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REPORT
OF THE
For an online version of the Report in Adobe Acrobat PDF format, see: |
CHAPTER SUMMARYTHE STRUCTURE OF THE PRC GOVERNMENT
COSTIND: The CCP's Use of Corporations for Military Aims
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CCP'S TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
The 863 and Super-863 Programs:
Importing Technologies for Military UseThe 16-Character Policy: 'Give Priority to Military Products'
The PRC's Use of Intelligence Services to Acquire U.S. Military Technology
METHODS USED BY THE PRC TO ACQUIRE ADVANCED
U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGYAcquisition of Military Technology from Other Governments
Joint Ventures with U.S. Companies
Acquisition and Exploitation of Dual-Use Technologies
Direct Collection of Technology by
Non-Intelligence Agencies and IndividualsIllegal Export of Military Technology
Purchased in the United StatesPRC Purchase of Interests in U.S. Companies
Methods Used by the PRC to Export
Military Technology from the United StatesPRC Incentives for U.S. Companies to
Advocate Relaxation of Export ControlsTHE PRC'S EFFORTS TO ASSIMILATE
ADVANCED U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGYU.S. GOVERNMENT MONITORING OF PRC TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATESCHAPTER 1 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARYPRC THEFT OF U.S. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN INFORMATION
THE PRC'S NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR WARHEADS
THE IMPACT OF THE PRC'S THEFT OF U.S. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN INFORMATION
Mobile and Submarine-Launched Missiles
Acceleration of PRC Weapons Development
U.S. GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN INFORMATION LOSSES
Investigation of Theft of Design Information for the Neutron Bomb
Investigation of Theft of Design Information for the W-88 Trident D-5 Thermonuclear Warhead
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT THE U.S. NATIONAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS
MILITARY OBJECTIVES CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRC'S
INTEREST IN HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERSU.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS HAVE
THE GREATEST POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PRC'S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIESTRANSFER OF HPS TECHNOLOGY CAN BENEFIT
PRC INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIESSensors for Surveillance, Target Detection,
and Target RecognitionTRANSFER OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
TO THE PRC COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE MANUFACTURE
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, MISSILES,
AND OTHER WEAPONSTRANSFER OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY TO THE PRC COULD SUPPORT ATTAINMENT
OF OTHER PRC MILITARY OBJECTIVESCommand, Control, and Communications
Meteorology for Military Operations
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE
COMPUTER USE BY THE PRC MILITARYU.S. EXPORT POLICY HAS GRADUALLY RELAXED CONTROLS
ON HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERSDefense Department Review of
Military Applications for HPCsDetails of the 1996 High Performance Computer Export Control Policy Changes
CONCERNS OVER HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER
EXPORTERS' ABILITY TO REVIEW END-USERS IN THE PRC
PROMPTED THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATIONThe U.S. Government Has Conducted Only One End-Use Check for High Performance Computers in the PRC
Some U.S. High Performance Computer Exports to the PRC Have Violated U.S. Restrictions
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS AT U.S. NATIONAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES ARE TARGETS FOR PRC ESPIONAGE
MANY TYPES OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY HAVE
BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TOTHE PRC THAT
COULD FACILITATE RUNNING PROGRAMS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPORTANCETHE PRC HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERSU.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORTS
TO THE PRC ARE INCREASING DRAMATICALLYTHE PRC IS OBTAINING SOFTWARE FROM
U.S. AND DOMESTIC SOURCESPOTENTIAL METHODS OF IMPROVING END-USE VERIFICATION
TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Changing High Performance Computer Technology Is Making Export Control More Difficult
CHAPTER 3 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
THE PLA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
Development of the PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces
The Soviet Union's Contribution to the PLA's Ballistic Missile Force
The Role of Qian Xuesen in the Development of the PRC's Ballisitc Missile and Space Programs
Development of the PLA's Intermediate- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
The PLA's Current 'East Wind' Intercontinental
Ballistic MissilesThe PLA's Future 'East Wind' Intercontinental
Ballistic MissilesThe PRC's Medium- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
Stolen U.S. Technology Used on PRC Ballistic Missiles
The PRC's Strategic Forces Doctrine
The PRC's Opposition to U.S. Missile Defenses
The PRC's Acquisition of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology
The PRC's Indigenous Ballistic Missile Design Capabilities
THE PRC'S MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM
The PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program
The PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities
The PRC's Manned Space Program
The PRC's Communications Satellite Programs
The PRC's Use of Foreign Components on
Communications SatellitesThe PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program
The PRC's Other Military Satellite Programs
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PRC'S
BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ROCKET TECHNOLOGYCHAPTER 4 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
OPTUS B2, APSTAR 2 LAUNCH FAILURES: PRC GAINS
SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM HUGHES INVESTIGATIONSTHE PROHIBITION AGAINST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
IN FOREIGN LAUNCHESInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations
and the U.S. Munitions ListOPTUS B2
The Optus B2 Fails To Achieve Orbit
Hughes' Export Administrators Deal
with the Licensing QuestionA 'Political' Business Solution
The Optus B3: Hughes' Efforts to Improve
the Long March ContinueAPSTAR 2
Failure Investigation Schedule
Commerce Department Conference
Same Fairing Failure Identified by Hughes
A 'Political' Business Solution, Again?
The Commerce Department Approves Data Release to the PRC
Hughes Tries to Get the PRC to Accept Its Findings
Final Failure Investigation Report Released
to the PRC by the Commerce DepartmentImplementing the 'Consolidated Solution'
U.S. Government Actions Following
the Apstar 2 Launch FailureDefense Department Assessments
of Damage to National SecurityDamage to National Security from
the Apstar 2 Failure InvestigationDamage to National Security from the Sharing
of Coupled Loads AnalysisOther Information Learned by the PRC,
and Defense Department ReactionState Department Assessments of Damage to National Secuirty
Damage to National Security Identified
by the Select Committee's Technical ConsultantCHARLIE TRIE, THE PRC, AND HUGHES ELECTRONICS
FURTHER INVESTIGATION WARRANTED
TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Nose Fairings on Rockets
and Ballistic MissilesCHAPTER 5 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
INTELSAT 708 LAUNCH FAILURE: LORAL INVESTIGATION PROVIDES PRC WITH SENSITIVE INFORMATION: OVERVIEW OF EVENTS
The PRC's Launch Failure Investigation
The Asia Pacific Telecommunications Insurance Meeting
The PRC's Creation of an 'Independent Review Committee'
The Independent Review Committee's Meetings
The Independent Review Committee's Report
Substance of the Preliminary Report
Defense Department Analyst Discovers the Activities of the Independent Review Committee
DETAILS OF THE FAILED LONG MARCH 3B-INTELSAT 708 LAUNCH AND INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
Background on Intelsat and Loral
The Intelsat 708 Launch Failure
Events Leading Up to the Creation of the Independent Review Committee
The Apstar 1A Insurance Meeting
The April 1996 Independent Review Committee Meetings in Palo Alto
United States Trade Representative Meeting on April 23, 1996
The April and May 1996 Independent Review Committee Meetings in Beijing
The Independent Review Committee Preliminary Report
Loral Sends the Draft Report to the PRC
The Contents of the Draft Report
Notification to Loral Officials That a Report Had Been Prepared
Loral Review and Analysis of the Independent Review Committee Report
The Final Preliminary Report is Sent to the PRC
Loral Management Actions After Delivery of the Report
to the PRCDefense Department Official Discovers the Activities of the Independent Review Committee
Meeting with the Defense Technology Security Administration
Loral Management Discovers the Independent Review Committee Report Has Been Sent to the PRC
Loral's 'Voluntary' Disclosure
Investigation by Loral's Outside Counsel
Loral Submits Its 'Voluntary' Disclosure to the State Department
The PRC Gives Its Final Failure Investigation Report
Assessments By U.S. Government Agencies and Referral to the Department of Justice
Defense Department 1996 Assessment
Central Intelligence Agency Assessment
Department of State Assessment
Outline of What Was Transferred to the PRC
Loral's Inaccurate Instructions on Releasing Public Domain Information to Foreigners
Instructions to the Independent Review Committee Regarding Public Domain Information
The Cross-Fertilization of the PRC's Rocket
and Missile Design ProgramsThe Independent Review Committee Aided the PRC in Identifying the Cause of the Long March 3B Failure
The PRC Implemented All of the Independent Review Committee's Recommendations
The Independent Review Committee Helped the PRC Improve the Reliability of Its Long March Rockets
AFTERWORD: U.S. Companies' Motivations to Launch SATELLITES in the PRC
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Technical Aspects of Technology Transfer During the Loral Failure Investigation: Background
CHAPTER 6 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
AT PRC LAUNCH SITES: BACKGROUNDUNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ALLOWS OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. SATELLITES AND OTHER CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY
INADEQUACY OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS
SAFEGUARDING U.S.-BUILT SATELLITES AND U.S. ROCKET TECHNOLOGY AT PRC LAUNCHES
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFEGUARDING U.S. TECHNOLOGY AT LAUNCHES
DEFICIENCIES OBSERVED IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
U.S.-PRC Technical Discussions Occur Prior to the Issuance of Export Licenses
Technology Transfer Control Plans and Security Plans Vary Throughout the Space Industry
Temporary Assignments of Defense Department Monitors Disrupt Continuity of Launch Site Security
An Inadequate Number of Defense Department Monitors Is Assigned to PRC Launches
Uneven Prior Technical Experience of
the Defense Department MonitorsInadequate Headquarters Review of Monitor Reports
Lack of Intermediate Sanction Authority
Conflicting Industry Priorities
Satellite Manufacturers, Not the Defense Department, Supervise Site Security Personnel
Reliance on Private Contractor Security Is Inadequate
Insufficient Numbers of Security Guards at PRC Launche Sites
CORRECTING SECURITY DEFICIENCIES
EXCERPTS FROM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MONITORS' REPORTS OF SECURITY LAUNCHES OF U.S. SATELLITES
CHAPTER 7 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE INSURANCE IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PRC
Insurance Aspects of
the Long March 3B-Loral-Intelsat 708 FailureThe Formation of the Independent Review Committee
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: The Commercial Space Insurance Industry
CHAPTER 8 NOTES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTROLS:
THE EXPORT OF OUR MILITARY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGYCONTROLS MAINTAINED IN COOPERATION
WITH OTHER NATIONSCOCOM (Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls)ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE
EXPORT ADMIISTRATION REGULATIONS
ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS
OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
EXPORT LICENSES FOR MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY:
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCEExport License Processing Until December 1995
License Processing Since Executive Order 12981
in December 1995Pre-License Checks and Post-Shipment Verifications
Roles of Other Departments and Agencies
in Commerce's Export Licensing PolicyPenalties for Violation of
the Export Administration RegulationsPenalties Under the 1979 Act (Expired Since 1994)
Penalties Under the International Emergency
Economic Powers ActCommodity Classification Requests Under
the Commerce Control ListEXPORT LICENSES FOR MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Commodity Jurisdiction Process
Congressional Oversight and Required Reports
Foreign-Origin Items with U.S. Content
Penalties for Violations of
the Arms Export Control Act and ITAREXPORT CONTROL POLICY TOWARD THE PRC
Launch of Satellites on PRC Rockets
Satellite Launches in the PRC Following Tiananmen Square
Missile Proliferation Sanctions on the PRC
U.S. Munitions List Changes Regarding Satellites
Relaxation of Satellite Export Rules
The 1996 Transfer of Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites to Commerce
The 1999 Return of Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites to the State Department
CHAPTER SUMMARY
MANUFACTURING PROCESSES: PRC EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MACHINE TOOL AND JET ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES
PRC TARGETING OF ADVANCED MACHINE TOOLS
Export Controls on Machine Tools
Export Administration Regulations
The PRC's Machine Tool Capabilities and Foreign Acquisitions
CASE STUDY: McDONNELL DOUGLAS MACHINE TOOLS
Findings of the U.S. General Accounting Office
The U.S. Government's Actions in Approving the Export Licenses
Intelligence Community Assessments
Changes to the Trunkliner Program
Commerce Department Delays Investigating Machine Tool Diversion for Six Months
The Commerce Department's Actions in April 1995
The Commerce Department's Actions in October 1995
Allegation that the Commerce Department Discouraged the Los Angeles Field Office's Investigation
PRC Diversion of Machine Tools
CATIC Letter Suggests Trunkliner Program at Risk
CATIC's Efforts to Create the Beijing Machining Centerwith Monitor Aerospace
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
PRC TARGETING OF U.S. JET ENGINES
AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGYCASE STUDY: GARRETT ENGINES
PRC Targeting of Garrett Engines
U.S. Government Approval of
the Initial Garrett Engine ExportsCommerce Department Decontrol of the Garrett Jet Engines
The Interagency Review of the Proposed Export
of Garrett Jet EnginesConsideration of Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative RegulationsTHE PRC CONTINUES TO ACQUIRE
JET ENGINE PRODUCTION PROCESSESTECHNICAL AFTERWORD: The PRC's Acquisition of Machine Tools, Composite Materials, and Computers for Aircraft and Missile Manufacturing
CHAPTER 10 NOTES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS
SATELLITE LAUNCHES
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS
EXPORT LEGISLATION AND
OTHER TECHNOLOGY CONTROLSINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS
SATELLITE LAUNCHES
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS
EXPORT LEGISLATION AND
OTHER TECHNOLOGY CONTROLSINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
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