Monographs

ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY CHANGE

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For any country, the implementation of significant policy change is challenging, but for developing countries, implementing major policy shifts poses special challenges. Policy change may be externally driven, accepted only reluctantly and perhaps without a genuine sense of local ownership. Although the proposed policy change may be recognized as necessary and vital by many, it may face widespread opposition, or it may be undertaken without the benefit of adequate resources to get the job done. Under such circumstances, the rate of failure of many major serious policy reform efforts in the LDCs should not be at all surprising.

While the complexity and difficulty of implementing policy change is widely recognized (Williamson, 1990; World Bank, 1990; Haggard, 1995; Van de Walle, 1994), nonetheless, many policy reform failures can be attributed to the lack of careful thought about how the policy reform implementation effort is or should be organized. All too frequently, once the "policy dialogue" (generally consisting of negotiations held between two or three senior government officials and the representative of a donor agency) renders an agreement and decisions are made about which policies are to be adopted in exchange for certain benefits (such as a Structural Adjustment Loan or Facility, Economic Support Funds, or other conditioned facility), policy implementation then becomes a matter for the government. The donor official simply assumes that reform will be carried through or implemented since there is a signed agreement to that effect. Unfortunately, in all too many cases, the real task has yet to begin. Organizing policy implementation is a complex and muddy process. Nevertheless, implementation often is treated as a mechanical process without much thought given to the task even when tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in grants or loans are at stake.

This theme paper explores the organizational dimensions of implementing policy change and the applications of strategic organization challenges presented. The paper will first examine the nature of policy implementation in developing countries and some of the factors that increase the difficulty of the process. The characteristics of policy implementation and its component tasks are described in contrast to both program and project implementation. The paper then discusses the nature of organizing policy implementation and some of the challenges presented. We examine IPC experience and some of the creative responses made to organizing the implementation tasks. Finally, some initial observations are presented regarding the role of strategic management as a tool for responding to the organizational dimension of the policy implementation process.

Most of the data and the examples, as well as many of the insights concerning organizing policy implementation have emerged from the work of the Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC), a five year effort funded by the Center for Democracy and Governance in USAID's Global Bureau. The IPC project became immersed in the problems of policy implementation through a wide-ranging set of activities in over thirty countries dealing with virtually all aspects of policy implementation from formulation to evaluation and monitoring of policy impact. The lessons drawn out in the course of this paper have the advantage of being grounded in IPC's activities but, it should be pointed out, represent only a relatively limited number of cases in the universe of the implementation of policy change.

B. THE NATURE OF POLICY CHANGE

The nature of policy reforms and the organizations tasked with their implementation are by definition complex. Implementation, however, is often viewed as part of a linear process that proceeds directly from the predictions and prescriptions given by the economist or other technical expert to the policy maker, to policy selection by the appropriate decision-maker(s), to implementation by the executing agency, and then to policy outcomes (Meier, 1991). When breakdown occurs, it is often assumed that the problem is one of accountability or control — or if not that, then one of a lack of political will that can be traced back to the decision-makers.

The impression given is that policy change takes place in a closed system, where inputs and outcomes are under direct control of first the decision-maker and then the implementor. While this description may apply for some private enterprises[1] and perhaps the odd public activity, reform or policy change probably never occurs or takes place in a closed system. Since by its nature, policy change cuts across sectors and interests, policy change must invariably

be implemented in highly open systems (Bardach, 1973; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Thompson, 1967). Officials tasked with implementing a policy change may head an agency, but it is likely that they have neither the resources nor the authority to carry out all those decisions implied by the policy change. To the contrary, Bardach (1973) has argued that implementation is a "process of assembly...of numerous and diverse (policy) elements...elements that are in the hands of different parties, most of whom are independent of each other." But even if the policy change were doable within a single agency, the agency's budget and mandates will likely be at least partially or wholly determined by other actors, actors not necessarily well informed or concerned with the implementing agency's needs, capacities, structure, or interests.

Although there has been extensive research into the problem of implementation at the project and program level, the nature of policy change and its implementation requires a re-assessment of the task. There are a number of characteristics about policy change that have considerable implications for implementation.

First, in the developing world, **the stimulus for policy change has generally come from the outside** as intractable economic crises have forced governments to seek external assistance (Nelson, 1989; Gordon, 1994). However, this assistance has usually come with demanding conditions. Donor agencies may require substantial changes in the economic policy framework (Haggard, 1990; Callaghy 1990) and increasingly in other policy areas, such as the environment and governance (Nelson and Eglington, 1992; Van de Walle, 1994) in exchange for proposed loans — changes which may represent dramatic departure from the country's current policies and practices. Frequently, negotiations for such reforms take place among a very narrow set of actors, and conditions required agreed to only reluctantly. Economic structural adjustment agreements, for instance, may be negotiated primarily with the Minister of Finance, the head of the Central Bank and the donor agency's representatives. Those involved will then tell the President that the proposed changes will produce desired effects but moreover, if he doesn't agree, the donor won't disburse the needed funds. While the President agrees to carry out the policy, it may be with a great deal of hesitance and apprehension.

Second, **policy decisions and implementation tend to be highly political**. Policy change addresses fundamental questions of what is to be done, how it is to be done, and how benefits are distributed. When change occurs, there will be winners and losers — but perhaps more often than not the losers will be in a position to exercise strong and effective opposition (Haggard, 1995; Lindenberg and Ramirez, 1989). Relationships at various levels and between stakeholders will be shifted; those in will be out, those currently benefiting will no longer do so.

Third, while it is the political, rather than the administrative, leadership of the government that has the lead role in the initiation of policy change, **those most actively involved in the formulation of the policy changes are technocrats or technical staff.** However, technocrats usually operate under rather different decisional criteria than either the political or administrative leadership. While generally, the politician takes care not to damage his constituencies, and the bureaucrat seeks to maintain stability and assure survival, the technocrat is concerned with maximizing output and rationalizing scarce resources. Such political and bureaucratic trade-offs are generally not factors in the policy change formulation equation (Grindle and Thomas, 1990; Allison, 1971). Further, local technocrats are often assisted by expatriate consultants in policy analysis and formulation who may be unaware and even unsympathetic to the political and bureaucratic constraints to implementation.

Fourth, **policy making and decisions about which policies are to be changed is largely a top-down, non-participative process, confined to a narrow set of decision makers** (Kahler, 1989). Moreover, decisions to make significant policy changes are not usually made by those who will have to implement the decision. Instead, the implementing official is simply the receptor of orders regarding policy change, with little opportunity for input into the decision-making process. Although those formulating the policy change may have a sense of ownership, those implementing may not. Nevertheless, for implementation to be successful, a sense of ownership must be engendered in those actually charged with implementing the policy.

Fifth, **reform-minded policy decision-makers are frequently new to government and unfamiliar with the politico-bureaucratic environment for policy implementation**. Reformers frequently have their say

early in a new regime and almost by definition will be those new to government. While such individuals will have the advantage of having neither established routines nor entrenched interests (Waterbury, 1989), they are also very likely to be unfamiliar with the pitfalls of the administrative bureaucracy (Bardach, 1977) — and in many cases can be distracted by the stalling or diversionary tactics of those familiar with the system. While certain shock measures can be highly effective at the outset of a new government, such measures tend to be relatively simple to implement (eg., exchange rate modifications or elimination of price controls on certain goods). Policies that are administratively intense or complex, however, will require familiarity with the administrative system and how to manage it in order to have significant impact.

Sixth, in most cases **adequate resources to carry out policy changes either do not exist or are in the wrong place**. Contrary to what the technocrat might prefer, budget resources are not free goods (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974). They cannot be shifted easily or at will. The allocation of resources represented by a budget is the product of understandings and arrangements arrived at through hard negotiation and commitment of interested and often powerful actors. It should never be assumed that such actors will easily give up their piece of the budgetary pie. While resources can be reallocated, it can only be done through the consent of those with prior interest; the political consequences of proceeding without that consent can be drastic. The difficulty of reallocation also explains the critical role of external resources for initiating the policy change process. These resources are not only catalytic but also allow time for re-negotiating the budget.

Finally, **governmental organizations generally the ability to easily adapt to the tasks required by policy change**. Changes are usually made with great reluctance and wrenching difficulty. Implementation of policy change often demands that extensive modifications be made or new organizations created. Contrary to what the policy analyst might prefer, it should not be assumed that existing organizations are not performing important tasks, or that they have considerable idle capacity that can be used in implementing the new policies. As with the budget, what the organization does and what it produces is the product of understandings and commitments among interested parties about what and whose needs should be satisfied. Procedures, routines, and

organizational culture are built and become institutionalized around such understandings — thus, while changes can be instituted, the process is neither simple nor quick. Sudden change in the organization's tasks, like sudden reallocation of budget resources, can have drastic internal as well as political consequences.

In contrast to the direct formulation - to selection - to implementation framework implied by the linear model, the policy change and implementation process is fragmented and open. The implementor of policy change is generally excluded from the process of formulation and policy selection, has little ownership over either the policy or the process, has little control over the diverse resources needed to carry out the policy mandate, lacks the appropriate organizational resources, and often must operate in an environment hostile to the changes mandated. Given those elements of the policy change process, what is the official supposed to do to implement a policy change? Understanding more about the actual nature of implementing policy and the nature of the tasks involved in policy implementation is a first step toward helping the official develop more adequate or more appropriate strategies for implementing complex policies.

II. **POLICY CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION TASKS**

A. **A CONTINUUM OF IMPLEMENTATION TASK FUNCTIONS**

From the foregoing, it appears that once the decision is made to adopt a particular policy, there are actually several different types of tasks to be accomplished that can be lumped under the single category of implementation. However, each of these tasks themselves may be highly complex and difficult to manage. **Implementation tasks** can be broken down into the following generic types: ***policy legitimation, constituency building, resource accumulation, organizational design and modification, resource mobilization, monitoring impact***.

The literature on policy change or on implementation tells us very little about the nature of the policy implementation task (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Sabatier, 1988; Matland, 1995). More ample discussion of the nature of implementation tasks can be found in some of the literature on program and

project implementation (Brinkerhoff and Ingle, 1989, Brinkerhoff, 1991; Kiggundu, 1989; Paul, 1983). Brinkerhoff (1991, pp. 12-13) develops a continuum to describe project and program tasks, distinguishing between program tasks as more strategic and project tasks as more operative in nature. Policy implementation is not specifically dealt with but actually appears to be another dimension of that continuum. Figure 1 modifies Brinkerhoff's framework and visualizes policy implementation as the third or extended dimension of the continuum.

Figure 1. A Continuum of Implementation Task Functions

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	**PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**	**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**
(Emphasis on strategic tasks) ←——————————————→		(Emphasis on operating tasks)
Legitimization	Program design	Clear objectives
Constituency building	Capacity building for implementors	Defined roles and responsibilities
Resource accumulation	Collaboration with multiple orgs. & groups	Plans/schedules
Organizational design/structure	Expanding resources and support	Rewards/sanctions
Resource mobilization	Proactive leadership	Feedback/adaptation mechanisms
Monitoring impact		

Source: Adapted from Brinkerhoff (1991).

Unlike project or program implementation, policy implementation tasks are all strategic, not operational. Each are prerequisite "first steps" in either program or project implementation. In program and project implementation, there is a pre-existing policy; it is from that policy that the project or program is derived. Therefore, one can assume that the policy is considered legitimate, that a constituency which wants and supports the policy exists, and that resources have already been assigned. Without that minimum base, implementation of the project or program would be impossible. However, in the case of policy implementation, all these elements have to be won. This is not to say that the project or program manager can simply ignore these tasks, but acceptance and support already do exist in some measure — the manager's job will be to increase acceptance, support, and resources. If the manager fails to do so, the policy framing the program or project could collapse. Let us, then, examine more carefully the tasks involved in policy implementation.

B.   POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TASKS

1.   Policy Legitimization:

Before anything else can happen, the proposed policy must be viewed as legitimate by key decision makers. To acquire legitimacy, some individual orgroup of individuals must assert that the proposed policy reform is necessary, vital, and must be accepted even though it might present serious costs. This step involves the emergence or designation of a policy "champion," someone willing to risk political capital in support of the policy.

It is not at all likely that a movement for significant policy change will spontaneously emerge in society. Instead the process begins with a key individual giving his/her assent and building support from there. Since policy change is often externally generated, it is extremely important that the policy be internally legitimized in order that the host country develop a sense of ownership for the change. As new policy will likely require changes in attitudes and actions and because the policy will represent a significant break from tradition, it is important that the "legitimizer" state that the new policy actually represents the preferred behavior, that the policy is considered both valid and desirable.

The individual or group that serves as the policy champion must not only accept and believe in the new policy, but must also have sufficient status or prestige to be viewed as credible by important segments of those controlling the decision-making apparatus (such status may be conferred by position or personality). Though an individual may believe fervently in the suggested change and be capable of articulating the necessary arguments, without the appropriate prestige, he/she will be unable to supply the requisite credibility — even though that person uses exactly the same words as the "credible" individual. It should not be assumed that finding an individual or group with sufficient prestige, status, or credibility to legitimize the policy will be easy. New policies are often risky. If they don't work or accomplish the desired results, then the "legitimator" will suffer loss of prestige or status.

The more difficult or contentious the policy, or the more the new policy departs from past practice, the more important will be the legitimation function. Consider those countries moving from a socialist or state-driven economy to a more market- oriented framework: in such cases the task of convincing key decision makers has proven extremely difficult and one requiring the most respected or powerful (or both) spokespersons available. Even then, legitimation will face serious challenge in confronting a vast array of entrenched interests with everything to lose in the changeover. Whoever takes on the challenge will need substantial political resources and support since the process of legitimation can easily drain most of them. The initiation of reform in the former Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev is eloquent testimony to the difficulty of legitimating policy change. But without the vital legitimation function, policy implementation will not go forward.

In Guinea Bissau, judicial reform was seen as a vital ingredient to the enhancement of the investment climate. However, despite the interest of a working group which was actively engaged in studies and developing policy recommendations with the assistance of IPC, little was accomplished. It was only when the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice were recruited to the working group, that the idea of judicial reform actually began to take hold.

In South Africa, IPC assisted in the organization of the Policy Advisory Group (PAG) and in the development of a study analyzing the barriers to entry to South Africa's highly protected and concentrated economy. The PAG, with participation of the principal black business organization (the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce), the primary white organization (the South African Chamber of Business), and the principal foreign business organization (the South African-American Chamber of Commerce) is probably the only private sector mechanism with sufficient legitimacy to actually raise and make recommendations regarding this highly sensitive issue — especially since it is its members who are the primary beneficiaries.

In West Africa, the problem of rent-seeking by government officials overseeing cross-border livestock commodity trade was an issue that created a variety of disequilibria but was very difficult to address. With the assistance of IPC and the Club du Sahel, working groups were organized to open discussion on cross border trade reform aimed at eliminating opportunities for rent-seeking and to restore greater equilibrium. While many new policy recommendations came out of the working groups, perhaps the greatest role of the working groups was to provide a legitimate forum for discussion of difficult and controversial issues.

2. Constituency Building:

Since support is frequently absent at the outset, an adequate constituency for the reform must be developed; the reform must be marketed and promoted. Constituents are those who will benefit by the change in some manner. They may be consumers of the service provided; they may be providers of inputs; or they may be officials within the implementing agency who find their position or status enhanced by the change. Constituents may also be groups with some influence in the direction of the

change, or that can bring some sort of resource to the change.

Constituents are positive stakeholders who will lend the force of support to the policy champion. Constituency building is complementary to the legitimation function; it can be seen as an amplification of the legitimation process (Kahler, 1989; Lindenberg and Crosby, 1981), but has the aim not only of gaining acceptance but also of operationalizing the change through the creation of a new set of beneficiaries. Constituency building is the process of creating and mobilizing *positive* stakeholders in favor of the new policy. (Note that not all stakeholders will actually be in favor of the proposed change, some will be strongly opposed.)

Constituencies are the principal clients for the change suggested. Once the constituency has a stake in the change, it will be more likely to mobilize to defend its interests in the change. However, putting together a constituency at the outset is a difficult task. Since the benefits of policy change are mostly felt only in the long run, a certain amount of faith on the part of the new constituents will be necessary. In the meantime, the losers will complain and lobby to restore the status quo, arguing that at the very least, the benefits of the former policy were real even if poorly distributed or not particularly effective. Although support is vital, not just any support will do — the proposed policy change must have the support of enough key stakeholders to assure that the change can be effected. Thus, a key task for policy implementation is constituency identification. Without an effective constituency, it will be simple enough to assemble sufficient opposition to block the reform.

Constituencies are important in a practical sense as well; since no single Minister is capable of implementing difficult reform alone, active support is always required. Donors too often rely on the policy "champion" without giving much thought to the development of policy constituencies. For instance, in Zambia, the donors had an influential and prominent champion for the liberalization of grain marketing in Minister of Finance Chigaga. However, since little or no effort had been given to developing support constituencies for either the Minister or for the proposed policy changes, when Mr. Chigaga suddenly died upon returning from a conference abroad, the policies were abandoned.

Several IPC interventions have assisted host country officials or managers in building constituencies for policy change. In Southern Africa, in order to gain support for the development of protocols in transport and communication among the Southern Africa Development Council's member states, a consultative process was designed to allow important stakeholders a voice in the protocol development process. The consultations not only obtained input from a large number of participants (over 1500), but a significant body of demand and support was created for the protocols.

Stakeholder assessments can also reveal a lack of support. IPC assisted El Salvador's Judicial Sector Working Group in carrying out a stakeholder analysis to examine the level of support for implementing important changes in the penal code. The result of the study was that there was insufficient support to proceed; but the study did assist in pointing to directions where key support might be found, and where the primary sources of opproposed policies lay.

The establishment of the Uganda National Forum illustrates the key role constituency development plays. Uganda's economic reform process was one that donor organizations saw as highly successful, if not yet complete. However, in the early 1990s, little real growth had been achieved, mostly due to lack of investment by the private sector. The Uganda National Forum, organized with the assistance of IPC in 1992, provided the first instance where the government actually sat down with the private sector to discuss policy. The Forum created sector working groups in which both the public and private sector participated to examine issues and make specific policy recommendations. Although the process has produced many concrete changes, perhaps the most important feature of the Forum is that it contributes to building a constituent base for those policy changes, now and into the future.

3. Resource Accumulation:

To implement a new policy, human, technical, and financial resources must be set aside (Grindle and Thomas, 1990). While external resources may cover a portion of what will be needed, gathering sufficient resources generally means cutting those directed to the old policies. With the all too common problem of dwindling resources for all activities of government, competition for scarce resources increases. A minimum, acceptable level of resources was an easy assumption before the debt and financial crises of the

1980s, but with the subsequent need for stabilization and adjustment, assurance of the minimum level of resources has become a difficult task. The inability of governments to reallocate resources to new priorities is frequently the cause of programs or projects shutting down once donor resources have been exhausted. The task of resource accumulation thus goes beyond that of securing the initial funding, it also means assuring that the policy has a place in the government's resource allocation process (Ames, 1987).

Many developing countries suffer from a scarcity of human, physical as well as financial resources. Not only do many countries simply lack the skills for certain kinds of new policies, but in certain cases, the pool of potential talent has been depleted through war, repression, disease, and emigration. Brain-drain places serious constraints on what sorts of tasks can be undertaken effectively. In some countries plagued by war or continued economic crisis, necessary physical infrastructure (communications, roads, electricity, ports, transport) either does not exist, has been destroyed, or has become so deteriorated as to be useless.

The problem of lack of sufficient resources for government agencies tasked with policy implementation is difficult to overstate. Frequently, the agency charged with implementing new policy is severely resource deficient or worse, an empty shell. In an era (increasingly prolonged in the LDCs) of operational budget austerity and of dwindling capital budgets, room for taking on new tasks is extremely limited. It is sometimes assumed that to take on a new task, all the implementing agency needs is a simple injection of funds. However, it may be that the implementing agency does not have, nor has ever had, the type of resources necessary to do that which is now required. When that happens, adding funds to the agency's budget will not necessarily assure the task will be accomplished. For example, when economic policy shifts from import substitution to the encouragement of an export driven economy, the task may seem elusively simple. But does the government have the skills to manage such a shift? It may know nothing about exports, export markets, or the manufacture of new products. To manage the shift will invariably require the contracting of new skills; but in less developed countries, these skills are often unavailable. Time and other resources will have to be devoted to acquiring new capacity.

One of the critical resource problems facing the new South African government of Nelson Mandela was the lack of black civil servants capable of taking over the predominantly white civil service and managing the new political-administrative arrangements prompted by the creation of new provinces. The Mandela government decided to make a commitment to assuring a majority of blacks in civil service by the end of his term in office. One of the many organizations created to respond to implementing that commitment is the South African Foundation for Public Management, which works with educational and training organizations through the provision of grants and technical assistance in curriculum design to accelerate the development of human resources for civil service.

When the Philippine government decided to create a one-stop duty drawback center to encourage the development of export processing and assembly industries, the first task of the Department of Finance was to put together the resources it needed to make the Center work. Human resources were drawn from agencies which had previously had part of the functions that would now reside with the Center, and some were created through an extensive training program implemented shortly before the Center opened its doors for business. However, the reluctance of one agency to pass critical resources (both informational and human) to the Center limited its effectiveness. IPC assisted in conducting several strategic retreats in which the Center's primary stakeholders worked out solutions leading to the eventual release of the resources. Seed money from donor organizations provided operational funds for the Center's first year, but the need to find internal resources occupied considerable time of the director until the Center became a line item in the Department of Finance's budget.

In Guinea Bissau, a lack of resources slowed implementation of the government's policy to create an independent judiciary more responsive to investment. When the Judiciary was separated from the Executive Branch, the budget disappeared. Since the judiciary was expected to expand in order to eliminate a growing backlog as well as to attend to needs in the rural areas, new judges or mediators would have to be trained and given at least minimal resources to carry out their duties. Part of IPC's assistance to the Judicial Working Group was to work with it in assessing priority needs for training, determining minimum resources needed, and in developing strategies to obtain both internal (through

gaining a place in the national budget) and external resources.

4. Organizational Design and Modification:

The introduction of new tasks and objectives accompanying policy reform will likely cause modifications in the implementing organization(s). However, redesign or modification of an organization is not simple. First, because of the existence of entrenched procedures and routines in bureaucratic organizations, there is frequently resistance to making changes in established organizations. There may be resistance to the new tasks to be implemented or to the structural modifications required to carry out the policy changes. Second, many organizational and management tasks called for by reforms may be substantially different than current ones; hence, one may easily find the old organization without adequate resources to carry out the prescribed changes. Even if it has the will, the organization may lack the financial or technical wherewithal to carry out the change.

With significant policy change, an agency's organization can be affected in at least three major dimensions: first, the organization may be affected at the internal level with respect to what the agency does and how it goes about those tasks. Re-organizations and modification of tasks will cause many of the organization's structural components to be superseded by new units and departments. As a consequence, internal relationships within the agency will also change: organizational culture will be affected, working relationships altered, and power and authority structures modified. In all likelihood, new capacities will be required and it may be necessary to circumvent or change personnel norms in order to secure the needed talent. New units (such as policy analysis or advisory groups) may be created which do not fit within the organization's hierarchical culture. Any of these changes will cause a certain amount of organizational shock and resistance.

Second, since policy reform tends to cut across both organizational and functional boundaries, implementing organizations will also need to pay more attention to the external environment and the organization's external stakeholders, both for reasons of securing resources and for potential tensions arising from turf issues. It should not be assumed that an agency will easily give up tasks and functions for which it exists (especially if this implies a net loss of functions and importance). At the same time,

with overall levels of resources diminished, the organization will need to become more competitive with other agencies to make sure it receives its share.

Third, increased communication with other agencies will be necessary to develop enabling or sub-policies vital to implementation of the agency's tasks. Since successful actions by one agency will often depend on the implementation of complementary actions by other agencies, there will be greater need for sharing information and other resources as well as for a more concerted coordination of endeavors by multiple agencies. Mechanisms will also need to be developed to monitor the performance of such collaborative efforts. Matrix-type arrangements, task forces, special inter-ministerial commissions, or creative innovations such as "super-ministries" are all designed to enhance inter-agency communications and coordination in dealing with cross-cutting policy reform problems.

Re-tooling organizations to new tasks and functions is an extremely difficult process. Most organization officials are accustomed to a certain routine, have systems down pat, and often see little reason for change. When suggested, new ideas, structures, or methods are frequently ignored or modified to adapt to the system already in place. Simply ignoring the new directive for change is often the easiest strategy. Since the turnover rate of cabinet ministers is high in most LDCs, the official knows that if he/she stalls long enough, the Minister and the new policy directive will go away.

A variety of mechanisms are available to modify existing organizations to the needs of new policies. Through re-organizations or re-structuring, organizations can be made to adapt to their new circumstances. This may involve a full makeover; but it could also mean that only a relatively narrow part of the organization need undergo serious modification in order to comply with new directions. In certain cases, the addition of a new department or other functional or specialized unit can solve the adaptation problem. The creation of units to fill specialized niches may also address the adaptation problem. But if by creating such additional capacity and ignoring the fact that other parts of the organization no longer serve a useful purpose, then the problem remains only partially solved. It should also be remembered that the greater the disparity between traditional tasks and new requirements, the more difficulty the organization will have in adapting.

Because of the frequent difficulty in establishing new routines or tasks in organizations, it is tempting, perhaps much easier, and often politically more feasible, to create new structures rather than overhaul older ones. But this can be quite costly if the existing organization remains untouched. The officials that inhabit the older structure understand the budgeting, procurement, financial, and personnel systems of government and likely have their own political networks. Dislodging or eliminating such structures can be an imposing task. Consequently, if new organizations are created they may have to either be superimposed on or parallel the older ones.

The separation of the Judiciary from the Executive branch in Guinea Bissau represents a fairly extreme case of organizational modification but one in which independence was critical to the implementation of the declared policy of improved responsiveness. It is unlikely that the strategies adopted by the independent court could have been constructed, or much less implemented, had the judiciary remained under the authority of the Ministry of Justice.

In Zambia, perhaps the only organization equipped to manage the cabng process to assure that submitted policy proposals were both actionable and of sound quality, is the Policy Analysis and Coordination Unit (PAC). The PAC's position within the Cabinet Office and with the blessing of the sitting Cabinet allows the PAC to provide an objective quality control unavailable elsewhere, and gives it the authority to return policy proposals should they not meet the criteria agreed upon by the full Cabinet. It appears unlikely that modification of any of the Ministerial organizations could have accomplished what the creation of a new entity within Cabinet Office has.

While there may often be little alternative, the creation of new organizations can cause considerable problems. The organization of the Fiscal Policy Management Unit in Jamaica's Ministry of Finance at first posed problems since there was resistance to locating the unit where it would have immediate access to the Minister. The IPC technical assistance team expended considerable effort in designing a set of workshops (only part of which were actually implemented) to launch the Unit but which had as an important element, attempting to create agreement about the Unit's role vis a vis other units and parts of the Ministry in order to assure a facilitative environment for the Unit. The objective was to explore and show how the new unit could benefit others. In a like manner, when the Policy Analysis

and Implementation Unit in Honduras (UDAPE) was first getting underway, IPC technical assistance teams worked with the Unit in establishing communications and discussing mechanisms for coordination with similar technical units. These efforts were considered crucial since there was concern that UDAPE would usurp other units. Additional efforts were aimed at helping the Unit's Executive Committee understand the role of UDAPE and in securing the Committee's support for its activities.

In several instances where IPC has assisted, new organizational mechanisms have been created to respond to the cross-cutting nature of policy change. Interestingly, these cross-cutting responses can be found in the public sector, the private sector, and in cases of public-private collaboration. These organizations tend to resemble task forces both because of their multiple organizational membership and their apparently temporary nature. In order to legitimize the discussion of policy change concerning concentration of the South African economy, an exclusively private sector taskforce-like Policy Advisory Group (discussed earlier) was created. While it seems apparent that in order to advance discussion in this sensitive policy area, the creation of a PAG-like mechanism (one which includes the major stakeholders of black business, dominant white business, and foreign investment) is appropriate, it is not at all clear that the PAG will have a life beyond the issues revolving around economic concentration. At the same time, it seems equally unclear that another sort of organizational mechanism (with different members) could have taken on the same task.

In Uganda, as an adjunct to the National Forum, several public-private working groups were created to examine and make recommendations regarding a series of issues related to enhancing the climate for investment. With the elimination of a command economy, the privatization of state enterprises, and the increased responsibility of the private sector as an engine of growth, the Forum provides an important organizational response for discussing policy options and for coordinating activities aimed at improving Uganda's investment climate.

The establishment of special multi-organizational groups within government has proven effective in managing and responding to certain types of intensive policy change. In Bolivia, the formation of the Macro-group provided a means of managing the government's short-term economic stabilization

program. The group was composed of the agencies most affected by and responsible for management of the program. However, once the program had ended, the group was disbanded. In Honduras, the President has periodically convened the Economic Cabinet (an ad hoc group consisting of the President of the Central Bank and the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Economy, and Agriculture) to manage critical economic programs. Though ad hoc, the Economic Cabinet is the only mechanism capable of cross-cutting policy management.

5. Resource Mobilization:

If real and effective change is to be accomplished, then resources must be mobilized in the appropriate directions. Doing so, however, will probably not be easy; re-direction of resources can cause resistance or even antagonistic reaction. Before resources are mobilized, policy change is mostly theoretical; but mobilization defines the change and its impact in terms of resource/benefit addition or subtraction, causing some to win and others to lose. It is here that policy change will encounter its stiffest resistance.

Mobilization of resources for policy change is accomplished through a set of action statements about how, when, where, and by whom the accumulated resources are to be utilized. Programs will need to be designated, projects designed, action strategies identified and then put into place. This may include creation of entirely new structures or others that parallel existing organizations; the re-design or reorganization of all or parts of the agency; modification of the agency's mission, purpose and objectives; changes in the organization's clientele and beneficiaries and relationships with them; elimination of certain, no longer useful or needed departments or divisions; re-alignment of human and material resources to fit the new policy priorities; modification or re-structure of the agency's tasks, services, and products to respond to policy priorities; and the modification, restructure, or creation of entirely new incentive mechanisms to induce the organization and its participants to adopt new modes and practices required by the policy change. If adequate incentives are not provided, resource mobilization will be impaired. If those in control of the resources within the implementing organization do not perceive adequate benefits for modifying their behavior, then the policy will not move forward. Likewise, if consumers or clients of the policy change do not perceive benefits, they will not modify their behavior and thus moot the policy's aims. It is also

likely that the incentive needs of external and internal stakeholders will be different.

Resource mobilization can be extremely complex, and is directly related to the complexity of the policy. Mobilizing resources for policy change within just one agency can be quite difficult; however, if it requires the assistance or collaboration of one or more other agencies, the difficulty increases and requires the development of mechanisms for coordination, communication, and control between participating institutions. For example, policy implementation in environmental and natural resources frequently requires cooperation between multiple organizations from the national to the local level.

Unless compelling reasons and incentives are given, implementing agency(s) will probably resist the mandated changes (Waterbury, 1989); thus, strategies must be developed to overcome that resistance. At the very least, incentives will need to be modified, and it is quite possible that entirely new incentives systems will have to be created. Wages, salaries, and other benefits will probably need adjustment and key staff may need to be re-trained. Unless a new agency is created specifically for the implementation of a particular policy, it is likely that implementation will be a combination of new policies alongside some, if not most, of the agency's traditional activities. Officials in charge of traditional activities will likely try to continue resource flows to the old and familiar versus new mandates.

The complexities of mobilizing resources for policy implementation are aptly illustrated in the case of the development of transport and communications protocols for the member countries of the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC). While the protocols will likely be approved by SADC's Council of Ministers, it will be up to each government to assure that resources are mobilized appropriately toward actual implementation of the protocols. In a single country, this is not an easy task, but when spread across 11 member states, with uneven levels of available resources, asking each not only to make significant change in their own transport and communication policies but also in close harmony with the others, the degree of difficulty and complexity grows exponentially. It is clearly in the interest of SADC to assist member states in setting up mechanisms to help assure the development of action plans and the mobilization of resources toward implementation.

In Guinea Bissau, the Judicial Sector Working Group played a key role in the mobilization of resources putting the newly independent judiciary into motion. Without the presence of the Working Group, mobilization of the new Judiciary would have been much more prolonged — the Working Group provided a vital support system. The active participation in the Working Group of the Minister of Justice, from whose Ministry the Judiciary was removed, helped to assure that resources were channeled to the independent Judiciary, and that functions were handed over in a collaborative and coordinated fashion. The Working Group also assisted the President of the Supreme Court in crafting action plans for the expansion of the court system to the rural areas, for training, infrastructure development, and in assuring that the new Judiciary system received a prominent place in the national budget.

The creation of a Strategic Management Committee at the outset of the Duty Drawback Center in the Philippines proved a valuable tool for mobilizing resources to the new agency and for maintaining the pace and direction of implementation. Periodic retreats were held by the Committee to both assess progress as well as to make corrective actions. Since the Center was dependent to a degree on the support and collaboration (especially for information and the processing of certain forms) of other agencies, the inclusion of key personnel from these agencies on the Committee proved a useful tactic for assuring the flow of resources.

6. Monitoring the Impact of Policy Change:

If policy changes are successful, then their impact will be evidenced in some manner or another such as through changed behavior, greater or improved benefits to consumers or clients, more effective or efficient production and use of resources. However, not all policy change strategies actually produce positive benefits or results despite good intentions; some may produce negative impacts and actually worsen an already bad situation. For instance, economic stabilization and adjustment reforms can exacerbate economic imbalances or factors if they are not quickly followed by strategies aimed at inducing growth. It is therefore important to attempt to ascertain what effect policy change is having — and thereby be able to correct or adjust the policy should it happen to produce unsatisfactory results. Ideally, such monitoring or evaluation should begin early on

in order to stop unproductive strategies before losses or negative impact become too costly or damaging. IPC's strategic management approach encourages monitoring through the use of regular strategic reviews. Even when no formal system of benchmarks and indicators has been set up, the strategic review can assist in determining whether strategies are off course and whether corrections are needed. Strategic reviews have become standard practice for a number of IPC clients including Zambia's PAC, the Duty Drawback Center in the Philippines, the West Africa Enterprise Network, and the Uganda National Forum.

While monitoring is certainly necessary, under situations of complex policy change it is quite difficult to manage. However, it is in situations of rapid and complex policy change where tracking is the most necessary — but again, the most difficult. The fact that policy change is frequently a fragmented process, and one which may take place over a lengthy period, further complicates the monitoring task. The monitoring process of policy change may require both mechanisms for periodic review and evaluation and mechanisms capable of tracking policies over multiple agencies over several years. The twin elements of multiple agencies and long, often unpredictable, time horizons sets policy change monitoring apart from the monitoring of projects and programs. With policy change, impact in one agency's behaviors and outputs may come relatively rapidly and clearly, while in another more slowly and vague, perhaps caused by the nature of the policy or perhaps by a lack of resources at critical stages...but with the overall effect of complicating the construction of manageable monitoring indicators.

When multiple agencies are involved, the question of who monitors the overall policy is problematic. It is not only important that policies produce favorable outputs and changes in their respective agencies but that the interaction of policy changes among agencies also be positive. A given agency can monitor the impact of its own policy change actions, but it is less obvious who will be responsible for tracking cumulative policy impact over several agencies. In several IPC projects, the overall monitoring function for policy change has been taken up by support agencies which work with cross-agency policy making bodies. For instance, the Policy Analysis and Coordination Unit within the Cabinet Office in Zambia has begun to develop methodologies for tracking the implementation of policy decisions coming out of Cabinet. Likewise in Honduras, the Economic Policy Analysis and Implementation Unit

which provides technical support to the Economic Cabinet, has begun to develop logical framework based mechanisms to track implementation and impact of policies related to the Government's structural adjustment program. In Bolivia, the Economic Policy Analysis Unit which supports the Macro-Economic Advisory group, has developed monitoring strategies which employ powerful econometric models to closely track the impact of the government's stabilization policies.

Policy implementation is not necessarily a coherent, continuous process; instead, it is frequently fragmented and may be interrupted at many points during the process. Policy change usually requires difficult changes in the supporting stakeholder coalition, changes in the structures and rules of familiar institutions, and new patterns of interaction (Ayee, 1994: Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; White, 1990). Implementing a policy requires bringing together new resources and new capabilities to accomplish new objectives. The difficulties posed by some tasks may cause the implementation process to be prolonged over several years — a process that may be disrupted by changes in governments, the ebb and flow of critical resources and the like.

Each of the tasks required to bring about policy change is complex — different tasks require different sets of skills and resources, and the sort of leadership required for one task may not be suitable for another. Instead of a single organization orchestrating the process, several may be required, each adding different ingredients. When implementation stretches out over time, then even the character, interests, and style of the participant organizations will change — further adding to the complexity. Rather than a neat, orderly process, policy implementation may appear almost ad hoc. Bardach (1973) argues that policy implementation is much like an assembly process, but it is rarely analogous to the orderly process of constructing of a bridge. As the bridge is going up, progress will appear orderly and even dramatic, but in order to cross, one must wait until the task is actually finished. The implementation of large-scale policy change, on the other hand, is more akin to the rehabilitation of a city. Many of the tasks required (changes in laws and regulations, new businesses, demographic shifts) will be accomplished almost unnoticed. Infrastructure changes may occur only slowly as shifts in priorities begin to be reflected in the city's budget. Other changes will occur in almost a seemingly random pattern; a building or two renovated here, new restaurants and shops there, and

it will generally be difficult to imagine the final outcome — but after ten years the results can be dramatic. In the meantime, life goes on — the city continues to provide a place to live and work as the changes take place.

Organizing implementation, then, may actually appear to resemble a fragmented process of organization of a series of (even seemingly disjointed) tasks. While no one actually may be "in charge", the policy itself (a decision reflecting how resources and benefits are to be allocated) provides the framework that gives an overall structure to the process. The removal of agricultural subsidies, the creation of competition commissions, the adoption of the role of export facilitator by the Ministry of Commerce, and restricting the role of the central bank may all be viewed as separate actions. But in the framework of a decision to create a market driven economy, each action can be seen as contributing to the implementation of a single policy.

III. **ORGANIZING THE IMPLEMENTATION TASK**

A. **WHO'S IN CHARGE?**

The decision about who takes on the implementation task may not be obvious. The broader or more diffuse the reform, the more the policy will cut across several organizational and functional lines — and thereby, the less easy it will be to specify the reform's implementing organization. The more specific and defined the reform, the easier it will be to be precise about which organization(s) should take on the different tasks. And, as policies are cut up into specific projects or programs or to the extent that the policy has a very narrow focus, it will be relatively simple to define the appropriate organization to take on the implementation task. Unfortunately, most policy reforms have broader and usually less rather than more clearly defined objectives and focus, and all too frequently encompasses a number of projects and programs.

Typically, significant reform calls for multiple actions by multiple organizations. However, even though policy reforms tend to cut across several agencies, if a policy reform seems to affect one particular agency more than others, then it is reasonably likely that organization will be assigned the task of implementation. But the fact that a particular entity

is assigned the principal role in implementation does not necessarily mean that it is equipped for the task or will be an enthusiastic collaborator. The agency chosen may not consider the policy legitimate nor support it. It may not have the requisite skills, sufficient resources or mechanisms to access resources, nor the appropriate organizational structure for implementing the policy.

Finding a suitable implementing organization is complicated by several factors. First, if it is not readily obvious that a particular agency should take on the implementation task, then it certainly implies that the policy change is sufficiently different from any potential organization's normal activities as to make that activity a difficult fit. Second, broad policy requires collaboration of several institutions, but coordination is difficult and not particularly attractive. Officials may be asked to give up some degree of control over scarce resources and their organization's activities to achieve a goal for nator will receive credit. Third, reforms carry costs as well as benefits. However, costs tend to be felt in the short run while benefits are generally achieved only in the longer run. As reforms are begun, the manager will be held to account for the damage caused to the organization, but few will be inclined to see the future benefits of those actions. Fourth, an organization's incentive structure is generally not equipped to take on the challenges of change — were it so equipped, then it is likely that change would not be an issue. Incentives must be created to get the agency to accept the challenges of change. But if the new incentives are sufficiently different and attractive they will cause resentment among those not benefiting.

Reform, as the word implies, means doing things differently or doing different things. However, it is rare that reform means only the restructuring or substitution of just one activity; rather, reform generally causes a ripple effect within the source agency as well as across and within other organizations. When a ministry or agency restructures or substitutes one activity with another, its relations to and with other organizations and the activities they carry out will also change, thus calling for changes in the way things are done in the corresponding or affected organization.

For instance, elimination of agricultural subsidies might appear to be a relatively simple action squarely within the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture. But elimination of the subsidy will likely affect a range of other areas as well, such as the financial

system, the fiscal balance, the commercial sector, and transport. How effectively the Minister can implement the new policy will depend on the effectiveness and speed of actions taken in other sectors, sectors not under the direct control of the Minister of Agriculture? Certain sectors will likely oppose the new policy. When subsidies are removed some farmers will likely be bankrupted, negatively affecting loan portfolios of banks. There will probably be at least a temporary rise in the need for imported agricultural commodities; and difficulties will be created for the transport sector as their clients go broke. Where there are negative consequences, it is unlikely that the stakeholder will simply sit still; but the degree to which such opposition becomes mobilized will have a significant effect on outcomes of the new policy. On the positive side, the fiscal balance will im funds will then be available for other purposes. These other purposes will then generate winners or positive stakeholders who will then have a stake in staunchly defending the new policy. For instance, with subsidies removed, the prices to the consumer may drop substantially; the need for imports will boost the business of those engaged in importing and selling commodities. Clearly, the Minister must look beyond his own narrowly prescribed sphere of action into those areas that can affect the outcomes of contemplated policy changes.

Policy processes appear to present a situation where, as Bryson and Crosby(1992) put it, no one is in charge (also Hjern and Porter, 1981). Policy decisions made by one Minister or agency head will have significant repercussions for another, either in terms of altered resource levels, or in terms of procedural or task changes needed in another to accommodate the new policy, but the individual decision maker has virtually no power to effect such changes in agencies other than his own.

In cases where it is impossible to define a single agency to lead the change, some mechanism for group leadership may have to be developed. Under differing circumstances, reform leadership has been embodied in task forces, special commissions, or coordinating committees. Where communications are difficult or working through collective leadership is not feasible, collective actions may be grouped under a single leader such as a "super-Minister" or "Czar". Even where these frameworks are accepted, however, it should also be noted that authority is not hierarchical, but rests more on consensus.

When policy reform cuts across several agencies, then the manager may be more appropriately viewed as a broker or coordinator of interests than as an executive sitting atop a hierarchical pyramid. In the case of broad policy reforms involving various ministries or agencies, the top of the hierarchical pyramid is generally occupied by the President of the country. While ownership of or agreement to the policies by the affected Ministers or other heads of agencies is indispensable, the President's role is generally confined to legitimation of the reforms; overall management of the remaining policy implementation tasks is generally carried out at the next level below. Usually, that means the cabinet, a group composed of several powerful and theoretically equal individuals.

The task of implementing policy reform is, then, one of management of peers and peer organizations. The policy change implementation manager is rarely in a position to tell individual ministers or other agency heads what to do, or how to restructure their organizations. Rather, the manager will need to influence and persuade those organizations to go along and adopt required changes that will facilitate the effectiveness of the reforms. When the cabinet is composed of multiple interests or representatives of a fragmented coalition (as is often the case in the newly democratizing developing countries) it is not unusual that the various ministers will be quite jealous and protective of their turf. All too often, for the sake of either the Minister's own political ambition or the interest of the group he/she represents, one Minister would just as soon see another fail. Important skills in the management of policy reform then, are facilitation coordination, and the ability to foster collaboration among multiple agencies (Lindenberg and Crosby, 1981).

B. INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGE

IPC's role has been focused extensively on the problems of implementation of economic policy change or democratization. However, and contrary to what was thought at the outset of the project, IPC experience has largely been assisting in the partial implementation of policies, with specific tasks of the implementation process, or, as pointed out by Brinkerhoff (1995) in Theme Paper 1, has assisted in strengthening the capacity of implementing agencies to carry out their responsibilities — perhaps a direct reflection of the nature of policy implementation,

wherein policies are most often implemented in bits and pieces.

Given the IPC philosophy of assisting and/or increasing the capabilities of host country agents of policy change, rather than working directly to implement policy, IPC has focused most of its attention on working with, and strengthening organizations tasked with implementing policy change and has most often been geared toward developing specific capabilities to carry out certain tasks. For instance, where the implementation task has been constituency building, such as in the case of the Uganda National Forum, IPC's assistance was oriented toward mechanisms to increase participation and dialogue among an expanded set of stakeholders. IPC assisted in developing stakeholder analysis capability and in workshop organization and facilitation. Over the past five years, IPC has assisted in the creation and development of several innovative responses to the organizational challenges presented by policy implementation. These responses have ranged over a variety of the implementation tasks from legitimation to resource mobilization; several of these are discussed below.

1. Creating legitimacy   new arenas:

The formulation and implementation of macro-policy reform presents challenging organizational problems. As policies cut across agencies and functional lines of decision-making. Traditional decision- or policy-making mechanisms within standard government agencies may lag behind or be inappropriate to the policy change task. As a consequence, some governments have opted for the creation of new arenas of decision-making on important policy reform issues — arenas which create the necessary legitimacy to move the process of policy implementation forward (Bryson and Crosby, 1992).

As decisions emerging from these arenas tend to have broad impact, the traditional organizations of public policy implementation (ie., the line ministries and decentralized public agencies) frequently have found themselves ill-equipped or inappropriate for management of the mandates and tasks of policy reform, and as a consequence have turned increasingly to the use of ad hoc or task force-like organizations or mechanisms both to make decisions and to manage the implementation process (see Falk, 1993). Altier (1987, p. 52) argues that "task forces are productive tools to use when resolving decisions that cross functional or organizational boundaries.

They are tools to apply to situations that do not fit neatly into an existing box in the organizational structure; they're big round pegs where the organizational structure consists of small square holes. They overlap conventional boundaries, and their outcome has effects beyond the neat little square holes."

These new "arenas" are frequently ad-hoc, created as political and policy needs arise, but by-passing the need for statutory authority. They may be temporary in nature or have distinctive task-force qualities; and they are often composed of several (three or more) Ministers or officials with significant discretional authority, to manage and coordinate the reform process. The primary purpose of such groups is to serve as a collective legitimizing force for implementing policy changes and which openly recognizes the interdependence of actions between and among their respective organizations.

In Zambia, a reinvigorated Cabinet office has taken on the function of developing and overseeing the implementation of a more coordinated policy formulation and implementation process (Koenen-Grant and Garnett, 1996); in Bolivia, a Macro-economic Group composed of the Minister of Planning, Minister of Finance, and the Central Bank President was formed to oversee and monitor the implementation of the critical short-term economic reforms process (Cooley et al, 1991); in Honduras, the President convened an ad hoc "Economic Cabinet," composed of four key Ministries and the head of the Central Bank, to serve as the locus of decision-making for the formulation, implementation, and oversight of economic reforms (Crosby, 1996b); and in Peru the Executive Secretary of the Presidency serves as the coordinating mechanism for economic reform (De Franco and Diaz, 1994). The head of such groups, reflecting the nature of the task, may be referred to as the "Coordinator" for economic policy as in Honduras, or, as in the case of Bolivia, a "super-

The unifying thread among these organizations is the need to collectively develop and manage policies that cross agency lines. Because of the high degree of interaction and interdependence of economic policy reform decisions, successful implementation requires that critical stakeholders be involved in decisions regarding policy formulation and implementation that affect their agencies. While these organisms have no statutory authority to make decisions or to implement policy — they have the collective authority of the

participants to implement decisions based on the agreements made in the new decisional "arenas" (Crosby 1996a).

In the examples cited, "ad hoc" groups appear to work best as bridging mechanisms to provide the collective political and legitimizing will to move the policy change process forward. Ad hoc groups can unblock the inertia caused by recalcitrant bureaucrats in their respective ministries and provide support to the development and realignment of internal coalitions favoring policy change. They can also be useful for monitoring the results of implementation efforts. But questions have been raised about their utility in the long run. Altier (p. 54) declares that "an ongoing task force isn't a task force; it's a poor excuse for an inappropriate organizational structure. Task forces are used to deal with the unusual, the exception to the routine conduct of business. There is no reason for a task force to be kept in business *ad infinitum.*" Bolivia and Honduras may have already begun to recognize the validity of that dictum.

During the governments of both Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora in Bolivia, the "Macro-Group" was authoritative on matters of short-term economic policy, but under Sanchez de Losada, it was disbanded. In Honduras, the Economic Cabinet was the pre-eminent economic policy-making group under the Presidency of Callejas, but with the election of Reina, the group became conflictive and its influence reduced. In both Bolivia and Honduras, the ad hoc groups were most effective when the process of policy change implementation was just beginning. When the new governments came in, commitment to the process within all the relevant agencies was more fully (though certainly not completely) embedded. When the new Bolivian government entered it appears that the need for an ad hoc, bridging mechanism had diminished — largely owing to the newly developed competencies of the regular Ministries. On the other hand, Zambia's Cabinet Office has steadily increased its influence and utility as a policy coordinating mechanism, but with elections scheduled for 1996, it remains to be fully tested.

At least in IPC's experience, ad hoc or "macro-groups" have bounded utility — they are most useful for bridging "policy transition periods" when the traditional implementation agencies are either unwilling or incapable of fulfilling the implementation leadership role. Eventually, however, traditional or existing government

institutions will modify their nature, and adjust organizational structures and internal operating processes to the exigencies of policy reform. Responsibility for managing policy reforms will be more readily divided and assigned. Once that occurs, the need for multi-organizational institutions such as the "macro-group" will simply disappear. In Bolivia, this process seems to have already taken place. The reason of course, is that the most of the "reform" policies have been implemented and institutionalized. Policy management that before was new, uncertain, and not well understood, is now procedure and even obvious. Internal systems have been adjusted to deal with the cross-cutting impact of policy change. There is no longer a need for the "macro-group".

2. Constituency building — approaches to mobilizing stakeholders:

Without adequate constituency support, a policy will most likely fail. If a policy is new, it will not necessarily be obvious who the appropriate or most likely supporters will be. Further, since the benefits of the new policy may not be completely obvious, once potential supporters are identified, it may take some effort to convince them that it is the best, most supportable option. Under command economies or centralized polities, finding a constituency was not a problem, there was only a single policy option, and thus only a single constituency. Opposition, when it existed, was quashed. Under democratic systems and market based economies, however, alternatives exist. For every proposal made, there is likely to be a counter-proposal which may appear to have as much merit as the other. Policy champions, therefore, may have to compete for the support of potential constituents. Two cases from the IPC experience, the Uganda National Forum and the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Council (SATCC) national stakeholder dialogues, illustrate different but nevertheless successful approaches to the problem of constituency building and stakeholder mobilization.

The development and subsequent evolution of the Uganda National Forum has provided a major breakthrough in relations between the public and private sectors of Uganda, and has served to increase the voice of the private sector in the formulation and implementation of economic policy. Uganda was considered one of the more successful examples of what undertaking economic reform initiatives can accomplish in Africa. By the early 1990's, it had received substantial loans and assistance from international donors and the international financial institutions. Decision-making for economic policy change and structural reform was centered in a narrow group of politicians, senior civil servants, and technical advisors. Even though the thrust of their decisions was toward implementing a more open, liberalized, market driven economy. Instead of enthusiastic support for the government's reform initiatives, it remained lukewarm — at least in part because the government did not actively seek the support of the important private sector constituency. The result, was a low rate of private investment and export growth.

With increased interest and pressure to consolidate the reform process but in a context of democratization and greater pluralism, the need to develop firmer support links became apparent. This led, in 1992, to the National Forum on Strategic Management which provided the first formal opportunity for government officials to establish a working relationship with the private sector with a view to identifying and implementing actions to promote private investment and export growth (see Harvey and Robinson, 1994). While private sector comprised only one-third of the participants, the Forum not only helped establish a broader base of support for the government's reform program, but also provided the private sector with channel of access to the policy formulation and implementation process. As part of its ongoing activity, the Forum created four Working Groups composed of government officials, private sector representatives and academic economists. (The subject areas of the four groups will vary according to need but have included tax policy, investment promotion, export growth, and financial sector development.) The groups meet regularly and produce recommendations for consideration by the President's Economic Council and other policy decision-making groups. They also provide regular feedback to the government on the progress of reforms and policy changes suggested. A second National Forum conference was held in early 1995, and it was decided that national conferences would be held on a bi-annual basis. It appears that the Forum and the working groups have now become a semi-permanent fixture or mechanism for mobilizing stakeholder concern, as well as a mechanism for tapping into constituency support from the private sector. Although the government has given up some of its exclusivity in economic policy decision-making, it has also gained an important ally for the implementation of difficult policy changes.

The Southern Africa Transport and Communications Council (SATCC) was charged with the development of regional protocols in a variety of sectoral areas of transport and communications (including roads, ports, air transport, customs, meteorology, postal service and telecommunications). One of the more permanent problems that SATCC and its parent organization (the Southern Africa Development Community) had experienced was compliance with regional initiatives and protocols. One criticism that had been made of both SATCC and SADC was a tendency to not consult widely at the national or even regional levels on proposed agreements or protocols prior to their preparation, presentation to the Council of Ministers, and subsequent enactment. While it was generally assumed that there was a constituency in most of the countries for uniformity and harmonization of regulations affecting economic activity, only very rarely, if ever, did regional officials try to determine the nature of that constituency's interest nor how to mobilize its support. In this particular instance, the then head of SATCC, was determined to avoid this pitfall, and designed a highly consultative process to assist in both assessing and vetting key issues. IPC was brought in to assist in organizing and facilitating the process.

The process consisted of three major points of consultation: 1) one to one and one-half day regional consultations in each of the seven subsectors (with representatives from each of the 11 SATCC member countries) to determine a list of fundamental issues to be treated by the protocols; 2) one-half day national stakeholder consultations in each of the subsectors in each country; and 3) a final, three day omnibus session for each of the sub-sectors with the participation of designated, official representatives from each country. As a constituency building/legitimizing activity, the oversubscription of each event is eloquent testimony. Further, the results of the omnibus sessions provided a framework from which the actual protocols were to be developed. There was, of course, much debate over the content of the protocols in each of the areas, but the fact that the process generated the participation of over 1500 individuals representing a wide range of stakeholder interests does show that such constituencies can be mobilized. The fact that such a large constituency was mobilized puts a great responsibility on the officials of SATCC to actually follow through with a set of implementable protocols.

Mobilization of stakeholders can be threatening to policy-making officials. In order to gain access to policy-making/implementation process, means must be selected that do not threaten but still manage to mobilize interests. In West Africa, the closed nature of most political regimes has made finding such means challenging. Even in those countries where there is a high degree of openness, governments and their representatives are not accustomed to dealing with organized pressure groups, or highly mobilized stakeholder interests. To the extent that pressure groups have had access in the past, it has usually been for a narrowly circumscribed group, and the nature of the relationship can generally be characterized as "cozy" or cronyish — one that rather than reform-minded, tends toward the status quo. This setting gave rise to a unique and interesting model for mobilization of stakeholder interests — the West Africa Enterprise Network, which was developed as a regional means for developing advocacy capacity among several informal national networks of entrepreneurs.

The stimulus for creation of the network was the need felt by marginalized but dynamic economic actors to have greater input to the policy process so as to improve the framework and climate for doing business. The concept of an informal network of young, innovative, and concerned entrepreneurs was advanced as a means of aggregating interests concerning economic and business related policy in a non-threatening way. Although the groups would meet regularly, they would remain only loosely affiliated, there would be no organizational infrastructure, and moreover, without legal personality or standing, there would be substantial limits on network's range of activities. Through the assistance of IPC, most of the individual networks acquired greater issue analysis and prioritization skills, and began to develop positions on issues of key concern. Policy positions of the group were then advanced, usually through personal contacts of the membership, but with only indirect reference to the network. The networks had become highly organized, but by not opting for legal status, they remained informal. Rather quickly, the networks began to emerge publicly through the associated efforts of the individual members. But by the time that occurred, the networks, again through its individual members, had already managed to dispel any connotation of threat to important policy-makers.

Although perhaps not intended as such, the concept of the highly organized informal organization has

only limited viability. The Network has found that being an informal organization, with no legal personality, carries some distinct disadvantages, especially in the highly legalistic and formalistic francophone West African countries. Nevertheless, as a strategy for overcoming the establishment's fears of a more mobilized non-traditional, non-establishment private sector, the well organized informal organization proved an excellent mechanism for mobilization of stakeholders.

3. Supporting the process of policy change:

A problem common to the task force-like groups described above is the need for quality information and analysis for decision-making on policy formulation and implementation options that, like the policies they deal with, can cut across agency lines. Unfortunately, all too often, staff already on board in the group's respective agencies are incapable of such cross-cutting analysis, or has yet to adapt to the changing nature of economic policy thought.

In several countries an innovative set of **policy analysis and implementation and/or management units** have been created to support top economic policy decision makers and strengthen their capacity for developing appropriate responses and strategies to pressures for economic reform (Lamb, 1987; Lamb and Weaving, 1992; Boeninger, 1992). Unlike sector analytic units, or those created during the sixties to support Planning Ministries, which all too often were buried in the bureaucratic structure, these new units frequently have become prominent and highly visible actors, as advisors on critical policy issues and in the policy dialogue process with donors, and as participants in setting the policy reform agenda. Like the policies they develop, these units cross functional boundaries and become much more "government-wide". Rather than attached to specific or single Ministries, these new analytical units are often dependencies of cross-cutting government agencies such as Cabinet Offices or policy-making mechanisms such as "economic cabinets" or "macro groups". Policy Units are mechanisms for formalizing strategic thinking and problem solving in an organized way around important economic or other reform issues... they are arenas that policy makers acknowledge and recognize but with the difference that they add a strategic dimension oriented toward action — the implementation dimension.

The purpose of these new units is to provide the intellectual and analytical capability to examine questions of why and which policies should be carried out, how and when the selected policies should be executed, and once in place monitor the performance of the chosen measures. However, in order to be able to carry out their role, ie., support the macro-groups and their like, they must be able to make themselves heard or achieve influence within the actual policy making decision and implementation process. That is neither as easy or clear a task as it might seem (Callaghy, 1990; Paul, 1990). Another IPC paper (Crosby, 1996a) has analyzed several cases, each representing a slightly different approach to the development and strengthening of analytic and policy management capacity at the strategic apex of government, in order to determine what seems to contribute to successful insertion of these units into the policy process.   These include Honduras' Economic Policy Analysis and Implementation Unit (UDAPEH), Zambia's Policy Analysis and Coordination Unit (PAC), Jamaica's Fiscal Policy Management Unit (FPMU), Bolivia's Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), Gambia's Statistical and Special Studies Unit (SSSU), and Peru's Policy Analysis and Implementation Project (PAPI).

The ability of these units to influence the policy formulation and implementation process ranges from quite successful to apparent failure. By closely examining what is considered to be a highly successful example of a policy unit, Bolivia's UDAPE, six factors were isolated which appear to contribute significantly to successful insertion into the policy process. These factors include the degree of ownership and patronage for the Unit's output, linkage to a dominant or significant policy maker, technical capacity, commitment by the donor to remain non-intrusive regarding the Unit's policy agenda but nevertheless provide long-term financing, congruence with the political and policy environment, and finally, the degree of collaboration with competitive analytical units.

The presence of "success factors" is rather varied in these policy units, with none reaching the levels achieved in Bolivia (Table 1). The three most successful cases, Bolivia, Honduras, and Zambia do share certain characteristics, however: a high degree of ownership and patronage, and a strong, direct linkage to the dominant policy maker. In all three, the dominant policy maker happens to be one of the ad hoc task force-like groups described in the section above.   In two of the remaining cases, Jamaica and

Gambia, the units were created within the Ministry of Finance, while the third, in Peru, was not clearly linked to any policy maker. With a high level of ownership by each organization's principal client in Honduras, Bolivia, and Zambia, each of these Units has, to some degree, ridden the coattails of their respective patron's success. In both Gambia and Peru, but to a lesser extent in Jamaica as well, the Units had the misfortune of being attached to a client (in Peru to no apparent client at all!) who did not seem to care about the Unit's output, or was not in a particularly good position to use it.

Within most reforming governments, individual agencies may have mechanisms for monitoring those policies pertaining to their own interests, but the ability to track policy implementation across agencies is either limited or absent. In Honduras, Zambia, and Bolivia this was a particular problem for policies related to international financial assistance, ie., stabilization and structural adjustment loan packages. To develop capacity to carry out this function, Bolivia's UDAPE centralized economic and financial data collected by the economic and financial ministries and developed econometric models to determine appropriate parameters of behaviors for short-term stabilization and adjustment policies. Similar capabilities were to be developed for Honduras' UDAPEH. Part of IPC's assistance to the

PAC in Zambia was aimed at increasing skills and developing methodologies for monitoring cross-Ministerial policy. As the only agencies with such cross-cutting skills, organizations like UDAPE also bring an "agency-neutral" point of view — a view that does not focus strictly on a particular agency's outlook nor one that remains entrenched in old patterns or ways of thinking. In periods of change, the benefits of being agency-neutral cannot be underestimated — what is good for the Ministry of Finance may not be good for the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Agriculture.

It appears that the same questions about sustained need for Macro-Groups also applies to the cross-cutting analytical units. With the demise of the Macro-Group in Bolivia, questions were raised about the need for a "cross-cutting", independent UDAPE. It has now been placed within the Ministry of Planning and appears to have a much diminished influence. On the other hand, in Honduras although the Economic Cabinet, especially its Coordinator, still has much use for the Unit, it is not difficult to imagine a similar fate as UDAPE-Bolivia, should the Economic Cabinet or its Coordinator lose importance, and the line Ministries begin to reassert themselves.

Table 1. Presence of "Success Factors" in Policy Analysis Units

	BOLIVIA	ZAMBIA	HONDURAS	GAMBIA	PERU	JAMAICA
Ownership/Patronage	hi	med	med/hi	lo	lo	lo/med
Linkage to Policy Maker	hi	med/hi	hi	lo	lo	lo/med
Technical Capacity	hi	lo/med	med	lo	lo	lo
Donor Role/Commitment	hi	med	med	med	lo/med	lo/med
Policy/Political Congruence	hi	med	med/hi	lo	med/hi	med
Collaborative Environment	med/hi	med	med	lo	lo	med/lo

4. Redesigning organizations for implementation — new configurations:

It will frequently be necessary for agencies to restructure their organizations in order to meet the

needs of the policy implementation. New tasks will be developed, new procedures created, responsibilities will shift, some divisions or departments will gain importance while others may even be abolished, and new patterns of internal resource allocation will

emerge in accordance with the demands of the new policies. Much like the nature of cross-cutting policies, on occasion, restructuring also may be necessary across agencies — some tasks may be reassigned or reallocated to another agency, resources will be redistributed in accordance with the new policies, some agencies will gain in importance or stature while others decline, and a greater level of coordination may be called for.

In the Philippines, in a move to develop greater transparency as well as to decrease restrictions on exports, the Department of Finance decided to consolidate a series of functions related to granting import tax rebates to export processors, thereby increasing Philippine competitiveness. To accomplish this, a new agency, the Duty Drawback Center, was created within the Department. IPC was asked to assist in the start up of the Center and to work with the Under-Secretary of Finance in the creation and establishment of the Center's management structure. The Center was supposed to consolidate an array of functions from several Divisions within the Department of Finance and the Department of Commerce including rebates for both import taxes (Bureau of Customs), Value Added Tax (Bureau of Internal Revenue) charged on exports, and the determination of standards for local content and value (Bureau of Trade, Department of Commerce). To make the Center work, these agencies were required to pass functions over to the new Center, and to transfer certain employees. Some degree of resistance and apprehension was created on two levels: first, at the level of leadership of the affected agencies who saw some of their functions eliminated and second, apprehension of those to be transferred to the new Center because of the change in location and the need to learn new skills and systems.

Some of the resistance on the part of the top officials was reduced by their inclusion as members of the Duty Drawback Center's Executive Committee, which was designated as the chief oversight mechanism for the Center. The idea for the Executive Committee emerged from a stakeholder analysis and political mapping exercise done by Department of Finance officials with guidance from IPC as part of its long-term technical assistance effort, that showed more clearly the new coalitional patterns of both support and opposition to the Center. The creation of the Committee allowed the top officials to continue to have a say over matters that had previously been strictly under their own purview, and at the same time appears to have played a key role in gaining the

necessary concurrence for restructuring the functions of the Center. Strategic retreats were periodically held to both review progress and to discuss plans. The integration of employees from other bureaus was accomplished through a fairly lengthy set of IPC facilitated organizational development and team-building workshops before the inauguration of the Center, to help clarify and define responsibilities and roles, expectations and to help them become acquainted and comfortable with the new environment, functions and procedures of the Center.

In Guinea Bissau, a general shift in government policy away from a heavily centralized, command economy to a more market oriented framework, caused major shake-ups in government institutions and the need to undertake some major restructuring. Although IPC worked with three sectors, Judicial, Commerce, and Agriculture, in the restructuring both institutions and policies, the Judicial sector posed the most interesting an challenging problems. Until 1994, the Judiciary and the court system was under the authority of the Ministry of Justice (in keeping with the colonial Portuguese framework). Whether as a consequence or not, the courts had badly deteriorated and the legal system as a whole was incapable of responding the needs of an increasingly market oriented economy. The regulatory system was considered obsolete and the courts had become incapable of keeping up with caseload. It was felt that if a market economy was to develop, Guinea Bissau needed a capable and functioning legal system for the resolution and remedy of disputes, and to provide an regulatory and commercial framework that foreign investors could trust.

As part of the overall constitutional reform process, it was decided that in order to give the judicial sector the importance it deserved, an independent judiciary should be created, headed by the President of the Supreme Court. As part of the Ministry of Justice, the courts received a portion of the Ministry's budget. Nevertheless, the courts' administrative systems were poor, its infrastructure was in poor repair. But with independence, the court would now have to compete for the government's scarce resources and a place on the national budget. To manage the process of transition and restructuring, a Judicial Working Group was created, composed of critical judicial sector stakeholders, including the heads of the Bar Association and the Law School, the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice, among others. Wide consultations were held by the Working

Group to assess the needs of different sectors regarding the legal framework and the court system. Particular attention was given to the commercial sector, sincat if the country was to make serious progress toward a market economy, the regulatory framework would need extensive revision. With the assistance of the IPC consultants, a collaborative strategic process was begun to assess the needs of an independent judiciary, assist in shepherding judicial independence through the constitutional process, define objectives, structure a new system of incentives for judges, develop training and ongoing capacity building programs, develop strategies for competing for scarce resources in a government plagued by budget deficits, and develop action plans for putting it all into motion (Gustafson, 1995).

While the judicial sector required major overhaul and re-tooling to be able to carry out its function as an independent entity in a more market based economy, the organizational restructuring needs of other agencies, while extensive, were not quite as wholesale. In the cases of Commerce and Agriculture, questions were raised about the capability of each agency's structures and functions to respond to changes in the environment. Working groups patterned much along the same lines as the successful judicial working group were established. Workshops were facilitated by the IPC technical assistance team for the purpose of re-examining the appropriateness of each organization' objectives given changes in the environment and in stakeholder interests and needs. For the Commerce working group, the most significant input came through a national conference with a large private sector participation, which fed directly into the development of a new Commerce action plan. Since Agriculture's organization was better suited for a command economy and much less for a market framework, the activities of the Agriculture Working Group were more oriented toward re-thinking the organization's objectives in light of both a drastically shrunken budget as well as very different economic posture on the part of the government.

It is worth noting that the working groups have become rather regular, though unofficial, players in the development of issue agendas in each of the agencies. Moreover, though none of the groups has any official standing, they have begun to exercise an informal monitoring function regarding the recommendations implemented, and have been especially important as interface between the Ministries and the technical assistance teams. In

several respects they are similar to the "macro-groups" used for bridging the transition of policy change; the difference is that the working groups have become valued mechanisms for assisting in strategically managing the organizational restructuring process. It is not clear, however, whether the working groups will persist once restructuring is completed and institutionalized.

The organization dimension for implementing policy change affects not only the government or public sector — it also has considerable impact on the private sector. When significant policy change has occurred in many developing countries, it is frequently the private sector which has taken the brunt of policy impact. Policies that provided benefits and subsidies to select and privileged industries are suddenly removed. Those affected suddenly find their tax incentives and exemptions removed. They are now faced competition as the protective shield to their market is lifted.

Traditional business associations or chamber groups in developing countries may be slow to adjust to economic liberalization — indeed, such groups are often in the forefront of opposition to reform, or have resisted cooperating with government in the implementation of policy reform. The reasons are easily understood: chamber associations represent important vested interests, those that perceive that they will have the most to lose by significant changes in the status quo. In economies shifting to export oriented macro-frameworks, traditional interests in the area of import substitution or traditional agricultural crops represent potent opposition to the changes that an export orientation will bring. In many cases, the counterpart for implementation of liberalizing policies has not been the traditional chamber of commerce or associations of employers that have typically dominated business associational interests in developing countries, but rather, newer, smaller and often highly entrepreneurial groups. These forces are frequently composed of young, dynamic elements that have sat impatiently at the margin of the traditional, larger chamber groups. In some cases they will be emerging associations and in others loose networks of like-minded individuals (see Orsini and Courcelle, 1995). But with reform initiatives these new, younger, and more dynamic elements have become the more amenable counterparts to policy implementation discussions with the donors.

The newer, non-traditional business associations tend to find a sympathetic ear with international donors, and have frequently aligned with donor policy interests. Through generous financial support, donors have been instrumental in realigning policy coalition arrangements within the private sector and in integrating new stakeholders into the policy formulation and implementation process. As the newer private sector organizations have developed rapidly, they have tended to adopt modern management and advocacy strategies and techniques, and in many cases have come to represent formidable competition for the traditional private sector organizations. In several Latin American countries, the appearance of these non-traditional organization has fostered positive competition with their more traditional counterparts. Traditional business associations, recognizing a growing encroachment by the newer groups into their formerly exclusive territory, set about revamping their own organizational structures and began to actively recruit new stakeholders and participants. Interestingly, as the newer, non-traditional organizations have seen their sources of financing from the donors dry up, they have also seen a resurgence in the leadership and political importance of the traditional, but reworked, organizations.

In one sense, it can be argued that the newer, non-traditional business organizations have served a bridging function. Traditional business associations largely resisted policy change, while the non-traditional organizations welcomed it. As they embraced change they attracted the support and attention of international donors and through that support became important stakeholders (even if only marginal players or decision-makers) in the policy process. The presence and ascendancy of the newer, non-traditional groups provoked not only a positive response in the stagnant, narrowly based traditional business organization toward acceptance of policy change but also provided a catalyst for restructure of their own organizations and the acquisition of new skills and capacities that would allow them to regain their former influence on the policy formulation and implementation process.

5. Organizing the mobilization and coordination of implementation:

While it is not always necessary that various organizations affected by policy change work directly in concert with each other to assure implementation, it is important that they not impede the process through implementation of regulations or practices which contradict the proposed policy change. In many cases, control over the actions of all agencies involved in implementation is unnecessary. Nevertheless, it is important that agencies be aware of what the others are doing and that they coordinate their actions — both to avoid getting at cross purposes and to provide information concerning results which may affect the implementation strategy and actions of another agency.

Loosely organized coordinating bodies or networks, which meet on a periodic basis to exchange information about their current and proposed actions, can be rather useful mechanisms for agencies to avoid stepping on one another during the implementation process. In Honduras, for example, in order to avoid encroachment into the turf of institutionally based technical analytical units, UDAPE created an Advisory Committee. The committee was composed of the chiefs or other representatives of several of these other technical analytical units and met on a quarterly or as needed basis (Crosby, 1996b). The purpose of the committee was coordination through a sharing of information concerning what their respective units were doing, and what sorts of studies would be useful to attend to upcoming policy needs. At the same time, the meetings helped to dispel what was perceived by several technical units to be a threat to their units by UDAPE. Most importantly, through this non-hierarchical, and informal mechanism, several multi-agency studies were begun, and considerable improvements were made in the cross-flow of information and data.

The use of loosely based coordination networks can also create efficiencies in the utilization of scarce resources. The West Africa Enterprise Network's (WAEN) regional conferences serve as mechanisms to coordinate issue priorities and to develop advocacy positions, especially in the areas of trade and financial services, aimed at creating greater harmonization of policy. WAEN's creation of several specialized sub-networks helps both to link, accumulate, and mobilize what would otherwise be isolated and not particularly efficient resources. One such sub-network is NETFORCE, which acts as a clearinghouse for financial service professionals and channels interested parties to the appropriate consultants. WAEN's Ghana network centralizes the collection and distribution of information on trade of West Africa. The West Africa Development Fund, also managed by the Ghanaian network, is a

coordinated effort to mobilize local resources for financing local enterprise initiatives.

Although IPC has encountered instances where the coordination mechanisms appear to be more highly structured and formal, informal relationships or mechanisms have actually proved more determinant for effective coordination, especially as the pace of policy change has picked up (Brinkerhoff, 1993; Chisholm, 1989). In Honduras, although the Economic Cabinet is an ad hoc body for the coordination of economic policy, its decisions carry considerable force. The Cabinet has a technical secretariat, it meets every thursday, and the head of the group is called the "Coordinator". All that notwithstanding, most of the decision-making and real coordination of actions between the ministries represented is actually done in side meetings among one or two of the members or over the telephone. Much of the time, the actual meetings of the Economic Cabinet serve more as informational, rather than decisional, purposes. In Bolivia, the Macro-Group serves as the informal chief coordinator for short term economic policy, though the official coordinative mechanism is the highly formal National Economic Planning Council (CONAPLANE). The Macro-group came about as a reaction to the sluggishness of the CONAPLANE, as the needs for rapid decision making on economic policy began to outpace its capacity to respond. As the need for greater interdependence in decision-making increased, the formal structure of CONAPLANE could not respond. Meetings were held once per month and the rules for decision-making required vetting through a sub-committee structure. As a consequence, the informal relations among a sub-group of CONAPLANE began to take on more and more of the short-term economic policy coordination function.

C. SOME CAPABILITIES FOR ORGANIZING IMPLEMENTATION

As can be seen, organizational response to policy change tends to focus on specific policy implementation tasks. Like the fragmented nature of policy implementation itself, fairly specific organizational responses are developed for the various tasks of constituency building, resource accumulation, or for the development of mechanisms to mobilize resources. While the responses may come from the traditional line ministries, from new organizations, from ad hoc or time-bounded

taskforce-like groups, or from non-governmental organizations, it is also clear that the implementation tasks they must address require management capabilities different from those associated with traditional principles of administration. When the problem is securing legitimacy for a new policy, budgeting skills may be important for paying salaries of the organization's staff, but skills for brokering agreements or advocacy will be more useful for addressing the problem.

When new policies are instituted, organizations will often place considerable emphasis on the acquisition of technical skills for implementation. While these skills are vital to operationalizing the new policies, or to making the new policies feasible at a practical level, they tend to be directed at the internal operations of the organization, at honing the more technical activities of the organization, and appear to be less useful for the change management component of policy reform. Technical skills focus on the internal needs of policy change, whereas many of the barriers to policy implementation are externally derived. While it is important that the organization upgrade its skills to be able to deliver on the substance of the new policies, those skills must be balanced with others that will assist the organization in adapting to and surviving in a changing environment — skills that will allow it to compete on an equal footing with other organizations in the quest for resources to carry out its new activities.

The following skills and capabilities appear to be those most useful for the policy implementation tasks discussed above. The mix for a particular implementing organization would depend largely on the implementation tasks undertaken.

- **Mechanisms for brokering multiple interests**: Since much policy change will involve multiple organizations or cross multiple organizational boundaries, differences of opinion will arise from time to time regarding priorities, sharing of resources, and authority. The capacity to mediate and/or broker such differences thus becomes crucial to assuring legitimacy and the successful implementation of the proposed policy changes. The establishment of rules and boundaries through establishment of evenly understood and agreed upon roles, responsibilities, and expectations is an essential step toward the ability to resolve differences amicably. The use of regular or periodic retreats and/or workshops

among the principal stakeholders to air differences of opinion can help to prevent disputes before they become disruptive. Access to skilled internal or external facilitators to manage these processes can enhance the potential for productive problem-solving exercises. IPC's use of mediators and regional working groups proved highly effective mechanisms for brokering interests and for developing and legitimizing agreements about what policies should be adopted in highly sensitive cross-border trade issues in West Africa.

- **Capabilities for generating and maintaining support**: A key to successful policy implementation is the existence of a supportive constituency for the proposed policy change. In some cases, it might be relatively easy to mobilize support at the outset of a significant policy change but difficult to maintain that support over the long haul, especially when some stakeholders discover that the new policy benefits are not to their advantage. Advocacy techniques can be particularly useful in generating and mobilizing initial support. The development and institutionalization of participative and collaborative mechanisms within the organization through consultative processes, or others that include and give effective voice to the broad range of stakeholders included under the organization's range of activities and mandate, will assist in generating genuine support. It is important that such mechanisms be regular features of the organization's agenda setting and problem solving approaches so as to maintain a supportive constituency once it has been generated. This is especially important for treating the losers in the policy change process. If losers are part of the consultation process, and if mechanisms are developed to assist in mitigating some of the costs to the "losers", the impact on the organization's support base will be minimized. In Uganda, the utilization of both the working groups and conferences proved to be strong consultative mechanisms for both maintaining support as well as a way to give voice to dissension.

- **Mechanisms for adapting new tasks to the organization and the development of frameworks for organizational learning:** If policy implementation is to be effective, organizations must be able to redesign or re-

invent themselves in order to adapt to new tasks. In the process of organizational modification or redesign, new tasks will be juxtaposed with traditional activities, and tensions will likely arise. Adaptation will be an iterative process. The use of action research or other iterative organizational learning techniques can be useful to smooth adaptation to new tasks that take into account both ingrained institutional patterns as well as the needs of the new policy tasks and hence stem some of the risks inherent in carrying out new activities with old structures resistant to change.

The use of periodic workshops to provide a collaborative setting for installing and reviewing the adaption of new tasks has proven an effective mechanism in several IPC settings. SWOT analysis (a tool that examines the organization's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) can provide not only baseline criteria but is a useful mechanism for monitoring whether new adaptations are correctly targeted. The redesign and transformation of Zambia's PAC from a "minutes-taking" organization into an effective policy process "manager" was effected largely through a combination of action research workshops with ministry officials combined with periodic skills training. Similarly, Guinea Bissau's working groups for transforming the Agricultural Ministry and for "re-creating" the judiciary were largely action research driven.

- **Enhanced capability for scanning the environment**: Large scale policy change tends to come in waves. Positions and or policies of other organizations and stakeholders affected by policy change will not remain static — they will adopt new positions, acquire new leadership, all of which will change the relational equation with other organizations. The organization must be alert for changes in the environment and among other organizations that may affect its coalitional relationships with supporting constituencies, organizations or stakeholders, that may affect its abilities to accumulate and mobilize resources, and that might impede its ability to implement particular strategies. Periodic use of stakeholder analytic techniques, political mapping, or force-field analysis, and the opportunities/threats portion of the SWOT analysis can assist the manager to gauge the temperature of the environment. These methods have been

particularly useful for UDAPE in managing the transition from one government to another in Honduras. An environment scan provided the group with a map of the new coalitional arrangement. Following this map, UDAPE developed a strategy to successfully generate support and was accepted as a valued advisor by the new government.

- **Increased abilities in lobbying and advocacy:** In order to build an appropriate constituency and to generate support, the organization must be able to disseminate its message. At the same time, if the organization is to carry out its mission, it must be able to accumulate an appropriate level of resources. Development of abilities in both advocacy — to disseminate the benefits of the proposed policies to provide support for both the policy and organization — and in lobbying — in order to both convince policy makers of the needed policy change as well as to secure sufficient resources to implement the change — is vital to the organization interested in successful policy implementation. For both the public and the private sector organization, democratization has increased the level of competition for public resources and the number of policy alternatives from which the policy decision-maker may choose. Development of capabilities in both advocacy and lobbying will help to assure that the organization's message is at least heard and that the right policy-makers are approached. Technical assistance in both skills provided to the West Africa Enterprise Network has allowed the WAEN to get its issues on the policy agenda and has helped to develop a remarkable success rate of policy changes proposed to those implemented.

- **Frameworks for monitoring and controlling implementation activities**. The implementing organization must be able to "see where it is going" if implementation is to be successful. Actions taken must be properly mobilized to produce desired outcomes, and if not, then corrective actions must be taken. This is especially true given the highly interactive nature of policy change and the impacts generated by policy changes in other organizations. What may appear to be a sound action taken by the organization may suddenly become less so due to the actions of another agency. While the

mechanisms available for monitoring activities range from very sophisticated computerized management information systems, simpler and more direct methods may be equally relevant. What is important to remember is that the sophistication of the system should not exceed the organization's needs nor capacity to actually use it for decisional input. Relatively simple techniques such as the development of and close attention to the implementation of action plans through periodic review workshops can assist in keeping tabs on the progress and costs of the organization's policy implementation strategy. It is important to remember that, given the rapidly changing environment of policy change in most LDC's, any framework must be reviewed with regularity. Action plans have been used as monitoring instruments with great success by the West Africa Enterprise Network. In a similar mode, the judicial and agriculture working groups in Guinea-Bissau have used regular action plan reviews to keep track of progress toward their policy objectives.

- **Structures or techniques for coordination among multiple agencies**. Since policy implementation frequently involves multiple agencies, techniques for mobilization of dispersed resources, and for avoiding duplication of effort (so as not to waste resources) need to be developed. IPC's collaborative approaches are highly salient for addressing these sorts of coordination problems. The development of collaborative strategies for implementation incorporating stakeholders must include other agencies whose policies and activities will be impacted. Start-up workshops are useful, minimal investment activities for identifying overlaps and gaps in responsibilities and capacities for implementing new policies. Depending on the nature of the activities structures may be developed that will allow for the sharing or transfer of resources or for simply sharing information regarding plans and activities. IPC's assistance in developing the framework for UDAPE's Advisory Committee addressed the problem of potential overlap with other technical analysis units. The coordinative mechanism of a strategic management committee became the vehicle for the transfer of resources from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the Duty Drawback Center in the Philippines.

- **Frameworks for reporting external impact feedback and for checking "environmental**

Tracking and monitoring impact is perhaps one of the more ignored but most important functions for the policy implementation organization to develop. It is the mechanism for determining if the organization is doing what it is supposed to do and for whom it is supposed to benefit. Developing capacity in the use of evaluation methods can certainly assist, but for some organizations, periodic strategic reviews can go a long way toward understanding policy impact and effectiveness. The use of the logical framework when formulating policy implementation strategies will provide a base from which to judge policy impact and organizational effectiveness. But as is the case with other rational-formal methods, the evaluator must be careful to understand the why of implementation performance or policy failures and the possibility of change in critical assumptions caused by environmental change so that the framework does not become a straightjacket. Without the ability to measure or judge the impact of the implementing organization's actions, resources will be wasted, or worse, become counterproductive.

IV. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY CHANGE

The Implementing Policy Change Project makes the assumption that the policy change and implementation process can be improved by strategic management. Strategic management concepts have, over the last twenty years, been applied to vast numbers of organizations, particularly those in the private sector, but increasingly within the public sector as well (Goldsmith, 1995). Strategic planning and management has been found an effective tool in defining environmental demands and for helping the organization achieve a greater congruence with those demands. Strategic management has also been found helpful in coping with uncertainty and the openness of the organization to environmental pressures.

Strategic management has generally been applied to bounded organizations where leadership exerts hierarchical control over resources and activities. Though the organization may be rather complex (consisting of various divisions or business units such as the cases of General Electric, RJR Tobacco, or IBM), there is a clear and final source of authority within the organization. When applied to the public sector, strategic management also has been found useful in specific organizations where leadership and organizational hierarchy seems rather clear. However, in situations of policy change, organizational boundaries begin to break down, and moreover, the management of policy implementation may become multi-organizational or fragmented.

As White (1989) points out, (sectoral) policy change provokes intense debate, strains or breaks organizational capacity, threatens those in power, and exacts high political costs. To bring about policy change, the actors and institutions involved will be required to make significant adjustments in what they do. When governments attempt policy change/reform, they do so with a much larger set of constraints than the private sector executive or the manager of single public sector organization (Goldsmith, 1995). The set of institutions is much more complex and varied and the degree of hierarchical control (though nominally substantial) is often rather vague. Even in those countries characterized by some sort of authoritarian rule, control is often much more "apparent than real". In many developing countries, such as Zaire and Liberia, authoritarian rule is diluted by competing power or strong coalitions. And in those countries undergoing massive changes in their economies and political systems, such as Russia, Zambia, or Nicaragua, it is often difficult to tell exactly who or what has any, let alone substantial, control.

Given the complexity and uncertainty of the policy change and implementation process, it would appear that strategic management of that process will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The problem is that policy change goes beyond the single bounded organization, and the resources to accomplish that which needs to be done are beyond the hierarchical control of a single organization's leader. If strategic management of policy change requires a single, bounded organization, then it would appear that the approach is not very useful. If, however, strategically managing policy change is more a change of approach or of mentality to the problem of policy change (Crosby, 1991), then strategic management is certainly applicable as a means for managing the policy implementation process. Indeed, the IPC experience appears to indicate that not only is the strategic management approach highly pertinent but may well be the approach which best fits the problems

and organizational challenges induced by policy change (Brinkerhoff, 1995). Strategic management and its emphasis on looking out and looking ahead is ideally suited to the nature of policy change. Strategic management does not ignore the past, but nor does it assume that past actions will be relevant for the future. In strategic management, high value is placed on constant testing and learning as the environment and the organization's stakeholders feed back reactions on the appropriateness of strategies and solutions to the distinctive policy implementation tasks undertaken.

Strategic management provides a valuable process for guiding an organization through the challenges of the policy implementation task(s) for which it is responsible. The several steps of the strategic management process framework assists the organizations in respondithe needs of policy change through the following:

- **Recasting objectives:** When significant policy change occurs, organizational missions, objectives, and tasks may change radically. Strategic management induces the organization to review its objectives, analyze their effectiveness, and to restate the organization's purpose when such change occurs. An organization with an inappropriate mission or irrelevant objectives will clearly be incapable of effective policy implementation. In Zambia, the application of strategic management led to a recasting of PAC's mission and objectives thereby transforming it from a "minutes taking" secretariat to a policy process manager.

- **Rethinking the environment:** When policy changes are made, coalitions will shift, those who once benefited no longer will, and those once out will now be in. The organization will find that some of its supporters and allies are no longer; easy access to resources will be plagued with obstacles. If the organization is to be effective, it must understand and develop a good fit with its environment. Strategic management equips the organization with skills to assess the environment, to better understand coalitional re-alignments that come with policy change, and to determine where potential support lies. Strategic management tools can also help to ascertain where future trends lie that will affect the organization's ability to effectively carry out its tasks. Strategic management tools for assessing

the environment assisted Honduras' UDAPE in consolidating its position during a very difficult government transition from the leadership of one political party to that of the former opposition.

- **Re-examining the organization, inventorying capabilities:** Once policy change is initiated and implementation progresses, new skills and capabilities will no doubt be required. Strategic management's frameworks for analyzing managerial strengths and weaknesses in light of changes in the organization's mission, objectives, and tasks will assist in assessing which new skills and capabilities are needed, which need to be reinforced, and which are no longer needed. Rather than assuming that such capabilities are static, strategic management invites periodic reassessment to keep the organization in close alignment with environmental needs. The West Africa Enterprise Network has found that this element of strategic management has allowed the Network to be highly responsive to policy changes as they emerge.

- **Identifying and coming to grips with strategic issues:** The ability to anticipate issues is one of the keys to organizational effectiveness in policy implementation. Strategic management places emphasis on periodic review of important or key issues — those that will affect the organization's ability to carry out its tasks or role. Since policy change environments tend to be unstable, key issues are likely to change and shift with some frequency. Strategic management approaches help the organization to sift through such issues and prioritize — thereby also encouraging it to adjust both strategies and skills accordingly. The Uganda National Forum's utilization of strategic management approaches has assisted them in pinpointing key issues impeding or facilitating the country's economic development policies and in making strategic recommendations on these issues to the President's Economic Council.

- **Developing feasible and acceptable alternatives:** If policy alternatives are not acceptable to the consumer, they obviously will fail. Much of the problem of feasibility and acceptability can be solved through generating real support and through involvement of critical stakeholders in the development of policy implementation alternatives. Strategic management's participative style encourages the

involvement of stakeholders at critical junctures, on the expectation that they can point out what is acceptable and assist in the design of feasible alternatives. In the Philippines, a strategic retreat was held to discuss alternatives for merging certain Bureau of Internal Revenue functions into the Duty Drawback Center. Mapping techniques and force-field analysis were applied to gauge the political feasibility of the alternatives presented. In Guinea Bissau, the fact of wide stakeholder participation in the Judicial Working Group, gave wide acceptability and legitimacy to the alternatives presented.

- **Tracking and monitoring solutions:** The strategic management process is by nature iterative. The assumption is that the environment changes and therefore the relevance of the solution or strategy presented for addressing the implementation task will likely also change. Periodic review and feedback on the impact of the organization's response to the implementation task is a fundamental part of the strategic process. The practice of regular review of organizational strategy and strategic management's attentiveness to wide stakeholder participation provides realistic feedback on

effectiveness and impact. Periodic strategic workshops and/or retreats in Zambia by the PAC, have kept it attentive to potential problems with stakeholders and allowed its staff to make strategic corrections to avoid serious problems. Similarly, the Judicial Sector Working Group used periodic workshops to track and get feedback on efforts at gaining independence of the judiciary and, just as important, for securing budget resources.

Successful organizational response for the implementation of policy change requires flexibility and creativity. To adequately respond to the various implementation tasks, the participation of several organizations at several different points over a relatively long period of time may be required — all under what in all likelihood will be a continually changing political environment. While strategic management is not the complete answer, it does provide a method and a framework for keeping an eye on the future, for making sure the solutions adopted are compatible with the external environment and the organization's internal capabilities, and mechanisms for reassessing and learning —all of which will assist in a more effective and beneficial implementation of policy change.

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