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The activities and programs discussed in this section encompass all NWS organizational levels and contain both labor and non­labor costs. The costs of these activities have been included in Sections VI and VII. A. - Research/Development and Technology Development/Refreshment For NWS to fulfill its policy, operational, and support role it must not only maintain state of the art awareness (i.e., be a smart­buyer and smart­user of technology), but play a national leadership role in promoting knowledge and technology in the areas for which it has core responsibility. NWS need not be the biggest contributor, but it must be able to ensure that R&D addresses the issues most critical to meeting its mission requirements. It can only do this by being a key contributor to the process. NWS has this responsibility in important aspects of observation, phenomenology, forecasting and dissemination in meteorology, hydrology, and climatology. NWS requires a broad range of research and developmental activities to maintain and improve the products and services provided to the nation and uses NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) as its primary research arm. Within OAR, the Environmental Research Laboratories (ERL) accomplish the majority of the NWS­related work. While NWS does not either directly fund the bulk of OAR's programs or control internal OAR prioritization of research efforts or decisions on the levels of work to be accomplished, it does collaborate with OAR in defining research objectives and in the transition of new science and techniques into routine operations. In FY 1997, OAR expended approximately $23.2M on NWS related work. Efforts to improve short­term warnings and forecasts equaled $19.8M ($12.3M of OAR funds and $7.5M of NWS funds ) with an additional $3.4M of funding directed at climate related research. From a funding perspective, NWS supports in a limited way the U.S. Weather Research Program. NWS also draws on research performed by the academic community, private sector and national laboratories. The ties with the academic components of the atmospheric science community have traditionally been strong and fruitful. NWS through the Collaborative Science and Technology and Applied Research (CSTAR) program states science needs to the University community and provides funds (Cooperative Institute, Partners program and graduate fellowships) for R/D activities. While the laboratories and academic community focus on the research end of the R/D spectrum, NWS, as one would expect from a science based service organization, devotes considerable resources to the development end. At all levels, from WFOs and RFCs to Headquarters, NWS staffs are actively engaged in technical development, infusion and product improvement activities. The Offices of Meteorology and Hydrology formulate policy for, and facilitate orchestration, of hydrometeorology development activities. Table 18 - NWS FY1997 Technical Development/Infusion - outlines our estimate of the FY 1997 staff and contractor efforts engaged in technical development/infusion work. Funding for these activities is provided from BASE and modernization accounts (primarily AWIPS and NEXRAD). NCEP also obtains funding , so­called "soft money" (approximately $5.5M in FY 1997) from many external sources to support numerical model development efforts. Overall, in FY 1997, approximately 332 NWS employees and 116 contractor personnel were engaged either full or part time with technical development activities. This level of activity will continue in both FY 1998 and FY 1999. The majority of efforts by the Headquarters, NWS staff were directed at applications software development for AWIPS. Our analysis revealed that meaningful and productive work was being accomplished (in the case of the Environmental Modeling Center -EMC- and the Climate Prediction Center -CPC- much of it is "world class") by these individuals and their respective offices and collectively the NWS and the nation will benefit. However, we could not find an overall NWS plan that ties all these activities together, prioritizes them in terms of importance and specifies required completion dates. Additionally, we could not locate a formal NWS policy directive outlining how R/D and technical development requirements are stated, related to end­users needs, validated and prioritized nor could we see evidence of a corporate process to manage, allocate resources, assign priorities and coordinate the overall NWS technical development program. Lack of such a process also limits NWS' ability to coordinate and leverage the work being accomplished by external agencies. We did note that several individual offices and organizations do have plans (several are very good) reflecting their views on needs and initiatives to pursue, but in the aggregate, they did not hang together as a coherent whole, traceable to a NWS­wide vision or plan or to budgets. Additionally, absence of an overarching NWS­wide plan introduces the possibility of unnecessary duplication of efforts, reduced teamwork, sub­optimal use of valuable technical resources and allows pursuit of an activity that may not support NWS goals. An area of concern is the amount of "soft money" required to support the EMC. Over time, EMC has been allowed to grow to the point that now over 50% of its funding is from external sources. To put this in perspective, the fraction of "soft money" underwriting EMC is higher than that at many university-based atmospheric science departments. This reliance on outside sources for operating capital raises two potential problems. First, the administrative burden of dealing with multiple grants and contracts is large and impacts time available to conduct the development work. Second, the potential exists to focus on the fund providers development priority vice NWS needs. Within Headquarters NWS, funding for a large portion of the Hydrology and System Development staffs are linked to AWIPS and NEXRAD. The activities these staffs accomplish extend beyond the bounds of these two modernization programs and should be funded from BASE accounts.
Another technical challenge facing NWS is the daunting task of carefully prioritizing, time phasing and implementing relevant technical refreshment efforts once new systems are fielded and become reasonably stable. The aim must be to prevent the systems from becoming technologically and operationally obsolete, thus avoiding the cost of a major replacement. In essence this is a form of continuous improvement. Evolution or technical refreshment efforts typically take the form of improvements to decrease life­cycle costs, increase capability or improve products. NWS' major focus to date has been on evolution of the AWIPS, NEXRAD and ASOS systems. Table 19 - System Evolution: AWIPS, NEXRAD and ASOS - outlines the fiscal resources projected for these programs. Plans for NEXRAD and ASOS are relatively mature. Programmed NEXRAD activities include a software rehost to a non-proprietary open system platform that will decrease life­cycle operating costs and yield significant increases in processing capacity plus efforts to improve the systems' capability to identify precipitation types. ASOS efforts are directed at adding sensors to automatically measure critical atmospheric elements. AWIPS plans are still in the early stages and the FY 1999 OMB Submit provides funds ($250,000) to develop a definitive plan for technology refreshment for this system. Taken individually these plans have merit, but as with our discussion of technical development activities, what's lacking is an overall and coherent NWS plan or vision that integrates, prioritizes and time-phases all these refreshment programs. NWS efforts to create a NWS Weather System Architecture is a good start.
In the limited time available for this review, the team could not devote sufficient time to determine the adequacy of funding allocated for R/D, technical development and technology refreshment activities. In general, the aggregate resources available for technical development and refreshment efforts seem sufficient. A few areas were detected (i.e., IFP) where it appears that critical activities were not receiving sufficient attention; these are management not resource issues. Given the importance of technology infusion and development, NOAA should have a small panel of outside experts review NWS R/D and technology development and refreshment plans. The study should focus on the requirements development and validation process and assess the adequacy, timing and resource implications of NWS plans to infuse new technology. The study should also evaluate how technical plans are linked to societal needs and gauge the value of the improvements gained via technical innovation to end users and NWS. B. - Training As a science based service organization, NWS must continually provide technical and professional development training and education to insure its professional work force maintains currency with new technology, understands and is able to apply research advances and knows how to effectively use the new equipment being deployed by the modernization program. This education and training yields improved forecasts and warnings. Scientific education has been provided to meteorologists and hydrologists at the various NWS training facilities, selected Universities and through the Cooperative Meteorological Education and Training (COMET) program. Technical training has been provided via a mix of NWS training facilities, e.g., NWSTC and OSF, contractor personnel, on­the­job training and distance learning. The training encompasses basic meteorology and hydrology concepts, equipment and software maintenance, operation of the NEXRAD and AWIPS equipment and leadership and management development programs. Training has from the inception of the modernization been an integral part of the NWS modernization plan. It has enjoyed robust fiscal support. Over the period, FY 1990­1996, NWS has expended approximately $85 million to prepares its work force to effectively employ the technology being procured and apply advances in scientific learning. FY 1997 training projections indicate expenditures in the range of $13 million. NWS training expenses in FY 1997 are in line with high technology private industry companies wherein training budgets normally comprise 1­2 % of revenue. Additionally, FY 1998 and 1999 plans provide approximately 114 hrs/year of formal and informal training for the technical work force. This is slightly below (114 vs. 122 hours) the U.S. industry average (per Bureau of Labor Statistics). Until this year the predominant training method was via on­site classes at a NWS training facility, COMET, and seminars and/or workshops. Some distance learning programs were available but their use was limited. In FY 1997, NWS redesigned the training program to make more effective use of emerging distance learning (DL) technology. Several factors caused this change: a) maturity of DL technology, b) increasing travel costs, c) operational and family pressures to minimize student time away from station and home and d) budget pressures to maximize output for available training dollars. While this approach is reasonable, NWS must insure they maintain a balanced approach in the allocation of resources between DL and in­house class room, seminar and workshop training. Certain types of education and training are best suited to the class room environment. Fiscal resources required in FY 1998 and 1999 are depicted in Table 20 - NWS FY1998 & 1999 Training Budgets. The table depicts both the NWS and NOAA Review team training budgets; following the budget data, adjustments to the NWS plan are discussed.
For FY 1998, we increased the COMET budget by $500,000 to develop a training program for Quantitative Precipitation Forecasting (QPF), the top priority NWS forecasting initiative and included $250,000 to evaluate the effectiveness of the new DL procedures; we decreased the Conference and Workshop budget by $250,000. In FY 1999, we included $500,000 for continued development of the COMET QPF training program and $1million to improve DL technology (adds two­way motion video capability NWS­wide) and decreased the conference/workshop program by $250,000. Within NWS, training activities are managed in several organizations. We experienced difficulty in pulling together all the component parts. We believe overall management of the training program would be enhanced by assigning a single organization lead responsibility. C. - Operations and Maintenance NWS system operations and maintenance (O&M) include field level and central support activities. To sustain system capabilities and maximize their operational utility, resources are required in the following functional areas: operations and maintenance, communications, training, field maintenance, repair and replenishment, modifications, configuration management, and field support. On average, the NWS expends $27.5 million (FY 1998 dollars) for non-labor operation and maintenance activities. In addition, NWS transfers a recurring $1.8 million of NEXRAD funds to Government laboratories for technique development ($1.0 million) and to the National Climatic Data Center for data archival ($800,000). Also not reflected in these expenditures is the annual $4.2 million in operational support modifications which were allowed to accumulate in anticipation of the NEXRAD Transition Power and Maintenance Shelter (TPMS) procurement. In total, non-labor O&M activities total $33.5 million per year. Of this total $11.4 million is expended by the NWS Regions and the remaining $22.1 million by the NWS Centers for Telecommunications, Radar, and Logistics (Central Operations) and the Office of System Management (OSM). The Regional expenditures are for: (1) Field maintenance - $1.0 million, (2) NEXRAD utilities and ASOS communications - $4.0 million, (3) Consumables - $700,000 and (4) Field maintenance and spares - $5.7 million. The ASOS program funds $1.5 million and NEXRAD funds the remaining $9.9 million. Additional funds are expended for maintenance of legacy weather systems and other equipment used at the WFO/RFCs; however, we could not readily discern these resources. Central Operations and OSM expenditures are for: (1) NEXRAD Operational Support Facility (OSF) and Operations Training Branch (OTB) - $5.6 million, (2) Central Communications - $6.1 million, (3) Engineering Support - $1.5 million, (4) Repair, reconditioning, and quality control - $2.0 million, (5) modifications - $4.2 million, (6) System Management - $1.2 million and (7) legacy weather systems - $1.5 million. D. - Communications Weather data is a perishable commodity - to be effective observations must be in a forecaster's hands soon after recording and forecasts need to be in decision-makers hands soon after issuance. NWS maintains many diverse and independent communication networks to collect and disseminate essential observational, forecast and warning information. In FY 1997 total communications expenditures are projected at $30 million; growing to $35 million by FY 1999. The majority of communications activities (management and operation) are accomplished at the Headquarters NWS (66%) but both NCEP and the Regions plan for and operate communications systems. Currently, at the national level, data is collected and distributed over approximately 15 network and 10 dissemination systems. At the Regional level the systems collect unique local observations, disseminate warnings and interconnect all WFO/RFC's (i.e., Regional wide area network). AWIPS, once deployed, with its associated communications network will replace a number of legacy systems. But, information provided us indicates that in the AWIPS era the majority of the current stand-alone network/dissemination systems will remain. The Regional wide area network is discussed separately in Section X - UNCERTAINTIES. We believe that economies and efficiencies may be possible, at least, with the national systems if the disparate networks and dissemination programs were integrated. As in several other areas, we could find no evidence of an overall NWS­wide communications plan governing management of the overall NWS communications program or plans to merge and combine the many existing systems. Also, within the Headquarters, we could not find the lead office responsible for NWS­wide communications. E. - Travel Over the period, FY 1992­1996 NWS BASE and MARDI travel budgets averaged $8.6 million annually (in FY 1998 dollars). Additionally, another $2­3 million of travel related expenditures were paid from modernization and reimbursable accounts. Of the BASE/MARDI total, $2.6M was expended by the field units and $6.0M by Regional and Headquarters NWS staffs. NWS has deployed Video Teleconferencing Capability (VTC) at each Regional Headquarters and selected central support locations. The impact of this deployment is reflected in the $400,000 reduction in travel expenditures during FY 1996. Last year, responding to budget pressures, NWS accelerated plans to reduce resident training and increase distance learning investments. This move contributed to a decrease in the requirement for Headquarters funded travel; we believe similar reductions will continue in the future. Additionally, permanent staffing reductions at the National Headquarters (153 FTE) and the CONUS Regional Headquarters (20%) should further reduce travel requirements. Accordingly, we reduced the FY 1998 and FY 1999 Regional and National Headquarters travel budgets by approximately $1.5 million dollars from the historical requirement and increased field travel by $500,000 to restore Cooperative Observer Network site visits. NOAA­directed Programs
New NWS Initiatives
This program is designed to provide the public with improved (magnitude and probability of occurrence for river conditions) and longer lead time (several days to months) flood and river condition forecast products. FY 1999 funding would start initial national implementation (adaptation and calibration of the system to 4 river basins) of the system.
This program will improve predictions and forecasts of the seasonal to interannual variations in sea surface temperature and precipitation associated with the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomena. When implemented ENSO forecast lead times will increase from seasons to years.
A. - Weather Forecast Staffing Model The methodology used by NWS to develop a WFO manpower allocation model appears reasonable. The model was originally developed in the late 1980's and updated in 1996. It assumed a fully integrated WFO operation, determined core staffing needs for a nominal WFO's workload and then adjusted staffing by individual WFO based on additional workload factors. The model assumed planned AWIPS capabilities (build 6 functionality), the NOAA Weather Radio Console replacement program, Local Data Acquisition and Dissemination system and Interactive Forecast Preparation System are available for routine use, meet design specifications and forecasters can efficiently and effectively use these tools to produce the total spectrum of required products and services (e.g., watches and warnings, fire weather products, bilingual language forecasts etc.). None of these systems has been rigorously tested in an operational environment. If these systems do not provide planned capabilities or the tools do not enable forecasters to efficiently provide the total spectrum of required general and specialized products, the model will have to be re-evaluated and possibly adjusted. This could impact post FY 2001 staffing levels and labor costs. Programmed "end­state" staffing levels at all 119 WFOs, with the exception of those at the Jackson, KY and Guam WFOs appear consistent with the manpower model. Staffing levels at Jackson appear particularly low and may limit the office's ability to provide required services. B. - Interactive Forecast Preparation System (IFP) This system (includes the Interactive Computer Worded Forecast ­ICWF­ and AWIPS Forecast Preparation System ­AFPS) is designed to reduce the forecaster's workload in preparing a variety of forecast and warning products. Gridded products (both numerical model output and point forecasts) from NCEP as well as software from the ICWF software program, are required. Development of the ICWF software is progressing satisfactorily and the system should be available to meet baseline schedules. Available information indicates considerable uncertainty revolves around the availability dates for the gridded NCEP data. Our analysis indicates the problem is not one of resources, but of assigning the appropriate priority to effort, allocating resources and executing a plan to meet the IFP schedule. Failure to have necessary products ready in time may delay completion of WFO restructuring and staffing plans. C. - Station Closures As part of the restructuring NWS plans to close approximately 204 offices. This analysis assumed all closures proceed according to current schedules. If the offices fail to close on schedule, associated labor and non­labor costs are additive to the derived numbers. D. - Assessment Sites Last year the Secretary of Commerce approved acquisition and siting of three additional NEXRADs and one WFO. Additionally the Secretary directed office and/or radar operations continue at 5 other offices ( Caribou ME, Key West Fl, Erie PA, South Bend IN and Williston ND) until completion of specific assessments regarding the adequacy of the planned radar coverage and weather delivery system for these locations. These reviews are scheduled to be completed by the Fall of 1997. Once completed, results will be analyzed and recommendations provided to the Secretary. This analysis assumed existing NWS plans are not modified. If the assessments alter current NWS plans (require fielding of additional weather radars or establishment of additional forecast offices), associated labor and/or non­labor costs are additive to the fiscal resources determined in this analysis. E. - Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System AWIPS is the final technology system required to complete the current modernization program and the linchpin for operations of the realigned and modernized NWS field structure. Like many large information technology programs AWIPS has experienced development difficulties with the attendant result of cost growth, schedule slippage and routine monitoring from the DOC OIG and GAO, as well as added oversight from the Congress. Additionally, the delays have generated skepticism in the field about whether the system will ever be delivered or perform to expectations. During the past 18 months, the program has made considerable progress. The 1996 decision to incorporate the FSL developed WFO­Advanced software into AWIPS Build 3 was wise and should significantly reduce development risks and yield a system that meets functional requirements and field expectations for meteorological and hydrological applications. Visits to sites using prototype WFO­Advanced software and discussions with field forecasters and hydrologists at other sites indicate the WFO­A software performs well. Once additional capabilities are added, it should meet their needs. Despite the recent progress, serious challenges remain. The DOC has agreed to develop and deploy a fully compliant system within a congressionally imposed cap of $550M. Our limited review indicates achieving this will be a challenge. The DOC FY 1998 and 1999 budgets reflect delivery of the system within the cap and allocate approximately $185M for remaining development, deployment and O&M activities. Deployment is forecast to be completed in July 1999. The projected schedules are "success oriented" and the program only maintains a small management reserve. Any perturbations to program schedules (e.g., modifications to the 1997 DOC Secretary's decision regarding deployment, or ability of the field to accept deployed systems) will impact costs and may cause a cap breach. Additional software development is still required. Software build 4 is projected for completion in May 1998 with Build 5/6 following in December 1998. With the incorporation of WFO­Advanced as the system baseline, three different government offices and the prime contractor are engaged in software development. We were unable to obtain estimates as to the size and complexity of Build 4 or 5/6. Given the known functionality that must be incorporated and the diverse number of software development agencies, the remaining software work (particularly that associated with build 4) will be complex and challenging. Finally, until completion of the deployment phase, hardware and software O&M costs are considered within the cap. FY 1998 and 1999 budgets project $1.8M and $2.6M respectively to cover software maintenance. These estimates may prove adequate; however, to thoroughly assess their reasonableness, definitive information regarding software size, structure, languages and complexity and maintenance work force productivity is necessary. Any delay in completion of the deployment phase will likely result in an increase in the O&M period covered under the cap with the potential for added costs. The current AWIPS acquisition/program management structure is costly, inefficient, and blurs responsibility. In theory, NOAA's System Acquisition Office is responsible for acquisition matters (performance cost and schedule baselines) with NWS responsible for requirements, milestones and budgets. In practice, there is overlap in execution, much time expended in coordination and uncertainty as to responsibility boundaries. The structure is inefficient. In FY 1998, approximately $9M ($5M for government activities and $3.8M for support contractors) will be allocated to the SAO to cover acquisition management activities and about $1.1M to NWS for program management activities (note this is a conservative figure as a number of NWS non­AWIPS funded employees routinely work program issues). It appears that individuals or offices are normally not assigned responsibility for critical components of the development. As an example, we noted several NWS offices were engaged in software maintenance planning, however we could not (as of September 29,1997) discern who (specific office and individual) was assigned the overall responsibility for developing the NWS approach and plan to accomplish required actions so that a viable software maintenance system is in place for fielded systems. The same is true with respect to System Engineering. In the place of assigning responsibility and accountability to individuals or established offices, multiple teams and committees work issues and strive to resolve problems. Given the existing distribution of responsibilities, both SAO and NWS staff routinely participate on the committees. The blurred responsibilities coupled with the committee approach to issues/projects results in a time-consuming coordination process and a consensus approach to decision-making. Additionally, since few have been given responsibility and authority in functional areas, accountability is not established. This management philosophy inhibits individual empowerment, delays identification and rapid resolution of critical issues affecting development and deployment efforts, and adds unnecessary time and costs to the process. The Fall 1996 decision to incorporate the WFO­advanced software into AWIPS significantly increased government system development responsibilities. This was particularly true with respect to System Engineering (i.e., those activities that facilitate the coordinated design of a system made of many elements and subsystems such that the system as a whole optimally meets the requirements and constraints imposed on it). NWS was slow to react to the need to address System Engineering issues. In May 1997, a System Engineering Team was established. Figure 1 summarizes my understanding of the current AWIPS System Engineering structure. The structure reflects a committee approach in which no one person has specific responsibility or the authority required to carry out responsibilities and no one is accountable. Also the prime contractor's System Engineer is not considered a team member. In discussions with System Engineering team and senior acquisition management staff members we discerned the team views their role as essentially that of a coordinator and does not perceive it has the authority to alter system design or make trades among sub­systems to improve overall system performance and design. Additionally, the team has met infrequently and informally. AWIPS is a complex system with distributed elements, multiple sites, intricate interconnections through multiple networks (satellite, terrestrial wide area networks, local connections to radars and data sources), loosely integrated software and multiple data base architectures. To achieve optimal system performance and reduce long term operating and system evolution costs, someone must have authority over and responsibility for the system/subsystem architecture, allocation of requirements among systems, specification of interfaces between subsystems and making the necessary trades in subsystem capabilities. Lack of a strong System Engineering capability introduces uncertainty regarding AWIPS' potential to satisfy user expectations and out year budget projections for operating and evolution costs. Key System Engineering areas requiring attention in the near term are the software and hardware issues associated with the Local Data Acquisition and Dissemination System (LDADS) and overall system security. From a software perspective AWIPS consists of a loosely integrated series of software components (e.g., Build 3.1 will contain approximately 1.4M Delivered Lines of Code) developed by four different organizations (Prime contractor, Technique Development Laboratory, Office of Hydrology, Forecast System Laboratory) using a variety of programming languages and database architectures. The FSL component was initially designed as a research system so attendant documentation is somewhat limited. These factors will complicate software maintenance efforts. The time available for this study, coupled with our inability to receive definitive information regarding size (no estimates were available regarding total LOCs anticipated upon completion of Build 6), complexity, structure, quality and adequacy of documentation precluded a detailed analysis of the reasonableness of FY 1998, FY 1999 and out year software maintenance budget estimates. Given what we know about the code, we believe NWS may have insufficiently budgeted for software maintenance in both fiscal years. To reduce uncertainties particularly in the out years, software maintenance estimates should be analyzed in a more rigorous manner.
F. - N­AWIPS The AWIPS budget funds the separate development of an interactive processing system to meet the needs of the NCEP Prediction Centers. While this effort uses AWIPS funds and hardware solutions there is no technical relationship between the two programs. The stated differences between the two stem from N­AWIPS's focus on analysis and visualization of model data nation­wide whereas AWIPS focuses on analysis of observations for a specific WFO forecast and warning area. The incorporation of the WFO­Advanced software as the baseline AWIPS system has tended to blur this distinction. To date, N­AWIPS costs have totaled about $2.8 million for contractor support and $1.8 million for government staff. FY 1998­1999 costs are projected at $1.8 million for contractor support and $900,000 for government staff with out year projections through FY 2002 of an additional $2.3 million and $1.5 million respectively. The majority of N­AWIPS (through FY 1999) costs fall within the AWIPS cap. Development and deployment of this system will standardize the information technology used at the various NCEP Prediction Centers and eliminate costly legacy systems (to date use of N­AWIPS has yielded savings of approximately $1.2 million annually). Budget uncertainties extend beyond the FY 1998 and 1999 time frame and stem from the questions concerning the maintainability of the N­AWIPS software (GEMPAK),its ability to adequately accommodate growth in NCEP requirements, communications interfaces to the AWIPS communications network and the migration of the two divergent systems into a more common and standard NWS software system. H. - Regional Wide Area Network Currently all mainland Regions operate and maintain a Wide Area Network that provides two­way connectivity to their field offices. This was a regionally conceived and funded program to provide field units with operational weather data - high resolution satellite data and gridded NCEP model data - that were not available on standard NWS communications systems. The network's capability has expanded to include Internet and World Wide Web service and a variety of administrative services, e.g., electronic mail and electronic forms submission. Plans are being formulated to enlarge the system's capacity for audio and video teleconferencing and experimental NCEP model data. Over time this unofficial network has become a key region/field office link. The AWIPS communication network will provide the field with all required operational data (high resolution satellite and NCEP model data); however, it was not intended to satisfy administrative needs, e.g., Internet and World Wide Web access, electronic mail, video-teleconferencing etc. NWS plans for the AWIPS era do not include continuation of the existing Regional wide area network. If AWIPS does not satisfy the field's total data needs, the Regions will press to continue and expand the current network. Projected FY 2000 costs for a stand alone Regional wide area network are about $1.9 million. NWS should review the field's needs and determine how they can most efficiently be accommodated (e.g., handled within the AWIPS communication network). Maintenance of two separate NWS wide area networks should be avoided. H. - Observation Networks Despite the successful deployments of ASOS and the NEXRAD systems, many NWS constituencies express concern over the quality of the existing observational network and NWS' commitment to maintain and improve it. Concerns ranged from the adequacy of the current cooperative observer program, marine observation networks, and the Voluntary Observing Ship program, to efforts to centrally collect, quality control and disseminate all observational data. The quality of weather warning products and the ability to produce meaningful climate products are related to the continuity, representativeness and quality of the observational networks. Maintaining and upgrading it is a matter of basic importance that goes to the core of the NWS mission. Information gained during this study indicates parts of the network are threatened. Again, we could find no central office within Headquarters NWS that could be classed as the data or observation "guru" and no NWS­wide program to address or assign a priority to this many faceted issue. Funds to upgrade selected portions of the network are included in the proposed budgets. Sustainment and upgrade of the current observational infrastructure will have budget implications in out year budgets. I. - Regional Non-Labor Budgets NWS does not appear to have a detailed understanding of regional non-labor business practices and is not able to relate non-labor expenditures to the types and quality of services provided by WFO/RFCs. Likewise, we were unable to gain a comprehensive understanding of regional non-labor resource requirements. The fiscal resources involved with these budgets are large. If all regions operated at the same per location non-labor rate as the Central Region, substantial non-labor regional budget savings could be realized. NOAA should invest the effort to understand the true fiscal resources required to operate the WFO/RFCs. Two issues were identified as requiring special assessment: a) AWIPS functionality and its impact on programmed staffing levels and planned station closures and b) feasibility of plans to accelerate the closure of the Southern Region. A. - Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System Assessment
At the onset of the restructuring program, NWS plans linked closure of a Weather Service Office (WSO) or residual WSO to AWIPS commissioning (availability of Software build 4). Available evidence indicates NWS has modified this linkage. While AWIPS deployment and use will be occurring during the same time period as WSOs and residual WSOs are being certified for closure, NWS does not believe closure is dependent on an operational AWIPS. In point of fact, all but a few closures (Redding and Riverside, CA, Olympia and Wenatchee, WA, Kahului, HI and Valdez, AL) will occur before scheduled AWIPS commissioning activities are completed.
The end­state staffing model is predicated on both AWIPS ( with software build 6 functionality) and several productivity enhancing tools performing to design specifications. Failure of either to provide required forecaster productivity tools will impact validity of the model. While uncertainty exists as to the adequacy of both systems, discussions with the NWS staff indicates AWIPS is not the "long pole in the tent." Plans for the IFP, particularly the NCEP portion, require review and attention. B. - The Regional Structure Of The Weather Service The regional headquarters provide oversight, program management, technical, operational and administrative support to assigned field units and facilitate coordination of service programs that cross WFO boundaries with federal, state and local emergency managers and water management agencies. Additionally, they manage and orchestrate the myriad of activities necessary to implement modernization and restructuring plans and oversee actions to comply with P.L. 102­567 certification requirements at the WFOs and closing stations. Regional headquarters do not prepare or deliver forecast and warning products to the public. In FY 1996, NWS had a 292 FTE regional infrastructure consisting of six regions - four mainland (Eastern, Central, Southern and Western) plus the Alaska and Pacific regions. A central tenet of NWS' Strategic Modernization plan has been to streamline the regional headquarters infrastructure after completion of the restructuring. While the 1989 Strategic plan did not provide details, discussions with the NWS senior staff revealed their intent was to replace the six region infrastructure with a three CONUS based structure. In FY 1994, DOC and NOAA recognized projected delays in the AWIPS deployment schedule and the critical role the regions play in accomplishing essential transitional activities associated with the NWS modernization and restructuring required continued funding of the SRH through, at least, FY 1999. In order to operate within lower FY 1997 spending levels, NWS initiated a series of cost reductions actions. An acceleration (i.e., closure of the SRH and consolidation of administrative and program oversight functions for the Alaska and Pacific Regions in the Western Region Headquarters) of the regional realignment was one of many actions. It was a budget based decision. A specific task assigned the team was to evaluate the feasibility of plans to accelerate the closure of the Southern Region. Although not specifically assigned we also included an evaluation of the feasibility of NWS plans to relegate the Alaska and Pacific regions to "element" status and the reasonableness of projected staffing levels at these regions. At the outset, we requested documentation on all realignment options considered and underlying analyses (i.e., studies identifying merits, pro's/con's, risk analysis, risk mitigation plans and costs etc.) along with an explanation of the rationale and decision logic used to select the NWS FY 1997 realignment position. We did not receive that information. During the many discussions we held with the NWS senior staff, we noted (Table 21 - Regional Headquarters Staffing Proposals) that while a realignment plan was sent to the Congress in March 1997, considerable uncertainty existed as to precisely how NWS planned to organize and staff the regions. During our meetings with the Regional Directors (RDs), we were provided with a plan they proposed in May 1997 that maintained the existing regional structure with reduced (i.e., essentially met NWS staff reduction goals) staffing at each region. The major labor differences between that plan and the early March 1997 NWS plan involve the Alaska and Pacific regions. Given the realities of the Federal budget situation, the need to make the government more efficient and the projected regional headquarters management workload, I believe the NWS decision to reduce the staffing levels in the regional headquarters below the FY 1996 level (292 FTEs) was sound and will yield significant recurring savings (approximately $3 million). The central issue remaining is how to most effectively organize the regional infrastructure to manage and guide the field units through this critical period of the MAR and support public safety activities.
Based on information from the senior NWS staff, we believe proposals to downgrade the Alaska and Pacific regions have been tabled. Considering the many MAR related actions that still must be accomplished, we support that position. Our recommended staffing for those regions agrees with that provided by the respective RDs. In conducting our analysis of the mainland regional structure, we evaluated the September 1997 NWS three CONUS region and the RD's four CONUS region structure. From a labor perspective, the difference between the plans is small (3 FTEs) - the latest NWS plan requires 177 FTEs and the RD's plan requires 180 FTEs. We looked at four factors: a) operational impacts, b) external customer impact, c) Regional Director views and d) cost impacts. 1. - Operational Span of Control. The NWS proposal would, on average, require an RD to supervise 42 field units; the RD proposal would, on average, require supervision of 31 units. While the senior grade level of WFO/RFC supervisors will enable the RDs to effectively manage a larger than typical number of employees, the current level is stretching their capability. The supervisory ratio in the NWS proposal, is in our opinion, excessive. Disruption to Field Units. The NWS proposal will require 43 operational units and approximately 50 closing units to transfer to new regions. This disruption would be minimal if the regions managed the field units in a similar manner, but NWS field management activities are decentralized and management approaches differ considerably from region to region. Thus in the midst of the AWIPS deployment and with station closures on­going, field supervisors would have to adjust to new management philosophies and requirements. Impact on MAR activities. As was noted earlier, the regions
play a major role in accomplishing MAR activities. A major restructuring
and realignment of regional responsibilities in the midst of
this will introduce further complexity to an already complex
situation. Staffs at the three regions will have to rapidly get
up to speed on a myriad of MAR issues at the realigned units
and establish contacts with a host of citizens in affected communities.
2. - External Customer Impact Many constituents in the Southern Region's area of responsibility, especially those in the states of Florida and Texas, believe the NWS proposed alignment will result in degraded severe weather mitigation support. The Emergency Manager community in particular perceive the resultant span of control in a three region alignment, coupled with the geographic remoteness of the Central and Eastern regions, will result in degraded support to their critical functions. Whether these fears are real or perceived they have caused a loss of confidence in a key NWS constituency. The Emergency Managers we met favor the four mainland region alignment over the current NWS plan. 3. - Regional Director's Views Regardless of which regional alignment (four or three) is adopted, the RDs will have to make the structure work. We contacted each independently to determine their position. All were uniform in their preference for the four versus three region proposal. All indicated that required operational and transition work can be accomplished with the staffing levels proposed for the four regions (i.e., 180 FTEs in the mainland regions and 59 in the Alaska and Pacific regions). NWS, in August 1997, commissioned a study to assess the impact of the SRH closure on external customers. The study's team leader confirmed the RDs believe that a 4 (smaller staffed) CONUS regional structure is better and more effective than a three (with marginally larger staffs) region structure. 4. - Costs
We worked with the mainland RDs to develop a grade structure for their regions and applied FY 1998 salary and benefits to determine labor costs. The same grade demographics were then applied to the mainland regions in the NWS proposal and labor costs determined. The labor cost differences between both proposals are small (about $400,000). With the assistance of the RDs we developed a notional grade structure for a 45 FTE staffed region (Figure 2 - CONUS Regional HQ Structure). The majority of a Region's non­labor budget is allocated to field operations. In both proposals, the total number of field units requiring support remain unchanged. Thus the non­labor cost differential in the 4 versus 3 Region plan is support to the 3 additional staff positions. We believe the cost differential to be minimal. Were the SRH to close, NWS
estimated one time closure costs would range from $1.2 million
to $2.6 million to settle personnel issues, plus another $400,000
to integrate the existing wide area network into the Central
and Eastern networks. Retention of four regions would avoid these
costs. 5. - Summary I believe closure of the Southern Region Headquarters and relegation of the Alaska or Pacific regions to sub­region status is not warranted at this time. The degradation in operational effectiveness of field support that would result from closure of the SRH at this point in the modernization outweighs the small dollar savings. NWS should maintain a 6 Region infrastructure with an aggregate staffing of 239 FTEs (180 FTEs in four mainland regions, 35 in Alaska and 24 in Pacific) until significant progress has been made with essential MAR activities. Nearer the completion of the restructuring, NWS should conduct an objective and comprehensive study to determine the optimum infrastructure (number and location of regions) to operate the modernized NWS.  Conclusions
Recommendations A. - DOC
B. - NOAA 1. Technology Infusion
2. - Management and Budget
3. - AWIPS Program Management
C. - NWS 1. - Management and Planning
2. - Customer Dialog and Service Adjustments
3. -Budget Formulation and Execution
4. - AWIPS
5. - Other Areas
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