

AmerenUE alleged violations in connection with Taum Sauk dam failure

A. Violations of 18 C.F.R. § 12.10(a), which requires licensees to report to the Regional Engineer any condition affecting the safety of a project or project works:

- AmerenUE failed to report the September 25, 2005 overtopping to the Commission.
- AmerenUE failed to report the unusual instrumentation readings observed on September 27, 2005.
- AmerenUE failed to report the failed system for anchoring the transducers used to measure the water level in the upper reservoir to the Commission.

B. Violations of 18 C.F.R. § 12.5, which requires licensees to use sound and prudent engineering practices in any action relating to the design, construction, operation, maintenance, use, repair or modification of a water power project or project works:

- AmerenUE added 0.4 foot to the programmable logic controllers' measurement of the project's water level to compensate for an inaccurate transducer reading.
- AmerenUE did not repair the loose transducers used to measure the water level in the upper reservoir.
- AmerenUE operated the Taum Sauk Project with water at 1596 feet above sea level, too close to the top of the upper reservoir's parapet wall.
- AmerenUE raised the upper reservoir's Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level, higher than the lowest point of the top of the parapet wall.
- AmerenUE added a one-minute delay after the Warrick probes were activated before the pumps were shut off.
- AmerenUE programmed the Hi and Hi-Hi Warrick emergency shutoff probes to operate in series rather than in parallel mode.
- AmerenUE did not program the Warrick probe to transmit an alarm when the Hi probe was activated.

C. Violation of 18 C.F.R. § 12.11, which requires licensees to report any modification of the project to the Commission:

- AmerenUe failed to report to the Commission that it raised the Warrick probes.

D. Violations of Article 20 of license Form L-11 for the Taum Sauk Project, which requires advance Commission approval of modifications of the project's instrumentation:

- AmerenUE raised the Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level without prior Commission approval.

- AmerenUE added a one-minute delay to the activation of the Warrick probes without prior Commission approval.
- AmerenUE programmed the Hi and Hi-Hi Warrick emergency shutoff probes to operate in series rather than parallel mode without prior Commission approval.

E. Violation of Article 27 of the license for the Taum Sauk Project, which requires Commission approval of a substantial alteration of the project:

- AmerenUE raised the Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level without prior Commission approval.