Testimony
of Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Records
Management Divisionm FBI
Before the House of Represenatatives, Subcommittee on International
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights
Los Angeles, California
February 13, 2004
Mr.
Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
Director Mueller here today to testify in this hearing,
in which the Committee is examining the FBI's role in the
process of preventing the entry of terrorists into the United
States. Unfortunately, Director Mueller could not be here
today, so I have been designated to provide testimony in
his stead. My name is Robert Garrity, and I have served
as an FBI Special Agent since 1976. I currently serve as
the Deputy Assistant Director of one of the FBI's newest
divisions, the Records Management Division (RMD). My goal
today is to inform you of two main methods in which the
FBI is an integral part of the cooperative effort of federal
agencies to screen for potential terrorists attempting to
enter this country. The first process is the FBI National
Name Check Program which screens selected groups before
they receive a visa for entry into the United States. Lastly,
I want to provide you with the mission and objectives of
the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) which assists in
the efforts to respond to suspected terrorists screened
or stopped at our borders.
FBI
Name Check Process
Certain
visa applications require substantial interagency vetting
prior to approval by the Department of State. The primary
category is designated Visa Condor, relevant to certain individuals
who are from designated countries and who satisfy additional
criteria which may make them worthy of additional scrutiny.
The FBI receives information on the applicants from the Department
of State, which is entered into the FBI's National Name Check
Program (NNCP). The information is searched against the FBI's
Universal Indices (UNI). The searches seek all instances of
the individual's name and approximate date of birth, whether
a main file name or reference. By way of explanation, a main
file name is that of an individual who is the subject of an
FBI investigation, whereas a reference is someone whose name
appears in an FBI investigation. References may be associates,
witnesses, co-conspirators, or victims whose name has been
indexed for later retrieval. The names are searched in a multitude
of combinations, switching the order of first, last, middle
names, as well as combinations with just the first and last,
first and middle, and so on. It also searches different phonetic
spelling variations of the names, which is especially important,
considering that many names in our indices have been transliterated
from a language other than English.
If there
is a match with a name in an FBI record, it is designated
as a "Hit", meaning that the system has stopped on a possible
match with the name being checked, but now a human being must
review the file or indices entry to further refine the "Hit"
on names. If the search comes up with a name and birth date
match, it is designated an "Ident." An "Ident" is usually
easier to resolve.
Approximately
85% of name checks are electronically returned as having "No
Record" within 72 hours. A "No Record" indicates that the
FBI's Central Records System contains no identifiable information
regarding this individual. By agreement with the Department
of State, partially due to our concern about the time factors
in approving most visa requests, a "No Record" equates to
a "No Objection" to the issuance of a visa. The substantive
investigative divisions in the FBI, (i.e., the Counterterrorism
Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the Cyber Division
(CyD)) do not review visa requests where there is no record
of the individual. Duplicate submissions (i.e., identically
spelled names with identical dates of birth submitted within
the last 120 days) are not checked, and the duplicate findings
are returned to State.
Because
a name and birth date are not sufficient to positively correlate
the file with an individual, additional review is required.
A secondary manual name search usually identifies an additional
10% of the requests as having a "No Record", for a 95% overall
"No Record" response rate. This is usually accomplished within
a week of the request. The remaining 5% are identified as
possibly being the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI
record must now be retrieved and reviewed. If the records
were electronically uploaded into the FBI Automated Case Support
(ACS) electronic record keeping system, it can be viewed quickly.
If not, the relevant information must be retrieved from the
existing paper record. Review of this information will determine
whether the information is identified with the subject of
the request. If not, the request is closed as a "No Record."
The information
in the file is reviewed for possible derogatory information.
Less than 1% of the requests are identified with an individual
with possible derogatory information. These requests are forwarded
to the appropriate FBI investigative division for further
analysis. If the investigative division determines there is
no objection to the visa request, the request is returned
to the name check dissemination desk for forwarding to the
Department of State. If there is an FBI objection to the visa
request, the investigative division will prepare a written
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and forward it to the Department
of State. In reviewing these visa requests, the FBI has identified
individuals attempting to enter the United States who are
of serious concern to the FBI.
I want
to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact
that delays in visa processing may have on business, education,
tourism, this country's foreign relations, and worldwide perceptions
of the United States. With these considerations in mind, the
FBI is working diligently with the Department of State toward
the common goal of improving the expediency and efficiency
of the visa clearance process. At the same time, the consequences
of the FBI's mission on homeland security require that our
name check process be primarily focused on an accurate and
thorough result. This means that there are instances when
the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much time
as needed to obtain an unequivocally correct result.
Processing
Times
The FBI's
goal is to have all requests completed within 120 days. How
long does it take to complete a visa request name check? Ninety-two
percent are completed in 30 days. Between 98-99% of the requests
are resolved in 120 days. Most name check requests that are
over 30 days old are the result of the time required to retrieve
and review field office record information. Some delay occurs
at substantive analysts' desks, but this is to be expected.
These analysts are assigned to the investigative divisions
and are primarily assigned to the analysis of intelligence
reports from around the world in order to support ongoing
investigations, or to support the flow of intelligence to
policy makers. Despite these significant and voluminous responsibilities,
these are the best professionals to review information in
our records, and to then make an informed decision on whether
a requester of a visa represents a threat to our homeland,
or is interested in illegally acquiring our targeted technology.
Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, the FBI resolves between
98-99% of all types of visa requests within 120 days.
Decentralized
Record Keeping System
I alluded
to the time delay for most requests in excess of 30 days being
the time necessary to retrieve the file from the field office
where the file is stored. This is the primary factor in any
delay in the FBI responding to a visa name check. FBI files
are currently stored at one of 265 locations, including FBI
Headquarters, all 56 field offices, many of the larger of
our 400 resident agencies, several warehouses around the Washington
Metropolitan area, in records centers operated either by the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or a commercial
concern, four large Information Technology Center facilities
on the east and west coast, and at Legal Attaché offices worldwide.
Delays result from NNCP personnel identifying a file's location
and then requesting the file from a field office. Time delays
mount as field office staff search file rooms and then fax
or ship copies of the needed file or a prepared summary to
FBI Headquarters. This process - repeated for many tasks,
not only dilutes the FBI's responsiveness, but also limits
information sharing - a critical success factor in working
counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.
One possible
solution to this problem the FBI is exploring is the establishment
of a central records repository where all of our closed paper
files could be located, and our active files stored electronically.
Our frequently requested closed files could be scanned and
uploaded into our electronic record keeping system, so that
Agents and analysts worldwide would have instant electronic
access to the information they require for their jobs.
Terrorist
Screening Center
The TSC
was created to ensure that government investigators, screeners,
agents, and state and local law enforcement officers have
ready access to the information and expertise they need in
order to respond quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened
or stopped. The TSC will consolidate access to terrorist watch
lists from multiple agencies and provide 24/7 operational
support for thousands of federal screeners and state and local
law enforcement officers across the country and around the
world. When fully operational, the TSC will dramatically increase
our ability to ensure that federal, state, and local officials
are working from the same unified, comprehensive set of anti-terrorist
information. The TSC allows for the consolidation of disparate
information, currently held by multiple agencies to be brought
together for a single purpose of identifying and detaining
potential terrorists, or prevent future terrorist attacks.
The creation of the TSC marks a significant step in protecting
America's communities and families by detecting, disrupting
or preempting terrorist threats.
Since
December 1, 2003, TSC has been providing key resources for
screeners and law enforcement personnel. These include:
- a
single coordination point for terrorist screening data;
- a
consolidated 24/7 call center for encounter identification
assistance;
- a
coordinated law enforcement response to federal, state and
local law enforcement;
- a
formal process for tracking encounters and ensuring feedback
is supplied to the appropriate entities.
Since
December 1, 2003, the TSC has had the ability to: (1) make
the names and identifying information of terrorists (known
to or suspected by the U.S. Government) accessible to federal,
state and local law enforcement; (2) systematically review
whether a known or suspected terrorist should be included
in or deleted from additional screening processes; (3) administer
a process to ensure that persons, who may share a name with
a known or suspected terrorist, are not unduly inconvenienced
in U.S. Government screening processes; and, (4) implement
a system to adjust or delete outdated or incorrect information
to prevent problems arising from misidentifications.
Conclusion
The nature
of the terrorist, foreign intelligence and criminal threats
facing our nation continues to evolve and so does the FBI.
We have made significant strides toward enhancing our operations,
both domestically and overseas, and depend upon valuable partnerships
with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition,
the FBI recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name
check processing. I want to emphasize to you, this issue has
the full attention of Director Mueller. The FBI appreciates
the interest of the Committee in this matter. I am prepared
to answer any questions the Committee may have.
Thank
you.
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