According to Yano, he verbally agreed to pay Araque $5.00 an hour. Although both LCAs specified a salary of $30,000, Yano attempted to distance himself from the forms by testifying that the salary information was not on the second form when he signed it. When asked whether the salary information was on the first form, Yano said he could not remember. The ALJ found that Yano was being either less than truthful or willfully ignorant. In any event, the ALJ reasoned that Yano signed both LCAs and, as a result, was required by the applicable regulations to pay Araque the greater of his actual wage or the prevailing wage. Inasmuch as the Department approved a prevailing wage of $30,000 a year, the ALJ reasoned that Yano must pay that amount.

   Yano also asserted that the $10,500.00 housing credit was too small and argued that he was entitled to a credit of $34,700.00. Araque, on the other hand, argued Yano should not receive any credit for housing. After reviewing the applicable regulations, the ALJ noted that under 29 C.F.R. §655.731(c)(7)(iii) a deduction is only allowable if it is made in accordance with a voluntary, written authorization from the employee. Yano Enterprises produced no such written authorization. Therefore, the ALJ disallowed the housing credit in its entirety and directed Yano Enterprises to pay back wages in the amount of $102,797.02. This appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION

   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §655.845.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

   Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we have plenary power to review an ALJ's factual and legal conclusions de novo. See 5 U.S.C.A. §557 (b) (West 1996); Masek v. Cadle Co., ARB No. 97-069, ALJ No. 95-WPC-1, slip op. at 7 (ARB Apr. 28, 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

   Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §655.731 (c), "[t]he required wage must be paid to the employee, cash in hand, free and clear, when due, except that deductions made in accordance with paragraph (c)(7) of this section may reduce the cash wage below the level of the required wage." (Emphasis in original.) Paragraph (c)(7) provides as follows:

(7) "Authorized deduction," for the purposes of the H-1B required wage obligation, means a deduction from wages in complete compliance with one of the following sets of criteria -

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(iii) Deduction which meets the following requirements:

(A) Is made in accordance with a voluntary, written authorization by the employee (Note: an employee's mere acceptance of a job which carries a deduction as a condition of employment does not constitute voluntary authorization even if such condition were stated in writing);
(B) Is for a matter principally for the benefit for the employee . . .;
(C) Is not a recoupment of the employer's business expenses . . .;
(D) Is an amount that does not exceed the fair market value or the actual cost . . .; and
(E) Is an amount that does not exceed the limits set for garnishment of wages in the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1673, and the regulations of the Secretary . . . .

   According to Yano:

The ALJ herein [h]as construed that all of the requirements of this subsection must be met or a deduction would fail. He has held as a matter of law that any and all deductions must be in writing signed by the employee. By doing so he has effectively inserted the word "and" after each of the sub-clauses. But the word is not there. There is nothing to indicate that a writing would be required where the test of sub-clause (B) is not met. General principles of statutory or regulatory interpretation do not support the ALJ's interpretation of the Rule.

   The basic tenets of statutory construction are applicable to the interpretation of regulations. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2001); Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1998). Generally, a statute should be read as punctuated unless there is some reason to do otherwise. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.15 (5th ed. 1992). Yano Enterprises has not argued, nor do we discern, any reason for interpreting this regulation differently than its punctuation suggests.

   The issue before us is whether an employer must comply with subsection (c)(7)(iii)(A) in order to qualify for a reduction in wages owed the employee. This provision is one of five subordinate clauses. Each of the five clauses occupies the same structural position of subordination relative to the main clause and each is separated by a semicolon, with the last two clauses being separated by the conjunctive "and."

   According to Professor Richard Wydick:

Sometimes the best way to present a cluster of conditions, or exceptions, or other closely related ideas is in one long sentence, split up like a laundry list. This device is called tabulation . . . . When you tabulate, follow these conventions:

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3. After each item in the list, except the last, put a semicolon followed by or (if the list is disjunctive) or and (if the list is conjunctive). If both the list and the items are short, and if the reader will not become confused, you can omit the and or or after all except the next-to-last item.

Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers at 47-48 (4th ed. 1998). If the clauses under subsection (c)(7)(iii), were intended to be read as alternative bases for a deduction as Yano Enterprises implies, then the last two clauses would be separated by the disjunctive "or."

Inasmuch as the last two clauses are separated by the conjunction "and," we conclude that all of the clauses were intended to be read in conjunction with each other and that a deduction would not be appropriate unless the employer met the conditions set forth under all five clauses. See, e.g., United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 882 (1996) (in portion of federal Sentencing Guidelines having multiple clauses joined by semi-colons and ending with the conjunctive "and," the semicolons and the word "and" have equivalent meaning). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Yano Enterprises' failure to satisfy subsection (c)(7)(iii)(A) rendered it ineligible for a deduction.

   Yano Enterprises also argues that the ALJ violated its Fifth Amendment due process rights by increasing the penalty. In support of its argument, Yano Enterprises cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce involved a criminal defendant who succeeded in having his conviction set aside by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Following a new trial, the trial judge convicted Pearce and sentenced him to a term longer than the one originally imposed. Ultimately, Pearce's case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction. However, the Court held that it would be a flagrant violation of the Due Process Clause for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. Pearce is clearly inapposite. The matter before us is not a criminal case, and there is no indication that the ALJ increased the fine out of vindictiveness.

   Here, the ALJ determined that, as a matter of law, Yano Enterprises could not receive a credit for housing without first producing a written document showing that Araque voluntarily agreed to have his housing expenses deducted from his wages. Yano Enterprises produced no such document and, therefore, was not entitled to a deduction. In the absence of an entitlement to a deduction, the ALJ had no alternative but to find that Yano Enterprises must pay