

**RELEASE AND REVIEW OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT: "THE DECLINE IN AMERICA'S
REPUTATION: WHY?"**

MARKUP AND HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
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RELEASE AND REVIEW OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT: "THE DECLINE IN AMERICA'S REPUTATION: WHY?"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D. Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. This meeting of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight will come to order. And pursuant to notice, I will call up the proposed subcommittee report entitled, "The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?" for purposes of markup before moving to approve the report. Is there any debate? If not, without objection, the report—including the views of the ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher—before the members is hereby approved by the subcommittee.

[NOTE: The subcommittee's report is not reprinted here but may be accessed on the Web at <http://hcfa.house.gov/110/42566.pdf>.]

Mr. DELAHUNT. Last year, the subcommittee conducted a series of 10 hearings on international opinion about the United States and its foreign policies. I am sure my good friend and ranking member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, will agree that it was an exhausting, if not exhaustive process. We heard from respected pollsters with data from every continent, except on Antarctica.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Which has more ice than it used to.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And that was only because the penguins are notoriously hostile to pollsters.

But seriously, there was a hearing why I chose to make this topic the subject of the very first hearing we held during my tenure as chair of the subcommittee, a reason why we have invested so much of the subcommittee's time and effort in only the 10 hearings in preparing the report we are releasing today. And that rationale is summed up perfectly in something written over 140 years ago about the importance of our national reputation to our ability to conduct a foreign policy worthy of our ideals. As the end of the Civil War drew near, Ulysses S. Grant was thinking about what role the United States could play in international affairs. And here is what he wrote. That nation united will have a strength which

will enable it to dictate to all others, conform to justice and right. According to his biographer, Charles Flood, Grant then contemplated the limits of power, the good it could achieve if used wisely and the dangers of using it in an immoral way. Grant concluded with these words. Power I think can go no further the moment conscience leaves physical strength will avail nothing in the long run. The data presented to this subcommittee during the 10 hearings and compiled in the report we are releasing today show that the world thinks that our conscience has indeed left us and that our physical strength has come to be seen not as a source of solace, but as a threat, not as a guarantee of stability and order, but as a source of intimidation, violence and torture.

As Grant feared, our strength has availed us nothing, continued its unilateral use has cost us much. We are dangerously depleted what Grant—at the time he wrote these words was still a military commandment—identified as our greatest source of international power, our reputation for what he called conscience. I would substitute the phrase moral authority.

In a second report, the subcommittee will address the complex issue of precisely what impact the decline in our international standing has had on our ability to conduct foreign policy and safeguard our national security and national interests. Today's report, though, has a simpler and a singular focus. This report is to establish a baseline of facts, data, perhaps not indisputable, but strongly suggestive about what has happened to our international reputation and why. The report is being issued by all members of the subcommittee with the exception of the ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher.

So I propose to proceed today by reading the summary of the eight main findings and then turning to Mr. Rohrabacher to summarize his views as included in the report and then asking our witnesses, who have read both the report and his views, to comment on the findings and what they believe are their implications for our foreign policy and our national interest. Here are the findings in a very summary form. It is true, number one, it is true U.S. approval ratings have fallen to record lows in nearly every region of the world. Generally positive ratings that existed from the 1950s to 2001 have moved to generally negative ratings since 2002.

Approval ratings are highest in non-Muslim Africa and lowest in Latin America and in Muslim countries, it is the policies, opposition to specific United States policies rather than to American values or people that have driven this decline. The key policies are the invasion and occupation of Iraq, support for repressive governments worldwide and a perceived lack of evenhandedness in the Israeli/Palestinian dispute and torture and abuse of prisoners in violation of treaty obligations. It is the perceived hypocrisy, disappointment and bitterness arise from the perception that the proclaimed American values of democracy, human rights, tolerance and the rule of law have been selectively ignored by successive administrations when American security or economic considerations are in play.

It is the unilateralism, a recent patent of ignoring international consensus, particularly in the application of military follow-up have led to anger and a fear of attack that are transforming disagree-

ment with U.S. policies into a broadening and deepening anti-Americanism as suggested by the Government Accountability Office. It is also—number five, it is also the historical memory, U.S. domination remains a potent image for long periods of time and that image is used to discredit current U.S. policies. Six, it is the lack of contact. Contact with American and Americans reduces anti-Americanism but not opposition to specific policies.

Visitors to America, particularly students and even their family and friends have more positive views about America than nonvisitors by some 10 percentage points. Seven, it is the visas. Interaction with U.S. immigration and the visa process a significant source of frustration with the United States. Muslim applicants, in particular, report that customs officials create a perception that they are not welcome. This perception spreads across their communities through horror stories about travel to the United States.

Eighth, it is the perceived war on Islam, the combination of all of the previous findings has created a growing belief in the Islamic world that the United States is using the war on terror as a cover for its attempt to destroy Islam. Our distinguished witnesses today will assess those findings. I will introduce them shortly. Now, though, I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member for as much time as he desires. Mr. Rohrabacher.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Delahunt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT

Last year the Subcommittee conducted a series of ten hearings on international opinion about the United States and its foreign policies. I am sure my good friend and ranking member Mr. Rhorabacher will agree that it was an exhausting, if not exhaustive, process. We heard from respected polling experts with data from every continent except Antarctica, and that was only because penguins are notoriously hostile to pollsters, having once seen the Zogby brothers in action on CNN.

But seriously, there was a reason why I made this topic the subject of the very first hearing we held during my tenure as Chairman of the Subcommittee—a reason why I have invested so much of the Subcommittee's time and effort in holding the ten hearings and preparing the report we are releasing today.

And that reason is summed up perfectly in something written over 140 years ago about the importance of our reputation to our ability to conduct a foreign policy worthy of our ideals.

As the end of the Civil War drew near, Ulysses S. Grant was thinking about what role the United States could play in international affairs. Here is what he wrote:

That nation, united, will have a strength which will enable it to dictate to all others, *conform to justice and right*.

According to biographer Charles Flood, Grant then contemplated “the limits of power, the good it could achieve if used wisely, and the dangers of using it in an immoral way.” Grant concluded with these words:

Power I think can go no further. The moment conscience leaves, physical strength will avail nothing, in the long run.

How I wish the current administration had given some consideration to Grant's counsel. The data presented to this Subcommittee during the ten hearings and compiled in the report we are releasing today show that the world thinks that our conscience has indeed left us, and that our physical strength has come to be seen not as a solace but as a threat—not as a guarantee of stability and order, but as a source of intimidation, violence, and torture.

As Grant feared, our strength has availed us nothing—indeed its unilateral use has cost us much. We have dangerously depleted what Grant, who at the time he wrote those words was still a military commander, identified as our greatest source of international power—our reputation for what he called conscience.

In a second report the Subcommittee will address the complex issue of precisely what impact the decline in our international standing has had on our ability to conduct foreign policy and safeguard our national interests. Today's report, though, has a simpler, and singular focus. This report seeks to establish a baseline of facts—perhaps not indisputable, but strongly suggestive—about what has happened to our international reputation and why.

The report is being issued by all Members of the Subcommittee with the exception of my Ranking Member, so I propose to proceed today by reading the summary of the eight main findings, and then turning to Mr. Rohrabacher to summarize his minority report, and then asking our witnesses, who have read both the report and the minority report, to comment on the findings and what they believe are their implications for our foreign policy and our national interests.

Here are the findings, in summary form:

1. *It's true:* U.S. approval ratings have fallen to record lows in nearly every region of the world. Generally positive ratings from the 1950's to 2000 have moved to generally negative ratings since 2002. Approval ratings are highest in non-Muslim Africa and lowest in Latin America and in Muslim countries.
2. *It's the policies:* Opposition to specific U.S. policies, rather than to American values or people, has driven this decline. The key policies are: the invasion and occupation of Iraq; support for repressive governments worldwide; a perceived lack of even-handedness in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute; and torture and abuse of prisoners in violation of treaty obligations.
3. *It's the perceived hypocrisy:* Disappointment and bitterness arise from the perception that the proclaimed American values of democracy, human rights, tolerance, and the rule of law have been selectively ignored by successive administrations when American security or economic considerations are in play.
4. *It's the unilateralism:* A recent pattern of ignoring international consensus, particularly in the application of military power, have led to anger and a fear of attack that are transforming disagreement with U.S. policies into a broadening and deepening anti-Americanism, as suggested by the Government Accountability Office.
5. *It's the historical memory:* U.S. domination remains a potent image for long periods—and that image is used to discredit current U.S. policies.
6. *It's the lack of contact:* Contact with America and Americans reduces anti-Americanism, but not opposition to specific policies. Visitors to America—particularly students—and even their families and friends, have more positive views about America than non-visitors by ten percentage points.
7. *It's the visas:* Interaction with U.S. immigration and the visa process is a significant source of frustration with America. Muslim applicants in particular report that, customs officials create a perception that they are not welcome. This perception spreads across their communities through “horror stories” about travel to the United States.
8. *It's the perceived war on Islam:* The combination of all of the previous findings has created a growing belief in the Muslim world that the United States is using the “war on terror” as a cover for its attempts to destroy Islam.

Our witnesses today will assess those findings for us. I will introduce them shortly. Now, though, I recognize my distinguished Ranking Member for as much time as he desires.

Thank you Mr. Rohrabacher. Do any other Subcommittee members wish to make any remarks before we proceed to our witnesses?

Let me now turn to the witnesses, who represent a wealth of expertise and fresh thinking about U.S. foreign policy in various regions of the world. Their biographies are included in the record and on our website, and they are so lengthy and distinguished that we truly could spend the entire hearing just reading them. So, I just going to summarize their positions and specialties and leave it at that.

Dr. Scott Hibbard is a professor at DePaul University, and a leading author in the field of religion and politics, with emphasis both on the Islamic world, where he has conducted field research for extended periods, and on the United States. He served for many years at the U.S. Institute of Peace in the Office of Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights. He is the author of *Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, and is finishing a new book on how political leaders interact with religious fundamentalism in Egypt, India, and US—it's called *Playing with Fire*.

Dr. Esther Brimmer is the deputy director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins. The author

of numerous books and reports on U.S.-European relations and multilateral institutions, she served on the policy planning staff in the State Department under President Bush and President Clinton before him. Dr. Brimmer also worked closely with one of our favorite witnesses, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Operations, Jane Holl Lute, as the research coordinator for the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, from 1995 to 1999, for which Ms. Lute was the executive director.

I would note for the benefit, or shall we say the inspiration, of our Subcommittee staff that both Dr. Brimmer and Dr. Hibbard are proof that there is indeed life after Capitol Hill, as in previous lives Esther worked for the House Democratic Study Group, and Scott for our colleague Louise Slaughter and former Senator Dale Bumpers.

Dr. John Tirman is the executive director of the Center for International Studies at MIT. For more than 30 years he has been a leading analyst and author on such topics as U.S. grand strategy, nuclear weapons, and the conventional arms trade. He writes both for foreign policy specialists—his most recent book is titled, *Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change*—and for general audiences, as witnessed by the title of his previous book: *100 Ways America is Screwing up the World*. Among his recent projects at MIT has been sponsoring the noted sampling studies of mortality among Iraqi civilians that have been conducted by researchers at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine.

David Frum is a former speech writer for President Bush, so he will feel right at home in the company of our distinguished ranking member Mr. Rohrabacher, who served in that capacity for President Reagan. A resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Frum is the author of *THE RIGHT MAN: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush*, and co-author with Richard Perle of *AN END TO EVIL: What's Next in the War on Terror*. David, I am particularly pleased to have you here as the witness selected by the Minority because this report cites as an example of aggressive and counter-productive rhetoric a phrase that is often attributed to your pen: axis of evil. I look forward to discussing that one with you.

Thank you all for coming. Let me start with Professor Hibbard, and move on down the line.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And we have held 10 hearings and one review of polling data related to the perception of the United States around the world. We have held at least five hearings questioning the motives and the actions of U.S. employees who are involved with rendition. We have held 12 hearings on the occupation of Iraq and let us not forget the five hearings on the actions of our military men and women at Guantanamo. And I would hope that this hearing and markup indicates that we have covered this area of interest, and that we might be concerned enough on other elements of foreign policy and other elements of human rights to actually discuss some of the other things going on in the world.

But Republicans are no longer in charge of Congress and I am no longer in charge of this committee. So I thank you. I do thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the spirit in which we have worked together. And although I have some very substantial fundamental disagreements about the conclusions that have been reached, as well as I might add, the choice and the magnitude of the subjects that we should focus our time on, the report today—if the report today is correct, the world perceives us and who is the United States, U.S., it is us.

When we refer to the United States, we are referring to us. And apparently a lot of people are carrying what we have heard in these hearings don't like us and don't—because we are going along with government policies or we reflect attitudes that they—that in some way, they disdain or that they think deserves their condemnation.

Mr. Chairman, the committee report starts out with this on page 5: "In the aftermath since September 11, 2001, in that attack, there was a worldwide sympathy and support for the United States." Now, let me note that there may have been sympathy on that day. Prior to that day and during the Clinton administration, I don't believe there was this worldwide sympathy for the United States. But the report states that this sympathy toward the United States on 9/11 was best summed up in the headline in the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, and I cannot pronounce this.

We are all Americans now, is the French way of saying what they said. Well, I beg to differ right off the bat. And, in fact, if anyone reads past that headline in *Le Monde* in that column—*Le Monde—Le Monde*. I am sorry. They probably don't like us because we don't speak French. But they do have—anyway, it is clear that the column's author, beside that headline is blaming America for those attacks. The column is not sympathetic to America, and that is where we start off with supposedly as judging where our popularity has gone. That column is part and parcel of the anti-Americanism that is spewed around the world and continues to be spewed around the world. Here is a quotation from that column that the committee didn't include, "America in the solitude of its power, in the status of the sole superpower now in absence of a solvent counter model, has ceased to draw other nations to itself or more precisely in certain parts of the globe it seems to draw nothing but hate," and here is more of that:

"But the reality is perhaps also that an America whose own cynicism has caught up with if bin Laden, as the American authorities seem to think, really is the one who ordered the September 11th attack, how can we fail to recall that he was, in fact, trained by the CIA and that he was an element of policy directed against the Soviets, that the Americans considered to be wise? Might it not have then have been America itself that created this demon?"

Let me note that this myth that the CIA funded bin Laden has been perpetrated here and perpetrated throughout the world and maybe they believe that. The fact is Saudi Arabia poured hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars into the effort in Afghanistan on its own. It did not need the criteria to finance bin Laden and, in fact, bin Laden was an increasingly independent player and, in fact, bin Laden was very well known for attacking other interests who were not as loyal to Islam as they would see fit, as they thought was fit. The report precedes after this, I might add. From the conclusion that America's reputation has indeed declined throughout the world, even because there is a fundamental disagreement between America and these other nations or because America has embarked on a series of policies which contradicts past pronouncements of values on human rights and so on. Well, let me be very clear. I have rather significant thoughts on a large number of domestic and foreign policy issues.

Many of them happen to be human rights based where I disagree with the administration, especially on China and its dealings with other dictatorships with China. It is not the way this administration is trying to conduct the war on Islam. We did not declare war

on radical Islam. The Islamists in the world have declared war on us. And I—9/11—I am sorry, I can't speak French either. But, look, the radical Islamists in this country and throughout the world—and there are radical Islamists in this country who are out—who consider themselves friends of those people who conducted the attack on 9/11 through some mistake and there are many people overseas in Islamic countries who consider themselves of friends of those who conducted the attack on 9/11 and there are also our friends like we just—as just pointed out and even in France who, after 9/11, chose to point fingers at the United States after 3,000 of our citizens were slaughtered in an attack that was meant to murder tens of thousands of our citizens.

Why radical Islam hates the United States, quite frankly, they have every right—people have every right to their personal opinions, their personal religious opinion, but let us recognize that when people are fanatics to a certain religious or political concept or that they be Nazis or whether they be Communists or whether they be radical Islamists, and thus they set out to hurt the United States, hurt us, kill our children, kill our friends our neighbors, to terrorize the rest of us, well, then, I don't think we need to try to just beat ourselves up and say, how could it be that they don't like us so much.

I don't think that we need to do that. I don't think it makes any sense at all. Sometimes there are radicals in the world that hate the United States because actually we stand as a force in this world to thwart the expansion of their views. And I am very happy that over the years the United States of America has—the United States walked out like my father did off his poor dirt farm in North Dakota to go out and fight Japanese militarism and Nazism and save the world from those evils. And I am very proud that during the Cold War, that we stood firm against the Communists until that evil philosophy collapsed of its own inconsistencies and evil and now we have another threat. But in each one of these threats to civilization, America has been heaped with abuse or total non-involvement or, in some way, nitpicking by the people that we were trying to protect around the world.

And I will tell you without the United States of America, there would not have been, and without the young 20-year- and 17-year-olds that landed at D Day and, yeah, there are people that would prefer that we only look at the mistakes of it has liberation and see how many Frenchman and other people were killed in our liberation of that continent from the Nazis. And I know that during the entire Cold War that we faced this same type of backbiting or undermining of the effort to hold firm against communism. There are the anti—what we call the anti-anti-Communists during that era. Spent all of their time—instead of fighting the threat to Western civilization, spent the time undercutting what Ronald Reagan was trying to do.

And what Ronald Reagan finally did was free the world from that threat, that horrible threat that enslaved so much of the planet. And now we have this other, we have this challenge. Should we be so concerned that people don't like us or should we be trying to do what is right and what will eventually lead this planet to free itself from a radical Islamic terrorist threat that will slaughter not

just American, but slaughter moderate Muslims and let us know that for every American that has been killed in America, there have been probably 10 or 20 Iraqis that have been killed by these radical Islamists, trying to terrorize the people of Iraq into submission. Thank God that we have held out long enough so that now the people of Iraq are mobilizing to make sure that their country isn't taken over by the radical Islamists who would take a teacher into the middle of a courtyard and behead the teacher for teaching girls, for teaching young ladies and giving them an education. That is the type of enemy we are up against. We are up against the Nazis who didn't have any doubt that they had the right to murder countless Jews in order to purify the planet just like the radical Islamists don't have any doubt they have the right to behead people or to fly planes into buildings and murder thousands of civilians in order to create this better world that they know their religion will bring the world. I don't think the United States needs to apologize.

And let us note that even if it makes us enemies in the short run as did the battle against communism, in the long run, people will see and they won't judge us by our mistakes, no matter how much we try to focus on the mistakes, they will judge us by the outcome. And we do need to correct the mistakes. We need open discussion of the mistakes, because no human endeavor has ever been attempted where mistakes haven't been made and that certainly elements within an effort don't do the wrong thing.

We need to pull those elements back when people are doing the wrong thing in the war against radical Islam like some of the people who have been drawn in in the rendition program or sent to Guantanamo that we have determined that that was not a just thing for those individuals. With that said, Mr. Chairman, let me just note that I do not believe—and my final comment—that we are—that us, the United States, that we are not as hated and we are not as negative as the hearings that we have had suggest and as the pollsters would suggest. During that, we have noted—the pollsters noted that we have such a high negatives and that yet in Germany and in France when the people of Germany and France went to the polls, they elected parties that were demonstrably pro-American. In Eastern Europe, countries that were under communism and now for the first time—and they are easing into Democratic government, they are overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly pro American. And maybe they have their disagreements as does Germany and France with us, but in essence, I believe that we still have a great deal of people around this world who, in their heart, understand that America is the force that, the only force that is going to protect the decent people of the world against radical Islam or communism or Nazism or Japanese militarism, and thank God we are still willing to do it and thank God we have young people and people who go into our Foreign Service and into our CIA, into our military who are like my father, who marched off that little farm in North Dakota to save the world in 1941. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. And let me be clear that this report is not in any way meant to apologize. This report from my perspective is about our national security. And with

that, let me yield for any comments he might have to the vice chair of the committee, Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. My friend from California, I think it is important that—I would agree that we focus on correcting the mistakes that certainly this report has highlighted. And certainly this is more than worrying about being liked around the world. I think these worldwide trends have been identified really of historic proportions. It is about hurting our ability to do the right thing. Anyway, I am pleased to have been a part of these hearings. I appreciate the leadership from the chairman that has brought this about and the experts that have come forward. Just a couple of comments I would like to make. It really—the report highlights several things, but the first and most obvious, that this is really about policies and not the American people. Clearly what we have seen, there is a distinction there and that obviously has to do with who runs our Government and who is making those policies. I was at a meeting recently that had several European parliamentarians there, and there was a lot of discussion about various United States policies, but there was almost unanimous agreement that just the fact that we were having policy discussions around our Presidential campaign about how we can do a better job in some of the area, they said was really helping with Europeans in terms of the fact that America was having this debate of how we can change these policies. That was actually helping improve our image.

The other thing is that this is about the perception of hypocrisy, not our values. When you dig into these reports, even though there is disagreement with policies, there is strong belief in the idea of America and what we stand for. So there is a great reservoir, I think, of respect for our country in that regard. The other thing I would point out, that it says it is about the visas, not the visit. There are great statistics about people who have visited our country 10 times—you know, 10 points more positive views about our country if they have had contact or visited our country. But we are making that more difficult with some of our immigration policies. It is impacting tourism here. It is impacting business. It is impacting science and academic exchanges. All things that we should be engaging in better.

Finally, it is about fighting terrorists, not a war on Islam. And I think there has been some reckless language used in that regard, even President Bush recently has acknowledged that some of the language he has used that has been inflammatory and hurt our message and I think it is important that those of us that are focusing on those who would do us harm really focus on terrorists regardless of their religious persuasion and be careful about making that into a war on Islam.

So with that, I just want to commend the chair and say I look forward to this report getting out. I look forward to the follow-up hearings to talk about the impact and recommendations to address them. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank you, Mr. Carnahan. And now to our witnesses who collectively represent a wealth of expertise and creative thinking about American foreign policy and their biographies—and

this is an understatement—are extensive. So I am going to attempt to be brief.

Let me begin with Dr. Hibbard, who is a professor at DePaul University and a leading author in the field of religion and politics with emphasis both on the Islamic world, where he has conducted field research for extended periods and on the United States. He is a prolific author, as all of our witnesses are. I am not going to read the list of books because it is extensive.

And next we have Dr. Esther Brimmer, who is the deputy director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins. She too is the author of numerous books and reports on United States-European relations and multilateral institutions. She served on the public policy staff in State Department under President Bush and President Clinton before him. She also worked closely with one of our favorite witnesses, the United Nations assistant secretary general for peacekeeping, Jane Holl Lute.

Next we have Dr. John Tirman, who is the executive director of the Center for International Studies at MIT. For more than 30 years, he has been a leading analyst and author on such topics as U.S. grand strategy, nuclear weapons and the conventional arms trade. He writes both for foreign policy specialists and the general audiences. His most recent book is titled, "Multilateralism Under Challenge, Power, International Order, and Structural Change."

David Frum is a former speechwriter for President Bush. So he will feel right at home here in the company of the distinguished ranking member who served in that same capacity for President Reagan, although I never did read any of the speeches that he claims he authored. Mr. Frum is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and is the author of *The Right Man*, the *Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush*, and co-author with Richard Perle of *An End Evil, What is Next on the War on Terror?*

So let me thank all of you for coming and let me start from my left with Mr. Frum, and we will just proceed in that order. So please proceed and thank you all.

**STATEMENT OF DAVID FRUM, ESQ., RESIDENT FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH**

Mr. FRUM. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. And thank you all for the privilege of addressing this committee, the subcommittee and discussing this important study. I think we would all agree that it is an important part of America's power in the world to have standing and reputation. That these are indeed vital, national interests, and I think we would also all agree that mere disapproval elsewhere would not suffice in itself to persuade us to alter policies that are in the national interest. I note in the study, for example, that one of the causes of some friction with Latin America is the existence of American immigration policy, yet none of us would suggest that mere disapproval of the existence of such policies should lead us to abandon immigration policies. So we have a final balance to strike. And this subject is too serious and so important that I think we

want to be very confident that when we are measuring, we are indeed measuring something real.

And let me suggest 4 concepts that I would—that I think are important to help you in your deliberation. The first is that people who do engage in opinion research point out the more deeply rooted an opinion is, the less likely it is to shift dramatically over time. When we look at opinions about issues like the death penalty and abortion, issues that most people have strong views on, the shifts in those views are glacial. If we see dramatic swings in opinion, that suggests we are looking at an opinion that is not deeply fixed.

So when we vote, for example, the Pew surveys suggest that one fifth of the population of Spain changed its mind about the United States in the 12 months between the spring of 2005 and the spring of 2006, that that suggests probably not a very deeply rooted view.

The second thing we need to consider, many of the countries in which we are interested are unfree countries. Countries with state-controlled media and countries in which there are high levels of illiteracy and lack of access to information. We need the case of those countries to ask ourselves are we measuring something that people independently believe or are we measuring an artifact of propaganda created by government and quasi-government entities. When we look at many of these countries that are unfree or have large degrees of illiteracy. We need to ask ourselves is this something real we are seeing?

I think we need to consider also—we need to be very careful about romanticizing the standing of the world—the United States in the world before 2001 and 2002. This report, the committee has approved, tends to—it speaks very lightly about American standing in the 1980s and 1990s. Now there are some good reasons for that. The data was before we all became a lot more interested in this question after 2001, so our surveys after 2001 are much better than our surveys before 2001.

Still it is striking that in early 2002, for example, long before Iraq was ever discussed, long before Abu Ghraib, that we found very negative views of America through the Islamic world. According to Zogby polls, only 12 percent of Saudis had a favorable opinion of the United States in early 2002 and only 13 percent of Egyptians. Gallup polls conducted in the 1990s rated Pakistan the most anti-American country on earth. Long before any of these events, we had a deep problem with America's standing in the Islamic world and we had a problem in Europe. The ranking member very astutely read deeper into that famous *Le Monde* editorial, we are all Americans. And that—and as he pointed out, that that editorial in its body accused the United States of having—and this is a piece of black propaganda that has circulated.

It was already there on—written on the days that the Towers were still smoking, itself having created bin Laden as a weapon—as a weapon against the Soviet Union and the false charge. And this was believed already on the day. In the Gallup survey of European countries in the very week after 9/11 to find out their willingness to support American military action, now this report points out that high proportions of Europeans later said that they would have been prepared to support the United States if the United States had operated in Iraq under a U.N. mandate. But that kind

of hypothetical counterfactual question is to my mind a less powerful gauge of public opinion than the actual question posed in the actual week after 9/11. In that—in 2 weeks. I beg your pardon.

In those 2 weeks, only 29 percent of French people, only 21 percent of Italians, only 18 percent of the British, only 17 percent of the Germans, and only 12 percent of the Spaniards said that they would support United States military action against terrorism. We have a deep problem in the trans-Atlantic relation. You have correctly identified it. I am worried that you have looked for the wrong cause. And this brief brings me to my last caution that I would urge this committee to consider. There is a simple model of how we form opinions about the world.

We begin with perceived facts. And from those perceived facts, we arrive at our opinions. But one of the things that people are interested in, survey research has noted, is that opinions actually can often sway our perceived facts. Through the 1990s, for example, we discovered that one of the most powerful predictors of whether you thought the economy was doing well or badly was whether you were a Republican or a Democrat. Democrats thought the economy was doing well in the 1990s and Republicans thought—were much less likely to say the economy was doing well.

Now, there may be some elaborate explanation of this, but it seems that the simplest one is if you don't like the President, you don't want to give him credit and if you do like the President, you do want to give him credit. I worry that we see something of this in especially the Arab and Islamic world. That the grievances cited are genuinely cited, but are they the cause of the opinion or does the pre-existence of the opinion lead people to cite these particular grievances. And if it is that latter, than that suggests that to say well, it is our policies is not very hopeful because whatever—many of these policies are based on very deep roots in American interests and in American values.

And many of these deep policies—many of these policies are inescapable. I notice, for example, that the United States is unpopular because it supports oppressive dictatorships. That is said to be the case. It is also unpopular because it overthrew an oppressive dictatorship in Iraq. If you are unpopular when you support them and unpopular when you overthrow them, it is very difficult to see what policy guidance this view will offer you.

So I would urge the committee in its deliberations in this important subject to begin with the possibility that the reasons stated are not always the deeper motives and that there may be deeper problems in our relationships with our friends in Europe and in the Arab and Islamic world that explain many of the deep attitudes that find expression in causes that may be for fluctuating, less profound and less important.

And I thank you for your attention today and for the honor of addressing this committee.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Frum. Before I go to Dr. Tirman, how do you think the economy is doing, Mr. Frum?

Mr. FRUM. It is great.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID FRUM, ESQ., RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

“AMERICA HAS NEVER BEEN MORE HATED IN THE WORLD”

Unproveable. On what basis could one even begin to decide whether such a statement is true or false? Global opinion surveys are inexact, to put it mildly. The Pew survey of international public opinion for example suggests that one-fifth of the population of Spain changed their view of the United States in the 12 months between the spring 2005 and spring 2006. But polling experts tell us that strongly held views do not shift that rapidly; a number that bobs up and down reflects at best a transitory impression, if not statistical noise.

Outside the developed world, in poor countries that are predominantly rural and illiterate, global public opinion surveys tell us even less.

And even if we choose to believe these assessments, what they mostly tell us is that the United States faced serious image problems well before 9/11. The Gallup Organization conducted a huge survey of Islamic public opinion between December 2001 and January 2002. It found that a majority of those surveyed regarded the United States unfavorably, with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran being the most hostile. Significant numbers regarded the 9/11 attacks as justifiable. Barely one-fifth of those surveyed accepted that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arab men—two-thirds denied it outright. In Saudi Arabia, the government refused to allow the question to be asked at all.

Americans like to tell themselves that the world rallied in sympathy to the murder of some 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001. In fact, the attacks triggered a spasm of delight across the Middle East. The Memri organization has compiled an archive of grisly clippings, of which many of the worst come from the press of America’s ally, Egypt: “[T]he most beautiful and precious moments of my life,” wrote the opposition columnist, Muhammad Mustagab. “We have been prohibited from showing the happiness and joy that we feel, so as not to hurt the Americans’ feelings. Although, in this case, rejoicing is a national and religious obligation,” wrote Salim ’Azzouz in the official newspaper of the Egyptian Liberal Party.

This kind of malignancy obviously has deeper roots than any one administration. Today’s anti-Americanism traces back to the 1980s, if not earlier.

Surveys conducted by Zogby International in early 2002—a year before the Iraq war—found that only 13 percent of Egyptians and 12 percent of Saudis expressed favorable opinions of the United States. Many accuse George Bush of squandering the goodwill of the world. But in the Islamic world, there was precious little goodwill to start with. In Pew’s 1999 survey of global opinion, Pakistan ranked as the most anti-American country on earth.

Nor should one blame Iraq for the collapse of European support for American military action against terrorism. A Gallup poll conducted the week after 9/11 found that only 29 percent of the French, 21 percent of Italians, 18 percent of the British, 17 percent of Germans, and 12 percent of Spaniards supported military action against countries that harbored terrorists. We are all aware that the French newspaper *Le Monde* headlined its post-9/11 editorial “We Are All Americans.” How many of us know the words below the headline: “[T]he reality is perhaps also that of an America whose own cynicism has caught up with [it]”?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Dr. Tirman.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN TIRMAN, PH.D., PRINCIPAL RESEARCH
SCIENTIST AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTER-
NATIONAL STUDIES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH-
NOLOGY**

Mr. TIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you to the chair and to the committee for this opportunity to speak with you today. I support the findings of this report, anti-Americanism is clearly on the rise and this recent rise is linked to the actions and policies of the Bush administration. I will add one example here to my written testimony, and that is about Iran, which I spend a lot of time working on. As of today, one of the most pro American populations in the Middle East is that of Iran. This could be a very important asset if we were able to improve our relations with the Islamic republic. But much of what the United States has done with respect to Iran from

the overthrow of Mosaddeq in 1953, to defining it as part of an axis of evil, to placing primary blame on it for violence in Iraq is counterproductive. We risk losing the admiration and affection of the people of what is arguably the most important country in the region and to add insult to injury, without achieving anything in return.

It is also important to consider how Bush administration policies combined with long-standing habits and attitude set against new challenges in the world to create negative consequences. Those challenges include a truly post Cold War security policy, one which moves beyond the engrained modes of thinking about the massive use of military force or support for authoritarian states or the belief that there is no choice in between.

A second challenge, perhaps the most important, is a more equitable approach to economic development, globally, and most particularly a razor sharp emphasis on sustainable growth at home and abroad that reduces greenhouse gases. When we approach India and China and others about this problem, we are viewed as a hypocrite; but more important, we have an opportunity to lead and we must seize that opportunity. And the third challenge is how we collectively undertake our global problem solving, which is to say, a firmer commitment to inclusive and multilateral decision making. That we are not meeting these challenges effectively constitutes a primary cause of anti-American sentiment.

Consider the war in Iraq. Its dreadful consequences result from the failure to meet the challenges I just outlined. The threat from al-Qaeda was diverted into an old style military intervention to overthrow a state that had little if anything to do with the kinds of political violence that occasionally threaten U.S. interests. It was done in part to secure an oil rich part of the world and it was administered from the start as a neo-liberal economic experiment, and, of course, the invasion decision was taken unilaterally. The Iraq war bundles all the reasons why anti-Americanism is on the rise globally.

Congress has an opportunity to help start a national conversation about how American values match up with current global challenges, how policies can be more consistent with the best of U.S. principles, openness, Democratic decision making, respect for pluralism and so forth, but also how we must rethink our values to meet the enormous challenges of this century, particularly the need for sustainable economics and cooperative global governance.

At a more specific level, we need some fresh thinking and support for so-called soft power in pursuing goals of security and equity. Diplomatic assets are enormous and varied but undervalued and under supported. Congress could assess how these assets are used and how they could better serve to meet the challenges we face. Commercial diplomacy, for example, can support not only U.S. economic growth, but vastly more equitable and sustainable policies the world over. I urge you, too, to marshal the exceptional power in the universities and labs to address the immense challenge of global climate change and sustainable development.

This is a political as well as technical challenge, of course, but we can demonstrate our seriousness to the world by deploying our most dynamic resources to solve this problem.

And finally, I urge a sober assessment of global governance, how the U.S. can lead but also cooperate through multilateral institutions which most of the world's people see as a vital, indispensable instrument of their own aspirations and goodwill. We need to respect those aspirations and to discover anew how these institutions, many of which we created, serve common values. I think if we meet these challenges in this way, among other ways, the kind of anti-Americanism we see today will diminish dramatically. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tirman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN TIRMAN, PH.D., PRINCIPAL RESEARCH SCIENTIST AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

AMERICA'S SELF-IMAGE AND VALUES, AND GLOBAL ANTI-AMERICANISM

Thank you to the Chairman and the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. Very briefly I will describe how America's own self-image and its political culture affect the anti-Americanism that the committee is exploring and which is skillfully analyzed in the draft report, "The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?"

The self-image of the United States leads to a cognitive dissonance between how we view our role in the world and what we believe the rest of the world thinks about us. This lack of a connection between our self-perception and those of much of the remainder of the world, in my assessment, accounts in part for the origins of anti-Americanism and its recent resurgence and resilience.

Our self-image and the ideology that shapes it also lead to certain kinds of actions in the world—frequently violent or damaging—which are self-justified by the same ideology. We tend to be deaf to the legitimate concerns of others, and that, perhaps more than anything, is the font of the animus we now see growing.¹

The fundamental self-perception of our mission and actions in the world, one we have carried for centuries, is that of the frontier—an exceptionally sturdy image for American politics, the backdrop for our national character and sense of purpose. For nearly 300 years, settling, cultivating, and "taming" the frontier drove the Europeans who came to this continent. When the frontier closed—when the last of the indigenous tribes was subdued and the land taken—it created a sense of crisis in American politics. Teddy Roosevelt in particular responded to this by looking outward, across oceans, to imagine frontiers abroad. Much of the ensuing century has involved America in such global frontiers. But now that frontier is also closing, and one troubling question is how does our frontier mythology equip us to meet the challenges we face in the world today.

The myth of the frontier is an architecture of American politics and how we frame our role in the world. As the cultural theorist Richard Slotkin describes this myth, "the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or displacement of the Native Americans . . . have been the means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic polity, an ever-expanding economy, and a phenomenally dynamic and 'progressive' civilization."² These ideas, so redolent in TR's time, remain powerful: one can see the war on terrorism, especially in Iraq, in terms virtually identical to our continental expansion, the suppression of Filipinos in Roosevelt's presidency, or the U.S. war in Vietnam.

The language used to encourage and justify this mythology also remains sturdy. John F. Kennedy famously invoked a "new frontier" for his presidency. John McCain, like Ronald Reagan before him, refers to America as a "city on a hill" to which all the world aspires, and Barack Obama invokes Kennedy, Truman, and Franklin Roosevelt as paragons of global leadership that must be renewed. These references not only assume that the whole world is our rightful domain of action, but that an innate, moral superiority guides and justifies this mission.

¹This is most evident in the "public diplomacy" efforts of recent years, which typically depict a need for us to tell the rest of the world about ourselves and intentions, instead of listening to their concerns. For an example, see Richard C. Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post* (October 28, 2001), a slightly more sophisticated version of the Bush administration's actual effort (cf., John Brown, "A Failed Public Diplomat," TomPaine.com, October 6, 2005).

²Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998): 10.

It is easy to see why many people in the world do not share these views, many of them from ancient civilizations with their own self-referential myths and narratives. Our insistence on the correctness of our own, often backed by military force or economic leverage, is a wellspring of resentment in many parts of the world.

Nor is it apparent among most U.S. political leaders that the world of the twentieth century—the American Century, as Henry Luce famously branded it—has changed so much that this vast realm of American dominance and action is closing. Three phenomena have diminished the global frontier of this American sensibility.

(1) The first is the end of the Cold War, which formed so much of America's identity in the cardinal phase of our global involvement. The “twilight struggle” with Soviet communism, which began long before the late 1940s, still shapes much of how we structure foreign relations, institutions, military doctrine, public diplomacy, and our sense of self-worth. The conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry nearly twenty years ago drained American globalism of a paramount ideology—a way of seeing ourselves in the world—and the vitality that came with the waging of “savage wars” in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. It is with difficulty that we let go: that the war on terrorism closely follows and invokes this warrior myth—the fight for civilization against barely human and wholly alien “hostiles”—should come as no surprise, since it is the mission constructed by the Puritans and renewed throughout our history.

Since the United States has in living memory been active in so many places as a warrior nation, even a “Christian crusading” nation,³ it should also come as no surprise that this attitude and reality of war-making, whether viewed here as defensive or not, should define how many in the world see us—a morally self-righteous power with a willingness to use force, including nuclear weapons.

(2) The end of the global frontier is also evident in the rise of rivals for economic dominance. Globalization cuts many ways, and the European Union, Japan, China, India, Russia, and others are developing economic power that crowds out U.S. control of markets and the seemingly limitless potential that came with such dominance. But American pre-eminence, which remains potent, often has carried a heavy burden for a large segment of the developing world in particular. After the Second World War and until the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the United States largely facilitated the hybridized approach of developing countries that used markets, government subsidies, and other improvisations to build national industry and wealth. The “Asian tigers” were paragons of this strategy. But with Reagan, market dogma ruled the roost at the Treasury and Commerce Departments, the World Bank, IMF, and other powerful institutions of trade and development. The result was policy, including high interest rates in the late 1970s and 1980s, that devastated Third World economies.⁴ Those in the global south have not forgotten, as the election of a string of leftists in Latin America demonstrates. But we act, through the international financial institutions and bilateral relationships, as if the disproven and destructive market ideologies of the past remain the aspiration of all peoples. The rise of rivals and the continuing resentment of unfair U.S. economic practices both diminish America's standing in the developing world.

(3) Most important is the third sign of the close of the frontier—the limits of the Earth itself, the biological capacity that is now collapsing with frightening speed. This is a consequence of the “taming of the wilderness,” which has certainly been tamed and is now wreaking its revenge. The longstanding notion that resources were ours for the taking, and for using promiscuously, is no longer viable. The closing of this frontier not only impedes economic growth built on this attitude (the engines fueled by cheap oil in particular), but have other costs as well—the health and safety challenges of rapid climate change, among many others. Yet, again, as a nation we consume more resources per capita than any other, resist necessary changes in lifestyles or the application of energy efficiency in our own economy, and reject international efforts to curb greenhouse gases as if they are a plot against American prerogatives.

So we now face the closure of the global frontier in three ways—ideological, economic, and biological—and they sometimes combine with particularly destructive force. The war in Iraq, with its mendacious rationales, the hundreds of thousands dead, and the undeniable undercurrent of a war against Muslims, is not only a continuation of the “savage wars” in which we have long engaged and a new “twilight struggle,” but is both a “resource” war for control of oil and a “development” war to tame the last region resistant to American-led globalization. And the result now

³This was how a reporter for the *Wall Street Journal*, stationed in Shanghai, said the Chinese viewed the U.S. in the 1990s. Personal communication.

⁴See Dani Rodrik, “Good and Bad News on Economic Development,” Audits of Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2008; and Alice Amsden, *Escape from Empire: The Developing World's Journey through Heaven and Hell* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).

includes a run-up in oil prices worldwide, which has devastating impacts in the developing world *and* is contributor to the world food crisis.

This war is also emblematic of another lesson of this frontier mentality: just as the wars against the Native Americans of this continent became more violent and invasive as the frontier began to close, our foreign involvements appear more self-interested and violent as the global frontiers as we once defined them are also closing. In other words, the “war on terror,” inequities in our economic policies, and the refusal to recognize the collapse of the ecosystem all have the scent of desperation about them, last gasps at forceful stratagems that compile one miscalculation upon the other, earning new waves of anti-American sentiment with each one.

So in answering the question regarding the decline in America’s reputation, we need to look at policies and how they flow from several cultural or political predispositions. The policies exist for a reason, they do not come from thin air. We speak approvingly of American values, but what values, specifically, are we extolling? The freedoms embodied in our Constitution and Bill of Rights, certainly; the ingenuity and enterprise that Americans have so frequently demonstrated; and our openness to immigrants and our social diversity, although contested by reactionary forces, remain vibrant. But freedom, ingenuity, hard work, and diversity are not exclusively, nor primarily, American values. Those of us dismayed by American missteps of this decade would nonetheless err if we fall into the same trap of “American exceptionalism” that leads us into wars and economic predation. It is, for example, one small step from “promoting democracy” through USAID, a deeply flawed approach in itself,⁵ to promoting market dogma, no matter how disproven in practice, to interventions based on the desire to remove certain authoritarians. American exceptionalism is the permissive attitude that leads from one self-gratifying moral conviction to another.

On the other hand, can it be said that our conception of important political values is shared by large numbers of the rest of the world? Are housing and food and jobs and health care and education part of a legitimate scheme of “democratic rights”? Not in the universe of “American values.” Is environmental sustainability an “American value”? No evidence would support such a claim. Is global problem-solving pursued through multilateral institutions an “American value”? When it suits us, yes; when not, no. On these crucial matters of *values*—of human security, ecological survival, and global governance—the United States evinces none of what is required now for moral or practical leadership. And these attitudes lag behind much of the rest of the world.

This need for leadership and the challenges at its root could be the stuff of a 21st century frontier: America, with extraordinary economic power, admirable political institutions, and unparalleled scientific and educational resources, could lead the way cooperatively to secure a broad agenda of political, economic, and social rights, to implement a new “green” revolution in the way we utilize the Earth’s resources, and to help invent new modes of global decision making, inclusion, and equity.

Those kinds of values and the policies that flow from them would make anti-Americanism a relic of the past.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Tirman.
Dr. Brimmer.

**STATEMENT OF ESTHER BRIMMER, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR
AND DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH FOR THE CENTER FOR
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL
OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY**

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for this opportunity to comment—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can you make sure you have—because we want to make sure your voice is being recorded for—

⁵This agency had never evaluated the effect of its “democratization” programs until very recently (and inadequately) and still sustains a view of democratization that is exceptionally narrow. It promotes parliamentary training, political party development (but only some political parties), civil society development (but, again, in a narrow ideological range), rule of law (as an anti-corruption device), and elections; at the same time, it promotes marketization that destabilizes countries at the very time they are expected to enact political reform, a combination that has often proved disastrous.

Ms. BRIMMER. Is that better?

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is it.

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important report. And I commend the subcommittee on its contribution to this question of America's standing in the world and I support its findings. In my remarks this morning, I am going to focus on two particular areas, the impact on transatlantic relations and hence our relationship with Europe of the issues raised by the report, and I will also talk about the impact briefly on our standing in multilateral organizations and the difficulty in advancing our interests because of the decline of America's standing.

I will begin, Mr. Chairman, by focusing on our relations with Europe. These countries are largely our friends, these are countries that are literate, well informed, and know us well. We do not provide foreign aid to these countries, we do not have a financial lever over them, but they are our closest friends and allies, and indeed in the relationship with European countries, many of the issues raised by the report resonate. Many European friends are concerned with unilateralism and American unilateralism. They are disappointed when we seem not to live up to our values. They share our values and would like to help us advance them internationally. And they often disagree with the current administration's perception of international affairs.

This morning we have talked about and as the report begins, talks about the Le Monde article and we looked at that in detail. But we should also remember that immediately after 9/11, we saw an outpouring of support for Americans. Our fine diplomats at many of our Embassies can talk about the numbers of people that rushed to sign the grievance books in solidarity with the American people after 9/11. And indeed after 9/11, our most important alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 on security for the United States, and since our allies wanted to support us after 9/11.

And this is particularly important if we look at the impact of the decline of support for the U.S., and I will highlight just a couple of points. As I mentioned, after the 9/11 attack, our allies wanted to support us. They wanted us to work through NATO. And they wanted to work with us in Afghanistan. They understood that it is part of the anti-terrorism campaign that it was important to respond to the al-Qaeda attack. In a sense, they wanted us not to be unilateral, but to actually draw on their assets to support us. Unfortunately, as we know now, the support for the United States action was deeply impacted by the invasion of Iraq, which meant that the policy of the invasion of Iraq actually undermined the already existing international support for the work in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the policies directly affected one of our most important efforts to deal with the response to 9/11. It has also meant that the decline of support for the United States and Europe has made it more difficult to manage many issues within the alliance. Indeed, even on topics which are not controversial, such as inviting countries that have met the qualifications for NATO to membership, means it is more difficult for the U.S. to advance its interests in this area.

We saw everyone at the most recent NATO summit in Bucharest where all of the allies agreed that we wanted to invite new members who had met the standards, that one, Macedonia was not invited because we were not able to resolve the issue of the name. Had the United States been in a position where its respect was higher, we probably could have convinced our allies to advance and admit Macedonia. But so I would say that on this important issue of Afghanistan and management of the alliance, the decline of support for the United States has made it more difficult to manage our most important alliance.

I would also say that even on the anti-terrorism campaign where there has been important law enforcement cooperation across the Atlantic, that even here, the poor record of the United States on human rights issues and civil liberties issues has undermined our ability to work on these areas. Indeed, even our close friends are concerned about how we manage civil liberties issues. They have seen the impact of the detention issues and so forth and question our ability to manage information that we gather, and that is even when we talk about the effort to gather information on people coming to the United States. They are less willing to work with us in this area.

So even with our closest partners, our friends and allies, that the decline in the standing of the United States has made it harder to work with them and they would like to work with us, but we have made it more difficult. Also in the international arena, when we look at relations even within the United Nations, amongst people who want to work with us, it has been more difficult. Here, when we look at efforts of reform, the decline of the standing of the United States has made it harder to enact reform. We have long said that changing the U.N. was fundamental, and we all agree that it is important. But when we have come forward to support international efforts for change, our lack of standing has made it harder. In 2005, finally the rest of the world came around to a point the United States has long advocated the need to radically change the previous U.N. Human Rights Commission. I had the honor of serving on the Commission in the year 2000, and I can say it was clearly an institution that was in need of change. But even then when the U.N. finally agreed with the United States, there was a need to create a new institution that the United States which had been the leader on human rights issues was not in a position to engage with the rest of the world to make a better council. So the council was created as a flawed institution because we were not able to be part of the diplomacy in a constructive way.

Our lack of standing on these issues meant that the institution was worse than it could have been and that those who wanted to work with us could not work with us even on this reform issue. I would also suggest that even at places such as the World Bank which has always thrived and been an important institution for the United States, the President of the World Bank has always traditionally been an American. But when we nominated the—Mr. Wolfowitz seen as a symbol of American unilateralism to the World Bank, it made it more difficult to advance ideas and reform even as this institution, where again the U.S. voice was a welcome one.

In conclusion, I would say that it is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that in these environments, within our transatlantic relationship with Europeans and in multilateral organizations amongst those who want to work with us, the decline of America's standing has meant we have not been able to work constructively everyone with those who wish us well and want to help us advance our causes in support of our national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brimmer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ESTHER BRIMMER, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH FOR THE CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight and the opportunity to comment on the draft report, "The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?" prepared by the Subcommittee.

The report is a welcome addition to the analysis of America's role in the world. As the report explains, in recent years the United States has experienced a significant decline in its international reputation. This is a significant shift in international affairs.

In my testimony, I shall focus on the impact of that decline in two areas, America's relations with European countries and on its ability to work in multilateral organizations. As the Subcommittee's report notes there has been "a 26 point increase in Europe of the view that U.S. leadership is undesirable." While all eight of the Subcommittee's findings on "What Do They Think, and Why?" are salient, point three is particularly relevant to the transatlantic relationship. Point three states, "It's the perception of hypocrisy" borne of "disappointment and bitterness." Europeans are particularly saddened by the perception that the United States does not want to follow certain international rules and norms that the U.S. itself helped establish. This disappointment stems from the second point the report highlights; "It's the policies" that distance the United States from many its closet friends and allies. This view is also found in many international organizations. The U.S. helped create the network of international organizations that it too often seems to ignore.

The challenges faced by the United States in working with Europeans and in international organizations are especially poignant because in these environments American participation is still seen as vital. Although relations within Europe and across the Atlantic are changing, the United States is still seen as a key member of the Euro-Atlantic community. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still binds twenty-six countries in a collective defense arrangement. The twenty-seven members of the European Union are developing a complex political system with security elements, but they recognize that relations with the United States are vitally important to the European Union. Europeans and North Americans debate the ways in which transatlantic relations should develop in future, but not because they consider the issue unimportant, rather because such relations are so important economically, socially and politically.

THE IMPACT ON AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

Relations with Europe are a fundamental aspect of the foreign affairs of the United States. The U.S., Canada and twenty-four European countries maintain the strongest military alliance in the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States and Europe are closely linked economically. The transatlantic economy is worth over \$3 trillion; over 14 million jobs in the U.S. and Europe derive from this vital economic relationship.¹

As noted in previous hearings, most Europeans want to work with a United States that would like to be a responsible partner. They are not averse to the United States itself, but to policies that they see as antithetical to our values of human rights and judicial due process such as rendition of suspects to third countries with harsh interrogation methods and holding prisoners at Guantanamo.

The decline in America's reputation in Europe includes three key elements:

¹Hamilton, Daniel S. and Joseph P. Quinlan, *The Transatlantic Economy 2008* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2007).

- Dislike of American unilateralism
- Disappointment with America not living up to its own values
- Disagreement with the Administration's perception of international affairs

As the Subcommittee report explains, one of the most important factors in Europe is a dislike of what is perceived American unilateralism. From rejection of global opinion on climate change to the invasion of Iraq, the Administration's policies reinforce the notion that the United States holds itself above the law and separate from the rules that it argues should apply to other nations. Repeatedly over the past few years I have heard European experts who would otherwise support strong relations with the U.S. bemoan policies that hold the U.S. separate from the family of nations. The internal U.S. debate on these issues is often not fully appreciated in other countries. Instead, some outsider observers think that Americans assume that they should be above international norms and do not need to consult with partners. This assumption is particularly egregious for Europeans. The United States is formally allied with many European countries and is a close partner of many others. As allies, Europeans expect to be consulted on strategic issues of concern to the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. Leaders in many allied countries share U.S. concern with fighting terrorism, supporting human rights, and bringing stability to Afghanistan, but think international cooperation is necessary. Europeans are disappointed in the United States not living up to the very values that they purport to share. Renditions, poor conduct at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and holding prisoners in Guantanamo all deepen European disappointment. Among European observers, changes in policy could help rehabilitate the reputation of the U.S.

European leaders disagree with the direction in which some American leaders seem to want to go towards a world in which international rules do not apply to the most powerful state, not only in extreme situations, but in normal times. They are concerned that the U.S. no longer wants to support international rules and norms as desirable ways to manage international society, but instead sees them as constraints.

These concerns underpin the decline of America's reputation in Europe, which in turn undermines the ability of the United States to advance its interests. I will highlight the following examples:

- Erosion of European public support for NATO
- Weakened ability to manage the alliance
- Initial reluctance to cooperate with the United States on data collection

Public support for NATO. After 9/11, for the first time ever, NATO invoked Article 5, the collective defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 states in part,

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²

NATO allies pledged support. For eight months afterwards, NATO AWAC airplanes scanned the skies over the United States to help guard against another terrorist attack using aircraft. The NATO allies saw the campaign to strike al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and end the repressive Taliban regime that harbored the terrorist group responsible for 9/11 as a legitimate endeavor. European countries wanted to help the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In late 2001, many observers were impressed that the U.S. waited several weeks to plan and execute a strike on al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attack. In early 2002, European leaders wanted to the U.S. to engage NATO *more* in Afghanistan.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq changed that sentiment. European publics and many European leaders opposed the invasion. Five years of war in Iraq have undermined support and even understanding of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. European publics tend to lump the two together. The Administration's reckless war in Iraq eroded European support for the campaign in Afghanistan. Sustained international action in Afghanistan would have been difficult anyway. After all, Afghanistan has long history of resisting outsiders from the British in the nineteenth century to the Rus-

²The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>

sians in the late twentieth. The country has been wracked by decades of war and poverty. Yet not only is the Afghan campaign hard on the ground, it is hard on the alliance. One reason for this difficulty is the erosion of European respect for the policies currently pursued by the Administration leading the U.S.

Managing the NATO alliance. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an alliance of equals, the United States has always played a leadership role. Leadership involves diplomacy. Over the decades the United States has usually advanced its initiatives within the alliance through persuasion. One of the most important initiatives within NATO has been the expansion of membership. Founded in 1949, over the past six decades the alliance has accepted new members as policymakers strove to enhance the security of the West. NATO was the United States' first permanent peacetime alliance. Forged during the Cold War, rather than a shooting war, it bolstered the security of the West.

After the end of the Cold War the alliance accepted members from the former Warsaw Pact. Membership in NATO has helped erase many of the legacies of the Cold War. Both Presidents Bush, senior and current, and President Bill Clinton all hailed the goal of "Europe whole and free." During the Cold War some member states were not yet democracies such as Portugal (a founding member in 1949) and Turkey (admitted in 1952). Yet now all NATO members are democracies. Applicant countries need to accept and meet rigorous standards for membership including democratic control of the military. The United States has been a long-standing supporter of Central and Eastern European countries' desires to join the alliance. As the Subcommittee's report explains, U.S. standing in Eastern Europe remains higher than in Western Europe as a result of memories of American support for people behind the Iron Curtain.

Engagement with Euro-Atlantic organizations has been fundamental to solidifying peace and security in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. One fact of this process is finding ways for the troubled Balkans region to build a peaceful future. In the 1995 Dayton Accords, the United States and European countries agreed that a European vocation, moving towards the European Union, was a key component for integrating Balkan countries into a stable international order. For those states who wish to meet the criteria, joining NATO is another aspect of finding a more stable and secure future. The Republic of Macedonia joined NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999. For nine years, Macedonia labored to meet the NATO standards. Along with Albania and Croatia, the country was expected to be invited to join NATO at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. However, Macedonia has been plagued by a controversy about its name. Neighboring Greece strongly objects to the use of the name "Macedonia" as it is close to the name of a province internal to Greece. Some assert that Skopje's use of the name hides territorial designs on Greek land. For years many countries would use the term "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" or FYROM. The U.S. Department of State now uses the name "Republic of Macedonia."

Macedonia had completed all the substantive criteria for membership in the most important Euro-Atlantic security organization, but was not invited to the next step at the April 2008 NATO summit because the name issue could not be resolved in time. Accepting states into NATO who have met the conditions has been a fundamental goal of the United States across decades. Yet the United States could not persuade its NATO allies to encourage one member to overcome its objection to the name of another state. This was not a situation in which the allies disagreed on whether a certain state should be admitted. If the standing of the United States were higher in Europe, it might have been better able to work with its allies to find a solution that enabled Macedonia to be admitted into the alliance for which it had qualified.

Reluctance to cooperate with the U.S. For the past seven years, the Administration has placed fighting international terrorism at the top of its international agenda. I was in the audience in Bucharest when President Bush addressed a group of transatlantic experts and young leaders on the eve of the most recent NATO summit.³ When outlining his priorities for the alliance in Bucharest, President Bush asserted that "The most important responsibility of NATO is the collective security of our citizens." He went on to stress the role of fighting terrorism as an important task for the alliance. One of the most productive areas of transatlantic cooperation after 9/11 has been law enforcement cooperation. The regular, legal channels for

³President George W. Bush spoke at a conference sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, on April 2, 2008, at the National Savings Bank, Bucharest, Romania. The speech is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/print/20080402-2.html>. Dr. Brimmer was in the audience at the Bucharest meeting and heard President George W. Bush deliver this speech.

transatlantic cooperation can work well. The United States would like to work constructively with other countries. One would expect such cooperation to be closest among countries that share values and legal standards. Yet Europeans' doubts about America's commitment to civil liberties have undermined even this area of cooperation.

Liberal democracies face challenges when endeavoring to manage civil liberties and the anti-terrorist campaign. The decline in international perceptions of America's standing on human rights hurt the country's ability to work with partners on law enforcement cooperation, in particular on developing data protection norms. Transatlantic cooperation in this vital area would have been difficult, but the decline in America's reputation made it even harder. Even before 9/11 the European Union had different regulations than the U.S. The European Commission's Directive on Data Protection was launched in 1998. Whereas, the EU placed greater limits on the transfer of personal information, the U.S. had permitted the compilation of information by private entities which had encouraged the spread of various Internet businesses.

The Administration argued that it needed to be able to exchange information with other law enforcement agencies to advance the anti-terrorism campaign. Yet initial U.S. forays were met with skepticism. The United States proposed exchanging detailed information on passengers traveling to the United States. What data could be collected and how it could be used has been a contentious issue across the Atlantic. Diplomacy and debate about passenger names records (PNR) continued for years. Europeans were worried about what data the U.S. would collect on European citizens, how long it would be held and who would have access to it. The erosion of civil liberties at home affected international interest in working with us. If we do not seem to value adequately the civil liberties of our own citizens, foreign observers could be worried that we would not respect their rights either. This unease could make Europeans who value law enforcement cooperation, cautious when working with the U.S., which could undermine the quality of that cooperation.

The decline in America's reputation has an impact on its ability to undertake cooperative anti-terrorism measures with some of its close allies. Senior officials have had to make an effort to reassure even close partners. As the State Department noted, on May 14, 2007, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff had to "reach out to members of the European Parliament and the media in Brussels in effort to allay European concerns about the collection of airline passenger data as part of the U.S. fight against terrorism."⁴

The decline in America's standing among its European allies and partners seems to be accelerating a process underway within the transatlantic relationship. Europeans are becoming more assertive within the transatlantic relationship. In a sense this is a mark of success. One of the fundamental foreign policy objectives of the United States for six decades has been to support the reemergence of peaceful, stable liberal democratic states on the European continent. NATO has provided the defensive framework and the evolving European Union has offered a political system that has enabled European states to thrive. The end of the Cold War and different views of the relative importance of challenges such as international terrorism or climate change, would have strained the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the alliance has withstood significant strains in the past, such as during the Vietnam War. The balance of relationships within transatlantic relations were likely to change as Europeans became or assertive. How the United States manages this shift will have a long-term impact on the quality of the transatlantic relationship. If U.S. policies undermine respect for the U.S. it will be harder for the U.S. to manage even natural changes in alliance relationships over time.

THE IMPACT ON AMERICA'S WORK IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

As then Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote America was "Present at the Creation" of the post-war international institutions. The U.S. helped create a world in which multilateral organizations helped maintain international order. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, which are part of the United Nations system, the UN itself with a permanent seat for the United States, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization are all part of an international system from which the United States has benefited greatly. In 1945 world leaders gathered in San Francisco to sign the United Nations Charter. In 1948, under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and experts from many countries, the U.S. led the effort to craft the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

⁴United States Mission to the European Union, "U.S.-EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation," Available at <http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/US%5FEU%5FCombat%5FTerrorism/>

For decades the United States has championed international human rights. Often we have led the way calling on the international community to condemn human rights abusers. The U.S. has also advocated improving human rights mechanisms. The U.S. criticized the shortcomings of the old UN Human Rights Commission. Finally the world agreed to reform the UN and the poor standing of the U.S. on human rights meant that we were not able step up to the challenge. Just when the international community was ready to listen to our ideas, the U.S. approach was pugnacious rather than persuasive. As the Subcommittee's report notes, words matter; tone matters, especially in diplomacy.

As the Subcommittee report documents, international opinion about the United States declined in response to renditions, holding detainees at Guantanamo and the policy of denying the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to prisoners held outside the United States in the "war on terror." The use of tactics that many would call torture undermined the image of the United States as a country that respected certain norms. This condition made the U.S. voice less credible in the diplomatic discourse on reform of the UN human rights mechanisms in 2004–2006. The perception of the U.S. being unilateral affected U.S. leadership at the World Bank.

International human rights. U.S. diplomats and non-governmental organizations had long bemoaned the flaws in the system. The Human Rights Commission was supposed to uphold the principles of the Universal Declaration and subsequent human rights documents. Although it existed amid the tension between universal human rights and state sovereignty, it was still able to help advance the observance of basic principles. One feature was the country-specific resolution that called attention to human rights abuses in a specific state. Not all UN member states were on the Commission. States had to compete for slots on the fifty-three member body. As the years passed, more countries with notoriously bad human rights records were joining to prevent passage of resolutions affecting them.

By 2005, UN member states were ready to undertake a major reform effort. They created the Peacebuilding Commission and strengthened the High Commissioner for Human Rights. They also launched the effort to replace the Human Rights Commission with a new body that fixed the flaws in the old system. That year the UN Secretary-General heeded U.S. calls for reform of UN human rights mechanisms, but the U.S. was poorly placed to respond. In his 2005 report, "In Larger Freedom," then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, called for the Human Rights Commission to be replaced by a smaller Human Rights Council.⁵ This moment could have been a moment for U.S. leadership. Yet, after Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo was not able to lead effectively on the reform human rights issue. U.S. appeared to have abandoned its commitment to the rule of law and relinquished its role as an advocate of international human rights.

The U.S.'s inability to persuade others meant that even good ideas failed to be included in the new Council. One of the most important features was how the membership would be selected. Many argued that members of the new Human Rights Council should meet certain human rights standards. The Secretary-General, the United States, Canada, Japan and many European countries argued that candidate countries should receive a vote of two-thirds of the General Assembly present in order to be elected. In the end, the states decided that only a simple majority of UN member states was required.

The abrasive style of the then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, had already alienated many at the UN. The sporadic, but brusque engagement by the U.S. left many wondering if the U.S. were really interested in reforming the institutions it had helped found decades earlier. Here was a chance for serious reform and our low standing on human rights and harsh tone meant that the U.S. was not able to advance its positions successfully. Had the standing of the U.S. been higher, it might have been better able to push for serious candidate criteria for membership in the new Human Rights Council. The international community would welcome a U.S. that wanted to engage positively on human rights. Without the input of the United States, the new Human Rights Council has not done well. Started without the U.S., the Council was launched like a ship with a hole in its hull. A component of restoring the U.S. standing on human rights could be helping to right the listing vessel.

Under this Administration, the U.S. already had an example of the decline in the standing of the U.S. affecting its ability to advance its policies. The U.S. had been a member of the Human Rights Commission since its founding. Every time its term of office expired, it was reelected. However, in 2001, in the wake of the Bush Administration's rejection of the Kyoto treaty on climate change, and "un-signing" of the

⁵ Annan, Kofi, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All" Paragraph # 183, Available at <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm>

Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court, the United States was not reelected to the Human Rights Commission. After over fifty years, the U.S. was no longer a member of the world's leading human rights institution. By 2005, the status of the United States had deteriorated to the point that it did not run for a seat on the new Human Rights Council. It was dissatisfied with how the Council was constituted, but it was also not clear that the U.S. could have won a seat if it had run. Stunningly, by mid-decade the low standing of the U.S. on human rights issues meant that there was doubt whether it could win a seat on a newly formed UN body.

The World Bank. Disillusionment with the U.S. has even emerged at the World Bank. Traditionally the head of the World Bank is an American and the head of the International Monetary Fund is a European. When the term of well-respected head James D. Wolfensohn expired, the Bush Administration nominated one of the architects of the Iraq war policy, Paul D. Wolfowitz. Many Bank experts were wary of a man they thought advocated a more assertively unilateral American foreign policy. Arguably, his commendable effort at management reform with the Bank was undermined by resistance to him as a symbol of the Administration's policies and a reflection of the decline of respect for the U.S. as a result of those policies. Reform within a large multilateral organization would have been hard, but here again a difficult situation was made harder by the decline in the international standing of the U.S.⁶

AMERICA'S REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Not only has the decline in America's reputation had a deleterious affect on relations with Europe and on multilateral issues, the timing is also important. The decline in respect for the United States comes at a particularly unfortunate time in international affairs for at least four reasons:

- Just at a time when some societies are opening up to democracy and human rights, the U.S. is losing credibility to advance these values;
- Just as emerging regional powers are choosing how to integrate into the international system, the U.S. is less able to advance its views;
- Globalization needs rules, but perceptions of U.S. unilateralism makes it less able to advance global norms;
- The importance of international identity issues to international politics makes the U.S. model especially relevant, but its credibility is weakened.

Societies opening up. In recent years many countries have begun to accept values the U.S. expounds: experiments with local democracy, greater respect for human rights, a greater degree of empowerment for women, or increased receptivity to market economics. For example, Kuwait launched a small parliament with some powers. Morocco hosted a truth and reconciliation process to investigate past human rights abuses. Such changes are difficult in many societies and would benefit from political support from the U.S. Yet, just at a time when some societies are opening up, the U.S. is losing credibility to advance these values.

Emerging powers. Not only China and India, but Brazil, South Africa and other countries are playing an increasingly important role in global affairs. More states will be able to advance their own interests in the international system. Over the years the U.S. has benefited when other countries agreed that it was in their interest to adopt democracy and market economics and accept U.S. leadership. After the Second World War, the U.S. created a system in which the reemergence of Japan and Germany helped "the West" and reinforced U.S. leadership. Today, the decline in America's reputation may make emerging powers less willing to accept U.S. leadership. Instead they may prefer a world of increasing non-polarity with no clear international leader.

The United States should not squander its potential for leadership in the organizations to which it does belong. There are important organizations to which the U.S. does not belong. In some cases this is not detrimental to the United States. The U.S. is not and will not be a member of the European Union, but the EU developed with U.S. support and complements the U.S. role in the world. Still, despite the compatibility of interests, the U.S. will not have a vote at the EU table where certain important decisions will be made. More challenging could be institutions which could be developing in opposition to western ones such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO focuses on resolving border disputes, but some of its members are inclined to use it to counteract western influence in the region. Members include

⁶Ultimately, Dr. Wolfowitz had to resign because of the appearance of favoritism.

China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India and Iran are observers. Some scholars foresee a “world without the West” in which the U.S. and other “western” states are excluded from emerging international institutions.

Globalization Needs Rules. Economic globalization is changing the way goods, services, and labor are managed across many parts of the world. Yet greater economic integration and dependence needs rules to run smoothly. Such rules include agreed banking and accounting principles, product safety regulations and enforcement, labor standards and environmental safeguards. As the world’s largest economy, the U.S. can benefit greatly from globalization. However, even the U.S. needs international rules and ways to enforce them. Such rules can help safeguard Americans from lead paint on toys and avoid supporting sweatshops with workers toiling for low wages. Yet if the U.S. flouts international standards and holds itself above international rules, it weakens its ability to advance international norms.

International Politics and Identity. Ironically, the U.S.’s reputation is declining just as identity politics gains prominence in international affairs. The press of globalization, migration and modernization change traditional ways of doing things, often for the better, but not without discomfort. Many societies are grappling with how to manage ethnically diverse populations amid change. While societies need to draw on their own traditions to sustain moves towards greater human rights, the examples of others can help inspire reformers. The American experiment in pluralism and the search for unity from diversity could contribute to the international discussion of national identities, tolerance and cohesion. Yet, the perception that the U.S. violates its own values undercuts the U.S.’s ability to advocate those values.

CONCLUSION

The Subcommittee’s hearings have demonstrated the decline in America’s reputation. This hearing has considered the impact of that decline on our country’s national interests. Yet, the situation is not without solutions. As the Subcommittee has noted in many parts of the world people who have had direct contact with Americans or a chance to visit the United States often retain a more positive attitude than those with no contact. At least their opinions may be based on a more informed understanding of the United States. Increasing opportunities for positive contact between Americans, especially students, and people in other countries could help the United State rebuild its reputation.

Fundamentally, however, policies matter. America’s standing in the world will be determined by the quality of its policies and the wisdom of its leadership. In this testimony I have endeavored to show that the decline in the international standing of the United States affects its ability to implement policies even among countries and institutions usually supportive of the United States. Our close allies in Europe and members of international organizations have been disappointed in our policies. This disappointment and frustration stems from their belief that we could play a positive role in international affairs if we chose to do so. Restoring America’s reputation through sound policies would be a way to start.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Brimmer.
Dr. Hibbard.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. HIBBARD, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DEPAUL UNIVERSITY

Mr. HIBBARD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for holding today’s hearing and providing me the opportunity to testify. My region of focus is the Middle East and South Asia, and I will be talking about those—and my comments reflect those regions. Let me confirm at the outset what I see as the two central contributions of the subcommittee report. The first is that it recognizes that the declining opinion of America and the source of anti-American sentiment, if you will, is rooted in our policies, not our values. Now, this is important for a couple of reasons. It is important in part because it is indicative of what I see as a central paradox of American foreign policy in the Middle East, while rhetorically remain committed to democratic development, human rights, rule of law.

The reality is that we rely upon autocratic regimes to promote our interests. And this has been a time worn problem going back 50 years. It has become more problematic in the post 9/11 period, which I will talk about that later. It is also important because it highlights the fact that there are things we can do to try to minimize or mitigate anti-American sentiments. If the problem is our policies, we can change that. If it is problem with our values, it is much more difficult.

Now the second key point from the subcommittee report is that—I think it is important to recognize this, for both the policymakers as well as for citizens. Because if we are going to win the war on terror, we need to be smarter about how we wage it. And we need to take the struggle for hearts and minds seriously. We need to engage the ideological struggle in a wiser manner. While there may be little we can do to ameliorate the Islamic militants, the radicals—and I appreciate the comments of Congressman Rohrabacher. He is a very articulate spokesman for his position.

While there may be little we can do to ameliorate Islamic militants, there is much we can do to sway mainstream populations. And much of this goes back to staying true to our values. Now, there are a handful of themes here that are—handful of things within my testimony that I have submitted for the record.

Let me just highlight two kinds of clusters of issues and I will be brief. First of all, when discussing why they hate us, I think it is enormously important to distinguish between mainstream populations on the one hand and Islamic extremists on the other. And I would argue it is helpful to make a second distinction between those Islamic extremists who advocate the use of violence and those who do not. In some respects, our policies need to separate these out and undermine the support for the Islamic militants.

Now, let me say just a brief word about the mainstream populations. The report does a nice job of articulating their causes or their underlying sources of discontent, and I think the polling data is very helpful in this regard. It reinforces my own findings just in talking to people living in different countries, they are not hostile to democracy, they are not hostile to rule of law, they are not hostile to an accountable government.

On the contrary, they yearn for it. I have many friends that are democracy activists in the Middle East and they will tell you that what they need more than anything else is constitutional government. All right. That is one of the reasons they are so critical of American foreign policy, particularly in Egypt where I lived for some time. They don't understand why we can talk such a good game about democracy and yet bankroll and continue to fund a military regime and give a significant amount of aid to the security services of that military regime.

Now, there are many other issues as well, which I won't get into, but America's unqualified support for Israeli and particularly its treatment of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. That is obviously a source of grievance. The invasion of Iraq. I would note that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was not as problematic as what were the perceived intentions. And when we look at the Arab world, there is an assumption that we were not there to promote freedom, but we were there to basically grab the oil.

And that remains a continuing source of anti-American sentiment and it is something that should be addressed.

Finally, in terms of the concerns of the mainstream Mideast population, the policies of rendition, the course of interrogation and those other issues that have been raised in the report do an enormous amount of damage, because again, they undermine this idea that what America really stands for is freedom and again highlights this idea that we have less benign intentions behind our policies.

Now, in terms of the Islamic activists, again, let me differentiate briefly between the militants—those who advocate the use of violence and those who do not. And the reason why this is important is it is those who don't advocate the use of violence that really raise the issue of cultural values. They are the ones that are concerned about the intrusion of Western morals into Arab and Muslim societies. They are the ones that are hostile to secularism; they are the ones who advocate a greater role of religion in public life.

And it is really from this slice of the ideological spectrum that the idea comes that they hate us for our values. The point is—and this is really kind of the crucial point. While this may be the driving force for these religious conservatives, it is not necessarily the driving force of either the mainstream populations or even of the Islamic militants. Okay? Now, in terms of the motivations of the militants, ultimately it is power. I mean, what al-Qaeda seeks, what Hamas seeks, what Islamic Jihad seeks is control of a state apparatus so that they can impose their vision of an Islamic society upon that community. Right?

Now, why are they so hostile to us? They are hostile to us in large measure because we underwrite the existing order, we back Egypt, we back Algeria, we back Saudi Arabia. And so in the 1990s, what you saw was a shift or a conflation, if you will, of what was commonly referred to as the near enemy and the far enemy. I talk more about this in the testimony. But the near enemy was always considered the local regimes; the far enemy was considered the United States which backs those regimes. And that is why in the 1990s, al-Qaeda at least shifted their opposition from the local regimes to the U.S.

Now, let me just make two final points on U.S. foreign policy and I will cease and desist and we can talk about some of these other issues in greater detail. The first point is that this paradox of American foreign policy, this tension between our short-term interest of stability and access to the regions or the Mideastern resources and the longer term goals of democratic development has been a perennial problem of American foreign policy for the last 50 years. And to that extent, many of the issues that are raised in the report are not new. This goes back for many, many years. The first Bush administration faced it, the Clinton administration faced it. And now I would argue that the second Bush administration has faced it. Even though there was this initial emphasis upon Arab reform and promoting democracy, ultimately, if you look at the way in which the war on terror is being prosecuted, they have fallen back into a time line strategy. And we don't have the language skills or the intelligence or the capabilities we need of people to prosecute our war on terror.

Because of this, the way to win the war on terror is ultimately counterproductive because it neglects this ideological struggle, it neglects the popular opinion. It also neglects the underlying socio-economic and political opinions that give rise to extremism in the first place. What is helpful in this report is it will give us a guide to try to fight the war on terror in a wise manner.

So what to do. And this is my concluding comments. First off, I would argue that we need to take a broader view. We need to look at it not just as a military struggle against a group of militant organizations, but I think we also need to look at the social and political. And we need to take a look at this to that end.

The second point, we really need to abide by our values. We need to take democracy seriously. We do need a legitimacy that being the beacon of freedom brings to us. We can't sacrifice that for short-term gains.

There are other things that we need to do. One is to genuinely reengage with the Arab-Israeli peace process, and I laud the Bush administration for reaching out to do this. And even if the prospects are dim for any kind of settlement, making steps toward some kind of negotiation and being perceived as a neutral arbiter on this front will help mitigate a lot of anti-American sentiment.

I think another issue we need to do is we need to figure out a game plan for exiting Iraq, whether that is 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, whatever. We need to make a commitment that at some time, America will be out of Iraq, and to demonstrate to the Arab populations that we are not there for the oil and that we don't want permanent bases, that we do have a game plan for leaving hopefully, as they say in Arabic, hopefully leaving a stable Iraq behind.

Finally, this is my last point, I think we really do need to take energy independence seriously. \$4 a gallon hasn't awakened us up to the fact. The reality is oil funds extremism, whether it is Shi'a extremism, Sunni extremism, what have you. Until we wean ourselves off oil, that region is going to be enormously strategically significant, and we will be stuck in the Middle East for years on end.

So thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hibbard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. HIBBARD, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DEPAUL UNIVERSITY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing, and giving me the opportunity to testify. The question of America's declining reputation overseas is an extremely important topic. It has a direct impact on our ability to act overseas, and, yet, has remained a largely unaddressed issue. The report that the Subcommittee has drafted is an important step in reversing this trend. The study offers an accurate assessment of the situation, and draws strength from the fact that it is based on what foreign populations actually think, rather than relying upon views that are typically ascribed to them.

Let me affirm at the outset what I see as the two central contributions of this report. First, it recognizes that the declining opinion of America in countries around the world is due to our policies, not to our values. This is an important distinction. The perception that anti-American sentiments are somehow rooted in an innate hostility to democratic values is enormously misleading. On the contrary, it is the unfortunate gap between what we say and what we do that undermines America's image in the world. Especially in the Middle East and South Asia, it is not democracy that people despise, but the lack thereof.

Second, it is important that policy makers understand this distinction, and, more importantly, that Americans understand it. If we as a nation are to win the “war on terror,” we need to take the struggle for ‘hearts and minds’ seriously. In other words, we need to live up to the values that we espouse. Ultimately, the war on terror is not a conflict that can be won through military means. Moreover, it has been the effort to do just this—to define the problem as predominantly a military or security threat—that has led to a set of policies that are ultimately doing more harm than good.

IS IT OUR VALUES OR OUR POLICIES?

The following remarks are drawn in large measure from my experiences living overseas in Egypt and India in 2000, 2002 and 2003. At that time, I was doing research on the religious politics of these countries. In the course of this research, I interviewed a wide range of government officials, academics, journalists, democracy activists and others. My comments are also influenced by my work over the last fifteen years as an analyst—both in and outside of government—working on Islamist politics and American foreign policy.

So, why do they hate us? Is it because of our values or our policies? In answering this question, I believe it is important to make two distinctions. First, it is useful to distinguish between mainstream populations on the one hand, and the motives of Islamic activists on the one other. Second, one can make a further distinction with regard to the latter group between those who advocate the use of violence and those who do not. Let me address each in turn.

In terms of the first group—and here I am referring to mainstream public opinion among populations in the Middle East and South Asia—it would be enormously misleading to argue that these populations are somehow hostile to the values of individual freedom, democracy or the rule of law. This simply is not true. The people in these regions whom I know and speak with on a regular basis are desperate for democracy. They long for societies with accountable governments, open societies and the autonomy that defines a vibrant civil society. In short, like people everywhere, they yearn for freedom. And, to this end, they are genuinely drawn to the idea of America, and to the rhetoric that we espouse.

It should not be surprising, then, that they are extremely critical of American support for autocratic governments, particularly in the countries in which they live. Whether it is our relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran under the Shah or even Iraq during the 1980s (when the U.S. Government was supporting Iraq in its war with Iran), American foreign policy has consistently turned a blind eye toward government repression among our allies in the Middle East and South Asia. U.S. policy, in short, has tended to place a greater priority on access to Middle Eastern oil and other geo-strategic considerations than on human rights, democracy or freedom. In the post-9/11 period, this trend has become even more pronounced. Despite the rhetorical commitment to Arab reform, the Bush Administration has increased its direct support to military regimes as a means of fighting sub-state actors.

Government repression in these regions, however, is not limited to Islamic militants. In Egypt, for example, the Mubarak regime has consistently used the fear of terror to stifle dissent of all sorts, and has specifically targeted secular democracy activists, liberal intellectuals, and moderate Islamic leaders. Similarly, the actions of Pakistan’s Perez Musharraf in recent months were defined by a systematic effort to marginalize the judiciary and elements of the legitimate opposition. In both instances, the fear of terrorism was used as a justification for the extraordinary measures taken to repress these elements of civil society that comprise the moderate alternative to both Islamist extremism and continued military rule.

While the support for autocratic regimes may be seen as a necessary evil, it is ultimately counter productive. Islamic extremism is a by-product of the economic corruption, authoritarian governance, and social stagnation that are endemic in the countries in question. By supporting repressive regimes, we may find short-term stability, but in the long run U.S. policy is perpetuating a debilitating status quo. Moreover, it is this social milieu that breeds extremism in the first place. Whether it is Algeria, Kazakhstan, Egypt or Pakistan, Western support for military rule is an important part of explaining why democracy does not exist in these parts of the world. It also explains why the hopelessness bred in the slums of Cairo, Algiers or Karachi is often articulated in anti-American and anti-Western terms.

A second issue of concern for Arab populations is the U.S. government’s unqualified support for Israeli policies towards Palestinians under Israeli rule. Admittedly, the media coverage in the Arab world of this conflict is extremely one-sided, and very anti-Israeli. This is an unfortunate fact. However, this coverage reflects a side

of the conflict that is not typically seen by the American public. This includes the daily hardships of a people living under military occupation, and graphic depictions of those Palestinians killed or wounded by Israeli forces. (Almost three times as many Palestinians have been killed in the conflict since 2000 than have Israelis.) The particular concern of Arabs in the Middle East is not that the U.S. government is allied with Israel, but, rather, that U.S. policy is so consistently hostile to Palestinian interests. The U.S. Government, in short, is not seen by Arab populations as a neutral arbiter in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and, on the contrary, is seen as promoting Israeli interests at the expense of the Palestinians. Arab media coverage also includes images of American-made military equipment (helicopters, tanks, and jets) being used by the Israeli army against the Palestinian population. Biased as this may be, it is nonetheless the perspective that shapes popular opinion throughout the Middle East.

The third issue of note is the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the other means by which the current Administration has chosen to prosecute the war on terror. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, the expansion of rendition policies, the establishment of secret prisons, and the use of coercive interrogation have all proven to be a significant liability for America's image overseas. The Subcommittee report summarizes these issues well, so I will not dwell on them at length. Let me simply make two points. First, the invasion of Iraq played into the hands of the Islamist militants which have long argued that America's interest in the region is driven by oil, not democracy. By invading an oil rich Arab state, the U.S. government apparently vindicated many of the claims made against it. Second, Arab and Muslim populations see in these policies a disturbing gulf between our rhetoric and our actions. It is this divide that generates the impression of hypocrisy. The images from Abu Ghraib, the indefinite detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and the policies mentioned above have greatly undermined the image of America as a defender of freedom. Moreover, they have led citizens in the region to conclude that the exercise of American power is analogous to that of the regional military rulers.

In terms of the Islamic extremists, the issues are a bit more complex. This is due to the fact that the Islamist movement itself is very diverse. Hence, it is helpful to further distinguish between those Islamic militants who advocate violence (the so-called *ihadists*) from conservative Islamic activists who do not. In terms of the second group—those who eschew violence—it is both U.S. policies and the values of a secular society with which they are concerned. Traditional Islamist thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna or Maulana Maududi were critical of Western cultural influence, particularly in the areas of education. Al-Banna, for example, associated western education with the 'colonization' of the Arab mind.¹ Similarly, more contemporary Islamist thinkers have commonly criticized secularism as a Western imposition, and argued that there is no separation between religion and politics in the Islamic tradition. It is such attitudes that inform the claim that "they hate us for our values"—the fact that many Islamist thinkers take issue with the cultural intrusion of the West, and the promotion of particular modes of social order in Islamic countries. Ironically, many of their specific complaints—such as depictions of sexual promiscuity in the media, the alleged amorality of secular society, and the corrupting influence this has on the youth—are concerns echoed by cultural conservatives in the West.

As for those Islamists who advocate the use of violence, it is instructive to examine their own stated intentions. For example, the various *fatwas* (religious edicts) and statements issued in the late 1990's by Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri indicate that the primary concern of al-Qaeda leaders at that time was with American policies in the Muslim World. Bin Laden's 1998 *fatwa*, for example, said nothing about American society, but did provide a laundry list of grievances against U.S. foreign policy. These included the continuing presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Israel, and American backing of repressive Arab regimes. In addition, Bin Laden's 1996 *fatwa* was exceedingly critical of the mismanagement of the economies of the Middle East, specifically the squandering of massive oil wealth by regional governments, and the complicity of Western governments in these actions.

In short, the statements of Bin Laden indicate that what ultimately drives the militants is their fight with the regional governments in the Middle East and South Asia. Because American military and financial power is crucial to the regional order, Islamic militants have conflated their opposition to local rulers (i.e. the 'near enemy') with their opposition to the United States (the 'far enemy'). As Bin Laden

¹ See Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). Similarly, Ayatollah Khomeini decried "westoxification," by which he meant the contamination of Iranian society by Western ideas and culture.

noted in the 1998 fatwa, “our fight against these governments is not separate from our fight against you [the United States].”² Moreover, the failure of Islamic militants in the 1990’s to remove the governments of these countries—particularly in Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—was a major setback for the movement. This provided the impetus for at least certain Islamist groups to change their strategy. Consequently, the militants associated with al-Qaeda shifted their focus from the ‘near enemy’ to the ‘far enemy.’³ Hence, one needs to view the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998, the assault on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the 9/11 attacks and other related acts of violence against U.S. targets within this context. Ultimately, these assaults had little to do American culture or values, and much more with the Islamist opposition to their own governments.

U.S. POLICY AND WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR

There are several issues related to the comments above that I would like to highlight. First, there is a long history to many of the points raised in the Subcommittee report. For example, American foreign policy in the Middle East has historically been defined by a tension between the long-term goals of democratic development, on the one hand, and the short-term interests of maintaining access to the region’s resources on the other.⁴ Supporting autocratic regimes has been seen as a useful means of maintaining stability in the region for much of the last six decades. Hence, our short-term interests of stability and access to cheap oil consistently trumped the promotion of responsive government. Although this strategy was recognized by earlier administrations as having limited utility, it has nonetheless continued to define U.S. policy towards the region. Similarly, trying to maintain close relations with our Arab allies who control the region’s resources, while simultaneously supporting Israeli, has been a continuing paradox of American foreign policy.

It was largely the effort to reconcile these competing goals that defined the tenure of the previous two administrations (at least in regard to their relations with the Middle East). For both the Clinton Administration, and the Administration of George H.W. Bush, supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was a key mechanism for mitigating at least one of these two contradictions. Similarly, both administrations pushed for limited political reform—liberalization not democratization—as a means of promoting democratic development without destabilizing the region. A central part of this strategy was a corresponding emphasis upon economic development as a means of raising living standards. Both programs of reforms—economic and political—were intended to address the underlying socio-economic issues that contributed greatly to militant extremism. As Clinton National Security Advisor Anthony Lake noted in 1994, “It is in large part the lack of economic, educational and political opportunities that gives extremists of any sort their constituency. The viable, long-term means to defeat extremism is to address the conditions on which it thrives.”⁵

If there was any failure to these earlier policies, it was the inability of either Administration to follow through on their initiatives and to live up to the rhetoric which they espoused. The commitment to Arab Reform by the current Bush Administration in the immediate post-9/11 era reflected these failings. In a speech in late 2003, President Bush reiterated the need for reform. “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export.”⁶ These comments reflected a growing recognition that the stability provided by repressive governments was illusory, and not without its costs both to the U.S. and to the region. This call for reform was further buttressed by the 2002 Arab

² Osama Bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998. See also Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (Expel the Infidels from the Arab Peninsula),” August 23, 1996.

³ For more on this trend, see Fawaz Gerges *The Near Enemy and the Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁴ For more on this analysis, see Scott Hibbard and David Little, *Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

⁵ Anthony Lake, remarks presented at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC May 17, 1994. Similar comments were made by Edward Djerijien, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy a few years before.

⁶ President George W. Bush, Remarks presented at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2003.

Human Development report, which highlighted the link between the social and economic stagnation of the region with the absence of political freedom.⁷

While 9/11 may once again have highlighted the need for reform, it ironically had the opposite effect. Despite the rhetoric of a renewed 'Freedom Agenda,' the policies engaged by the Bush Administration have moved in the opposite direction. This was reflected in the public opinion from the region. As the Subcommittee report rightly notes, there was an initial outpouring of support for the United States in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001. By late 2002, however, when I was living in Cairo, this sentiment had largely given way to despair. The reason was evident: from the Arab perspective, America had learned the wrong lessons from 9/11.⁸ Initially there was a hope in the Arab and Muslim worlds that the attacks on 9/11 might prompt a genuine period of self-reflection and a willingness to re-evaluate American foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Whatever initial reflection there may have been, it gave way to a more aggressive response. The culmination of this was a new unilateralism, a more assertive foreign policy, and the invasion of Iraq. It was in this over-stepping—of learning the wrong lessons—that mainstream Arab opinion turned decidedly against the Bush Administration's "War on Terror."

A central feature of this over-reaction was the way in which the Bush Administration defined the problem that it was trying to solve. By focusing predominantly upon the phenomenon of terrorism, and not on the underlying issues that give rise to extremism, the Administration limited its response to largely military actions. And although 'Arab Reform' was a part of the initial rhetoric, the continuation of the time worn strategy of supporting local autocrats undercut the Arab world's faith in American intentions. Linking democracy promotion to the invasion of Iraq had a similarly disillusioning effect on Arab populations. Moreover, by arguing that the 9/11 hijackers attacked America because of our freedoms, the Administration and its supporters essentially ruled out the review of U.S. policies that many had expected. The end result was a series of events that has brought us to where we are today.

The dilemma is that there is only a limited benefit to the use of military force in what is, in essence, an ideological struggle.⁹ Military means may be effective in toppling regimes, or killing insurgents, but it is not useful in winning 'hearts and minds.' Moreover, where Islamic militants have suffered the greatest setbacks, it is largely due to their own use of violence against civilian populations. This has been especially true in Jordan, Egypt and Indonesia, where targeting civilians generated a significant backlash, and sparked a precipitous drop in popular support. The point is that if America is, in fact, committed to fighting for the idea of free and open societies, it is going to need to rely upon a more comprehensive strategy, particularly one that minimizes the reliance upon force. As it is, our strategic alliances with military regimes to fight the "War on Terror"—and our continuing presence in Iraq—undercuts the idea that it is freedom for which we are fighting, at least among Arab and Muslim populations.

So, what is the alternative? How can we re-envision the conflict with militant extremism, and develop a more constructive response? In some respects, it is nothing more than abiding by the values that we espouse. To this end, the report is extremely informative. Making democratic development and respect for individual rights a more central feature of American foreign policy—and not a rhetorical justification for less benign policies—would be a good first step. This should include much more significant funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (and related projects) to demonstrate genuine seriousness and commitment to the initiative. Similarly, defining the problem of militant extremism more broadly to include the socio-economic conditions which give rise to extremism would be helpful. This would necessarily entail taking the issues of economic and political reform seriously. It would also recognize that there is a viable alternative to both Islamic militancy and continued authoritarian rule, and that this moderate center can only flourish in a genuinely open political environment. Finally, committing both political and economic resources to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a necessity. Even if the prospects for peace remain dim, a genuine commitment on the part of the U.S. government will go a long way toward improving our image overseas.

⁷For more on the Arab reform agenda, see Steven Cook, "The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005 and Mona Yacoubian, *Promoting Middle East Democracy, Parts I and II*, U.S. Institute of Peace.

⁸See Mohamed El-Sayed Said, "Lessons Unlearned," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 12_18 September 2002.

⁹A similar point is made in Anthony Cordesman "Winning the 'War on Terrorism': A Fundamentally Different Strategy," *Middle East Policy*, Fall 2006.

There are other steps that can be taken to both engage the regions that I have been discussing, and to promote American interests. One is to rebuild the diplomatic service of this country. It is not a coincidence that American foreign policy is dominated by military considerations—and that America's image overseas has suffered so greatly in recent years—when one looks at the respective levels of funding between the State and Defense Departments. Our diplomatic services have been systematically under-funded since the end of the Cold War, and, yet, the need has never been greater. Similarly, expanding academic exchange programs is perhaps the best form of long-term diplomacy in existence. Particularly in the Middle East, where the American university system is still seen as one of the best in the world, exchange programs provide a unique opportunity for citizen-to-citizen diplomacy.

It is also important to recognize that the next president—Republican or Democrat—will have a unique moment of opportunity to reshape American foreign policy. Despite all that has transpired over the last six years, there remains a reservoir of good will toward America and American ideals. This is why Middle Easterners regularly distinguish between American citizens and the government that represents them. Moreover, the policies that have defined the war on terror are largely linked to the Bush Administration. The next President will be able to take advantage of this situation to re-engage the populations of the Middle East and South Asia, and to redefine U.S. policy in a more constructive manner. Finally, it is no secret that oil wealth has contributed greatly to extremism. It is largely oil money that has funded Al-Qaeda, Pakistani *madrasas*, Hezbollah, the Shia militias in Iraq, a rising Iran, as well as Saddam Hussein's weapons' programs. Developing a coherent energy policy that is not reliant upon oil—and that takes solar energy, electric cars and energy independence seriously—is the single most important step that America can take to minimize the danger of Islamic radicalism, be it Sunni or Shia. If we can wean ourselves off our addiction to oil, then the intrigues of the Middle East and South Asia will simply be less critical to American security considerations. However, until we do that, the pressure to continue sacrificing democracy for security will remain, and we will likely have a significant military presence in the Middle East into the indefinite future.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. All of your testimonies were very insightful, and, I think, worthy of reflection on the part of all of us, I think in part, I agree with all of what you said, including you, Mr. Frum, with the exception of the economy, however.

I am going to go to Mr. Carnahan for questions. Although I want to go back to the report for a minute in terms of its utility. I think it is important to recognize what we can from the empirical data, and accept it with a margin of error as any poster will acknowledge. But there are dramatic differences.

And I think it was you, Dr. Hibbard, that used the term “winning the hearts and minds.” If you are going to make progress, we have to win the hearts and minds. I think this has been the underlying theme in terms of General Petraeus' approach, after considerable time lost, treasure spent, and blood spilled.

But I think in terms of a recognition is important that this isn't about popularity. Our national interest isn't simply about winning the presidency of the student body. You know, this is about our national security and in the panoply of our national interests, that GAO report that I alluded to was issued back in 2005. It was in the form of a letter of transmittal. It is about—I think this was, might have been you, Dr. Tirman, your reference to commercial diplomacy. The reality is that in that letter back in April 2005, it was expressed that if the anti-Americanism that it noted began to harden, that it could very well impair our commercial interests and our national economy.

We hear discussion today about the redomination, if that is the appropriate word, or the designation of the euro as possibly the end as the currency in terms of buying and selling oil. What are the

implications of that in terms of our GDP and our national economy?

So this isn't just about we as a people wanting to feel good. This is not intended to be a guide in terms of how we feel better about ourselves. This is about at some level our crafts, national, security, and our national interests. And it is meant to be the beginning of the creation, if you will, and we welcome input continually, in terms of how do we design that blueprint to win the hearts and minds so that it is a win-win for everyone?

You referenced—and it is important to talk to these. My friend from California talked about the Merkel government, the Merkel election and Sarkozy as being pro-American. Well, you know, a more careful analysis might indicate there has been a shift there. But that is—governments come and go. Populations and attitudes of society are a different animal.

I can remember in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, all of us—and I think, Mr. Frum, at the time you were probably in the White House. And let me be clear, I opposed and voted against the authorization for that invasion. But I think it came as a surprise to all of us that Turkey, a secular Islamic or Muslim society, appeared to be prepared to negotiate including a rather substantial assistance package to the United States or from the United States, rather, to allow American military personnel to come in through northern Iraq through the Turkish border, until the elected representatives of the Turkish Parliament went back to their constituencies and heard: “If you do that, you are not going to get reelected.” So I think to me that is a very stark and real example of why we have to not fool ourselves and kid ourselves about what the realities are.

And my memory is that that is—in terms of Turkey, because there was the withholding of United Nations' approval that that action was taken or impacted those society, that population, the Turkish population, whom had been our steadfast allies. And now there is a subsequent finding, I forget who did the polling, that indicates that about two thirds of the Turkish population believe—and this is just to me incredulous—believe that if there were to be a dispute, that the American Government would opt to militarily invade Turkey. Now, we all know that is absurd, but it has consequences. It has consequences.

I said I was going to yield, and I will, to my friend from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things I wanted to begin like my questioning, and I think I will direct this to Professor Hibbard. But I would especially like you to talk about those mainstream Muslim populations and governments in places like Turkey, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and others, where we might do a better job engaging with them, as an example, for other parts of the Islamic world. So that is my first part of the question.

And the second is, in terms of the language we use and how we can use that language and make that distinction between the terrorists and extremists where we are focused on them and in a way that is not turning off or inflaming other mainstream populations.

Mr. HIBBARD. Excellent questions. Let me deal with the second issue first because I think it is enormously important.

The Islamic militants have tried to characterize the war on terror as a war against Islam, and we've tried to define it as a war on terror. And that in some respects is still in the balance, and this is part of the ideological struggle and this is why I think it is important to segregate out the different constituencies, if you will.

Joseph Nye has a very interesting framework in analyzing Iraq, and he talks about a 3-D chess board, a three-dimensional chess board and how your actions on one level have effects throughout. And while we may be able to win the military battle, our actions on the one level are going to have implications on the social and economic on another level, and the political on another.

So while we move on one chess board, we are having unfortunate ramifications on other chess boards. And this gets back to part of the way in which we sell the war domestically in this country, and we do talk about as a clash of civilizations, or I think there is a phrase these days is more a struggle for civilization, or a struggle for a civilizational of values. And that feeds into the Huntington rhetoric which ironically had a great deal of resonance in Cairo. I was actually at the University of Cairo for a conference on clashes of civilizations. And the continuing refrain of there is no clash of civilizations; but if it comes, we will win.

And I know this is a very curious thing. But that rhetoric feeds into—or the way in which the war is sold domestically does seem to make the stereotype in the Middle East that this is a war on Islam. So I think the rhetoric needs to change.

Now, this feeds into kind of the second question asking, How can we reach out to the communities?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Before you leave that, I really want to dig in. Is there other language that you think can be used by policymakers and leaders here that would help us better focus on the terrorists and would not inflame other parts of the Islamic world?

Mr. HIBBARD. Sure. In many respects it is freedom. You know, freedom and democracy and the republican values that we espouse. Separating that out from a civilizational rhetoric, and recognizing that freedom and democracy are not limited to the Western tradition and that all traditions have elements within them that are consistent with liberal constitutionalism.

In Islam, for example, there is a strong emphasis upon justice. So if we got away from the idea that we want to impose democracy, then start talking about accountable government, constitutionalism. That type of rhetoric can kind of change the frame of debate.

Although I think the rhetoric is one thing because it is the packaging, but I think it is really the substance of the policies that really need to change. And this kind of in some respects gets back to the heart of the report. We can say all the nice things we say, but as long as we are still pumping \$1.3 billion a year into the Egyptian Security Services and giving them the best technology so they can monitor everyone's cell phones and tap everyone's e-mails and—you know, it is problematic and people realize what is going on, and there is a separate military class that runs that country. Until we can change the policies, it is just going to seem like rhetoric.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield?

You mean, Dr. Hibbard, it is not just about speechwriters.

Mr. HIBBARD. Yeah.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay.

Mr. HIBBARD. They are important.

Mr. FRUM. May I take that as a cue? Much of what Dr. Hibbard says was in fact the policy the Bush administration attempted to follow in the time that I was there and was writing for the President. But let me just point out a problem. President Bush, especially at the very beginning of the war on terror, went to great lengths to emphasize—to deemphasize any possible correction between terrorism and the mainstream of the Islamic populations. In fact, in his famous September 20th speech to the joint session of Congress in 2001 he described—I am not going to be able to quote this verbatim, but he described the al-Qaeda terrorists as a minority within the extremist wing. So the extremists of the extremists.

The trouble with this was that it quickly bumped up against the actual perceptions that many of the people in the United States and Europe had, which was that these statements were not quite accurate; that this was not—that these extremist views were not the minority within a minority, they were very broadly shared. One of the—and, Mr. Chairman, in your most recent statement you began by talking about the utility of this report. And there is much insight here, but there are some counter—there are some dangers that have been I think neglected that this latest statement brings to mind.

When you try to tell the American public something that does not meet reality, when you say it is a minority within a minority, you always have the risk of stoking a counter reaction. I think we saw a little bit of that with the Dubai Ports deal. Here, there was this case where there was this populist explosion against a deal that most would recognize was not at all injurious to the United States. People—many Americans felt that they were having dangers unduly minimized for them. And when we use this language that says it's a minority within a minority, whereas, in fact, it is actually quite a substantial minority, we risk a counter reaction.

There is another risk that again I think is not mentioned in this report. We have been very conscious—the President has always been very conscious about not trying to inflame opinion worldwide. And one of the ways in which that has manifested itself, when there are terrorist attacks within India, which is a country that has been a real target of terrorist attacks. Just this spring, hundreds killed in a series of attacks now in three different cities, if I remember right. The United States has been very soft-spoken in its condemnation of those attacks. The condemnations have come from people at the Assistant Secretary level, the Department of State, from the official spokesman. But the President, when he says anything, says it in a written statement released from the White House, not in his own words.

As we try to minimize the counter reaction to the words of the United States, we risk alienating friends, very important friends, potentially supremely important friends, by showing a lack of sympathy for them when they come under terrorist attack.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am yielding back; but I would like to hear if they have a response to Mr. Carnahan's question from Dr. Tirman and Dr. Brimmer.

Mr. TIRMAN. Just one thing quickly. One of the problems with rhetoric coming out of the United States is it is actually not the President. I find myself in reluctant agreement to some extent with Mr. Frum. I think the President has tried very hard not to say inflammatory things, and I congratulate him for that. That is different from policies, of course, but still in terms of language, I don't think that has been the primary problem.

The primary problem for anti-Muslim sentiment in this country is from civil society, from some elements of the right-winged blogosphere, for example, which pounds this anti-Muslim rhetoric day after day after day. And this is global—when we talk about globalization, communications is one of the most globalized of all the sectors that have political significance. People read those blogs or they hear about them day after day. This is not a government responsibility because, after all, this is a realm of freedom of speech. But it would be nice to see members from both sides of the aisle condemn this kind of rhetoric, which I think is very damaging to the interests of the United States.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you give us a couple of specific examples?

Mr. TIRMAN. I think if you read the blogs—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But specific blogs?

Mr. TIRMAN. Yeah. Michelle Malkin would be one. Little Green Footballs, or something like that. I can't remember the bizarre names of these things. But there are many of them, unfortunately.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have never read any of those blogs. But if you could submit for the record a list of about five of the people or specific groups that are pounding on Islam, I would find it very interesting, because I just haven't seen it, I haven't heard it. And I have to admit, I don't read the blogs, so maybe I am out of date. But I would prefer if you could put that in the record, it would be very helpful.

Mr. HIBBARD. I would be happy to contribute to that. I run across a lot of this in my research as we will.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ms. Brimmer.

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you. I would also pick up on this point that in an era of global communications, that what is said can have implications in many different places because many different ears hear it. And, indeed, the appearance or the tone that might seem to be anti-Islamic can have an effect on those who would actually otherwise want to support our policies.

Indeed, if we look in the transatlantic context that many European leaders understand the need for close antiterrorism cooperation and we need to work across the Atlantic on this. However, if the U.S. appears or sounds even, as you say, sometimes from the civil society side, sounds anti-Islamic as opposed to antiterrorism, and you made the important point about that distinction, it can make it easier for those who want say don't work with the U.S. They are really anti-Islamist, if you sound that way. It gets harder for those who say, no, there is an important effort to fight terrorism in which we want to cooperate. So, hence, the tone as well

as the policies can be important in our ability to accomplish our objectives.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have got a follow-up really on the 2005 GAO report that back in 2005 suggested that the decline of our reputation could damage our ability to conduct U.S. foreign policies. And it cited four examples: By increasing foreign public support for terrorism directed at Americans; rising the costs and lowering the effectiveness of military operations; third, weakening our work with other nations in pursuit of common objectives; and, reducing foreign public enthusiasm for our business services and our products. Again, that was 3 years ago. Kind of fast forward to the report today.

And this is a general for the panel. Are there specific examples from specific countries or regions where we have seen this play out already? And I would like to hear from the panel on that.

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may respond to the Congressman's comment and begin the response. I will pick up particularly on a point that you highlight from the GAO report which talks about raising the costs and lowering the effectiveness of United States foreign policy, and particularly of military operations. I will cite in particular NATO's efforts in Afghanistan.

As you know, NATO in Afghanistan, this is the first time that we have used a major military force in this region, and this is an important operation for NATO. NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. Now, the United States of course as a NATO member participates in ISAF, but I would suggest that the decline in America's standing has made it harder for our allies, even those who do want to work with us and who want to help share the burden of this important mission, makes it harder for them to sustain public support and, therefore, they probably deploy fewer resources than would be helpful.

For example, currently—and of course numbers do vary—there are approximately 52,000 troops in Afghanistan. That comprises all 26 NATO countries and 14 partners. Of those, over 23,000 are American troops. And although we are an alliance of 26, we are bearing a large part of that. And I would suggest that because that it is tough for even some of our close partners who have to defend having their troops in Afghanistan, even those who are in the south, such as Canada, the Netherlands, that are right there in the front lines with us, they have a tough time, and the decline of our standing makes it harder for them to work with us on a mission for NATO in Afghanistan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Has that also been reflected in restrictions or conditions on engagement from a patchwork of different conditions from different partners in that coalition?

Ms. BRIMMER. Indeed. Yes, Congressman, that would be the case. It would be ideally better if NATO could deploy all of the assets across the country. But, indeed, as you note, for certain countries, because of the lack of political support, for example, in Germany, it makes it harder to deploy those troops everywhere. Therefore, those countries have to put limits or caveats on what those troops do, making them in a sense less military effective when working within an alliance setting.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. TIRMAN. Since the chairman raised the issue of Turkey, I will elaborate a little bit on that since it is a country I have studied some. I have also found shocking the level of opposition within Turkey to the United States impending invasion of Iraq, because the United States had been very generous to Turkey over the years. In fact, we were regarded for many years as being their principal ally. And this was in contrast to Europe, Western Europe; we gave them a tremendous amount of military equipment, sold a lot of equipment to them, have attempted to put Turkey on a fast track to membership in the EU, and many, many other things. I think all good policies, apart from military assistance, I think the EU membership was a very important step for all of Europe, which is now of course in kind of a state of suspension. I think what is generally perceived to be anti-Islamic policies is what is at the root of the change of the opinion inside Turkey. And this has a lot of consequences. The immediate consequence was Kofi Annan's planned settlement of the dispute on Cyprus, which I think was a direct result in part—it is a complicated argument which I won't make, but was a direct result of Turkish umbrage, shall we say, over the action in Iraq.

Turkey is essential to our oil interests because of the pipelines. It is essential to peace in the Caucasus. It continues to be a major supplier of labor in Europe. And of course, the immigration issues and the emotional backlash against many from that region in Europe is also a serious issue.

And we can't lay all these many issues and the controversies surrounding them to American policies, but there is a causal chain here that we have to take into account. I mean, why has Turkey turned essentially against the United States in many respects? And what are the consequences of that turn? I think it is something that is very sobering. This is just one country, however key it is to that region broadly defined. Thank you.

Mr. FRUM. That question, Dr. Tirman, which is a very powerful one, may bring us to what ought to be the headline thought to take away from this problem, which is we need to be very careful about it seeming that when things happen in the world, they happened because America acted and others reacted; that United States is the cause and everybody else is merely the effect.

There are deep changes that are going on in Turkish society and culture, many of them troubling. Those changes have indigenous roots inside Turkey. I wish it were true, for example, with Dr. Brimmer, that if there were—that there was something that the United States could do, some alteration of policy that would make Europeans less—more willing to engage militarily in Afghanistan. But I don't think there is anything in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Europe today that explains the rules they impose on their forces. There were the same problems in Bosnia in the 1990s, the same problems in Kosovo.

That those—that the European attitude toward military force is an indigenous event within Europe. In this case, they are the cause and the United States is the effect. And in many ways, if we are to take seriously the advice to be more humble, to be more conscious of others, to be more respectful, that perhaps that advice

should also lead us to believe that not everything they do is a result of something that the United States has done first.

Mr. HIBBARD. Let me just chime in very briefly. There are any number of things, any number of policies in the Middle East that limits or that generates anti-American sentiment and limits the ability of these states to cooperate with us. Our unqualified support for Israel means a huge liability that we can talk about the merits of. I am not talking about it badly, that policy, I mean, the current policy of unqualified support is a huge liability and it hinders the ability of Arab states to be openly pro-American.

And it also fuels an unfortunate tendency within the Arab press to generate or to allow any number of stories that are hostile to Israel and to generate anti-Western sentiments as a way of deflecting attention from their own misrule. I could go on at length about some of the stories that I witnessed watching Nile Television News.

But similarly with Iraq. This has been a major problem for our Arab allies. You know, the Egyptians nor the Saudis have diplomatic representation in Iraq, and they think we have really blown it, and it is a real liability, and they are trying to figure out when we are going to fix it.

So these are issues that affect the ability of states to operate in conjunction with us. It also limits the popular support for any kind of action that would be supportive of the U.S.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me now go to the ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me note that in my opening statement, that I went through a list of the hearings that we had and the emphasis and focus, and with some critical attitude or critical tone that I had. And let me, however, add an amendment to my opening statement to say that the chairman has been very open to any suggestion that I would have to a hearing. And, in fact on several occasions, we had especially, dealing with our relations with Mexico and Ramos and Compean, the chairman worked with me to make sure we had good hearings and has always been open to other ideas as well. So I don't want to seem like I am being totally negative as I accuse other people sometimes of being totally negative toward things.

Let me just note that America's biggest military commitment during the 1990s was in the Balkans, and we intervened. To what? To defend Muslims against being massacred by basically Christians, Serbian Christians were involved in massacring great numbers of Muslim people.

At that same time, bin Laden and his group were engaged in various terrorist acts against the United States, and at the same time, opinion in many Muslim countries was just as negative about the United States as it is today. And that is when our number one military operation was aimed at protecting Muslims from being killed by Christians. And whether or not that reflects the Israeli policy or whether it reflects just the fact that there is in within the Muslim population a disdain for certain Western values that we—that some of us actually within our analyzing what comes out of a free society, there are many things that traditional Christians are upset with. And perhaps the Muslim population or devout Mus-

lims feel repulsed by some of the more sordid things that arrive from the human nature when human nature is free to act as they would choose to be, as they choose to act.

Let me, just a couple of housekeeping comments. And Mr. Tirmin—or Dr. Tirmin, I should say, let me just note about climate change and your suggestion that climate change has something to do with our popularity. You are from MIT. You are not a professor of science from MIT; and let me note that there are several professors in related science from MIT that totally disagree with the position that you have advocated on global warming today. And to mention two of them, Richard Lindzen, who is one of the most respected scientific minds in the country from MIT, totally disagrees with the position that we have to be worried about CO2 build-up, and that we are going to regulate everybody's lives on the planet on that. And Kerry Emanuel, a noted scientific professor at MIT, totally disagrees with your view on that.

Now, whether or not that means—you have every right to advocate your position. I think it is a wrong position, and I think trying to superimpose that on the world will just create enormous resentment in the Third World, and should indeed create, because it will keep people—poor people a chance to live a decent life because of the economic repercussions of that policy.

Now, if you would like to rebut that and have a couple minutes on global warming, please feel free.

Mr. TIRMAN. Well, I am not qualified to discuss the science of global warming. I think it is fair to say, among the qualified climate scientists in this country and indeed around the world, there is pretty close to a consensus about the relationship between climate change and human industrial activity.

But my point is slightly different, and that is to say that there is a challenge that we have before us, and that challenge does have to do with climate change and other environmental protection or sustainability challenges that we are perceived widely throughout the world as not paying heed to. Whether it is through the international efforts, international treaties that are on the table and have been proposed to some extent, endorsed by most industrial countries around the world, not all, or the implementation of goals for reduction of things like greenhouse gases. We are widely perceived, and I think correctly, as being well behind many, many other countries, particularly those of Western Europe, Australia, Japan, and others who are generally considered to be part of the Western industrial world. And I think this does create a sense that the United States is simply not playing by the same rules. And that does create I think a level of anti-Americanism, which is profound.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note that I am very happy that the United States doesn't play by their rules, and that we lead the way. There is not a consensus on global warming. In fact, the word "global warming" has been changed now to climate change, which we hear all the time, because it is not getting warmer. And after—and there is more and more scientists like the two from Massachusetts Institute of Technology who I named who are just now stepping up to this hoax that is being used as a leverage to get us to

agree to treaties and policies that our people would never accept if they had a choice.

Back to other issues then besides global warming. Let's get right down to this idea of whether the United States is, and this is, after all, what the hearing is about. We are losing our popularity in the world because we are not supporting those fundamental values that we believe in as a people. And first I will make one comment about Turkey.

If you would study very closely that vote in the Turkish Parliament and what forces were at play when the Turks refused to permit our troops access to go into Iraq during that part of the conflict, you will find that the moderate Islamic party that is now a majority in the Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of permitting the United States to do this, and it was the old secularists who voted almost unanimously against it that carried the day. And that tends to go against that it is America's alienating of the Islamists that have that impact. And I was very surprised to find that out, because I had to go to Turkey and talk to the people over there before they pointed that out to me, because I had never seen that pointed out in the American press.

The moderate Muslim regime in Turkey, I do not believe, is any type of ominous trend at all. In fact, I would think this reflects exactly the type of positive trend among Muslims that we should applaud in that we have a group of moderate—group of Muslims who have come to power in Turkey, and they are certainly adhering to democratic principles, it seems, as we would hope would other countries. And they voted against us in that particular case. Actually, the moderate Muslims are the ones who voted for us, and then it was the secularists who voted against us in that case.

So let's get to this. What are we talking about here? It seems those people who are condemning the neocon dream and condemning American's strategy that we start with President Bush's they call neo-con dream of supporting democracy in the Islamic world versus, and again, then on the other hand we are being condemned for supporting the old line authoritarian regime like Saudi Arabia.

Now, you can't have it both ways. I mean, are we unpopular in the Muslim world because we are pushing—unrealistically pushing the neocon dream of a universal democracy? Or is it that we are disliked in the Muslim world because we are supporting authoritarian regimes?

Mr. Frum, you did some good writing for the President.

Mr. FRUM. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Both the last question and the point you made at the beginning, I think, underlines something that this subcommittee needs to think about very hard. Because we do see—when you say you can't have it both ways. People are having it both ways. They condemn the United States both for supporting autocracies and for overthrowing them. There is much unhappiness because the United States is associated with the Egyptian Government when it tries to control the press or interfere with the courts, and yet there is not anger against the Turkish Government which is increasingly, unfortunately, interfering with the press and trying to control the courts.

I think when we are trying to analyze public opinion, when we look at the data that is amassed in this report, we need to pay attention to the structure of the human mind behind the data: Why is it—your question at the beginning. Why is it that Bosnia does not resonate as a fact and yet Israel-Palestine does resonate as a fact?

The fact that—we need to be I think a little more sophisticated in how we treat this survey data and to understand that opinion often precedes—it is the opinion that comes first, it is the perception of fact that comes second. And that is an extremely—if that is true, if that observation of how the mind works is true, then we would be making a big mistake if we imagined—well, let's go through this list of stated grievances and imagine that by somehow redressing them that we will solve the problem.

No European state, no Western states tilts more toward the Palestinians and more against Israel than France does. Yet, in the middle of 1990s, France discovered itself with a severe internal security problem, a severe terrorism problem. People—that the attitude came first in that case and the perception of fact came second. And this is something that when we think about why is it that we face this radicalization of opinion in the Islamic world, that is something we really have to address in our thinking about the problem.

Mr. HIBBARD. Let me respond to some of these comments. First, I think that, again, there is long-term animosity toward Western support for the military regimes of the region, and that is a continuing source of antagonism. There was also criticism of the neocon dream, to use your phrase, not because it was promoting democracy, but because the perception was that democracy was just a means of selling the strategy of Western domination, and that what was really driving the neocon vision was regional hegemony; it had very little to do with democracy, it had everything to do about imposing American power on the region.

Now, there was the view that certain regimes are no longer useful to the U.S. And so we were going to eradicate them, Saddam Hussein being the first. There was talk of the Saudi regime being displaced. And keep in mind that the historical context—people remember the 1980s when the United States was tilting toward Saddam Hussein in his war with Iraq and we provided covert funding and support and et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So there is a certain amount of cynicism and skepticism of what America's intentions are within Iraq all along, and hence a lot of skepticism of the neocon dream.

Let me make two last quick comments. First, in terms of Bosnia, it is an interesting point and I have raised this with friend of mine in the Middle East. And one of their responses is that the West sat by and watched the slaughter of Muslims transpire over about 4 years, and it was really only in 1994, I think, that the U.S. actually intervened.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It was only until the Americans decided to act to lead the way.

Mr. HIBBARD. Right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that anything was done.

Mr. HIBBARD. Exactly.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Americans—the West, meaning our European allies, sat back.

Mr. HIBBARD. The French and the Brits sat on the sidelines and the Germans. Of course. But the perception again is that the West sat on the sidelines watching the Muslims get slaughtered; and finally, when it became too much of a liability, the West actually stepped in. Unfair as it may be, that is part of the image.

The last comment I will make is in regard to France. And one of the reasons why they had the problem in the 1990s was because they were backing the Algerian regime, and the Algerian regime over—there were elections in 1989, 1990, as I remember this, and it looked like the moderate Islamists were going to win. There was a coalition of Islamists, some moderate, some militants, whatever.

And the military didn't want to see this happen, so they have intervened and displaced the regime, and you basically had 8, 9, 10 years of civil war that followed that. And that is why the attacks on France happened in the 1990s, because they were very much involved in the support of the FLN regime, or the FLN aligned regime.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ms. Brimmer, did you want to comment?

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you. First, I would concur on your point about France in particular and the link to the terrorism in the 1990s and the role of their foreign policies. Again, policies do matter. But I also want to pick up here on the use of the term “democracy.”

I think one of the other important elements, as the report notes, is in sense a disappointment in the U.S. use of language. And here, one of the things we note in the transatlantic relationship is that while there is actually quite a lot of support for supporting democracy, even the most recent German Marshall Forum report, notes there is actually quite a large support amongst Europeans for supporting democracy.

For example, in Central Eastern Europe and North Africa and elsewhere, but that one of the issues, by using support democracy promotion as one of the excuses for the invasion of Iraq, once we were searching for different reasons, we have since discredited a term which is actually very important which many people across the world value deeply and see us as champions. They see us as champions of democracy and human rights.

So when we use terms that devalue those terms for very different policies that we use those terms, we actually create additional problems because we make it harder to advance the very values that we hold important for international order. Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let's just note that the outcome is not—we are not done in Iraq, and the situation is still in play. If we walk away with our tail between our legs and some radical element within that society is able to take over, and you can bet they will condemn forever for what we did there. And, however, I would suggest that if we are successful and you have a somewhat pro-Western democratic society in which people's rights are respected to a certain degree more than in a lot of these other countries, people throughout the Middle East will forge different opinions.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Will my friend yield just for one moment?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Certainly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In terms of Iraq—and this is an observation about the comments by Dr. Brimmer. I put forth the premise that the world, and the American people, were told initially that this was about weapons of mass destruction in terms of how the case was presented. And then, of course, the issue of their relationship or the purported relationship between Saddam Hussein and then al-Qaeda. The comments by the President's chief of staff in terms of, you know, you don't market the war before Labor Day. And then democracy promotion and concern about the situation of Iraq almost was the tail wagging the dog again, which leads to the cynicism and the skepticism. And, let's put it right out there, the perceived hypocrisy of where we are in terms of the promotion of democracy and in our actions.

What I found fascinating—and I am going to yield right back. What I found fascinating is the almost universal approval of American values, uniquely American values, and how do we market them and at the same time deal with the realities of what the world is? On the one hand, we can talk about Saddam Hussein; and yet we invite Islam Karimov into the Oval Office. You know, we have Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan being described by the Vice President as a good friend. Secretary Rice talking about Obiang of Equatorial New Guinea is a good guy.

I mean, it is confusing, and I think it is something that really has to be thought through in terms of how we do promote our values, stick to them, and deal in very practical terms with issues that we have to deal with. Dr. Hibbard's observation about oil and independence of oil. That is not a bad beginning right there. I am ending. I am sorry.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that I think that American policy reflects the strengths and weaknesses of our people, of our system, and the strengths and weaknesses of our leader. And some of the complaints that my good friend and the chairman focus on, for example, the ones he just focused on meaning the excuses that we had for justifying our intervention in Iraq, some of them—some of the arguments that were made, and Mr. Frum was very involved in the writing of those positions. I know that I think that they reflected, frankly, the weaknesses in our own President, who is a very stubborn man and is a very—carries on things in a very personal way. And I think that he was probably determined—and I was a speechwriter for President Reagan for a number of years, and I was lucky enough to work for a man who had a different way of approaching people and a different attitude toward life. And I think that what our chairman has suggested by and large are shortcomings of our President personally. And I do not take glee in pointing that out.

With that said, let me note that as we mentioned several times, we talked about the inconsistency of us having tilted toward Iraq in the 1980s, that is a myth, a total, absolute myth. The Iraqi Army has always been—every piece of the Iraqi Army was Soviet. At no time have we supported a regime that was so totally enveloped and so much military a latch that you might say that every one of their attack rifles, pieces of military jets were all Soviet provided.

And so if there is any—in the 1980s, if there was, I say if because I am not privy to a secret strategy, but there may well have been a strategy that I wasn't privy to try to play Iran off of Iraq and vice versa in order to prevent those two very negative forces in the Middle East from going into other pro-Western countries and creating a bad situation. But never were we supportive of Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship in the 1980s, from what I know.

Mr. HIBBARD. I would just respond briefly. Bruce Jentleson has a great book on this where he kind of delineates. Bruce Jentleson is, I think, at Duke University and he wrote a book. I think the title is *With Friends Like These*. And there is also—there is a fair bit of documentary evidence on this, and I would be happy—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will take a look. I have heard a lot of it, and I will tell you that a lot it is like this that the CIA trained bin Laden and we supported bin Laden, which is a total myth as well. The fact is the Saudis had pumped in their own money. They didn't need any money or training from the United States.

Mr. HIBBARD. And the Pakistani Intelligence Services.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, well, the Pakistani Intelligence Services. Listen, I have done more complaining against the ISI than anybody you can possibly imagine. But that is a different story. I think the ISI played us during that time tremendously.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would my friend yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will, but I would like to get one other little area in, and that is another fundamental issue. When we are talking about Islam and Muslims and how we are now dealing with the Muslim community in the United States and the world after 9/11. And I would—you missed my great condemnation of the President personally. But to the degree that I condemned him personally for some of these mistakes, let me commend the President for after 9/11, the incredible effort he has put out to make sure that Muslims, moderate Muslims are reached out to and pointed to.

He has repeatedly, in his statements and his meetings, gone out to meet with moderate Muslims so that there would not be the backlash against Islam that would come from when 3,000 of your citizens are slaughtered in front of your eyes by fanatics who are claiming that their motive was Islamic in motivation. This President has done more than I could possibly have expected in that to that degree. He has really reached out.

But now let's take a look at what we are talking about among the Muslim community.

I happen to believe if we are going to be successful in this war—and I have no hesitation of calling it against radical Islam—the radical Islamic movement has declared war on us—that we have to have the moderate Muslim population, which is the overwhelming part of the Muslim population on our side or we lose. We lose unless the moderate Muslims and to the degree that we were able to mobilize very devout Muslims in Afghanistan to do the fighting necessary to remove radical Islam from Afghanistan shows you the success of that strategy.

But it is important that we note that without those moderate Muslims in Afghanistan—in fact, they are very devout Muslims in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban, we could not have subjected there as we have succeeded to the degree we have. How do we de-

fine radical Islam then? And how do we define who are those Muslims who are, yes, we need to reach out to and are basically in—we believe should be in our camp, which is the majority I believe of the Muslim population of the world?

I would ask you, the panel, are Muslims that advocate Shari'a law for their society, people who would advocate that women not be given the education that men are given, people who are advocating that all sorts of crimes against what we believe are crimes against women in terms of stoning a woman to death if she has committed adultery and things such as that, are we—are we including those people that believe this Shari'a law, that they are not our natural adversaries within the Muslim world? That is the question.

Mr. HIBBARD. I think the short answer is it is less about Shari'a law and more about the willingness to use violence to promote their vision of society. So the real issue is violence.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Shari'a law, as far as I am concerned, encompasses violence against individuals in a society. Now, in terms of imposing Shari'a law via a democratic process or a violent process—so you are saying as long as it was a democratic process and that law was imposed democratically, it is okay to commit the acts of violence that go with Shari'a law?

Mr. HIBBARD. No, what I am saying is that the—when you asked what is the defining feature of extremism, Islamic radicals, what is the defining feature, and I would argue that ultimately it is the willingness to use violence to impose their vision upon the rest of society. And the problem about—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Shari'a law by its nature is—

Mr. HIBBARD. Back up. Essentially Shari'a is nothing more than Islamic law. And there are 1,500 years of Islamic scholars and jurists and there are four different schools in the Sunni tradition, other schools in the Shi'a tradition. What do we mean by Islamic law? What do we mean by Shari'a? The Shari'a that the Taliban embraced or the Shari'a that the Sudanese embrace is a very narrow read of that historical tradition. Some of those people would argue it is not even consistent with that tradition. It is rooted in a handful of particular scholars, I think from the, I think 14th century in particular, and the Hambali school, which is very influenced by Saudi Wahabism, who is very influential.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are there forms of Shari'a law that you are saying are consistent with our ideas of liberties?

Mr. HIBBARD. Yeah, of course.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are?

Mr. HIBBARD. Of course. There is a great book by an individual named Sa'id al-Ashmawy called *Against Extremism*.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But it is more than just—you see, in my mind—yeah, okay. If someone is imposing Shari'a law democratically—obviously we believe that democracy—people have a right to choose their own—through a democratic process. But you understand that Shari'a law, in and of itself, with the treatment of women and the whole extent of some of these concepts—I guess I am not as educated on it as you are. I admit that.

Mr. HIBBARD. There has been a continued debate on how the modern world—and this debate has been going on since the 1920s.

It hasn't stopped. Terrorism is intertwined with this. Osama bin Laden has one vision of what an Islamic society ought to look like. And the vast majority of people within the Islamic world don't buy that vision. I mean, they may be swayed by his critiques of the West and the critiques of what the motivations of the West are in Afghanistan or Iraq, but they don't necessarily buy the vision that he proposes. So—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are finding out in Iraq where after a long period of time, certain areas of Iraq were then controlled by these radical elements, that the people have turned against these radical elements. Now, I then have to educate myself to—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield for one moment? Because I think the question that you posed, or the premise that you put forth really deserves to be answered with great clarity. And please correct me if I am misrepresenting what you are suggesting. But you described Shari'a, which is the body, if you will, of Islamic law and tradition.

Mr. HIBBARD. Exactly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. As espousing violence from how you—how you view it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you impose it on—

Mr. DELAHUNT. If it is imposed or not imposed.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is the question, is it violent in its nature in the fact that once it is in place, that its mandates on the people are based on a forced acceptance and adherence to those standards or else violence will be used against those individuals not willing to do that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Is it fair if I could restate what you just said?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Islamic law, per se, espousing violence?

Mr. HIBBARD. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. HIBBARD. There are interpretations of Islamic law which—

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I can, I think what we have witnessed, observed is—I think it was you, Dr. Hibbard, maybe it was Dr. Brimmer, is civil society here in this country reflecting exactly the interpretation of Shari'a and Islamic law that was just articulated, and I say this respectfully, erroneously by the ranking member.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well—

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is the concern.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me reclaim my time then, because, let me note I am not an expert on Shari'a law, but I am concerned when I hear people who claim that they are fulfilling Shari'a law suggesting that women must wear burkas from the head to the toe. And if they don't, violence can be used against them. Now, I don't know if that is part or essential to Shari'a law or not. I am not an expert on it. It seems to me that would be, by definition, an acceptance of violence that is part of Shari'a law. Now, am I wrong in that?

Mr. HIBBARD. The thing is, again, that is a very extreme reading of Islamic law. It is a very narrow reading of Islamic law. And it is the interpretation that is embodied in the Taliban and in Sudan, and, to a limited extent, in Saudi Arabia. I mean, they have a very restrictive—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Absolutely, Saudi Arabia.

Mr. HIBBARD. And again you can see elements of it in Iran as well. Now, the flip side is, again, I think somebody—I think it was Dr. Tirman was saying that Iran is the one area where the U.S.—anti-American sentiments really hold no sway and that is largely because they have had 20 years of rule by a theocratic rule. And so people don't share that vision because they see, you know, how regressive and oppressive it is.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is exactly correct. And I would suggest then that the United State's position should be that we do not believe in that and that is inconsistent with our goals. And that is the way that you make the people of Iran aware that you are on their side rather than the side of the nutty mullahs that run that country, because you make it very clear and you don't step back because your policies then are being defined as being inherently negative toward the Iranians, when, in fact, by taking a tough stand that the mullahs there are, you know, unacceptable, they are brutal, which is unacceptable, we are indeed allying ourselves with the moderate elements in that society who don't believe in that. And I think that that could be taken also as an example for the rest of the Muslim world. If people are advocating Shari'a law, people are advocating that the clerics run their country, perhaps those are the people that we should suggest are basically not America's allies. But moderate Muslims who are open to basically a much freer and open society, those are the people that we want to work with throughout the world. I would think that is a good strategy. And please comment and I am done. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. But if anybody on the panel would like to comment on that. That is fine.

Mr. TIRMAN. I just have one comment and that is it is a big complicated topic, so it is hard to parse this very concisely. But it is the implication of how we oppose, say, the extreme forms of Shari'a, if that is what is at issue. I would say that in Iran, for example, while it may be true that large numbers of Iranians don't like the regime as it is now constituted, it is not necessarily the case that they are against an Islamic Republic, that is, a Republic that is run according to some Muslim principles. The complexities of Iranian politics are things that we can't get into here. But I would not assume that because they may or may not like Ahmadinejad—although he was, in fact, elected—that doesn't mean that Islamic law is still not revered in Iran.

But the more important point for us here is, well, even if we believe that some majority of Iranians don't like the application of Islamic law in Iran, what is it that we do about it? Do we threaten them with war? Do we impose sanctions on a regime that then hurts mainly poor Iranian people? I am not saying that—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How about if we include them in the axis of evil in our statements, which—

Mr. TIRMAN. I think there is a legitimate question about how—to what extent American opinions are supposed to be backed by threats or force or sanctions or other kinds of what I would consider—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or support—the President has come under criticism here during—let's note during this administration, in

terms of public relations and promoting the ideals of democracy, this administration has basically spent twice as much, or at least a huge amount more, I will have to make sure it is twice as much, a huge proportion more of money on that effort than happened during the Clinton administration. And so that—

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman will again yield for just a moment?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think in listening to what Dr. Tirman said, it is not a question of necessarily how much money that is being spent, because we have heard on panels on the issue of Iran a plea coming from those who are ardent opponents of the current regime in Iran, if you will, represented the voices of those who are in Iran, please don't send us money, please do not send us dollars. The same issue today I daresay being discussed fervently within the pro democracy activists within Cuba. It is not a question of how much money and I am not saying there is debt by appropriating the money reflects nothing but good intentions. It is a question of doing it in a context and within a blueprint and in a full understanding of how to be effective, how do we achieve the goals, I think, that we all would hope. And if you don't mind, I will move to Mr. Meeks.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do disagree with that concept. I think we should be supporting those elements, and I tell you, there are many other people in—

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is not a question of supporting the elements. It is a question of how to support them and listen to them rather than impose our own recipe for what we believe that they want, start to listen to them.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Put me down for supporting the Iranian resistance. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. I can't help—you know, I wanted to go somewhere else, but I have to make some comments because I think that what I have just been listening to is part of the problem, why others are starting to look at us in a different vein. I can only imagine what we would have done as a country because sometimes, you know, the things we are accusing and we see incorrect I should say as opposed to accusing—what we know is incorrect that other countries are doing, you know, not too long ago, 45, 50 years ago, this country was doing some things, this country, in the name of democracy.

There was a whole group of people who may look like me, were subject to Jim Crow laws, segregation, should we be classified as the axis of evil? Would we have liked that if others had call us the axis of evil and said—and Christianity was utilized to a large part in this country to justify slavery. Should we then get rid of Christianity and say Christianity and condemn the religion of Christianity? It is how we deal with these things and based upon our own history, we should know that we should do differently, because surely, we would not like what we are doing upon other people done to us. When we looked at the regimes in South Africa, we never called them the axis of evil. When people were fighting to change what was taking place there, the fact of the matter is in this country, when individuals were trying to change it, Dr. King,

for example, you know, we celebrate him, now that he is dead, but when he was alive, we called him a Communist. We said he was a rabble rouser, creating trouble, making disturbances in our Government and our democracy.

You know, I had a whole thing here that I was going to go through that in this Congress, when W.E.B. Du Bois reminded me of you to a degree, Dr. Tirman, when he was talking about what was taking place in this country and they were at the beginning of the Cold War. People were looking at him as if he were crazy. Yet here we are again. I mean, I think—and then it is not just the matter of how the Muslim world is looking at us and that they—I think that is why Mr. Chairman, what you have done with these hearings is fantastic. Not just the Muslim world, our allies. You know, when we start calling them—it seems to me when people look at what we say, it is—I want to give you this quote.

You know, some people say that love is not just a noun. It should also be a verb. The same thing is true with democracy. It is not just a noun. It should be a verb. There are actions. People look at what you do to determine whether or not there is a democracy. Just as it is in love. You can easily say you love somebody and then do something else. But, you know, when I think about it, when we disagree with someone, our allies, the President of the United States calling them old NATO, we in this building—because France disagreed with us, changed French fries to freedom fries. That is what we did when someone disagrees with us. This is not the Muslim world. These are our allies. This is NATO.

And then we look at the statistics and the numbers, forget the Muslim world. There was a study that was done and it revealed that in the United Kingdom's favorable opinion of the United States has gone from 83 percent to 53 percent. This is not a Muslim world—country. In France, it has gone from 62 percent to 39 percent. In Germany, it has gone from 78 percent to 37 percent.

In Spain, it has gone from 50 percent to 23 percent. So this is not just a perception of the Muslim world. And you can go on and show similarities in countries in Central and South America. And it is based upon our actions, our policies. So sometimes you have got to look internally as I think what Dr. Tirman was talking about to see whether or not—you know, we wonder why people look at us and say we have a superiority complex.

Well, if any objective person from the outside was really looking in at what our policies are, it is do as I say, don't do as I do. Because if you do as I do, I am going to condemn you. So we do have to look internally. And I say to all of that believing that we are living in the greatest country on the planet. But because of that, W.E.B. Du Bois—we will use that. In one of his quotes testifying at a hearing here, he said the idea seems to be that we can conquer the world and make it do our bidding because we are rich. And at that time have an atomic bomb. Even if this were true, it begs the question of the right and justice of our role. Why in God's name do we want to control the earth? Is it because our success in ruling man and at this time do we want to rule Russia when we cannot rule Alabama?

How have we equipped ourselves to teach the world, to teach the world democracy that we chose at the time, Secretary of State

Burns trained in the democracy of South Carolina and we wanted to unravel the worst economic snarl of the modern world, we chose a general trained in military tactics at West Point, Marshal. This is our history. And, you know—and people were condemning him for saying that at that time and how the rest of the world was perceiving what was going on.

So I am saying that we have that same context and in the same thing we are dealing with today. Let me—I will ask Mr. Frum first, I guess. Because I believe and I was listening to testimony and reading testimony as I was sitting here, you are one that advocated the invasion of Iraq. The question is are you surprised by the damage that the invasion did to the public opinion about the United States, not only in the Muslim world, but also with NATO and in Kuwait, our allies.

If you look in the Kuwaiti region, these are our strongest allies. The invasion has changed their opinion of us. Are you surprised? I heard my esteemed colleague and friend talk about—say that it is, you know, going into Iraq. I remember sitting on that side, we were in the minority, but hearing people saying this was going to be a real short war and that people in Iraq were going to throw roses at our feet and welcome us and it would be all over and that is why the President came down in a couple of days and got on that ship and said “mission accomplished.” It didn’t happen and as a result, people looked at us in a different way. Are you surprised, Mr. Frum?

Mr. FRUM. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I look at numbers from early 2002 and late 2001, and what I see there are very negative assessments of the United States long before the possibility of a military conflict with Iraq was ever contemplated. I think we need to take more seriously the deep structural reasons for resentment of the whole Western world that pervade the Islamic world. When you see that this was already the case in 2002, that it was in 1999, Pakistan was already rated by Pew as the most anti-American country on the planet, I think you have to say we have a big problem and a long-term problem and it reflects some deep structural crisis in that regional of the world.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. Frum, you are not denying that in the aftermath of the invasion—and this is not limited to the Islamic world as others have said. But there has been a dramatic change in the polling data, in the empirical information that we have available in terms of that being probably the centerpiece of the issues and the consequences therefrom, and I don’t want to get into a discussion of Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib or what have you.

But I think it is irrefutable that the shift has been dramatic. In your statement that at the end of 2001 and 2002, let us go prior to 2001. The disparity in terms of the approval ratings of the United States is enormous, is of a proportion that I think compelled this subcommittee to take a look at the causes and produce this report. I mean, I don’t know what polls that you are referring to, but as I indicated in my opening remarks, I mean, we had pollsters who traditionally represent in partisan terms, Republican as well as Democratic interests and there was a consensus, and I don’t think that can be denied. And again, to speak to what Mr. Meeks

was suggesting, it isn't just the Islamic world. And it strikes me, I think it was Zogby who did a poll in terms of Latin America.

Mr. Meeks and I have spent considerable time in Latin America. And President Bush had a negative rating of 86 percent. And this transforms not just in terms of his personal approval, but into every action that is taken by the government receives a different—or gets a different reception, whether it is a good policy or a bad policy. And the irony in that particular poll was that 86 percent, the sample was extracted from the elites, the economic elite and the political elite in—I think it was nine countries in South America.

So this isn't a sample of, you know, fidalistas, chavistas, and the campeñeros. You know, this is constituencies that one would expect would support a pro trade administration. So I think—in fact, what we discovered was the only place where the ratings were favorable and this is—has a certain irony to it is in non-Muslim African societies.

Mr. FRUM. Mr. Chairman, your own observation there should lead, I think, to some very hard questions that point perhaps in a different direction from that which you and Mr. Meeks are going. I mean, President Bush came to office determined to build relationships in Latin America. He, with the criticism of many, moved his attention away from the traditional multilateral trade negotiations, for example, to emphasize a free trade zone of the Americas. He ran by any definition a permissive immigration policy and worked hard to build an even more permissive immigration policy. And yet you have the results you see.

So the question—so I am not disputing that the numbers collected here are true and even that the numbers collected in Europe are reliable. I am not so sure the numbers collected in the Middle East are reliable. But the question is what do they mean? What do they tell us? Why do people interpret certain facts in certain ways? Why is that when the United States launches what was supposed to be a massive redirection in favor of Latin America, it leads to a negative result? Why is it that we have this deep readiness in parts of the Islamic world to seize on the data that is gratifying to anger, like stories about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and so determined to ignore and blank out data that ought to lead to a different conclusion, like in Bosnia?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt and I will give you plenty of time to respond. I want everybody else—and I want to yield back. I am not going to ask any of my own questions in any event. So don't think we are going to keep you here that much longer. But there is also in the report an observation about historical context here and I want to get away from—for a moment from the Muslim world and the Middle East. And again, I want to get away from appearing to be partisan in this issue. We have had a Latin American policy that historically has supported our commercial interests there. And we have supported, you know, overthrows. This is a Democratic and Republican administration.

I mean, why Fidel Castro? I mean, Fidel Castro came because of his predecessor who certainly could not be described as a Democrat, Pinochet, you know, look at Central America. And they have a memory and they have a memory. So these aren't lessons to be

learned just as a result of what happened, you know, during the 8 years of the Bush administration. These are lessons to be carried on into the future in terms of a continuing reminder, if you will, as I think you have all said, there are consequences upon consequences and some are unforeseen and some we just have to accept. But at least let us be sensitive and let us be aware of those consequences.

Mr. MEEKS. Taking back my time. Some of it has to deal with—what we are talking about also. Because you definitely have to put it in the context of a Cold War and what our policies then and what now I call the post 9/11 syndrome, because also what you have, what the President has engaged in Latin America, a lot of that has to deal with military aid as opposed to humanitarian aid. And it also has to deal with—this is what we are telling you you need to do, as opposed to listening to them to say this is what we need.

So it is more of us telling folks this is what you need to do as opposed to listening to say, okay, now I hear you and here is how we are going to try to help, even as these governments are beginning to become democracies. Let me move on—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I just—one moment. Just what you said triggered something. And the point is—I forget which one of you—but why are we sending \$1.3 billion annually to Egypt for military assistance? What message does that send?

Mr. HIBBARD. That is part of the legacy of Camp David. But it also—you are right. To the average Egyptian on the streets, we talk a big game of democracy, but yet we are funding—

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is not winning the hearts and minds. And it is not just the Bush administration. If the gentleman will yield, since we are it.

Mr. MEEKS. You are the chairman. That is a democracy.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is the kind of democracy I like around here. One man, all the votes. I am only kidding. But all these issues too about, again, the disparity between our values and what we do are—even if you don't accept what we have done in terms of Abu Ghraib, secret renditions, et cetera, Guantanamo, have an impact. Here we are, we are discussing with the Mexicans a collaborative effort in terms of drug interdiction and violence. Some aspects of the program I like, some I have serious questions about. But this is—you know, a day or 2 ago in the New York Times, Conditions on U.S. Aid in Drug Fight Anger Mexico.

A chorus of similar protests went up this week from motion to recommit lawmakers, prosecutors and law enforcement officials who call the bills, these are proposals that just Democratic Congress has enacted, or at least, in terms of the committee and in terms of the House—who call the bills insulting and reeking of Yankee arrogance. Some pointed out the United States had no room to talk. This is about conditions for human rights on this legislation.

Given the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It provides a—there is a resentment there. I mean, resentment—whether this collaborative effort that the Bush administration has worked to develop with the Calderon administration could very well be in jeopardy as a result of attitude. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me see if we can find some solutions to this. Dr. Tirman, I turn to you because in reading some of your testimony, you argue that our choices in foreign policy create a resentment—not create a resentment, flow from several cultural or political predispositions in our country. How would you propose that we change these predispositions?

Mr. TIRMAN. Well, that is a big topic, but what I have been suggesting today is that we examine what our global challenges are going forward in the next couple of decades to the extent that one can anticipate them. And among those, I think, are the—I am sorry Congressman Rohrabacher has departed—but among them is the climate change issue and environmental sustainability issue, which I think is exceptionally important, perhaps the most important because it affects everything, it just doesn't affect the sea levels. It affects, for example, what we are seeing now throughout much of the world, such as the food crisis. When oil prices go up, and oil prices have gone up in part because of the war in Iraq, for example, it also affects everything else that oil is dependent upon.

And so we complain a lot about our \$4 a gallon gasoline here, but you can imagine what the effects are in the developing world. They don't have many alternatives in the short term to paying those prices. And when they do have to pay those prices, it means a tremendous economic blow, which now has included a crisis of food availability. It is a complex argument. But there is definitely a relationship. So it is not just about the environment, it is also about food production, it is about equity, it is about fairness. It is about economic growth. As Professor Hibbard said earlier, we need to change our attitudes about energy, and not just because of our military deployments in the Middle East, but because this is the new reality that we face globally.

If we don't take care of these issues to the extent that we can, it has tremendous reverberations for everyone in the world and among those effects, of course, is a kind of growing resentment of the United States as the leading economy, as a leading user per capita of energy, as a leading military power and so on. If we are not taking these challenges seriously then it does create resentments which are rebounding effects.

So that is just one element that I would point to—our capacity, our willingness, our application of ingenuity and revisiting our values about consumption, our sense of entitlement to the world's resources and so on. Revisiting those values as we face this closing frontier of resource availability.

Mr. MEEKS. Dr. Brimmer, let me ask you this question, and Dr. Hibbard and anyone else I want to ask—answer rather. At the same hearing, Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois also made another argument. His argument was that our education and media perpetuated dangerous and self-congratulatory myths. He basically said in this excerpt—and I am just going to condense it some. He said without exact and careful knowledge of this world, how can we guide it, yet we know that our knowledge of the world today is fed to us by a press whose reporters say that the owners of the press order them to say.

We naively assume that what we read in our press is the whole truth when a little reflection would convince us that we have in

America no complete picture of what is transpiring behind the Iron Curtain. My question would be, would you say that the core of the problem remains the same or has the United States done a better job in the era of electronic media and broader school choices of having a real debate and a broad education about our role in the world?

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you, Congressman. Indeed W.E.B. Du Bois does hit on a very important point which is the role of education and exchange. Indeed, I would say we—with the spread of communications—do have opportunities for greater knowledge of the world. But as all of us here are professors, we always tell our students you need primary sources and primary experiences. And that means not just reading about an event, but actually experiencing the event. So I think it is also important that we continue to facilitate opportunities for Americans to learn about the world around them, whether through travel or exchanges and other opportunities to learn about very different societies which have an impact on our own national security. We spent this morning talking about the importance of understanding Islam, Shari'a law, understanding a wide variety of cultural experiences. And to the extent that Americans have a chance to do that, we can help facilitate international dialogue. And similarly, as the report notes, often people from around the world when they have a chance to understand the nature of debate and dialogue in this country, often have a better understanding of our foreign policies and a higher opinion of the United States, often because they have had a chance to come to this country. So ways we have to facilitate that direct knowledge are very important. That can happen over the Internet, but it also needs to happen in person. So I think there are avenues for trying to keep open the dialogue and spreading knowledge and understanding which is so important as we look at these complex issues in the world internationally. Thank you.

Mr. HIBBARD. Just very briefly. This is a very important point. Because with the information revolution that has transpired you can read newspapers from Turkey, from Egypt, from Italy and you can get a very different perspective, but still the mainstream media in this country—and the vast majority of the population gets their information from the mainstream media. And that does remain very one sided and has its own biases. Now we should keep in mind that other nations have their own biases in the lead up to the fall of 2002, I was living in Cairo and their media was lambasting the debate about whether to invade Iraq and they were very, very critical and I remember leaving Egypt and then coming to the United States and watching the complete opposite of the debate.

You know, NBC, ABC, talking about this tyrant out there who is threatening us and I was like, wow, these are two very different realities and the societies are obviously not communicating and I realize that nothing good is going to come of this in the long run. So in many respects, the world needs to open its mind and open its ears and open its eyes to other communities. That is why I think that Dr. Brimmer's comment about cross cultural exchange and academic exchange is so crucial.

Mr. MEEKS. I couldn't agree more. One of the reasons why I bring that up is we have got to change the consciousness of people

in America, starting with those here in the United States Congress. Number one, you know, I know that—and I don't know whether it has changed or not, but just 4 to 5 years ago, a third, one-third of the members of the United States House of Representatives didn't own a passport, meaning they have never left this country to see what is taking place anywhere else to understand anybody else's culture, anybody else's way of living and everything was just predicated on the decisions that we make are right near this vacuum.

And then at the same time, many of the individuals that are within the media for those members who do travel, are often criticized for traveling to see and understand and learn what is going on in other parts of the world because you will see as I have noticed that those that have gotten to travel more often than others come to different conclusions when they get to see different parts of the world. That is part of—as I travel and I talk to other individuals they say why don't more Americans come, why are not more members of the United States Congress coming.

And when they don't see us coming, that also gives the perception to them that we feel we are superior. Because we don't come, we don't look, we don't want to learn, but yet we want to tell them from a vacuum what they should or should not be doing without a clear understanding. So that is why I relate so much—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would my friend yield for a second?

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. To the words of W.E.B. Du Bois. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it was interesting that last week, for the first time in this institution, there was an appearance by Iraqi parliamentarians in a public venue to discuss a whole array of issue, but the focus being the bilateral agreement between Iraq and the United States that is being discussed, at least between the White House and some members of the Iraqi Government. It was very informative and very interesting and that is why these parliamentary exchanges are so important. Because I have got to tell you, I think it expanded their understanding and our understanding of what was involved here and what was interesting was that the issue of the timetable from a withdrawal from Iraq was their sine qua non, it was their linchpin in terms of an agreement.

These are two members, but they represent a majority of Iraqi parliamentarians. And here we are talking not even near each other or past each other without having a better understanding. I yield back.

Mr. MEEKS. I just want to say thank you, Mr. Chairman. These series of hearings that you have conducted on this subject matter, the depth of the witnesses that have appeared before us has been absolutely extraordinary. And I think that we learn a lot from hearings and the ultimate report that this committee has put out. I just wish, you know, we were in school and we could make a mandatory reading for every Member of Congress. I think that would help us and help us in our world standing and this world is—this globe is so much smaller now than it used to be. And we have got to get it right. We have got to learn how to work with other people better than we have in recent years. So I just compliment you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. And I think the importance of communication on issues in full measure are important today, not just understanding how we are viewed and not just recognizing how we view others with our own biases and our own prejudices. I think that was evidenced by some of the questions that we heard today. I just don't know how to get there, you know. I would be interested in—and I am not going to hold you up, it is 12:30, but if you have some ideas and you want to jot them down and you want to come back again, you are welcome. Because I think it is really important that we get it right in terms of communicating in full measure so that there is—we are dealing at least with the basis of understanding and agreement on at least some facts and some realities, otherwise you just have this exchange of opinions, which—I mean, you get that on, you know—just turn on CNN or FOX or whatever and you can get that at any time.

I don't really know how fruitful it is. We are going to be filing legislation, which if it is passed, would allow for 30,000 students in the future from overseas to come here on full scholarship. And not just get knowledge, but get, as you were saying, Dr. Brimmer, the experience itself of being here. Because I think we all understand that—at least I am confident if they really have the experience of this country—then they will respect the United States, our values, our people and our dissent and our disagreements. Thanks again for bearing up. It was all very helpful. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

