

SonicWALL NSA 4500, NSA 5000, and NSA E5500

FIPS 140-2 Security Policy

Level 2

Version 1.5
March 13th, 2008

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Introduction

The SonicWALL NSA Series 4500, 5000, and E5500 (hereafter referred to as “the cryptographic module”) is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module, with hardware part numbers and versions as follows:

- NSA 4500 [HW P/N 101-500166-50, Rev. A]
- NSA 5000 [HW P/N 101-500088-50, Rev. A]
- NSA E5500 [HW P/N 101-500165-50, Rev. A]

The cryptographic module firmware is SonicOS v5.0.1. The overall FIPS validation level for the module is Security Level 2. The cryptographic module is an Internet security appliance, which provides stateful packet filtering firewall, deep packet inspection, virtual private network (VPN), and traffic shaping services.

Table 1 – Module Security Level Specification

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Machine	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Roles and Services

The cryptographic module provides a User role and a Cryptographic Officer role via role-based authentication. The cryptographic module does not provide a Maintenance role. The User role is referred to as “Limited Administrator” (individual user) or “Limited Administrators” (user group) in the vendor documentation. The Cryptographic Officer role is referred to as “Administrator” (individual user) or “SonicWALL Administrators” (user group) in the vendor documentation. The “Administrator” user is a local account on the SonicWALL appliance, and the name used to login as this account may be configured by the Cryptographic Officer role; the default name for the “Administrator” account is “admin”, The user group “SonicWALL Read-Only Admins” satisfies neither the Cryptographic Officer nor the User Role, and should not be used in FIPS mode operations.

The configuration settings required to enable FIPS mode are specified on page 9 of this document.

The User role is authenticated using the credentials of a member of the “Limited Administrators” user group. The User role can query status and non-critical configuration. The authentication mechanisms are discussed in the Security Rules Section.

User Role Services

- Show Status – Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
- Show Non-critical Configuration – “Show” commands that enable the User to view VPN tunnel status and network configuration parameters.
- Session Management – Limited commands that allow the User to perform minimal VPN session management, such as clearing logs, and enabling some debugging events. This includes the following services:
 1. Monitor Network Status
 2. Log Off (themselves and guest users)
 3. Clear Log
 4. Export Log

The Cryptographic Officer role is authenticated using the credentials of the “Administrator” user account (also referred to as “Admin”), or the credentials of a member of the “SonicWALL Administrators” user group. The use of the latter allows for identification of specific users (i.e. by username) upon whom is imparted full administrative privileges through their assigned membership to the “SonicWALL Administrators” group by the Admin user, or other user with full administrative privileges. The Cryptographic Officer role can show all status and configure cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic keys, certificates, and servers used for VPN tunnels. The Crypto Officer sets the rules by which the module encrypts and decrypts data passed through the VPN tunnels. The authentication mechanisms are discussed in the Security Rules Section.

Crypto Officer Services

- Show Status - Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
- Configuration Settings – System configuration, network configuration, User settings, Hardware settings, Log settings, and Security services including initiating encryption, decryption, random number generation, key management, and VPN tunnels. This includes the following services:
 1. Configure VPN Settings
 2. Set Encryption
 3. Set Content Filter
 4. Import/Export Certificates
 5. Upload Firmware
 6. Configure DNS Settings
 7. (Related to wireless activity) Configure Access Rules
- Session Management – Management access for VPN session management, such as setting and clearing logs, and enabling debugging events and traffic management. This includes the following services:
 1. Import/Export Certificates
 2. Clear Log
 3. Filter Log
 4. Export Log
 5. Setup DHCP Server
 6. Generate Log Reports
- Key Zeroization – Zeroizing cryptographic keys

The cryptographic module also supports unauthenticated services, which do not disclose, modify, or substitute CSP, use approved security functions, or otherwise affect the security of the cryptographic module.

Unauthenticated services

- Self-test Initiation – power cycle
- Firmware removal – reset switch
- Status – console and LED

Separation of roles is enforced by requiring users to authenticate using a username and password. The User role requires the use of a username and password of a user entity belonging to the “Limited Administrators” group. The Cryptographic Officer role requires the use the “Administrator” username and password, or the username and password of a user entity belonging to the “SonicWALL Administrators” group.

Multiple users may be logged in simultaneously, but only a single user-session can have full configuration privileges at any time, based upon the prioritized preemption model described below:

1. The Admin user has the highest priority and can preempt any users.

2. A user that is a member of the “SonicWALL Administrators” user group can preempt any users except for the Admin.
3. A user that is a member of the “Limited Administrators” user group can only preempt other members of the “Limited Administrators” group.

Session preemption may be handled in one of two ways, configurable from the System > Administration page, under the “On admin preemption” setting:

1. “Drop to non-config mode” – the preempting user will have three choices:
 - a. “Continue” – this action will drop the existing administrative session to a “non-config mode”, and will impart full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
 - b. “Non-Config Mode” – this action will keep the existing administrative session intact, and will login the preempting user in a “non-config mode”
 - c. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login, and will keep the existing administrative session intact.
2. “Log-out” – the preempting user will have two choices:
 - a. “Continue” – this action will log out the existing administrative session, and will impart full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
 - b. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login, and will keep the existing administrative session intact.

“Non-config mode” administrative sessions will have no privileges to cryptographic functions making them functionally equivalent to User role sessions. The ability to enter “Non-config mode” may be disabled altogether from the System > Administration page, under the “On admin preemption” setting by selecting “Log out” as the desired action.

The cryptographic module provides several security services including VPN and IPsec. The cryptographic module provides the Cryptographic Officer role the ability to configure VPN tunnels and network settings.

When configured to operate in FIPS mode, the cryptographic module provides only FIPS 140-2 compliant services. Whether or not the device is in FIPS mode is indicated on the System/Settings page.

The module supports the following FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms:

- AES (128, 192, and 256-bit) in CBC mode (Cert. #703)
- Triple-DES in CBC mode (Cert. #634)
- SHA-1 (Cert. #731)
- DSA (Cert. #268)
- FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 DRNG (Cert. #414)
- RSA (Cert. #329)

- HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. #381)

The Cryptographic Module also provides the following non FIPS-approved algorithms:

- MD5 within MSCHAP
- RC4 within L2TP (not used in FIPS mode)
- Diffie-Hellman within IKE (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength)
- NDRNG (used to seed the DRNG)

Interfaces

Ethernet Interfaces

The NSA 4500 and NSA 5000 each have 6 Ethernet interfaces, and the NSA E5500 class has 8 Ethernet interfaces. Each Ethernet interface is 10/100/1000 auto-sensing with an RJ-45 / SX/SC multimode fiber connector. The Ethernet interfaces are labeled X#..., LAN/WAN/.... Each Ethernet interface includes LINK and ACT LED's.

The Ethernet interfaces provide data input and data output.

USB Interfaces

The cryptographic module provides 2 USB interfaces. The USB ports are not currently supported.

HA Interface

The NSA E5500 provides a port for the high availability services. It is a physical link to support data transfer between the primary unit and the backup unit in a high availability deployment scenario. HA is not supported in the Approved mode of operation.

Console Interface

The cryptographic module provides a console interface. The console interface is a DB-9/RJ-45 serial connector. The serial port provides a serial console. The serial console can be used for basic administration functions.

The console interface provides control input and status output.

Status LED Interface

The cryptographic modules NSA 4500 and NSA 5000 provide three Status LED's. The Power LED indicates the module is receiving power. The Test LED indicates the module is initializing and performing self-tests. The Alarm LED indicates an alarm condition.

The NSA E5500 cryptographic module provides five Status LEDs. The Power LED indicates the module is receiving power. The Test LED indicates the module is initializing and performing self-tests. The Alarm LED indicates an alarm condition. The HD and Bypass Status LED are currently not used and are reserved for future extension.

The Status LED interface provides status output.

LCD Screen Interface

The NSA E5500 cryptographic module provides an LCD, which can be used to display status information.

Control Buttons Interface

The NSA E5500 cryptographic module provides four control buttons, which are used to navigate through the content displayed on the LCD.

The control buttons provide control input.

Reset (Safe Mode) Button Interface

This interface is used to manually reset the appliance to Safe Mode.

Expansion Bay

The NSA E5500 cryptographic module supports an expansion bay, but it is currently not used and does not provide any service or function.

Power Interface

The cryptographic module provides one AC power interface.

Fan Interface

The cryptographic module also provides two fan interfaces (dual removable fan components).

Security Rules

The cryptographic module has the following security rules:

- The cryptographic module provides two distinct operator roles: User role and Cryptographic Officer role.
- The cryptographic module provides role-based authentication relying upon username and passwords.
- The Administrator and Limited Administrator passwords must be at least eight characters long each, and the password character set is ASCII characters 32-127, which is 96 ASCII characters. This makes the probability 1 in 96^8 , which is less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur for each attempt. After three successive unsuccessful password verification tries, the cryptographic module pauses for one second before additional password entry attempts can be reinitiated. This makes the probability approximately $180/96^8$, which is less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in a one-minute period.
- The following cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed by the cryptographic module at power-up:
 - Software integrity test (using 16-bit CRC EDC)
 - Triple-DES-CBC Known Answer Test
 - AES-CBC Known Answer Test
 - SHA-1 Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
 - DSA Signature Verification Pairwise Consistency Test
 - RSA Signing and Verification Pairwise Consistency Test
 - RNG KAT
 - DH Pairwise Consistency Test

The module supports the following conditional self-tests:

- DRNG and NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- Firmware Load Test
- When a new firmware image is loaded, the cryptographic module verifies the 1024-bit DSA signed SHA-1 hash of the image. If this verification fails, the firmware image loading is aborted.

If any of the tests described above fail, the cryptographic module enters the error state. No security services are provided in the error state. Upon successful completion of the Diagnostic Phase, the cryptographic module enters the Command and Traffic Processing State. Security services are only provided in the Command and Traffic Processing State. No VPN tunnels are started until all tests are successfully completed. This effectively inhibits the data output interface.

When all tests are completed successfully, the Test LED is turned off.

Operational Environment

Area 6 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements does not apply to this module as the module only allows the loading of firmware through the firmware load test, which ensures the image is appropriately DSA signed by SonicWALL.

FIPS-mode Operation

The module is not configured to operate in FIPS-mode by default. The following steps must be taken to enable FIPS-mode operation.

- Set Administrator password to at least eight characters.
- Do not enable the RADIUS server or LDAP on the Users/Settings page.
- Do not export PKCS #12 packages.
- Use IKE with 3rd Party Certificates for IPsec Keying Mode when creating VPN tunnels.
- When creating VPN tunnels, ensure ESP is enabled for IPsec.
- Use a computer directly connected to a LAN port when loading 3rd Party Certificates.
- Use a minimum of 1024-bits for all RSA keys.
- Use FIPS-approved encryption and authentication algorithms when creating VPN tunnels.
- Use Group 2 or Group 5 for IKE Phase 1 DH Group and Use SHA1 for Authentication
- The same RSA key cannot be used for both signing and encryption.
- Do not enable HTTPS management or SSH management
- Do not enable Advanced Routing Services.
- Do not enable Group VPN management
- For NSA E5500 crypto module, do not enable HA service
- Disable “Notify me when new firmware is available” from the System/Settings page.
- Enable FIPS mode from the System/Settings page by checking “FIPS Mode” checkbox.
- For NSA E5500 crypto module, disable the “Enable front-panel Administrative interface” checkbox on the System/Administration page.

The FIPS mode configuration can be determined by the state of the “FIPS Mode” checkbox on the System/Settings page and verification of the preceding steps.

Definition of Critical Security Parameters

The following are the Critical Security Parameters (CSP) contained in the cryptographic module:

- IKE Shared Secret
- SKEYID
- SKEYID_d
- SKEYID_a
- SKEYID_e
- IKE Session Encryption Key
- IKE Session Authentication Key
- IKE RSA Private Key
- IPsec Shared Secret
- IPsec Session Encryption Key
- IPsec Session Authentication Key
- DH Private Key
- DRNG Seed Key
- Passwords

Public Keys

- Root CA Public Key
- Peer IKE RSA Public Key
- IKE RSA Public Key
- DSA Firmware Verification Key
- DH Public Key
- DH Peer Public Key

Definition of CSP Modes of Access

Table 2 describes the methods of accessing the individual CSPs.

Import/upload: The CSP is entered into the module from an external source.

Generate: The CSP is internally generated using the FIPS 186-2 DRNG.

Removal/Deletion: The CSP is actively destroyed.

Table 2 – Roles, Services, CSP Access Matrix

Role		Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
C.O.	User		
X	X	Show Status	N/A
	X	Show Non-critical Configuration	N/A
	X	Monitor Network Status	N/A
	X	Log Off	N/A
X	X	Clear Log	N/A
X	X	Export Log	N/A
X		Import/Export Certificates	N/A
X		Filter Log	N/A
X		Setup DHCP Server	Generate – DRNG Seed Key Generate – DH Private Key Generate –SKEYID Generate –SKEYID_d Generate –SKEYID_a Generate –SKEYID_e Generate –IKE RSA Private Key
X		Generate Log Reports	N/A
X		Configure VPN Settings	Generate – DRNG Seed Key Generate – DH Private Key Generate –SKEYID Generate –SKEYID_d Generate –SKEYID_a Generate –SKEYID_e

Role		Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
C.O.	User		
			Generate –IKE RSA Private Key Generate – IKE Shared Secret Generate –IKE Session Authentication Key Generate –IPsec Shared Secret Generate –IPsec Session Authentication Key
X		Set Encryption	Generate –IKE Session Encryption Key Generate –IPsec Session Encryption Key
X		Set Content Filter	N/A
X		Upload Firmware	N/A
X		Configure DNS Settings	N/A
X		Configure Access Rules	N/A
X		Key Zeroization	Remove – DRNG Seed Key Remove – Passwords Remove – IKE Shared Secret Remove –SKEYID Remove –SKEYID_d Remove –SKEYID_a Remove –SKEYID_e Remove –IKE Session Encryption Key Remove –IKE Session Authentication Key Remove –IKE RSA Private Key Remove –IPsec Shared Secret Remove –IPsec Session Encryption Key Remove –IPsec Session Authentication Key Remove – DH Private Key

Cryptographic Boundary

The Cryptographic Boundary includes the entire device.

The chassis for the NSA E5500 cryptographic module is sealed with two tamper-evident seals. The physical security of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the seals. The locations of the tamper-evident seals for the NSA E5500 cryptographic module are indicated by the red arrows in Figures 1 and 2 below:



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

The chassis for the NSA 4500 and NSA 5000 are sealed with two tamper-evident seals. The physical security of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the seals. The locations of the tamper-evident seals for the NSA 4500 and NSA 5000 are indicated by the red arrows in Figure 5 below:



Figure 5



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8

Mitigation of Attacks

Area 11 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements do not apply to this module as it has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

Definitions and Glossary

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
VPN	Virtual Private Network
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
Triple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
DES	Data Encryption Standard
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DRNG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman asymmetric algorithm
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
LAN	Local Area Network
DH	Diffie-Hellman
GUI	Graphical User Interface
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC	Hashed Message Authentication Code