that in the event of an attack, they will turn on him and overthrow him.
The current discussion about Iraq has obscured the successes of American policy toward Iraq. A recent Congressional Research Service report by its distinguished Middle East expert, Kenneth Katzman, observes, the United States "has largely succeeded in preventing Iraq from reemerging as an immediate strategic threat to the region." A British Government intelligence report notes that the "success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process."
If war becomes inevitable because Iraq refuses to give inspectors the liberty they need to perform their mission, then the United States must have an effective military strategy for fighting a war.
Great uncertainty surrounds the President's post-war strategy. Remember the day the war ends, Iraq becomes our responsibility, our problem. The United States lacks strategic planning for a post-conflict situation. Retired General George Joulwan recently said that the U.S. needs "to organize for the peace" and design now a strategy with "clear goals, milestones, objectives." General Joulwan argues we did not have such a plan for Bosnia and we are late to develop one in Afghanistan. Our objectives in Iraq have not yet been made clear: is it our goal to occupy Baghdad and if so, for how long? A rush to battle without a strategy to win the peace is folly.
General Hoar observed that "there has been scant discussion about what will take place after a successful military campaign against Iraq. The term "regime change" does not adequately describe the concept of what we expect to achieve as a result of a military campaign in Iraq. One would ask the question, "Are we willing to spend the time and treasure to rebuild Iraq and its institution after fighting, if we go it alone during a military campaign? Who will provide the troops, the policemen, the economists, the politicians, the judicial advisors to start Iraq on the road to democracy? Or are we going to turn the country over to another thug, who swears fealty to the United States?"
As General Shalikashvili stated in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, "we were very fortunate in Afghanistan that in fact a government, interim government emerged, that seemed to have a modicum of support from its people .... We should not count on being lucky twice." Nor can we count on Iraq's oil funding reconstruction if wellheads are blown up as they were by retreating Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
Experts indicate that American troops will need to remain inside Iraq for many years in order to ensure stability. Iraq will require extensive economic assistance. As the current situation in Afghanistan indicates, the process of restoring viability to a nation - nation-building - after years of repression is a difficult one and made more difficult by the inability of other nations to sustain their support in the effort. Violent attacks are on the increase in Afghanistan. Afghan officials have received only about half of the $1.8 billion in aid promised last January. A study by the Army's Center of Military History has concluded that we would need to commit 300,000 peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan and 100,000 in Iraq if we are to have an impact comparable to that which we had in reconstructing Japan and Germany after the war.
The consequences of a long-term American occupation of Iraq needs to be carefully weighed. Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has observed, "there has been a 'deafening silence' from the Administration about how Iraq will be run after Hussein." Historically, the United States has had a poor record in the Middle East. We supported Iraq in its war against Iran.
Nor does eliminating Saddam necessarily mean that the Iraqi people will welcome American occupiers or that they will have democratic leaders to govern. Secretary Rumsfeld asserts that he trusts the Iraqi people will be inspired to form a new government. But can we be assured that it would be a democratic government or a democratic government that is pro-American? Can we be assured that the new regime will be committed to getting rid of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, especially as Iraq's traditional adversary, Iran, has an even more advanced program of weapons of mass destruction?
Even though our military forces may be equipped to fight a war in Iraq and a war on terrorism in Afghanistan, there is a significant price to be paid. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, noted that certain unique units, such as intelligence platforms, command and control assets, and Special Operations Forces would need to be prioritized if the war on terrorism expanded. Richard Solomon, former Assistant Secretary of State in the first Bush Administration, refers to the "danger of over-stretch" in which the United States assets are deployed in multiple nation-building enterprises and are not able to respond if another crisis erupts.
All of these concerns point to the importance of international support as a critical ingredient of both our war-fighting and our peace-making strategy. Without the imprimatur of the international community, the President's war will be seen as a private vendetta by the United States.
The President was right to frame his speech at the United Nations in the context of restoring credibility to the United Nations through enforcement of its resolutions. This is the essential context of this conflict but it can be validated as such only if the international community joins it. Regional support will provide an allied force with the forward basing needed to mount a large-scale attack. Right now no country in the region contiguous to Iraq is volunteering to host American troops in a war. International support will help dampen hostility toward the United States by the peoples of the region and help build support among the Iraqi people. International support for the post-war, peace-making phase of the operation will reduce the American military's footprint and decrease the need for American financial resources. Secretary Rumsfeld has testified that the United Nations or an international coalition will run Iraq after Saddam. For that to be the case, the United Nations or some ad hoc international coalition will have to be formed before the war.
The President also must ensure our troops are properly prepared. Recently, the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical and Biological Defense stated that American troops are not "fully equipped and prepared" against a bio-chem attack. Decontamination shelters are reported to be in short supply as is the decontaminant foam used to clean up following an attack. The General Accounting Office recently testified that 250,000 defective protective suits against a chemical or biological attack cannot be located and may remain in current Pentagon inventories.
We must take the threat of an Iraqi chemical or biological attack very seriously. According to the British Government's White Paper on Iraq, Iraq chemical weapons caused over 20,000 casualties in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq used sprayers, bombs, artillery rockets, and artillery shells to deliver these weapons. Thousands of rockets and artillery shells filled with chemical weapons remain hidden in Iraq's arsenal.
Haste makes waste, affirms the adage, and in this case, haste means a waste of American lives. We may have an all-volunteer force but they are not mercenaries; they are citizen-soldiers and we owe it to each and every one of them and their families to proceed carefully when endangering their lives. Preparation is not the same as procrastination.
Constituent opinion in my home state is running strongly against any authorization of the use of force against Iraq. The President and his Administration need to make a clear and compelling case to the American people and to our allies abroad as to why this confrontation is necessary now.
For that reason, Mr. President, I support efforts to frame a multilateral approach to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. I support action by the United Nations in the form of a resolution calling for unconditional and unfettered inspections in Iraq. Only after we exhaust all of our alternative means should we engage in the use of force, and before then, the President must ensure we have a strategy and plans in place for winning the war and building the peace.
