Neither the Respondent nor the Prosecuting Party has cited any appellate decisions that directly address this contention, but the Prosecuting Party has pointed out that there is at least one Administrative Law Judge decision that used the date of a complaint by one aggrieved person for purposes of determining the applicability of 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(A) to alleged violations involving another person. See Adminstrator v. Kutty , 2001-LHC-10 at 55 (October 9, 2002). The pertinent language from 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(A) is as follows:
Subject to paragraph (5)(A), the Secretary [of Labor] shall establish a process for the receipt, investigation, and disposition of complaints respecting a petitioner's failure to meet a condition specified in an application submitted under paragraph (1) or a petitioner's misrepresentation of material facts in such an application. Complaints may be filed by any aggrieved person or organization (including bargaining representatives). No investigation or hearing shall be conducted on a complaint concerning such a failure or misrepresentation unless the complaint was filed not later than 12 months after the date of the failure or misrepresentation, respectively. The Secretary shall conduct an investigation under this paragraph if there is reasonable cause to believe that such a failure or misrepresentation has occurred.
Presumably, the Respondent's argument is based on the assumption that the word "complaint" in the foregoing passage must be narrowly construed so that it applies only to the specific grievances made by the person submitting the complaint. Conversely, the Prosecuting Party is apparently defining the term "complaint" very broadly so that any allegation by any aggrieved person or organization would provide the Secretary with broad jurisdiction to investigate and conduct hearings concerning any and all possible misrepresentations or compliance failures that may be related to a particular LCA.
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The Department of Labor regulations concerning LCA enforcement do not define the term "complaint" and there are arguably many different ways to interpret the term. However, it is concluded that, as used in 8 U.S.C. §1182(n), the word "complaint" should be interpreted as encompassing not only the individual grievances of the aggrieved person making the complaint but also all other similar violations involving the same LCA, even if those other violations involve other aggrieved persons who were not identified by the person making the complaint. Hence, Mr. Balakrishnan's November 2001 complaint would provide a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction over both the alleged violations involving Mr. Balakrishnan and the alleged violations involving Mr. Trimbakkar.
Moreover, even if the term "complaint" were given a very narrow interpretation, it appears that there would still be jurisdiction over the alleged violations concerning Mr. Trimbakkar. This conclusion follows from the fact that there is circumstantial evidence indicating that Mr. Balakrishnan's complaint of November 1, 2001 concerned both his own employment and that of Mr. Trimbakkar. This inference is based on the fact that Mr. Kim's notes of his April 2002 interview of Ms. Rowlands indicate that Mr. Kim was seeking information concerning both Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar. PX 11 at 4 (notes referring to "either Ramesh or Dingesh"), Tr. at 268-72. In this regard, it is recognized that it could be contended that because Mr. Balakrishnan was not the person "aggrieved" by the Respondent's alleged failure to properly pay Mr. Trimbakkar, the information provided by Mr. Balakrishnan did not satisfy the statutory requirement that complaints be made by an "aggrieved person." However, such an argument ignores the fact that any alleged failure to pay an employee the full amounts required by an LCA could cause an employer to use the underpaid employee more frequently than other employees and thereby reduce the amount of work available to those other employees.
As previously noted, the Respondent's second jurisdictional argument is the contention that jurisdiction has been lost because of the Secretary's failure to act within the various time frames set forth in 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(B). Unquestionably, the Wage and Hour Division's investigation in this case was slow, shallow, and sporadic. However, review of the relevant case law indicates that there is no merit to the Respondent's contention that the failure to comply with the statutory deadlines means that jurisdiction has been lost. Indeed, as pointed out by the Prosecuting Party, the relevant precedents establish that the time periods set forth in subsection 1182(n)(2)(B) are only directory, not jurisdictional. See Brock v. Pierce County , 476 U.S. 253, 259 (1986) (noting that government agencies do not lose jurisdiction for failure to comply with statutory time limits unless the statute "both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision"). Hence, the Secretary's failure in this case to comply with the time limits in 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(B) does not preclude the Secretary from exercising jurisdiction over this matter. See also Administrator v. Alden Management Services, Inc. , ARB Nos. 00-20 and 00-21, ALJ No. 1996-ARN-3, slip op. at 5 (ARB Aug. 30, 2002).
2. Amount of Any Unpaid Wages Owed to Mr. Trimbakkar and Mr. Balakrishnan
Synergy's payroll records indicate that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were not paid for various periods of time in February, March, May, June, September, and October of 2001. PX 3. As a result, the Administrator's April 14, 2003 determination concluded that the Respondent had underpaid Mr. Balakrishnan by $6,304.94 and Mr. Trimbakkar by $17,150.87. PX 2. During the trial, however, the Prosecuting Party reported that it had incorrectly calculated the amounts of the unpaid wages and that, in fact, Mr. Balakrishnan is owned $1,730.77 more than originally claimed (i.e., $8,035) and Mr. Trimbakkar is owed $1,730.77 less than previously alleged (i.e., $15,420.10). Tr. at 214-17. Although the Respondent challenges the Administrator's determinations concerning the periods of time that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were in fact working for Synergy, it does not challenge the Administrator's arithmetic in calculating the amounts that are allegedly owed to Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar.
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The Prosecuting Party's evidence of the alleged underpayments principally consists of testimony in which Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar asserted that they worked for Synergy from the first of February 2001 until the end of October 2001 without any breaks except weekends and holidays. As previously explained, much of that testimony was directly contradicted by the testimony of Synergy's management employees. Moreover, there are a variety of additional reasons for questioning the accuracy of the testimony of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar. For example, the testimony of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar is uncorroborated by any documentary evidence (e.g., time sheets) showing that either of these individuals actually worked in Synergy's offices during any of the periods for which they were not paid. Likewise, their testimony is inconsistent with the fact that the Respondent has produced documents purportedly showing that both Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar requested leaves of absence in late April or early May of 2001. The credibility of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar is also drawn into question by their assertions that Synergy offered each of them annual salaries of $65,000. In this regard, it is noted that it seems highly unlikely that Synergy would have seen any need to offer these individuals salaries that exceeded the prevailing wage for similarly qualified workers by more than $20,000 a year. In addition, the record contains letters to Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar offering them annual salaries of only $45,000 and a copy a LCA that indicates that they would be paid as little as $44,000 a year. Although Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar claim that they did not see any of these documents until after their employment ended, these assertions are inconsistent with the representations of other witnesses, including Ms. Vibhakar.
It is further noted that Mr. Trimbakkar's claim that he continued working for Synergy until the end of October of 2001 is inconsistent with the fact that he signed a termination agreement indicating that his employment ended on September 8, 2001. Although Mr. Trimbakkar contends that the termination agreement was backdated, Synergy's payroll records show that Mr. Trimbakkar was in fact taken off of Synergy's payroll on September 8, 2001, just as the termination agreement specifies. In addition, on cross-examination Mr. Trimbakkar admitted that he had misrepresented his job experience on his resume and had requested documents from Synergy that were apparently intended to deceive the INS concerning the length of his employment by Synergy. It also appears that Mr. Trimbakkar's testimony was inaccurate insofar as he asserted that he had completed a health insurance application on his first day of work. Tr. at 61-62 (Mr. Trimbakkar's testimony he had completed an insurance application on his first day of work for Synergy), ALJX 4, Attachment A (insurance application signed April 19, 2001).
On the other hand, there are also substantial reasons for questioning the accuracy of the testimony in which Mr. Gnanadoss, Ms. Motupolli, and Ms. Rao alleged that during the periods when Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were not paid, they were either on leaves of absence or for other reasons not on Synergy's premises. For example, the assertion that Mr. Balakrishnan took a voluntary leave of absence in May of 2001 merely because his family had returned to India does not ring true. Moreover, the reason given for Mr. Trimbakkar's alleged leave of absence ("unavoidable family circumstances") is so vague that it is meaningless. Even more significantly, Ms. Rowland's statements to the Department of Labor investigators strongly suggest that both Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar routinely reported to Synergy's Fremont office during their purported leaves of absence. Although Mr. Gnanadoss has testified that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were merely engaged in personal pursuits during that period, his testimony on this subject was so evasive and inconsistent that it is not credible. In addition, that testimony is inconsistent with the evidence indicating that Mr. Balakrishnan spoke with Mr. Watson during May of 2001 about having Synergy provide computer programming services to Mr. Watson's company. Likewise, Mr. Gnanadoss's testimony that Mr. Balakrishnan was terminated in September of 2001 is directly contradicted by Synergy payroll records showing that Mr. Balakrishnan continued to be paid until the end of October of 2001.
In addition, Synergy has failed to provide convincing explanations for conduct that does not appear to be consistent with the various rules governing the employment of H-1B visa holders. For example, although the evidence indisputably establishes that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar had begun working a project for a Synergy client on February 8, 2001, none of Synergy's witnesses has explained why the H-1B petitions Synergy filed on behalf of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar represented that their employment would not commence until March 15, 2001. Similarly, there has been no reasonable explanation for the fact that Synergy did not promptly pay Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar for their work during the period between February 8, 2001 and March 15, 2001. Although Ms. Motupolli has suggested that payments for that period were made sometime after September of 2001, the earnings statements for the period after September 2001 contradict that hypothesis. Moreover, there has been no credible explanation for the long delay in making such payments. It is also odd that Synergy has failed to produce any records that would show when it notified the INS that the employment of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar had been terminated. Tr. at 349-50 (Ms. Motupolli's testimony that she believes she notified the INS of Mr. Balakrishnan's termination in late October of 2001 and of Mr. Trimbakkar's termination in late September or early October of 2001, but does not think or cannot recall if Synergy received receipts from the INS).
[Page 15]
Because of the many doubts about the accuracy of the testimony of all of the foregoing witnesses, it has been concluded that, although all of these witnesses did testify truthfully on some aspects of Synergy's employment of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar, none of these witnesses told the full truth and, in some cases, their testimony was knowingly false. For this reason, it has been necessary to discount much of the testimony and to give greater weight to the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the less questionable documentary evidence This documentary evidence includes the LCA, the H-1B petitions, the earnings statements issued to Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar, and the records produced by Blue Cross.
After so considering evidence, it appears to be more likely than not that Synergy had an understanding with Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar that they would be paid for all work done on fee-producing projects and for the first month of any period in which they were not working on such a project, but that they would not receive any more pay until they were assigned to new fee-producing projects. This conclusion is illustrated by the fact that payroll records show that both Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were paid for approximately the first month after the conclusion of their work on the Documentum project, but were not paid again until each of them began working on a new project. PX 3. Likewise, Mr. Trimbakkar's pay stopped approximately one month after the conclusion his project for Trader Joe's concluded on August 10, 2001, and the salary payments to Mr. Balakrishnan ended one month after he completed his second project for Documentum on September 28, 2001. PX 3. It also appears that, as part of the arrangement, Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar agreed that during periods when they were not working on a project they would work in Synergy's offices in an attempt to improve their computer skills and find new fee-paying projects to which Synergy could assign them. This conclusion is demonstrated by the fact that the weight of the evidence indicates that both individuals routinely reported to work in Synergy's Fremont office during all of April and May of 2001, even though they were paid only for the month of April. Likewise, it appears that, in furtherance of this arrangement, Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar may have also agreed that after the end of the first month of being off a fee-producing project, they would ask for "leaves of absence" to explain the temporary suspensions of their paychecks. This is illustrated by the fact that the record contains a document in which Mr. Trimbakkar purportedly requested permission to take a leave of absence during the months of May and June, even though the evidence indicates that Mr. Trimbakkar worked in Synergy's Fremont office during the entire month of May. Likewise, the evidence includes a copy of an e-mail purportedly documenting Mr. Balakrishnan's request for a leave of absence during the month of May even though he reported daily to Synergy's Fremont office during that month. The conclusion that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar consented to take phony leaves of absence is also consistent with the fact that Mr. Trimbakkar was willing to sign his bogus leave request and the fact that there is no evidence indicating that either Mr. Balakrishnan or Mr. Trimbakkar made any contemporaneous complaints to Synergy or anyone else about not receiving any paychecks for parts of May and June of 2001. It is also noted that the practice of paying Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar for the first month following the conclusion of their work on a project for a Synergy client may in some way be related to the fact that neither Mr. Balakrishnan nor Mr. Trimbakkar made any contemporaneous complaints about Synergy's failure to promptly pay them for the work they performed during February and early March of 2001.
[Page 16]
The preponderance of the credible evidence also indicates that it is more likely than not that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar told the truth when they testified that they worked for Synergy on a continuous basis from February 1, 2001 until the end of October of 2001. This finding is primarily supported by the fact that the weight of the evidence indicates that neither Mr. Balakrishnan nor Mr. Trimbakkar actually took a leave of absence during May and June of 2001 and by the fact that Mr. Balakrishnan continued to be paid until October 20, 2001. However, the evidence also indicates that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar did not testify truthfully when they claimed that they were offered annual salaries of $65,000 per year. This conclusion is supported by the written employment offers specifying $45,0000 annual salaries and by the fact that the payroll records show that the paychecks checks received by Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar reflect earnings of approximately $45,000 per year. Likewise, the weight of the evidence suggests that although Mr. Balakrishnan did in fact report to Synergy's offices throughout the month of October of 2001 and make unsuccessful efforts to help Synergy find some new projects, he had been given notice at the end of September of 2001 that he would be terminated from Synergy's employment if he did not obtain some new projects by the end of October. This finding is partly supported by the fact that Mr. Balakrishnan continued to receive paychecks from Synergy until the end of October of 2001. Similarly, it appears that Mr. Trimbakkar had been given notice of his termination in early September of 2001, but allowed to continue to report to Synergy's offices until the end of October of 2001 so that he could attempt to help Synergy find a new project that would allow him to be reinstated to Synergy's payroll. It appears that this arrangement continued until Synergy told Mr. Trimbakkar to take a "vacation" at the end of October of 2001.
Accordingly, it has been concluded that Synergy owes Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar the full amounts alleged by the Administrator but is entitled to a credit of $500 for each of these employees to account for $500 portions of the $1,500 "advance loans" that were not deducted from Mr. Balakrishnan's and Mr. Trimbakkar's first paychecks. As previously explained, Mr. Balakrishnan was underpaid by $8,035.00 and Mr. Trimbakkar was underpaid $15,420.10. Hence, Synergy now owes $7,535.00 to Mr. Balakrishnan and $14,920.10 to Mr. Trimbakkar.
3. Willfulness of Any Failure to Pay Wages during Non-Productive Periods
As previously noted, for purposes of enforcing the INA's H-1B provisions, a willful violator is defined at 20 C.F.R. §655.736(f) and §655.805(c) as an employer that knowingly or through reckless disregard of the law engages in conduct violative of §212(n)(1)(A)(i) or (ii) of the INA (8 U.S.C. §1182 (n)(1)(A)). See also McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. , 486 U.S. 128 (1988), and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111 (1985). In this case, the weight of the evidence indicates that Synergy's managers did not pay Mr. Balakrishnan or Mr. Trimbakkar during periods in May and June of 2001 when they were not assigned to fee-paying projects and that, as a result, Synergy violated the provisions of the INA that require employers to continue to pay H-1B employees during such so-called "non-productive" periods unless the employees are on bona fide leaves of absence. The INA expressly provides that such conduct constitutes a violation of 8 U.S.C. §1182 (n)(1)(A). See 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(C)(vii). Moreover, the evidence indicates that Synergy's violation of this provision was in fact willful. The strongest proof of this conclusion is the evidence showing that Synergy's managers generated and retained written records falsely suggesting that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar were on leaves of absence during periods when these individuals were in fact working in Synergy's Fremont office.
4. Appropriateness of $5,000 Civil Penalty
Under 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(C) a civil penalty of as much as $5,000 can be assessed against an employer that willfully violates any of the conditions prescribed by the provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(1). In this case, the Prosecuting Party apparently contends that because Synergy underpaid two employees during "non-productive" periods, there were two violations and it would therefore be possible to assess civil penalties of as much as $10,000. However, the Prosecuting Party asks only for a civil penalty of $5,000.
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As previously noted, the amount of a civil penalty assessment should be based on the type of violation and on the factors set forth at 20 C.F.R. §655.810(c)(1). That provision mandates consideration of all other "relevant factors," but specifies that at least the following seven circumstances must be considered:
(1) Previous history of violation, or violations, by the employer under the INA and this subpart I or subpart H of this part;
(2) The number of workers affected by the violation or violations;
(3) The gravity of the violation or violations;
(4) Efforts made by the employer in good faith to comply with the provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1182(n) and this [sic ] subparts H and I of this part;
(5) The employer's explanation of the violation or violations;
(6) The employer's commitment to future compliance; and
(7) The extent to which the employer achieved a financial gain due to the violation, or the potential financial loss, potential injury or adverse effect with respect to other parties.
After considering all of the foregoing factors, it has been concluded that the $5,000 penalty recommended by the Prosecuting Party is the appropriate civil penalty. In this regard, it is noted that the first two factors favor a lesser civil penalty, but that factors three to five and seven favor an increased penalty.
5. Making the Labor Condition Application Available to Employees as required by 20 C.F.R. §655.760(a)
The Administrator does not seek the imposition of any civil penalty against Synergy for violating the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §655.760. However, the Administrator does contend that Synergy violated this provision by failing to make its LCA available for public examination at either its Diamond Bar headquarters or Fremont branch office. In this regard, Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar have asserted that Synergy's LCA was not available at either of these two offices. In contrast, Synergy's witnesses have testified that copies of the LCA were available for inspection at both offices. The Prosecuting Party contends that greater weight should be given to the testimony of Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar on the grounds that they allegedly have no reason to lie about this subject. The Prosecuting Party's argument is unconvincing. In fact, it appears that Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar may well have made misrepresentations about the availability of the LCA in order to give credibility to their claims that Synergy had agreed to pay them each $65,000 per year. It is therefore concluded that the weight of the evidence does not warrant a finding that Synergy violated the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §655.760(a).
6. Providing Copies of the Labor Condition Application as required by 20 C.F.R. §655.734(a)(3)
The Administrator does not seek the imposition of any civil penalty against Synergy for violating the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §655.734(a)(3). However, the Administrator does contend that Synergy violated this provision by failing to send Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar copies of their LCA by their first day of work. In this regard, Mr. Balakrishnan testified that he didn't receive a copy of the LCA until November of 2001 and Mr. Trimbakkar contends that he never received it. This testimony is contradicted by the declaration of Ms. Vibhakar, who represented that she mailed copies of the LCA to both Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar on March 24, 2001. It is concluded that even if Ms. Vibhakar's representation about mailing copies of the LCA to Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar on March 24, 2001 is true, Synergy still violated the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §655.734(a)(3). This conclusion is compelled by the fact that by all accounts Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Trimbakkar began working for Synergy at least six weeks prior to March 24, 2001.
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ORDER
1. The Respondent shall pay $7,535 in back wages to Mr. Balakrishnan and $14,920.10 in back wages to Mr. Trimbakkar.
2. The Respondent shall pay a $5,000 civil penalty to the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor.
Paul A. Mapes
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS : Pursuant to 20 CFR §655.845, any party dissatisfied with this Decision and Order may appeal it to the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington , DC 20210, by filing a petition to review the Decision and Order. The petition for review must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 calendar days of the date of the Decision and Order. Copies of the petition shall be served on all parties and on the administrative law judge.
[ENDNOTES]
1 The Department of Labor's regulations concerning these provisions are set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§655.700 to 655.855 (2002).
2 ALJX 1 is the transcript of a deposition of Mohan E. Gnanadoss, ALJX 2 is the transcript of a deposition of Gita Rowlands, and ALJX 3 is the transcript of a deposition of Ramesh Balakrishnan.
3 In this regard, it is noted that the Department of Labor's own regulations concerning LCA enforcement describe the 12-month period set forth in 8 U.S.C. §1182(n)(2)(A) as being "jurisdictional." 20 C.F.R. §655.806(a)(5). It is further noted that a litigant generally may raise issues concerning a court's jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action. See Mansfield, C & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan , 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
4 As previously explained, Mr. Trimbakkar is unsure when he first contacted the DOL, but thinks that this contact may have occurred in January of 2002. However, the fact that the DOL did not produce any documents recording any contacts with Mr. Trimbakkar prior to December 19, 2002 indicates that it is more likely than not that Mr. Trimbakkar's first contact with the DOL did not occur until December of 2002.