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ACCESSION #: 9602220425 AEROFIN CORPORATION AEROFIN Home STANDARD AND CUSTOM ENGINEERED New York Office HEATING AND COOLING SURFACE Chicago and Plant Dallas Lynchburg P.O. BOX 10819 Atlanta Virginia LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA 24506 1-800-AEROFIN February 15, 1996 Phone: 804-845-7081 Fax: 804-528-6242 CC: (with attachments) Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Barb Dotson Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant 22780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 Subject: 10CFR21 Report: Deviation Evaluation Reference: 1) Letter from Aerofin (Brian Elliott) to Consumers Power (Barb Dotson) dated October 4, 1995 regarding 10CFR21 notification (copy of same telefaxed to U.S. NRC on October 5, 1995) 2) Consumers Power Purchase Order G0109437 3) Aerofin Shop Order No. 947963 4) 10CFR21 Report from Cardinal Industrial Products as transmitted to Aerofin by Consolidated Power Supply by letter dated February 13, 1996 (attached) 5) Aerofin ASME Design Report dated 11/7/94 (copies of original cover page and pages 26 & 27, attached) 6) Aerofin ASME Design Report dated 11/7/94 (copies of original cover page and pages 26 & 27 marked up and attached to show effects of reduced bolt tensile strength and actual maximum system operating pressure) Ms. Barb Dotson 10CFR21 Report Consumers Power Company Page 2 Dear Ms. Dotson: This letter follows up our initial notification to Consumers Power Company and the U.S. NRC (Reference 1) which addressed 1,475 hex bolts (5/8"-11 x 3 inches, ASME SA193, Grade B7), manufactured by Cardinal Industrial Products and supplied to Aerofin by Consolidated Power Supply, which were used as header cover plate bolts in the Safety Related containment air cooler replacement cooling coils furnished by Aerofin to Consumers Power Company (Reference 2). These thirteen coils (twelve coils plus one spare) were shipped to the Palisades Nuclear Plant on or about November 16, 1994. The bolts in question are listed as Item #16 on "as-built" drawing QA-R-1012 dated 11/1/94 included with the Aerofin Quality Assurance Data Package for this equipment. These bolts are identified by Cardinal Industrial Products Heat No. CK256 (856 pieces, Trace Code TU2) and Heat No. L63051 (619 pieces, Trace Code CX1). Of the 1,475 bolts purchased by Aerofin, 1,456 were actually used in the coils. Enclosed is a complete copy of the 10CFR21 Report from Cardinal Industrial Products as transmitted to Aerofin by Consolidated Power Supply by letter dated February 13, 1996 (Reference 4) and received by Aerofin on February 14, 1996. Review of the Cardinal Industrial Products report conclusions reveals that they can make no guarantees as to what percentage of bolts may actually be substandard, but they do state that the actual tensile strength of any substandard bolts is between 60,000 and 70,000 psi as compared to a minimum tensile strength requirement of 125,000 psi for ASME SA-193, Grade B7 material. Given this information, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the header cover plate bolts: o The allowable stress for ASME SA-193, Grade B7 bolts is 25,000 psi (reference ASME Section III, Table I-7.3) which represents a safety factor of five when compared to the material minimum tensile strength of 125,000 psi. Bolt stresses in substandard bolts should be compared to a lower allowable stress. Using an allowable stress equal to one-fifth of the reduced tensile strength is consistent with the safety factor inherent in the Code material mechanical properties. This gives an allowable stress for substandard bolts of 12,000 to 14,000 psi. o For the design pressure load and nozzle loading, the worst calculated stress is the tensile stress on the short side bolts (13,323 psi - see Reference 5). This is within the range for the reduced allowable stress of 12,000 to 14,000 psi. Ms. Barb Dotson 10CFR21 Report Consumers Power Company Page 3 o Actual maximum system operating pressure is on the order of 80 psig which is based upon the zero flow pressure head developed by the system pumps. Compared to a design pressure of 150 psig, there is significant margin available to accommodate substandard bolt strength characteristics. (See Reference 6.) o The maximum calculated bolt torque corresponding to the minimum reduced tensile strength is 99 ft-lbs. This is sufficient to seat and seal the EPDM gasketed pressure boundary. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD EXISTS DUE TO THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF ANY SUBSTANDARD BOLTS. Based upon the conclusions of the Cardinal Industrial Products report, it is unlikely that any of the containment air cooler replacement cooling coils has header cover plate bolts that are entirely (or even that a majority are) substandard. Consequently, it is expected that the equipment will operate satisfactorily with substandard bolts, even if they are present, throughout the equipment's expected operating life. However, it certainly is recognized that Consumers Power Company may have received an indeterminate quantity of bolts that do not meet ASME Code specifications. Therefore, Aerofin will provide replacement bolts for the 1,456 (5/8"-11 x 3 inches) ASME SA193, Grade B7 bolts if Consumers Power Company will notify Aerofin in writing within 30 days of the date of this letter of its desire to receive replacement bolts. By copy of this letter, we are also notifying the NRC of this evaluation and thereby have completed our reporting obligations as required by 10CFR21. If you have any questions or require any additional information at this time, please contact me at 804-528-6210 (telephone) or 804-528-6243 (telefax). Very truly yours, Brian C. Elliott, P.E. Manager Nuclear and Code Products cc: D. L. Corell Aerofin President and Chief Operating Officer Michael D. King Consumers Power Company Project Manager Dan Depuydt Consumers Power Company Containment Cooler Responsible Engineer Consolidated Power Supply February 13, 1996 Aerofin Corporation 4621 Murray Place Lynchburg, VA 24505 Attn: Mr. Barry DeHart QA Manager Subject: Submittal of the Cardinal Industrial Products Final 10CFR Part 21 Report Dear Mr. DeHart: Please find enclosed a complete copy of the subject document. Consolidated Power Supply (CPS) received the document on 2/12/96 from Cardinal Industrial Products, which is now known as Accutech. CPS will retain a copy in our Nonconformance file, which is being closed based on issuance of this correspondence. As all CPS customers affected by the report have been notified, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no further actions by CPS are deemed necessary at this time regarding the questionable fasteners. CPS and Aerofin personnel have had discussions concerning replacement of the fasteners (1475 each, 5/8" - 11 X 3" SA193 B7 hex bolts) that were supplied by CPS against Aerofin Purchase Order 13822. It has been conveyed that these fasteners were used in a component manufactured by Aerofin that was supplied to Consumers Power. If replacement fasteners will be required, it is suggested that Aerofin obtain written correspondence to this affect from the applicable licensee, including written correspondence from Aerofin indicating the same. Exact quantities should be identified. If there are questions or comments relative to the enclosed information or this correspondence please contact the undersigned. Sincerely, Steven W. Andrews Quality Assurance Manager Enclosure - Cardinal Final Report (44 Pages) cc: H. Kerr - President, CPS, w/o; M. Mathias - Gen. Mgr., CPS, w/o; NCR# 95-150,w/a 3556 Mary Taylor Road o Birmingham, Alabama 35235 o (205) 655-5515 A Division of Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. Birmingham, AL DATE: February 5, 1996 CUSTOMER: CONSOLIDATED POWER SUPPLY 3556 MARY TAYLOR ROAD BIRMINGHAM, AL 35235 ATTENTION: STEVE ANDREWS, MANAGER OF QUALITY ASSURANCE SUBJECT: 10 CFR Part 21 Final Report Dear Mr. Andrews: Attached is Cardinal Industrial Products' final report that was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as required by 10 CFR Part 21. This final report is being provided to you as a courtesy to assist you in resolving this issue. This report was submitted to the NRC on November 21, 1995. As of this date, the NRC has not provided a reply or correspondence. Should you have any questions, please contact David Z. Hathcock at (702) 739-1966. cc: 10 CFR Part 21 file B&G Home Office: Manufacturing Company 3067 Unionville, Pike P.O. Box 904 Hatfield, PA 19440-0904 215-822-1925 November 21, 1995 QAM-95-090 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Reference: Event 29257 Subject: Final Report On July 10, 1995, B&G Manufacturing Co., Inc. purchased the name and certain assets from Cardinal Industrial Products, L.P., a limited partnership formed and operated in Nevada servicing the nuclear power industry. B&G adopted the "Cardinal Industrial Products" name and began its own nuclear fastener business from that same location. Shortly after July 10, 1995, B&G's new Cardinal Industrial Products was notified of a substandard fastener which had been processed and sold by Cardinal Industrial Products, L.P. As a courtesy and service to customers, B&G is submitting a final report of its investigation and analysis of the event so that customers can evaluate the situation in light of 10 CFR Part 21 paragraph 21.21 (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1). Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact the quality assurance manager at the division, David Z Hathcock, at (702) 739-1966, or myself at (215) 822-1925, extension 338. Sincerely yours, William A. Edmonds President cc: NCR File Suppliers of: Bolts - Nuts - Studs - Threaded Rods - Machined Specials Service Centers: 6870 N. Fathom St. 10231 General Dr. Portland, OR 97217 Orlando, FL 32824 503-286-6601 407-857-5858 4660 Pine Timbers 3873 W. Oquenco Houston, TX 77041 Las Vegas, NV 89118 215-822-1925 702-739-1966 Investigation and Analysis of Suspect Fasteners Event 29257 Final Report Prepared by Cardinal Industrial Products Division of B&G Manufacturing Co., Inc. November, 1995 INTRODUCTION On July 10, 1995, B&G Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("B&G") purchased the name and certain other assets from Cardinal Industrial Products, L.P. ("CIP- LP") a limited partnership formed and operated in Nevada servicing the nuclear power industry. B&G acquired these assets to begin its own nuclear fastener business as a new division of B&G ("B&G-Cardinal"). Various owners have operated a nuclear fastener business under the "Cardinal" name at West Oquendo Road in Las Vegas prior to B&G's acquisition of assets from CIP-LP on July 10, 1995. In this report the term "Cardinal facility" is used to describe the general operations which have continued at that site independently of ownership. The reader is advised to be aware of the nature and sequence of the ownership as this report is reviewed. Shortly after July 10, 1995, Duquesne Light notified B&G-Cardinal about nonconforming Grade B7 hex capscrews, which had been processed and sold to them by CIP-LP. Several of the suspect fasteners were tested by B&G- Cardinal and an independent testing laboratory and found to deviate from SA 193, Grade B7 mechanical requirements. Although these fasteners had been processed, sold, and shipped by CIP-LP, B&G sent notifications of the nonconformance to the NRC and to other purchasers of product from the same lot. As a result of the notifications, two other utility companies reported to B&G-Cardinal nonconforming fasteners from the same lot and one additional lot. E&G initiated a comprehensive investigation to ascertain the scope and cause of the problem, to determine corrective actions, to keep its new customers fully informed and, as a courtesy, to be able to instruct them to evaluate the condition in light of 10CFR Part 21 paragraph 21.21 (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1). Metallographic analysis of the nonconforming fasteners indicated improper heat treatment, which prompted B&G-Cardinal to begin testing similar lots of material from inventory that were manufactured using the same heat treatment process. This testing revealed additional nonconforming product and thereby indicated the problem was not isolated to only one lot but was related to the process. Investigation and testing traced the problem to the heat treating furnace at the Cardinal facility, and substandard fasteners most likely can be isolated to eight lots of material processed since 1989. (The investigation could not address product processed prior to 1989 because records were unavailable.) Final Report 11/95 Page 1 This report describes the problem, the investigation strategy, testing and analysis, and other actions taken by B&G-Cardinal that revealed the source of the defects to be processing deficiencies in heat treating certain material at the Cardinal facility. THE PROBLEM Certain lots of hex capscews that were processed and shipped per ASME SA-193, Grade B7 out of the Cardinal facility by CIP-LP were found to contain defective fasteners. The problem was initially discovered by Duquesne Light's Beaver Valley facility, which had sent several 3/8" diameter capscrews to an outside laboratory for random verification testing. The results of these tests indicated some fasteners from the lot were not in compliance with the mechanical requirements of the specification. Duquesne Light reported this failure to B&G-Cardinal. Independent test reports from the Beaver Valley facility (and later from PG&E Diablo Canyon and Washington Public Power Supply System) suggested the fasteners in question had not been properly heat treated. The suspect lot of ASME SA-193 Grade B7 capscrews was manufactured at the Cardinal facility from AISI medium carbon alloy steel. The manufacturing process utilized by CIP-LP was to cold form capscrews from spheroidized annealed cold heading wire. The fasteners were then heat treated by a process of either normalizing, quenching, and tempering, or simply by quenching and tempering. Depending on the lot sizes, the heat treatment was either performed at the Cardinal facility or by an approved outside vendor. IMMEDIATE ACTION To verify the testing results obtained by Beaver Valley, B&G-Cardinal performed tensile and hardness tests on capscrews, from the same lot. These tests were performed at the Cardinal facility's laboratory under the direction of B&G-Cardinal's Quality Assurance Department. The mechanical properties of several of the capscrews tested were found to deviate from the minimum requirements of Grade B7. This lot of material was immediately removed from stock, marked as nonconforming, and isolated in the nonconformance room. Samples of both conforming and nonconforming fasteners were sent to an outside laboratory for metallographic examination. The examination of the conforming fasteners indicated the fasteners had the tempered martensite structure expected from proper heat treatment. The nonconforming fasteners, however, had a spheroidized structure that indicated the heat-treated fasteners had not reached the temperature required for the martensite structure to form. Final Report 11/95 Page 2 Because the nonconforming lot was heat treated at the Cardinal facility, B&G-Cardinal decided to concentrate its investigation on the heat treating equipment and process there. THE INVESTIGATION Early indications suggested that the nonconforming fasteners had never been heat treated. The lot in question weighed over 250 pounds and would have been placed in several containers for ease of transport through the Cardinal facility, so it was plausible that a lone container of fasteners had bypassed heat treatment and was later intermingled with the rest of lot, which had been heat treated. B&G-Cardinal then sampled a large number of the fasteners still in inventory from the suspect lot and found, however, substandard fasteners with visible surface scale, which indicated that all the fasteners, including suspect ones, had been heat treated. Because the fasteners definitely had been heated in the furnace, the focus of the investigation turned to the heat treatment process and equipment at the Cardinal facility. Recognizing that a problem with the heat treating facility may have affected other lots of material, the Quality Assurance Department began sampling other lots from inventory that had been heat treated through the furnace at the Cardinal facility. During the investigation, B&G-Cardinal sent courtesy notifications to the NRC and to companies which had purchased capscrews from the questionable lot. Within a few days of these notifications, PG&E Diablo Canyon informed B&G-Cardinal of a substandard, 3/8" diameter capscrew that had come from a second lot. In addition, the inventory sampling process by B&G-Cardinal revealed a third and fourth lot that contained substandard fasteners of 3/8" and 5/8" diameters, respectively. Courtesy notifications were also sent regarding these lots. It became apparent that the four lots found to have substandard fasteners all entered the furnace in "large" charges held at a temperature for "short" periods (relative to other charges performed at the Cardinal facility). The period in question was the duration parts were held in the furnace ("soaked") at the specified temperature for austenitizing just prior to lowering the basket of parts into a quench tank. The soaking time for A/SA 193, Grade B7 product must be long enough to allow all parts to achieve an austenitic microstructure prior to quenching them rapidly in a liquid medium at a controlled temperature of 125 degrees F. The quenching provides a rapid temperature drop that results in the formation of a primarily martensitic structure. After quenching, parts should register hardness values of approximately 50 on the Rockwell C scale and tensile strengths between 225,000 and 300,000 psi. The parts then undergo a tempering cycle that entails heating them to a Final Report 11/95 Page 3 1,100 degrees F minimum followed by a slow cooling process. Tempering reduces the tensile strength and develops ductility as required (for A/SA 193, Grade B7, a minimum tensile strength of 125,000 psi with ductility exhibiting 16% minimum elongation and 50% minimum reduction of area). Two primary problems can occur with the heat treating cycle. First, the charge may not be allowed to "soak" in the furnace long enough for all the fasteners to reach the temperature required to achieve an austenistic microstructure. Second, the parts may not cool rapidly enough if the liquid quenching medium is not circulating sufficiently enough to provide adequate heat transfer in the required amount of time. The lots in question were processed in heat charges of relatively heavy weight, which could be a potential factor in either problem. If the charge size was too large, some or all the parts may not have reached the required temperature in the given time period; or the temperature of the quenching liquid may have become too high to accomplish the required rapid cooling by the time the liquid reached the parts at the center of the charge upon being lowered into the quenching tank. Heat treatment logs for charges performed at the Cardinal facility dating back to 1989 were included in the records obtained by B&G-Cardinal from CIP-LP. B&G-Cardinal examined these logs, which showed since 1989 a total of 333 charges were heat treated involving AISI 4140 medium carbon alloy steel. The data for each of these charges was entered into a spreadsheet and then sorted in descending order by weight and time (pounds per hour) with the expectation that the worst case charges (heavier charges or shorter soak times) would appear first (See Addendum 1). The charge with the previously identified 5/8" lot with known substandard fasteners was at the top of the list, and the other three 3/8" lots were all within the first 13% of charges listed. The pattern of sorted data was as anticipated and indicated that sound metallurgical principles were taking investigation in the proper direction. Most of the product identified in the heat treatment log had been sold and shipped prior to B&G's purchasing assets from CIP-LP, therefore lots generally were not available from inventory for testing. Thus, the strategy of investigation was to recreate the heat treating conditions that would produce known defects. Test charges were planned using times, temperatures, and weights identical to the heat charges known to have produced defective product. Other test charges were devised with the purpose of determining what combinations of weight and soak times would result in defective product. From the heat treatment log, charges with extreme weights relative to soaking times were identified for each diameter of Grade B7 capscrews, and product was either manufactured or taken from inventory to be used for the test charges. Final Report 11/95 Page 4 Over a two week period, 22 test charges were heat treated. After each charge, test coupons were removed from specific locations within the heat treatment basket and were tested for hardness (See Addendum 2). From the results of the early test charges, the following hypotheses were formed: 1. Some of the fasteners in the basket were not reaching the required temperature in the allotted time. This conclusion was based upon the location of the substandard fasteners found in failed test charges. This hypothesis is supported by two separate metallographic examinations of substandard fasteners. 2. The time required for all fasteners in the charge to reach temperature is dependent upon charge density as well as overall weight. Charge density is a function of the fastener's dimensions where 3/8" diameter fasteners will pack more densely than 5/8" diameter fasteners. In addition to performing tests to verify the integrity of past charges, other charges were specifically performed to verify the above hypotheses. Because the problem appeared to relate in general to heat transfer and not necessarily to any specific material, the investigation was broadened to include all heat treated materials. The heat treatment logs were again reviewed, but without regard for material or heat treatment type but rather simply for what appeared to be the critical indicators of weight, time at temperature, and charge density. No other charges were found to have critical factors in the range which coincided with test charge failures. During the investigation, the possibility of a problem with the quenching phase of the heat treating cycle was dismissed based upon metallographic analysis. The metallography comparisons of acceptable and substandard fasteners taken from the same lot showed two clearly different but identifiable microstructures. The photomicrograph of the acceptable fastener showed the proper tempered martensite microstructure with some retained austenite. The microstructure of the substandard fastener was spheroidized carbides in a ferrite matrix, which results only when alloy steel does not reach the austenitizing temperature. Either microstructure was dependent upon proper quenching. In other words, inadequate quenching in either case would have produce yet another identifiable microstructure. Final Report 11/95 Page 5 INVESTIGATION FINDINGS In the process of performing of 22 different quench-cycle test charges, B&G-Cardinal was able to recreate heat treatment conditions and substandard fasteners corresponding to the four inventory lots known to have contained substandard fasteners. Because these test charges produced the expected results and thereby substantiated the hypotheses, B&G-Cardinal ceased investigating other causes. In addition to the test charges that recreated known failures, other test charges produced substandard fasteners that paralleled four additional lots of material from the heat treatment log. While there is no conclusive evidence that corresponding actual production charges contained substandard fasteners, it was likely they did, therefore, B&G decided to send courtesy notifications to the NRC and known customers for these lots, too. The other 14 test charges done under the remaining worst-case conditions produced acceptable results and therefore strongly suggests that substandard fasteners can be isolated to the eight lots of inventory for which simulated heat-treatment charges produced failures. The test charges containing substandard fasteners were evaluated by hardness testing of forty coupons taken from specific locations from throughout the charge. The hardness readings were documented on forms which detail the location of each coupon (See Addendum 2). Based upon the map of the hardness readings, it is apparent that the bottom layer of fasteners near the center of the basket was the last to reach temperature in larger lots. The primary heat transfer mode for the furnace is radiation. The secondary heat transfer mode is conduction. In large charges of densely packed fasteners, conduction becomes much more important. Because of the configuration of the furnace at the Cardinal facility, the bottom center portion of the basket did not receive significant heat through radiation. Fasteners at the bottom layer received their heat through conduction from the upper layers of fasteners. In the charges containing substandard fasteners, the time required for the heat to reach the bottom layer of fasteners was longer than the fasteners remained in the furnace. This problem was not discovered earlier because the test coupons that had been used by the Cardinal facility for tensile and hardness testing were typically placed at the top, center spot of the charge. Had the test coupons been placed within the area of the charge which failed to reach temperature because of lagging heat transfer, the defects could have been detected during the normal testing performed on heat charges. The furnace at the Cardinal facility takes approximately two hours to reach the appropriate austenitizing temperature for A/SA 193, Grade B7. After this temperature is reached, the fasteners are allowed to "soak" at temperature for at least one hour. The soak time is intended to provide even distribution of the heat. The furnace's thermocouple used to Final Report 11/95 Page 6 register its temperature is positioned in the upper region of the furnace (See Addendum 3). The results of the test charges demonstrated that not all the contents of a charge reach the indicated temperature at the same time. The time required for the bottom layer of fasteners to reach temperature was affected by the weight of the charge and the charge density. One of the test charges that failed (#21) was 331 pounds of 3/8" x 1" long capscrews. This charge contained nearly 8,000 pieces and was only 2 1/2 inches deep in the basket (the basket is 37 inches long and 25 inches wide). Another charge of the equivalent weight (#5) passed but contained 5/8" x 2 1/2" and 5/8" x 3" long capscrews. This charge contained just over 1,100 fasteners and was 4 1/2 inches deep. How densely fasteners were packed in the charge affected the amount of heat received through radiation as compared to conduction. In general, the smaller the diameter of the fasteners, the more the charge acts as a solid mass. In both of the above listed examples the charge was held at temperature for one hour, but the charge that failed had 3/8" diameter fasteners that packed more densely than the charge that passed with the larger, 5/8" diameter fasteners. In another example, the diameter of the test charge was held constant and packing density was changed. 300 pounds of 3/8" x 1" long capscrews were held at temperature for one hour and contained no bad fasteners (test charge #19). Another charge (#22) contained 270 pounds of 3/8" x 4" capscrews and was also held at temperature for one hour. The four-inch long capscrews of this lot were carefully lined in rows when packed into the basket (which is a common practice to prevent shank warpage). The tightly packed charge of four-inch long screws contained failed fasteners. INVESTIGATION CONCLUSIONS The conclusion of this investigation is that the substandard fasteners resulted from procedural error involving the time that heat treatment charges were held at temperature for the given conditions, specifically the charge's weight and density as determined by the diameter of the products and method of packing. According to the records left behind by CIP-LP, the standard practice of CIP-LP for heat treating operations referred to Military Standard MIL-H-6875. However, the CIP-LP's standard practice made no reference to factoring the overall weight or packing method when determining the correct soaking time for a particular charge in the furnace at the Cardinal facility. The heat treatment equipment located at Cardinal facility does have limitations. In general, the furnace has heating elements on four sides and on the ceiling (See Addendum 3). This would not be a problem except that the single thermocouple is located in the ceiling of the furnace. The temperature indicated on the display panel and recorded on the strip chart Final Report 11/95 Page 7 may not reflect the temperature throughout the furnace and the charge. This limitation, however, could have been compensated for procedurally by allowing charges to remain at temperature for longer periods of time. B&G-Cardinal has been asked what the percentage of fasteners is substandard in the suspect, and what is the strength of the substandard fasteners. It should be assumed that the heat treatment of any of the suspect lots was insufficient to achieve the mechanical properties of A/SE 193, Grade B7, and that the mechanical properties of the fasteners from those lots are equivalent to annealed AISI 4140 material. This means the tensile strength is between 60,000 and 70,000 psi. Estimating the percentage of fasteners that are substandard in a given lot is much more difficult. Basing estimates upon heavy charges having five or six layers of capscrews with as many as fifty percent of the bottom layer being substandard suggests that the lot would contain 10 percent defective fasteners. However, one cannot assume that substandard fasteners are distributed evenly throughout a total lot; defective fasteners, for instance, could have been concentrated into one container when packed for warehousing or shipping. Therefore, B&G-Cardinal cannot conclusively say what percentage of fasteners purchased by any particular customer was substandard. There are two other factors in connection with the heat treating equipment at the Cardinal facility which would tend to isolate suspect charges to the types of product and material investigated with the 22 test charges. The first is the quenching medium, which is a polymer solution. The particular design of the quench tank located at the Cardinal facility precludes the use of oil because it would be a fire hazard. The polymer solution is a suitable alternate for oil for many materials such as A/SA 193 Grade B7. But a polymer solution cannot be used in the heat treatment of very high strength materials such as A490 structural bolts, A574 socket screws, F912 set screws, or A354 Grade BD (SAE J995 Grade 8) because these specifications require an oil quench. A polymer solution is also not suitable for quenching products made from medium carbon steels, such as A325 structural bolts, A449 Type 1 (SAE J995 Grade 5) bolts, A194 Grade 2H nuts, A563 Grade C, D, or DH nuts, and F436 flat washers. Consequently, there seems no reason to believe that any of these types of products would have undergone heat treatment at the Cardinal facility. Secondly, rods and studs were generally not heat treated at the Cardinal facility because they were produced from bars which already met applicable specifications and did not require additional heat treatment. In addition, the heat treatment basket could not physically accommodate any studs or rods longer than 36 inches. Final Report 11/95 Page 8 B&G-Cardinal believes that the problem of substandard fasteners discovered initially by Duquesne Light does not extend beyond the eight lots of Grade B7 capscrews already identified through testing charges based upon critical factors of weight, density, and soaking times; but B&G-Cardinal cannot guarantee this conclusion. Customers should evaluate replacing any fasteners installed from these eight lots, and should consider testing other lots if deemed necessary for further assurance. SUMMARY Shortly after receiving notification from Duquesne Light that capscrews sold to them by CIP-LP did not meet the specification requirements, B&G-Cardinal began an investigation into the cause and scope of the problem. During this investigation, a detailed review of records was performed as well as a duplication of past heat treatment charges. During the investigation, B&G-Cardinal recreated the heat treating conditions of suspect lots and through test charges successfully duplicated the failures in four lots of material known to contain substandard fasteners; additional test charges produced four more lots with substandard fasteners, which may indicate that corresponding lots in the field may also have substandard fasteners. The cause of the problem was determined to be procedural error. As a courtesy, B&G-Cardinal has notified the NRC and the companies that purchased capscrews from lots containing suspect material. B&G-Cardinal has discontinued using the heat treatment equipment at the Cardinal facility until such time that satisfactory modifications are made to both the hardware and procedures governing the heat treating operation. Corrective action to preclude recurrence include, but are not limited to: 1. Revising or adding procedures to address minimum soak times, basket loading procedures, and placement of test specimens; upgrading training programs for operators of the furnace. 2. Adding a second thermocouple to the furnace located at the bottom-center of the furnace near the parts basket (where heat transfer can lag behind other sections of the furnace, depending on weight and density). 3. Adding a view port to the furnace so that the operator can observe the charge during the heat treatment. Final Report 11/95 Page 9 4. Considering overhauling or replacing the furnace if other corrective actions are insufficient. ADDENDUMS 1. Sorted Heat Treatment Data Showing Heavy Charges 2. Test Charge Results 3. Heat Treatment Equipment at the Cardinal Facility Final Report 11/95 Page 10 Table "Heat Treatment Log Charge Data - Sorted by Pounds per Hour", Addendum 1 Pages 1 thru 7, omitted. Note (1) Charge 2572 was determined to be good based primarily upon data from charge 12. In addition to test charge 12, test charge 22 was also considered as a reference. Although test charge 22 was considered to contain non-conforming parts, it very nearly passed. Test charge 22 was referenced because the diameter and length of the parts were similar to charge 2572. The additional 30 minutes charge 2572 was held at temperature, compared to test charge 22, provides adequate assurance that this was a good charge. Table "Test Charge Results" omitted. The remaining addendum contains analyses for the above 22 test charges except for charges numbered 1, 2, and 5, which were either superceded or re-performed. NOTE: To maintain consistency throughout testing, the Rockwell C scale was used to record all hardness values since readings are valid for the entire scale. In normal practice, hardness values would be expressed using a different scale if Rockwell C readings were below 20. Addendum 2 Page 1 Table "As Quenched Heat Treat Charge Analysis", Addendum 2 Pages 2 thru 20, omitted. Heat Treatment Equipment General: The heat treatment equipment at the Cardinal facility consists of a basic electric furnace, a separate quench tank containing a polymer solution, as well as several instrumentation and control systems. Furnace: The furnace has two main components, the base and the door. The base is supported by a steel structure at a height of 4 1/2 feet above the foundation (just lower than the top of the adjacent quench tank). The door is supported by the same structure, and moves vertically to allow for insertion and removal of the parts basket. The door operates hydraulically with a total travel of approximately 30 inches. A rack supported by bricks rests in the center of the base. The basket containing the parts being heat treated is placed on the rack. Both the rack and the basket are made from Inconel. The furnace door houses the heating elements and the thermocouple. There are eleven rows of heating elements; two on each side and three across the ceiling. Side views of the furnace door and base are shown below as Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 is the view from the quench tank. Figure 2 is the view from the side perpendicular to the quench tank. Figure 1 "Furnace Side View Facing Quench Tank" omitted. Addendum 3 Page 1 Figure 2 "Furnace Side View" omitted. Figure 3 is a side view of the furnace with the oven door in the closed position. With the oven door closed, there is approximately 2 1/2 inches of clearance between the top of the basket and the upper heating elements. The thermocouple protrudes eight inches from the ceiling and extends into the basket approximately two inches. Figure 3 "Furnace Door Closed" omitted. Addendum 3 Page 2 Figure 4 is a top view (and side view) of the base with the bottom of the figure facing the quench tank. The bricks used to support the rack are arranged in a symmetrical pattern as shown. Figure 4 "Top View of Base" omitted. Figure 5 is a top view with the same perspective as Figure 4. This view shows the part's basket placed an the rack and a cutaway view of the door showing the clearance between the basket and the side heating elements. Figure 5 "Top View of Base with Basket" omitted. Addendum 3 Page 3 Figure 6 is a top view of the door as viewed from the base looking up. The right side of the drawing faced the quench tank. This view shows the upper three rows of heating elements and the location of the thermocouple. Figure 6 "Top View of Door" omitted. Quench Tank: The quench tank is located adjacent to the furnace. The tank contains 2,390 gallons of a polymer based quenchant. The polymer is suspended in water and precipitates out onto the hot parts when they are lowered into the tank. This provides an insulative layer which controls the rate of temperature drop. The polymer returns into solution as the parts cool. The polymer is a suitable replacement for oil as a quenchant, except for specifications which specifically state parts must be quenched in oil. The quenchant is circulated by an agitator assembly located at the bottom of the tank. The agitator ensures a continuous flow of quenchant through the parts basket during the quench. The polymer quenchant in maintained at approximately 125 degrees F for quenching A/SA 193 Grade B7 products. Instrumentation and Controls: The signal from the thermocouple is sent to a control panel which automatically maintains the furnace temperature by controlling the power to the heating elements. The temperature is maintained within a tolerance of +/-15 degrees F. The temperature signal also feeds a strip chart recorder which plots temperature against time. Other. The oven door, basket crane, and agitators are all operated by individual hydraulic systems. Addendum 3 Page 4 DESIGN REPORT ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE SECTION III, DIVISION 1, CLASS 3, SUBSECTIONS ND & NF 1989 EDITION NC ADDENDA BUYER: CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER G0109437 AEROFIN TYPE R COILS AEROFIN SHOP ORDER CR-947963 Items 001 thru 013 SPECIFICATION M-60A, REV. A page 1 of 39 AEROFIN CALCULATION FILE CA-529-546 Rev 4 AEROFIN CORPORATION PREPARED BY: 4621 MURRAY PLACE KIM W. LIENBERGER PO BOX 10819 PROJECT ENGINEER LYNCHBURG, VA 24506 APPROVED BY: GARY CARROLL VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING ASME SECTION III, SUBSECTION ND DESIGN REPORT PAGE 26 OF 39 AEROFIN CALCULATION FILE CA - 529 - 546 REV. 1 HEADER BOLT ANALYSIS Bolt Material: ASME SA-193 Gr. B7 5/8 in. Diameter. Tensile Stress area = .226 in**2 Allowable stress = 25000 psi [ASME Section III Table I-7.3] Minimum ultimate tensile strength = 125000 psi [Table I-7.3] The header bolts are subjected to loads due to pressure, gasket seating, and nozzle loads. These loads are summed to find the worst case stress on any of the bolts. From the specification, Nozzle Forces (lbs) and Moments (in-lbs) are Fx= 1200 Fy= 1200 Fz= 1200 Mx= 7200 My= 7200 Mz= 7200 PRESSURE LOAD Ref. ASME Sec. III, Appendix XI-3220 Pforce = Force / blot due to pressure Pforce = pressure * area / number of bolts Pforce = 150 * (18.5 * 51.0) / 56 = 2,527.3 lbs/Bolt GASKET LOAD Ref. ASME Sec. III, Appendix XI-3221.1 Effective gasket seating width: Ref. ASME Section III Table XI-3221.1-2 For perimeter gasket bo1 = (W + T)/2 = (1.5 + .125) / 2 = .8125 b1 = .5 * sqrt (bo1) = .5 * sqrt(.8125) = .4507 bo2 = (W + N) / 4 = (.25 + .375) / 4 = .156 b2 = bo = .156 Gi = Perimeter at gasket reaction G1 = 18.5 in. G2 = 51.0 in. Gforce = Force / bolt due to gasket reaction Gforcei = 2 * bi * mi * pressure * Gi / number of bolts Gforce1 = 2 * 0.4507 * .50 * 150 * 20.0 / 56 = 24.1 lbs/bolt Gforce2 = 2 * 0.156 * .50 * 150 * 51.0 / 16 = 74.6 lbs/bolt Gforce = 24.1 + 74.6 = 98.7 lbs/bolt NOZZLE LOADS Axial forces on bolts are induced by Fx, Fy, Fv, My, & Mv. Bl = # of bolts on long side; Bs = # of bolts on short side Dl & Ds = Center to center distance between bolts on long & short sides Bl = 17, Bs = 7, Dl = 52.5, Ds = 20.0 ASME SECTION III, SUBSECTION ND DESIGN REPORT PAGE _27_ OF _39_ AEROFIN CALCULATION FILE CA - 529 - 546 REV. 2 HEADER BOLT ANALYSIS continued Fl = forces on long side bolts due to Fx, Fy & Mv Fl = (Fx / Bl) + (2 * (Mz + Fy * a) / (Bl * Ds)) Fl = (1200 / 17) + (2 * (7200 + 1200 * 9.875) / (17 * 20.5) Fl = 180 per bolt Fs = forces an short side bolts due to Fx, Fv & My Fs = (Fx / Bs) + (2 * (My + Fz * a) / (Bs * Dl)) Fs = (1200 / 5) + (2 * (7200 + 1200 * 9.875) / (5 * 52.5) Fs = 385.1 per bolt TOTAL TENSILE STRESS Long side tensile force per bolt = Tl = Fl + pload * gload = 180 + 2,527.3 + 98.7 = 2806 Short side tensile force per bolt = Ts = Fs + pload + gload = 385.1 + 2,527.3 + 98.7 = 3011.1 Tensile stress = Tensile Force / Stress area Tensile stress on long side bolts = 2806.0 / .226 = 12,416 psi Tensile stress on short side bolts = 3011.1 / .226 = 13,323 psi For calculations use the larger of short or long side stress Total tensile stress = Saxial = 13, 323 psi SHEAR STRESS Shear stresses are induced by Mx Shear force = Fs = 2Mx / 4*d d = longest perpendicular distance from moment to bolts (4 corner bolts) Shearing Force = 2 * 7,200 / 4 * 40 = 90 Shear Stress = Shear force / stress area = 90 / .226 = 399 psi MAXIMUM BOLT TORQUE (Ref Spotts p 276) T = 0.2 * Area * dia(major) * (0.7 * Ult strength) T = 0.2 * 0.226 * 0.625 * (0.7 * 125000) /12 (12 converts to ft-lbs) T = 206 ft-lbs COMBINED TENSILE AND SHEAR STRESSES Combined tensile and shear stresses must not exceed the ellipse equation given in NF-3324.6(3) [1986 Code]. The 1989 Code does not address allowable shear stresses for non-welded pressure-retaining components. Therefore, using allowable shear stress equation for structural components in 1989 Code NF-3324.6, Fvb = .62 * Su / 3 = .62 * 125000 / 3 = 25,833 Ftb = Su / 2 = 125,000/2 = 62,500 (ft**2 / Ftb**2) + (fv**2 / Fvb**2) = 1 (13, 323**2 / 62, 500**2) + (399**2 / 25,833**2) = 0454 + .00024 = .04568 ><< 1 CONCLUSION: The ellipse equation is satisfied. Actual bolt stresses are within allowable limits. *** END OF DOCUMENT ***