

Department of Defense PKI Use Case/Experiences

PKI IMPLEMENTATION WORKSHOP

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Agenda

- Current Statistics
- Program Enhancements (Otherwise knows as lessons learned...)
- New Milestones for PK-Enabling
- FIPS 201 Challenges





Current Statistics...

- Common Access Cards (CAC) Issued 10 M
 - More than 90% of target population has a CAC
 - > 500,000 **software certificates** being used
 - 98% of DoD web servers have certificates
- PKI Certificates issued on NIPRNet 22M+
- PKI Certificates issued on SIPRNet 10000
 - > All Software certificates
 - ➤ NSA is currently working on enhancements to the CAC for its use on SIPRNET
- Other holders of DoD PKI Certificates
 - Intelligence Community
 - CCEB Nations (5-Eyes)
- Typical CAC issuing time with PKI Certificates
 - **12-15** minutes
 - **As many as 20,000 in a day**







Program Enhancements



Robust Certificate Validation Service

- Issue: Real-time certificate validation needed to minimize bandwidth impact
- Field RCVS Nodes
 - > Mechanicsburg
 - > San Antonio
 - **EUCOM**
 - **PACOM**
 - ➤ CONUS (2-TBD)
 - > SIPRNet
- Operational Issues
 - CRL Size
 - Rollout of OCSP Plugins







Non-person Entity Certificates (i.e., Device)

- <u>Issue</u>: Need to Extend PKI to support a net-centric environment by enabling recognition and authentication of those entities that operate on/within our networks.
- Currently Developing
 - > System Requirements Spec
 - Concept of Operation (CONOP)
 - Authoritative Naming Spec
- Develop Authoritative Naming System
- Develop Registration Processes & Controls
 - Certificate Expiration Notification
 - Determine Types of Devices To Be Supported
- Develop Device Certificate Profiles
- Implement Support for Certificate Request Protocols (HW & SW)
- Field CAs for NIPRNet and SIPRNet
- Continue To Evolve PKI to Support Future Devices





Windows Domain Controller Certificates

- Issue: Need to support smart card logon (with CACs) in a Microsoft Network Environment
- Develop Policy
- Design Certificate Issuance Process and Profiles
- Establish Subordinate CA for Domain Controller Certificates
- Support for SIPRNet





Automated PKI Monitoring

- Issue: Need capability to remotely monitor performance of key infrastructure components
- Develop Base Monitoring Functions
- Add Monitoring of Red Hat CMS
- Add Monitoring of Auto Key Recovery
- Auto Local Registration Authority Application
- Field at JITC
- Field at Chambersburg
- Field at Denver





Government Control of PKI Applets (aka HAPKI)

- Issue: Need for the DoD to acquire control of the PKI Java applets that are downloaded to the CAC for performing PKI functions
- Develop CONOP
- Develop System Requirements Specification
- Design CAC To Support Multiple Global Platform Security Domains
- Design CAC To Only Accept Government Signed Applets
- Develop Applets Under Government Control and/or Review
- Establish Mechanism To Sign Government Applets and Load CACs
- Develop CAC Proof-of-Possession for IP Issued Certificates
- Relocate PKI Sensitive Functions From CAC Infrastructure To The PKI Infrastructure



Bulk Revocation by Components

- Issue: DoD Components require a capability to efficiently revoke large numbers of certificates
- Develop Prototype
- Deploy in Operational Environment
- Develop Federated Database
- Deploy in SIPRNet





Citizenship Information

- Issue: DoD relying parties have a requirement for citizenship information in certificates
- Determine Owner of Citizenship Information
- Determine Source of Citizenship Information
- Determine Usage Requirements for Citizenship Information
- Design System for Hosting Citizenship Information
- Implement Citizenship Information
- Develop Training for Collecting Citizenship Information





Architecture Improvements

- Design and Implement Improvements To
 The Overall Architecture of The DoD PKI
- Architecture Improvements include:
 - Second Source Certification Authorities
 - Second Source Certification Authorities implement CA software from a second vendor to remove the dependency that the DoD currently has on a single vendor to support the DoD PKI
 - ➤ Automated Load Balancing for Issuance Portals (IP) and LRAs
 - Automated Load Balancing provides a load balancer between the CAs and the LRAs and CAC Issuance. By implementing a load balancing capability, LRA workstations and IPs could all be configured to access the load balancer, which would automatically route the request to an available CA



Other Slated Enhancements

- Trust Relationships with External PKIs
- Group/role certificates
- Distribution of the DoD Root CA certificate to all subscribers and relying parties in a trusted manor
- Improvements of compliance audits
- Enhance archival process of DoD PKI objects
- Access to encrypted data
- Trusted Timestamp





New Milestones for PK-Enabling





Past PK-Enabling Guidance

- August 12, 2000
 - ➤ Updated DoD policies for development and implementation of a Department-wide PKI
 - ➤ Aligned PKI activities and milestones with those of the DoD CAC program
- May 17, 2001
 - ➤ Provided specific guidelines for the Public Key Enabling of Applications, Web Servers, and Networks for DoD
- May 21, 2002
 - Mandated CAC as primary token platform for PKI certificates
 - > Adjusted milestone dates of two earlier memorandum



THE FORCE IS WITH Us





New Milestones Set for PK-Enabling Within the DoD Community

• The DRIVING FORCE:

➤ JOINT TASK FORCE - GLOBAL NETWORK OPERATIONS (JTF-GNO) - Responsible for operation and defense of the Global Information Grid (GIG) framework for DoD

JTF-GNO Actions:

- ➤ Issued a WARNING ORDER (WARNORD)
- ➤ Issued a COMMUNICATIONS TASKING ORDER (CTO)
 - Directed compliance with specified tasks
 - Provided dates for compliance, options for waivers, and percentages for completion within tasks by various deadlines





All DoD Components Directed To:

- Provide lessons learned from CAC/PKI implementation efforts
- Complete PKI training for all System Admins
- Implement SCL to the NIPRNet
- Develop an initial plan for email encryption and digital signature using DoD PKI
- Allow only certificate-based client authentication to private DoD web-servers using certificates issued by the DoD PKI
- Verify CAC readers, middleware, and ensure CAC users' required information and certificates are correct







Comparison of CAC and PIV Certificate Usage

CAC User Certificates

- Identity
 - Web client authentication
 - Document Signing
- Digital Signature
 - Email signatures
 - Smartcard Login
- Encryption
 - Encrypted email

PIV User Certificates

- PIV Authentication
 - > Web client authentication
 - Smartcard Login
- Digital Signature
 - > Email signatures
 - Document Signing
- Key Management
 - Email encryption
- Card Authentication
 - Physical access control
- Card Management
 - Personalization
 - Post Issuance





Alignment with Common Policy

- Requirement: January 1, 2008 Legacy PKIs cross certified with the Federal Bridge have to assert common policy oids in certs
 - Aug 2005 Established team to look at differences between DoD Certificate Policy and Federal Common Policy
 - > Sep 2005 Briefed Federal Bridge Policy Authority
 - > Oct 2005 Briefed Federal Certificate Policy Working Group
- Even though we are compliant with the Federal Bridge policy we aren't compliant with the Federal Common Policy
- There are some **Significant** care-abouts
- We're working with Judy Spencer and the federal community to harmonize policies and try to come to some mutual agreement for a way forward.
- Federal entities operating legacy PKIs need to perform a similar analysis





Other PIV Challenges

- Certificate Profiles changes to our existing ones
 - ➤ Issuer Signature Algorithm
 - Phased approach for changes
 - > CRL Distribution Point
 - Subject Public Key Information
 - > AIA
- Need additional certificate profile Card Issuer Certificate
- Foreign National Identity Proofing
 - > Within the US
 - > OCONUS
 - > Ties into our Citizenship initiative