	Ralph R. Stender	
	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON	
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING	
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5	STATE OF WASHINGTON, ex rel ROBERT H. ) DOULL, ALBERT H. WENDFELDT, L. ) STEVENSON and JACK H. HARRIS, )	
7	Relators,	
8	vs.	
9	HOWARD O'DELL and DEAN MCLEAN, THE BOARD OF KING COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, No. 520533 KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON,	
10	Respondents,	
11	<b>\</b>	
12	VS. A GEORGE ANTOVICH and SELLA ANTOVICH,	
14	Intervenors.	
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17	ORAL OPINION	
1.8	BY: The Hon. MALCOLM DOUGLAS DATE: July 23, 1953	
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THE COURT: From every practical consideration the Court would like to decide this case in favor of the respondents.

The Court is of the opinion and will find as a matter of fact that the action of the county commissioners in passing this rezoning resolution was not arbitrary or capricious, certainly in the lay sense of those terms.

I think the action of the county commissioners was taken after an open hearing with all parties represented where they gave open-minded consideration to the recommendation of the Planning Commission and consideration to the arguments of those objecting and came forth with a decision that was forthright and honest, not subject to any accusation of fraud in any respect.

On the other hand, I cannot think of any adequate answer to the arguments of Mr. Ehrlichman as to the lack of jurisdiction of the commissioners to act upon the petition.

The Court is of the opinion that that is true because King County did not have, on the date of the passing of this resolution, a Comprehensive Zoning Plan that met the requirements of the statutes.

MR. CLARK: Is your Honor referring to 16623?

THE COURT: Just a minute, now. I will make that clear, I think, when I get through. I do not want to conduct

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a running debate. I have listened patiently to everything counsel had to say and I do not care to be interrupted until I get through. Then if there are any questions I will be glad to answer them.

I refer initially to the provisions of the Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1935, Chapter 44, H. B. 103, and particularly to Sections 7 and 8 thereof which specify what the prerequisites are for a county adopting a Comprehensive Plan.

When Resolution 16623, which was adopted on the 13th of August, 1956, was passed, it was an effort to provide a Comprehensive Plan. But one needs only to read the Act of 1935 and particularly Sections 7 and 3 to see how far short it falls of complying with the provisions of that Act of the legislature and in how many respects it fails.

On the face of it this resolution for adopting the Comprehensive Plan for King County is an effort to reach back and make valid many things, many documents, that were invalid because they had been adopted before there was a Comprehensive Plan because someone got the cart before the horse.

You cannot have enforcible zoning regulations until you have a proper Comprehensive Plan adopted in compliance with the statutes.

I will not go through and enumerate all the particulars in which the resolution passed on August 13, 1956, falls short because they are so obvious upon a mere reading of the Statute.

Therefore, the original Zoning Code adopted on May 15, 1956, is invalid because the prior existence of a Comprehensive Plan is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement.

The law requires strict compliance with procedural requirements. "A like certified copy of any map or plat referred to or adopted by the ordinance or resolution shall likewise be filed with the county auditor," is one of the requirements of the statute which was not complied with. As I recall the evidence, it appears that neither the road map referred to nor the fourteen studies included in the so-called Plan were certified and filed.

The reason the statute requires certification and filing is, of course, to make it possible for interested citizens to know where they can go and find out what zoning requirements there are and what they require.

It follows that if the Zoning Code of May 15, 1956, is invalid because of failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites and failure to have a comprehensive plan that meets the requirements of the statute, then the Resolution which is an amendment of a Plan and of zoning regulations which the Court finds to be invalid, the

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amendment is also invalid and must be held to be an action taken under resolutions which fail to meet the requirements of the Act of 1935.

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As I intimated in my opening words I am reluctant to make this decision, but because a course has been followed for a number of years which is lacking in legal validity is no reason for giving encouragement to the continuation of such a course or for not meeting the issue squarely when it is presented.

Someone has suggested that such a holding would create chaos and leave property owners bewildered and uncertain as to where they stand with reference to their properties as they are affected by the so-called zoning regulations of the county.

This is not the first department of the Superior Court that has made a similar holding. Whatever trouble may result from such a decision can, in my opinion, be cured by prompt and proper remedial measures in the form of resolutions and in the form of a proper Comprehensive Plan that does meet the requirements of the statute and of a new Zoning Code drawn in furtherance of and in harmony with the basic Comprehensive Plan.

True, it will require some weeks of hard work on the part of the planners and staff of the Planning Commission and of the county commissioners and the aid of a competent legal staff to guide them; but the shortcomings that have been brought to the attention of the Court in this case are all shortcomings for which I think there is a remedy by proper procedures taken in compliance with the statutes defining the powers and duties of planning commissions and county commissioners on this subject.

The basic prayer of the relators will be granted and findings and conclusions and judgment in accordance with this oral opinion may be prepared and presented for the signature of the Court.

(Thereupon, at 3:55 o'clock p.m., June 23, 1953, the hearing was concluded.)