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1994 - 1998
Two of the most significant features of the drug trade in the mid-1990s were its scope and sophistication. The drug trade had expanded into a global problem, and the unprecedented power and wealth of the traffickers allowed them to manage their worldwide business with the most sophisticated technology and communications equipment that money could buy. The drug trade had evolved into a well-organized, highly structured enterprise that spanned the world. Drug trafficking activities were conducted in a seamless continuum, with individual organizations controlling all aspects of the drug trade, from cultivating or manufacturing drugs in source countries to transporting them through international zones and eventually selling them on the streets of American communities.
The DEA adjusted its strategy to address the unprecedented influence and power of the international drug mafias while working to reduce violent drug-related crime in American communities. Initially hampered by budget cutbacks in the late 1980s, by the mid-to-late 1990s, the agency had increased its budget, its staffing, and its cooperation with law enforcement counterparts in the United States and abroad. During this time period, violent drug gangs proliferated around the country. Violence and drug trafficking went hand-in-hand. More than 1.5 million Americans were arrested for drug law violations in 1996. Many crimes (e.g., assault, prostitution, and robbery) were committed under the influence of drugs or motivated by a need to get money for drugs. Competition and disputes contributed to violence as did the location of drug markets in areas where legal and social controls on violence tended to be ineffective.
The availability of automatic weapons also made drug violence more deadly. In addition to the rampant violence and denigration of neighborhoods, child abuse, crack babies, AIDS, homelessness, and a host of other drug-related afflictions also degraded the quality of life in many communities. Some influential intellectuals in America, in their frustration, began to advocate the wholesale legalization of drugs as a solution to the drug problem. Another challenge facing drug law enforcement was the fact that heroin, which previously had been smuggled mostly from Asia, was being smuggled into the United States from a new source--South America. Conviction of Dandeny Munoz-Mosquera (1994)Dandeny Munoz-Mosquera, the Medellin cartel's chief assassin, was arrested in Queens, New York, on September 25, 1991, for making false statements to a DEA special agent. Following Munoz's trial, conviction, and subsequent six-year sentence under the false statement charge, Munoz was then tried for his involvement in the 1989 midair bombing of Avianca flight-203, in which 107 people died when the cartel wanted to kill one informant on the plane. Because two American citizens were on board, the United States was able to charge Munoz with homicide in that case. Munoz was also linked to hundreds of other murders that he committed while serving as the cartel's most prolific assassin. In December 1994, Munoz was convicted in New York and sentenced to 10 life terms for the Avianca homicide charges, as well as two 20-year terms and one 5-year term on a variety of drug trafficking and RICO charges, all to be served consecutively. Operation Snowcap is Concluded (1994)Operation Snowcap was one of the major issues of concern that the SACs brought to the attention of incoming Administrator Constantine. The program was originally instituted to eliminate the flow of cocaine by building up internal law enforcement resources in the source countries and by teaching enforcement techniques to foreign counterparts. However, it had evolved to the point that DEA agents were also participating in drug law enforcement activities. Snowcap was envisioned as a temporary program, but after seven years of operation it became a serious drain on DEA domestic field division resources. The constant rotation of individuals from domestic field investigations made it difficult for the agents to initiate and follow through on casework and follow-up court testimony. In addition, because of the dangerous terrain the agents worked in, many agents who volunteered for Snowcap tours underwent intensive jungle training to prepare for the adversity that their tours of duty to the Latin American jungles created. This training, although a necessity to the agents, further depleted the domestic field divisions of badly needed special agents. These personnel limitations made it increasingly difficult for the domestic field divisions to combat the rising tide of drug-related violent crime in their regions. In order to address the SACs concerns, and because Operation Snowcap had achieved its goal of helping other countries' drug law enforcement agencies become more self-sufficient, a decision was made to phase out Snowcap and refocus the DEA's role in overseas operations. As a result, Snowcap's temporary positions were gradually eliminated. Nevertheless, the DEA continued to support permanent positions in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The agents in these positions provided support and training assistance and served as liaison officers and advisors. The phase-out of Operation Snowcap marked a significant change in the role of DEA special agents in certain overseas posts.
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![]() CNP Gen. Rosso Serrano (right) is pictured with Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela (center) shortly after his 1995 arrest. |
“No one has sacrificed more than the Colombian National Police.”
During the summer of 1995, six top leaders of the Cali mafia surrendered or were arrested by Colombian authorities under the leadership of CNP Director General Rosso Serrano, and the Cali mafia began to collapse. The arrest of the entire hierarchy of the wealthiest and most powerful international criminal organization was the most significant enforcement action taken against organized crime leaders since the Apalachin Gangster Raid in 1957 that exposed the existance and power of organized crime syndicates in the United States.
On June 9, 1995, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was arrested by the Colombian National Police (CNP) during a house raid in Cali. When the police searched the home several days earlier, Rodriguez-Orejeula hid in a hollowed-out bathroom cabinet with an oxygen tank. The CNP's excellent police work led to his arrest. After he was taken into custody, police discovered that he had a copy of an unclassified DEA report titled "The Kings of Cocaine" that had been translated into Spanish. He was sentenced to a prison term of 13 years.
Henry Loiaza-Ceballos | |
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was fingerprinted following his arrest. | |
Victor Patino-Fomeque | |
Jose Santacruz-Londono was arrested while meeting with associates in Colombia on July 4, 1995. | |
Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago |
On June 19, 1995, Henry Loiaza-Ceballos, who had overseen the mafia's military infrastructure, surrendered to police. He was considered one of the most violent members of the Cali drug mafia and was linked to at least three massacres in Colombia.
On June 24, 1995, Victor Julio Patino-Fomeque, who was responsible for ensuring the security and effectiveness of the mafia's maritime operations, also surrendered and was sentenced to 12 years behind bars.
On July 4, 1995, Jose Santacruz-Londono,the number three leader in the Cali mafia, was arrested by the CNP as he dined with associates at a Bogota steak house. He was never sentenced because he escaped from prison and was killed in March 1996 during a confrontation with the CNP.
Finally, on August 6, 1995, Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, the brother of Gilberto, was arrested when the CNP broke down the door of his apartment and found him hiding in a secret closet during another house raid. He was sentenced to 21 years.
Less than one year later, there were two more arrests of major Cali mafia leaders. In March 1996, Juan Carlos "Chupeta" Ramirez-Abadia, surrendered to Colombian authorities and was later sentenced to 24 years in prison.
On September 1, 1996, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago surrendered to Colombian authorities. He was one of the charter members of the Cali mafia and was the remaining "Kingpin" being sought by Colombian authorities. He was sentenced to six years in prison.
These arrests marked the beginning of the decline of the Cali mafia and were the results of extensive investigation by the DEA. However, the investigations of the Cali mafia would not have been as successful if not for the outstanding efforts of the CNP. Remarking on the CNP's contributions to combatting the drug problem in Colombia, Administrator Constantine remarked in 1998, "No one has sacrificed more than the Colombian National Police. At great sacrifice to themselves, and in the face of extraordinary temptations for corruption, General Rosso Serrano and his brave law enforcement officers have fought the powerful drug traffickers in Colombia."
Mexican cocaine trafficking had been pioneered by Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran who, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was actively involved with the Mexican Guadalajara cartel. This was the group largely responsible for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985. By the mid-1980s, the organizations from Mexico were well-established and reliable transporters of Colombian cocaine.
Throughout the 1990s, the United States was faced with trafficking organizations from Mexico that worked with the Cali drug organizations to smuggle more and more cocaine into the United States. By the 1990s, traffickers from Colombia were buying large cargo and passenger jets similar to 727s, gutting them, and using them to transport multi-ton loads of cocaine to Mexico. The planes were then refueled and returned to Colombia loaded with millions of dollars in cash. At first, the Mexican gangs were paid in cash for their transportation services. But in the late 1980s, the Mexican transport organizations and the Colombian drug traffickers settled on a payment-in-product arrangement. Transporters from Mexico usually were given 35 to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment. This arrangement meant that organizations from Mexico became involved in the distribution, as well as the transportation, of cocaine, and became formidable traffickers in their own right.
The criminal organizations based in Mexico demonstrated an ability to corrupt officials serving in high-level positions. Drug-related corruption was probably the single greatest obstacle that law enforcement faced in its battle against drug traffickers from Mexico. Ernesto Zedillo, the President of Mexico, recognized drug-related corruption as a threat to Mexican national security and, in 1998, announced a national initiative to fight, crime, violence, and corruption. In another attempt to overcome the problem of widespread corruption in law enforcement, the Mexican Government replaced civilian authorities with military officers. The following describes the most powerful drug traffickers and their status as of 1998.
When Amado Carrillo-Fuentes died in Mexico City on July 4, 1997, after undergoing
plastic surgery, he was considered the most powerful trafficker in Mexico.
In 1999, the Carrillo-Fuentes organization , based in Juarez, is still involved
in the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Its regional bases are
in Juarez, Hermosillo, and Reynosa, where the organization stores drugs for
eventual
shipment into the United States. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes’ organization has
been associated with the Cali-based Rodriguez-Orejuela organization and the Ochoa
brothers of Medellin.
This Tijuana-based organization is one of the most powerful, violent, and
aggressive trafficking groups in the world. The Arellano-Felix Organization
has high-level contacts within the Mexican law enforcement and judicial systems
and is directly involved in street-level trafficking within the United States.
This criminal organization is responsible for the transportation, importation,
and distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well
as large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine. The Arellano family, composed
of seven brothers and four sisters, inherited the organization from Miguel
Angel Felix-Gallardo upon his incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his complicity
in the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix
assumed leadership of the family enterprise and provides a businessman’s
approach to the management of their drug empire which operates in Tijuana,
Baja California, and parts of the States of Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, and Tamaulipas.
Benjamin coordinates the activities of the organization through his brothers
Ramon, Eduardo, and Francisco.
The Juan Garcia-Abrego organization was involved in smuggling drugs from the
Yucatan area in Mexico to South Texas and north to New York. This organization
transported large quantities of cocaine for the Cali mafia, as well as marijuana
and heroin for other traffickers. Garcia-Abrego pioneered deals in which Mexican
traffickers were compensated in cocaine. This substantially raised their profits
and allowed them to distribute, as well as smuggle, cocaine. He and his organization
were notorious for their violence. In 1996, Juan Garcia-Abrego was added to
the FBI’s top ten most wanted fugitives, with a $2 million reward for
his capture. This was the first time an international drug trafficker had been
included on the FBI list. In January 1996, he was arrested in Mexico and brought
to the United States for trial. He was sentenced to 11 life terms and fined
$128 million.
The Miguel Caro-Quintero organization is based in Sonora, Mexico. It is
involved in cultivating, processing, smuggling, and distributing heroin and
marijuana, and in transporting methamphet-amine and Colombian cocaine into
the United States. It was led by Rafael Caro-Quintero, known as the “Mexican
Rhinestone Cowboy,” until he was arrested and placed in a Mexican maximum
security prison for his involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder
of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Rafael Caro-Quintero was also convicted
on marijuana and cocaine trafficking charges. His brothers, Miguel ,Jorge,
and Genaro, assumed control of the organization. Miguel was arrested in 1992,
but was able to use a combination of threats and bribes to have the charges
dismissed by a federal judge in Hermosillo, Mexico, under questionable circumstances.
In response to this escalating problem, in 1995, the DEA established the Caribbean Division based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as its 21st Field Division. The division was responsible for five country offices that had previously reported to the Miami regional office: Netherlands Antilles, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, in addition to the St. Thomas Resident Office and the St. Croix Post of Duty in the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Ponce Resident Office in Ponce, Puerto Rico.
The White House requested that the DEA and other federal
law enforcement agencies assist with security during the 1996 Olympic
games in Atlanta, Georgia. As a result, over 200 men and women from the
DEA were detailed to Atlanta. Security was an important issue because
national leaders from some 197 participating nations, athletes, coaches,
and visitors from all over the world attended the event. The DEA had
previously
provided assistance at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 and at the 1987
Pan American Games in Indianapolis, Indiana. When a bomb exploded in
Centennial
Olympic Park in Atlanta on the ninth day of the Olympic games, DEA agents
were instrumental in preserving the safety of hundreds of spectators.
They had been on hand when FBI and Defense Department experts identified
a
suspicious-looking knapsack as a bomb just minutes before it exploded.
DEA agents, along with Georgia State patrol and other law enforcement
officers, hurriedly began evacuating the few hundred people in the park.
The agents risked their own safety by attempting to evacuate nearby civilians
and, after the explosion, administering first aid. The agents ability
to remain calm and focused during this chaotic situation undoubtedly
saved
many lives. One DEA agent, Craig Wiles, was injured in the blast. He
was stationed just 25 to 30 feet from the explosion and was struck in
the
back of the head by a piece of wood. Despite his injuries, Special Agent
Wiles continued to help fellow agents and wounded civilians. He was later
taken to nearby Georgia Baptist Medical Center where doctors removed
wood
splinters from his head. Wiles fully recovered within a few days and
was the first agent to receive the DEA's Purple Heart Award. All of the
DEA
agents who helped evacuate Centennial Olympic Park were honored for their
courage when that group, Atlanta Olympic Division Squad 23, was given
the Administrator's Award for Outstanding Group Achievement in 1997.
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Left: Honoring Heroism: During an August 1998 visit to Colombia, Administrator Constantine and General Serrano met with a wounded Colombian National Police officer who survived an attack by a rebel group against Colombian anti-narcotics headquarters. (Photo courtesy Semana Publicaciones.) | Below: March 1997, DEA Ft. Worth and DEA Midland, Texas offices jointly investigated a large-scale drug smuggling operation and seized 2,175 pounds of marijuana in Odessa, Texas. |
In the mid-nineties, trafficking groups from Mexico became deeply involved in the methamphetamine trade, replacing domestic outlaw motorcycle gangs as the predominant methamphetamine producers, traffickers, and distributors. Their involvement was made tragically clear when, during an undercover operation, DEA Special Agent Richard Fass was shot and killed in Tucson, Arizona, on June 30, 1994, by a methamphetamine trafficker from Mexico.
By the late 1990s, these trafficking organizations had virtually saturated the western United States market with high-purity methamphetamine, known also as speed or crank. In some areas of California, methamphetamine replaced cocaine as the drug of choice. With a saturated West Coast market, the traffickers then began to expand their markets to the East Coast, South, and the Mid-West.
As supplies increased, prices fell, making it a cheap alternative to cocaine. Some called it the poor man's cocaine. In 1991, for example, the lowest price nationwide for a pound of methamphetamine was $6,000. By 1995, in California, methamphetamine sold for between $2,500 and $3,600 per pound.
With increased availability, methamphetamine use increased. According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network, the number of emergency room episodes involving methamphetamine increased steadily after 1991, particularly in the West. From 1991 to 1993, episodes more than doubled in both Los Angeles and Phoenix.
The sophistication of the organizations from Mexico was also clear. Their long-standing expertise in polydrug smuggling and the smuggling skills developed while transporting cocaine for the Cali mafia had enabled these organizations to branch out into other contraband, such as the precursor chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
They also established international connections in Europe, Asia, and the Far East to have tons of precursor chemicals, particularly ephedrine, shipped to addresses in both the United States and Mexico. During 1993 and 1994, the majority of ephedrine shipments destined for Mexico were supplied by such diverse countries as China, India, the Czech Republic, and Switzerland. From mid-1993 to early 1995, the DEA documented the diversion of almost 170 tons of ephedrine used in illicit methamphetamine production.
Unlike other drugs, methamphetamine is one that these criminal organizations from Mexico controlled entirely from beginning to end. They had the international contacts to obtain the necessary precursor chemicals to make the drug. They also had the clandestine labs to process the chemicals into methamphetamine on both sides of the border. They expanded their distribution networks across the nation by the use and intimidation of illegal aliens. Also, unlike when they served as middlemen moving cocaine and heroin, they kept 100 percent of the profits from their methamphetamine sales.
In late 1994, state and local authorities in California requested a meeting with Administrator Constantine to express their growing concerns about escalating methamphetamine abuse and the increasing number of clandestine meth labs being encountered in that state. Their concerns and the information they provided mirrored intelligence the DEA was receiving about a scourge of meth abuse cases in many areas of the country. Working closely with California law enforcement, the DEA hosted a National Methamphetamine Conference in February 1996.
The conference brought together experts from around the United States to examine enforcement and policy options. It was structured to incorporate not only the input of knowledgeable DEA personnel, but also the experience of the state and local law enforcement agencies that had been encountering the problem. Conferees heard reports from state, local, and other federal agencies about the methamphetamine situation and exchanged ideas on a number of strategies to address the problem in the United States.
In his opening remarks, Administrator Constantine stated that the benefit of holding the conference was that it allowed those with extensive experience in drug law enforcement to help identify the scope of the methamphetamine problem and to ensure that [there would be] a coordinated response. Participants offered their input by filling out surveys and taking part in group discussions.
In 1997, the DEA achieved its first-ever billion dollar direct appropriation budget. This $1.054 billion budget was approximately $200 million, or 23 percent, greater than the DEA’s 1996 budget, which had been the previous all-time high budget. That the DEA’s funding would increase in a time of fiscal belt-tightening was a tribute to the outstanding work that DEA personnel were performing worldwide and to the DEA’s many achievements in 1996. The DEA’s fiscal year (FY) 1997 appropriation contained significant resources aimed at restoring the agency’s source country drug trafficking programs to FY 1992 funding levels. The DEA also received $29 million in the 1997 appropriations for construction of a DEA Training Center at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.
1. Restricting access to precursor chemicals such as iodine, red phosphorous, and hydrochloric gas used to make methamphetamine, and tightening controls on the sale of pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, and ephedrine combination products, all common ingredients found in over-the-counter diet pills and cold medicines.2. Tracking mail-order purchases of precursor chemicals.
3. Establishing civil penalties of up to $250,000 for firms that distribute laboratory supplies with reckless disregard for the illegal purposes for which the supplies might be used.
4. Doubling the maximum criminal penalty to 20 years in jail for possession of chemicals or equipment used to make methamphetamine.
5. Increasing penalties for trafficking and manufacturing methamphetamine or its precursor chemicals.
6. Directing the Attorney General to coordinate international drug enforcement efforts to reduce trafficking in methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals.
7. Making it a crime to manufacture precursor chemicals outside the United States with the intent to smuggle them into the country.
8. Allowing courts to order restitution for the extensive costs (often as much as $8,000) associated with the clean-up of methamphetamine labs and for any person injured as a result of the lab's operation.
9. Creating the Methamphetamine Interagency Task Force to design and implement methamphetamine education, prevention, and treatment strategies and establishing an advisory board to educate chemical companies to identify suspicious transactions.
The Hispanic Advisory Committee suggested to the Administrator
the establishment of an award to honor the “thousands of men and
women sworn to enforce the drug laws of the United States...who deserve
the full benefit of our recognition of the inherent dangers of our profession.”
In response to that suggestion, the DEA Purple Heart Award was instituted.
As of January 1, 1996, any DEA Agent wounded in the line of duty became eligible to receive the DEA’s new Purple Heart Award. Based on the design of the military’s Purple Heart Award presented for battle injuries, the DEA emblem honors agents who suffered injuries that required medical treatment or caused death and were incurred during the performance of official duties as the direct result of a hostile or criminal action.
The heart-shaped pendant, with a DEA Special Agent’s badge embossed on a purple background, is suspended from a red, white, and blue ribbon. The award is presented in a glass-front shadowbox and was accompanied by a lapel pin in a smaller version of the pendant. With the creation of this award, the DEA established an appropriate and significant way to recognize those employees who were injured while confronting the everyday dangers faced by those in drug law enforcement.
In 1998, the DEA’s SAC Advisory Committee expanded the awarding of Purple Hearts to state and local law enforcement officers killed or wounded in the line of duty while working with the DEA.
Two investigations in the late 1990s demonstrated that
Mexico-based drug traffickers had displaced some of the Colombia-based
cocaine organizations that had traditionally dominated the New York City
cocaine traffic.
During a highway interdiction stop on October 30,1996, near Tyler, Texas, two state troopers discovered over $2 million in cash concealed in a van heading south. This stop was the first seizure linked to Operation Reciprocity. On December 3, investigators seized 5.3 tons of cocaine from a Tucson, Arizona, warehouse. Evidence linked the warehouse operation to a Los Angeles investigation, a New York operation, a Michigan transportation group, and a trafficking cell connected to the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. On December 13, the same state troopers stopped a tractor trailer truck in Tyler, Texas, and seized 2,700 pounds of marijuana from a hidden compartment in the ceiling of the vehicle. The investigation revealed that traffickers were smuggling cocaine to the New York City area in concealed compartments in the roofs of tractor trailer trucks and in hollowed-out five-foot tall stacks of plywood. The same trucks were being used to transport the cash in kilo-sized packages of $5, $10, and $20 bills, back to Mexico.
On April 9, 1997, the U.S. Customs Service found $5.6 million in street cash hidden in a tractor trailer truck ceiling compartment in an Operation Reciprocity seizure in El Paso, Texas. This operation resulted in 41 arrests, as well as the seizure of 7 tons of cocaine, 2,800 pounds of marijuana, and more than $11 million. Meanwhile, an investigation initiated by the DEA's Imperial County, California Resident Office in August 1996 developed into Operation Limelight, which involved several state, local, and U.S. Treasury agencies, including the IRS and the U.S. Customs Service. The investigation focused on the Alberto Beltran transportation and distribution cell, which was part of the Carrillo-Fuentes organization.
Operation Limelight resulted in the arrest of 48 people
and the seizure of over 4,000 kilos of cocaine, over 10,800 pounds of
marijuana, and over $7.3 million. State and federal investigators believed
this Beltran cell was responsible for the monthly smuggling of at least
1.5 tons of cocaine, typically concealed in crates of vegetables and fruits
and trucked across the United States by Mexican nationals.
In March 1996, the head of the Beltran organization in the United States, Gerardo Gonzalez, was arrested by Operation Limelight investigators. The arrest was the result of the carrot case, which also led to the New York seizure of 1,630 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a 30-ton shipment of chopped up carrots used for horse feed. At that time, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force also seized $1.3 million and arrested nine organization members. Eight more members of the organization, including Gonzalez's wife, were arrested on August 1, 1997, in the second phase of this investigation.
In the early 1990s, as many communities were overrun by crime and violence, a small, but vocal group of people believed that the legalization of drugs would reduce drug abuse, lessen the violence, and restore peace to our cities. Because the DEA believed that legalization would exacerbate the drug problem, not solve it, the agency sponsored a forum in 1994 on the issue of how police chiefs and others could address arguments calling for the legalization of drugs [see Anti-Legalization Forum on page 109]. The findings of that conference were published in a manual that police chiefs and others used to speak out against the legalization issue.
In 1996, powerful, wealthy special interest organizations pushed for the legalization of marijuana, and in California and Arizona, they were successful in putting the issue before the voters. Through slick advertising media campaigns, voters were led to believe that the initiative would simply allow medical doctors to treat terminally ill and suffering patients with marijuana for the relief of pain symptoms. In Arizona, voters were led to believe that this proposition included provisions to toughen criminal justice systems.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) released resolutions that officially expressed the group's opposition to the propositions in Arizona and California to legalize marijuana. In these resolutions the IACP stated the grounds for its objections: marijuana is more carcinogenic than tobacco and other Schedule I drugs; it compromises brain functions, the immune system, the lungs, and hormonal responses to stress and metabolic changes; and makes diseases such as tuberculosis, asthma, and multiple sclerosis worse. The IACP also maintained that marijuana did not prevent blindness due to glaucoma and that no national health organization had accepted marijuana as medicine. In addition, the resolutions contained a list of organizations that asserted that marijuana had not been scientifically proven to be safe or effective as a medicine. These organizations included: the American Medical Association, American Cancer Society, National Multiple Sclerosis Association, American Academy of Opthamology, National Eye Institute, National Cancer Institute, National Institute for Neurological Disorders and Strokes, National Institute of Dental Research, and the National Institute on Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
Unfortunately, despite such widespread objections, the propositions passed in both states. California's Proposition 215 allowed anyone who received a doctor's recommendation to possess and use marijuana for cancer, AIDS, glaucoma and any other illness for which marijuana provides relief. It allowed doctors to verbally recommend marijuana use to minors, prisoners, individuals in sensitive positions, or anyone who claimed to have a medical condition. The proposition, by extension, also allowed individuals to smoke and cultivate marijuana openly, on the premise that marijuana had been recommended for the individual's medical condition.
The Arizona proposition was more restrictive than the California version in that a physician had to cite a study confirming the proven medical benefits of the Schedule I drug and provide a written prescription which was kept in the patient's medical file, and the patient was required to obtain a written opinion from a second physician confirming that the prescription for the Schedule I substance was appropriate to treat a disease or to relieve the pain and suffering of a seriously ill patient or terminally ill patient. The Arizona proposition, however, also provided for other actions that erode effective, tough drug policies, including the release of prisoners previously convicted of personal possession or use of a controlled substance.
Despite the differences between the two ballot initiatives, there was an indisputable similarity: both states allowed individuals to possess substances that have no legitimate medical use. Both California and Arizona, despite what the proponents claimed, had taken the first steps toward the proponents ultimate goal of legalizing drugs. Based on the success of legalization proponents in California and Arizona, campaigns for legalization began to organize in other states.
Zorro II illustrated the close and efficient partnership that existed between the drug organizations from Mexico and Colombia. More importantly, this case showed that the international drug trade was a seamless continuum, a criminal enterprise that stretched, without interruption, from the jungles of South America across transit zones, such as Mexico to the cities and communities of the United States.
Zorro II was particularly important because, for the first time, law enforcement dismantled not only a Colombian organization that produced the cocaine, but also the organization in Mexico that provided the transportation. During the course of the 8-month investigation, law enforcement officers coordinated and shared information gleaned from more than 90 court-authorized wiretaps. The operation involved 10 federal agencies, 42 state and local agencies, and 14 DEA field divisions across the country. As a result of the investigation, over $17 million and almost 5,600 kilos of cocaine were seized, and 156 people were arrested. Zorro II confirmed that Mexico-based traffickers were not just transporters, but had their own distribution networks throughout the United States.
In 1982, Jose Ivan Duarte and his conspirator Rene Benitez were hired by Colombian drug traffickers to plan and execute the kidnaping of DEA Special Agents Charles Martinez and Kelly McCullough. The agents were taken from their hotel in Cartagena, Colombia, and were transported by car to a secluded area 15 miles away. Agent Martinez was shot for the first time while still within city limits. Then Duarte and Benitez stopped the car and shot Martinez again. At that point Agent McCullough fled. He was shot as he ran into the jungle. SA Martinez escaped when his captors’ gun jammed as they attempted to shoot him for a third time. Both SA Martinez and SA McCullough managed to escape despite their wounds. They reached Cartagena the next day and phoned the U.S. Embassy for assistance. They were airlifted out of the country by a U.S. Air Force plane from Panama.
Both Duarte and Benitez eluded capture. Warrants for their arrests were issued in June 1982. Benetez was eventually captured in Colombia, extradited, and imprisoned in Miami in 1995. Duarte continued to evade authorities until August 1997, when he was detained in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian government expelled the fugitive and he was then transported to the United States to stand trial. His capture marked the end of a 15 year investigation and search. According to Administrator Constantine, “Duarte’s expulsion by the Ecuadorian government shows great courage and commitment to battling drugs.
As part of the nation's continuing efforts against the production of methamphetamine, on April 9, 1997, the DEA and Wal-Mart formed a partnership to control large-scale purchases of three over-the-counter products pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and phenyl-propanolamine used in clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine and amphetamine. Wal-Mart, one of the nation's largest employers, implemented a chain-wide policy limiting sales of these allergy, cold, and diet products. The cash registers of Wal-Mart stores across the country were programmed to limit sales to 3-6 packages of these items per customer. In addition, they discontinued the 100-count bottle of their brand of pseudoephedrine tablets that had been found at illegal labs and replaced them with small-count blister packs. Wal-Mart's initiative also limited the sale of blister packs, which were generally exempt from federal regulations. Wal-Mart's initiative dovetailed with federal regulations stipulated under the second phase of the Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996.
The use of heroin increased significantly in the United States in the mid-1990s. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) statistics for 1995 reported heroin to be second only to cocaine in terms of hospital incidents. DAWN statistics showed the annual number of heroin-related emergency room mentions increased from 33,384 in 1990 to 76,023 in 1995. In addition, the number of heroin overdose deaths nationally rose from 4,188 in 1994, to 4,625 in 1995. Purity levels also rose from 7 percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 1995. In some areas, particularly the Northeast, 80-90 percent purity was reported.
The heroin problem grew worse as South America began to play a bigger role in heroin trafficking. Soon, heroin from South America dominated the East Coast and accounted for the majority of heroin seized by the DEA. Another reason why heroin use increased was that drug dealers were actively marketing their product. In order to increase demand for heroin, drug traffickers began to include free samples of heroin in shipments of cocaine. This marketing scheme introduced heroin to cocaine dealers and abusers.
In response to this growing problem, Administrator Constantine held a National Heroin Conference in February 1997 in Reston, Virginia. In attendance were more than 300 federal, state, local, and international law enforcement officials, as well as demand reduction/prevention experts. The conferees gathered to assess the heroin threat to the United States and share effective strategies for addressing the problem. The goal of the conference was to bring together a broad representation of law enforcement. The first day and a half was devoted to presentations detailing the major issues related to the heroin trade, including situation reports and reports explaining the regional threats that heroin posed throughout the United States. On the afternoon of the second day, the conference participants broke into working groups to discuss issues and offer recommendations for future actions.
Included in the submitted 26 recommendations were the following:
1. Develop a national media campaign against heroin use;
2. Support the development of community-based educational/awareness drug campaigns;
3. Increase law enforcement and interdiction training regarding heroin concealment and transportation;
4. Enhance the Heroin Signature Program and Domestic Monitor Program;
5. Bolster interagency intelligence sharing; and
6. Identify a national heroin strategy.
For many years, state and local law enforcement envisioned a drug pointer system that would allow them to determine if other law enforcement organizations were investigating the same drug suspect. Despite the existence of some statewide and regional drug pointer systems, none extended to national participation. At the direction of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the DEA took the lead in the development of a national drug pointer system to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigating drug trafficking organizations.
In April 1998, Administrator Constantine announced the creation of the DEA Survivors’ Benefit Fund. The fund was established to assist the surviving family members of DEA employees and task force officers killed in the line of duty. The fund also supported programs that preserved the memory of those killed in the line of duty. In addition, the benefit fund provided financial assistance for family members of employees who died as a result of non-job-related causes. The Survivors’ Benefit Fund was created by combining existing organizations, namely, the Enrique Camarena Fund in Miami; the Seema/Montoya Fund in Los Angeles; the Rick Finley Memorial Foundation in Detroit, the Richard Fass Foundation in Phoenix; and the New York Drug Enforcement Agents Scholarship Foundation. Respectively, these foundations had been established to honor Enrique Camarena, who was kidnapped and murdered by drug traffickers in Mexico in 1985; Special Agents Paul S. Seema and George M. Montoya, who were both killed while performing an undercover operation in Los Angeles in 1988; Special Agent Rick Finley, who was killed in a plane crash in 1989 while returning from a DEA operation in Peru; and Special Agent Richard Fass, who was killed while performing an undercover methamphetamine investigation in 1994. Many of these organizations held annual events to raise funds to support the families of DEA agents killed in the line of duty. Representatives of these various funds agreed to come together to support one national fund, realizing that this would enable them to assist more people. Each fund was also able to maintain a separate identity by continuing to hold individual annual fund raisers. Financial support for the Survivors’ Benefit Fund came from donations by the general public, as well as profits from the various fund rasing events held across the country.
Since 1985, the DEA and FBI had shared training facilities at the FBI Academy
in Quantico, Virginia. With the expansion of both agencies and with increasingly
complex training requirements for DEA special agents, the need for additional
space became critical. In May 1991, a study was completed by the Department
of Justice that indicated that the best and most efficient way to satisfy the
training needs of both the DEA and FBI was to pursue an expansion at Quantico.
The securing of necessary funding to construct a new training center became
a major priority of Mr. Constantine when he was appointed Administrator. Congress
provided funding for a new training academy in the FY 1997 appropriations.
The $29 million academy, called the Justice Training Center, was constructed
on land made available to the DEA by the Marine Corps and located within the
FBI complex. The new center will enable the DEA to provide state-of-the-art
training for DEA basic agents, state and local law enforcement officials, and
international law enforcement counterparts. It was designed to house a 250-bed,
double occupancy dormitory, classrooms, office space for staff, a cafeteria,
and an international training room equipped for simultaneous translations.
Adjacent to the new academy is a special facility for clandestine laboratory
training. Special purpose facilities ranges, a driver training course, a swimming
pool, a gymnasium, and an auditorium will continue to be shared with the FBI.
Construction on the new center began in April 1997 and was completed in April
1999.
A new curriculum was planned for all training courses. In March 1998, Administrator Constantine commissioned the Office of Training to conduct a review of all DEA training programs, from entry-level basic agent training to specialized and supervisory/management training. This review was requested in anticipation of the completion and subsequent opening of the Justice Training Center in order to ensure that each training program was current and state-of-the-art. This review was conducted by a team of selected supervisory and special agents from the field, diversion investigators, chemists, DEA headquarters personnel, and members of the training staff. This team completed the training review and offered its suggestions in June 1998.
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Digging the first shovelful of earth on April 21, 1997, for DEA’s new training academy were, from left: Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Kelley, Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, Mr. Benjamin F. Burrell, SAC David Westrate, Administrator Thomas A. Constantine, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Mr. Steven S. Honigman, Rear Adm. David J. Nash, Mr. Harold J. Parmelee, and Mr. Everett Medling. |
Upon taking office in 1994, DEA Administrator Constantine requested a review of DEA’s training curriculum to ensure that state-of-the-art procedures and techniques were being provided in all DEA training. The goal was to have every DEA employee fully trained and prepared to operate successfully in the ever-changing environment of drug law enforcement. As a result of the re-evaluation of training procedures, a number of significant changes were instituted:
Training programs for basic agents, diversion investigators, intelligence analysts, and chemists were required to devote more time to legal issues, integrity, and personal responsibility.
Basic agent training was extended to 16 weeks. Also, in order to support the increased emphasis on personal responsibility, the DEA structured 25 hours of formal ethics and integrity sessions into the basic agent training program. These “life training” sessions emphasized the positive aspects of integrity and police ethics and equipped new agents with the moral tools needed to successfully tackle ethical dilemmas.
The Field Training Agent Program was instituted to provide continuous training and direction to probationary agents after completing basic agent training.
An in-service training course, to be held every 18 months, was developed for all core series employees. The program stressed reviews of internal regulations, oral and written communication skills, legal issues, case law, operational and tactical procedures, integrity, and personnel issues, such as sexual harassment. The course also included an ethics curriculum similar to that used for basic agent training.
A Training Advisory Committee, which met twice a year, was established to assess the training curriculum and increase field input into specific training programs.
From 1995 to September 1998, the DEA
trained 1,586 basic agents, and
from 1994
to September 1998, over 110,000 state
and local law enforcement
officers.
Compared with its 1971 aviation budget of $58,000, the Air Wing's 1998 operating budget of $24,400,000 covered a fleet of 98 aircraft and 108 special agents/pilots. On a daily basis, Air Wing personnel work in close support of domestic offices and provide sophisticated electronic, air-based surveillance.
Because of its proximity to the Southwest Border, the El Paso, Texas, region was an area that experienced a great deal of drug trafficking. For this reason, The FBI and the U.S. Customs Service established field divisions in the El Paso region. In order to focus on the drug problem on the U.S.-Mexican border and to better cooperate with other federal law enforcement efforts in that area, Administrator Constantine requested the creation of an El Paso Field Division. This request became a reality in June 1998, and the El Paso Field Division became the DEA’s 22nd field division. The reorganization realigned the former El Paso District Office from the Houston Division; the Alpine, Texas, Resident Office from the Dallas Division; the Albuquerque, New Mexico, District Office from the Denver Division. It also realigned the Las Cruces, New Mexico, Resident Office from the Denver Division to the new El Paso Division. In addition, the reorganization transferred the responsibility for the Billings, Montana, Resident Office from the Seattle Division to the Denver Division. By establishing the El Paso Division, adjoining geographical areas facing a common drug threat were combined under a single authority. With a separate field division to manage the El Paso region, the DEA focused directly on the significant drug threat facing the West Texas and New Mexico areas, thereby enhancing the agency’s effectiveness along the entire Southwest Border.
In late 1995, the DEA replaced its aging office automation system (UNISYS BTOS) with a network of Pentium-grade personal computers. This system, known as Firebird, represented a major effort to improve the DEA's automated infrastructure ($150 million) through establishment of a secure, centralized computer network that standardized the DEA's investigative reporting system, case file inventories, administrative functions, and electronic communications. Firebird was made available at DEA headquarters and all 22 division offices, and allowed access to the electronic headquarters file-room, easy access to the DEA community through electronic mail and bulletin boards, and use of a common suite of office automation functions. These capabilities increased user productivity and provided improved access to many automated tools essential to investigative activities. Plans were also made to install Firebird in the 180 DEA field offices, El Paso Intelligence Center, Air Wing, Laboratories, and several overseas offices.
Two of the major on-line resources available to DEA employees were Webster and IMPACT. Webster was the familiar name for the DEA Electronic Library project. As the core of the DEA's intranet, its objectives included building an electronic library for distributing official, up-to-date documents and news, providing secure access to DEA users worldwide via Firebird and Department of Justice mainframe/Teleview that allowed full-text search and retrieval and assisted DEA in expanding its presence on the public internet. The second on-line resource was the Investigative Management Program and Case Tracking (IMPACT) system, which was initiated in 1996. This program was a mission-oriented, field-led initiative that focused on the collection, use, and dissemination of case-related information at the field level with the emphasis on the group supervisor and agent.
In 1988, the DEA awarded a contract to investigate and evaluate a preliminary Intelligence Analyst Workstation that would assist intelligence analysts in developing their reports. This project evolved into the third on-line resource, Merlin a system that supports the classified processing needs of intelligence analysts and special agents. Merlin was deployed to DEA headquarters, the Special Operations Division, and the Houston, San Diego, and the Los Angeles Field Divisions. The Merlin project plan calls for seven additional divisions and one foreign office to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2000.
DEA laboratories continued to use the latest in forensic science technology to aid DEA investigations. Beginning in the 1980s, technology used by the DEA saw a quantum leap in microprocessor and computer technology. DEA laboratories engaged in extensive programs to convert to state-of-the-art instrumentation. For example, the outdated vacuum sweep apparatus that was used to collect traces of material for later laboratory analysis was replaced by the Ionscan. The Ionscan unit was a portable instrument that was used to both collect trace materials and provided preliminary on-the-spot identification. In 1994 alone, the Ionscan unit was used to develop evidence in cases that led to the seizure of 22 vehicles, 19 buildings, two aircraft, and over $350,000 in cash.
In 1995, the Department of Justice Inspector General conducted a study of the DEA Laboratory System. In a survey of all DEA and FBI field offices, U.S. Attorney's Offices, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, 96 percent of the respondents expressed their overall satisfaction with the DEA's laboratory services. "The DEA is justifiably proud of the contributions made by all laboratory system employees to maintain such a high level of accomplishment," stated Aaron Hatcher, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Forensic Science.
The DEA continued to upgrade and expand its
laboratory facilities. In 1994, a new lab, the North Central Laboratory,
was built in Chicago. In 1998, the DEA planned to build new replacement
labs to update the Mid-Atlantic Lab in Washington, D.C., the Southeast
Lab in Miami, the Southwest Lab in San Diego, the Western Lab in San Francisco,
and the Special Testing and Research Lab in McLean, Virginia. These expansions
were necessary to accommodate staffing increases. The new Special Testing
and Research, Mid-Atlantic and Southeast labs were scheduled to begin
operation during the last quarter of 2000; while a schedule for the openings
of the new Western, Southwest, and South Central labs had not yet been
established. Funding for such expansions was provided by Congress.
The DEA further expanded its laboratory capabilities by developing mobile labs. Mobile labs, small laboratories that were driven from site to site, enabled DEA forensic chemists to conduct on-the-spot analysis of seized drugs. Analyzing drugs at the scene of the seizure accelerated the prosecution of drug traffickers and provided intelligence that identified other drug activity in the local area.
Killed in the Line of Duty | |||
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Richard E. Fass Died on June 30, 1994 DEA Special Agent Fass was fatally shot during an undercover methamphetamine investigation in Glendale, Arizona. |
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Kenneth G. McCullough Died on April 19, 1995 DEA Special Agent McCullough was killed when a car bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. |
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Juan C. Vars Died on August 27, 1994 Juan C. Vars was one of five DEA special agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap. |
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Carrol June Fields Died on April 19, 1995 Carrol June Fields, a DEA Office Assistant, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. |
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Jay W. Seale Died on August 27, 1994 Jay W. Seale was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap. |
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Rona L. Chafey Died on April 19, 1995 Cleveland County Sheriff's Office Secretary Rona L. Chafey, who worked in a DEA, State, and Local Task Force, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. |
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Meredith Thompson Died on August 27, 1994 Meredith Thompson was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap. |
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Shelly D. Bland Died on April 19, 1995 DynCorp Legal Technician Shelly D. Bland, who was working under contract to the DEA, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. |
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Frank S. Wallace, Jr. Died on August 27, 1994 Frank S. Wallace, Jr. was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap. |
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Carrie A. Lenz Died on April 19, 1995 DynCorp Legal Technician Carrie A. Lenz and her unborn son, Michael James Lenz III, were killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. |
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Frank Fernandez, Jr. Died on August 27, 1994 Frank Fernandez, Jr. was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap. |
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Shaun E. Curl Died on December 12, 1997 Special Agent Curl was killed in the line of duty while assigned to the Miami Division. |