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> June 16
Event Notification Report for June 16, 2008
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/13/2008 - 06/16/2008
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 44265 |
Rep Org: CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: THERMOFISHER SCIENTIFIC
Region: 1
City: HARTFORD State: CT
County:
License #: GL RC:708101
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CAROLY JEAN WEBB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 06/04/2008
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
ILTAB Email only ()
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
MISSING NI-63 ELECTRON CAPTURE DEVICE
The Connecticut Department of Public Health Laboratories reported that they were unable to locate a general license Electron Capture Device Ni-63 source. Source serial number is 3359 and was 14.5 mCi in July, 1975.
The last known wipe test of the source was in 2001, conducted when the license was transferred from Thermo-Finnegan to Thermo-Fisher Scientific. The last inventory that positively identified the source was conducted in 2004. Connecticut Department of Public Health possessed the device under general license RC:708101.
In May, 2008, the end-user was assembling all known unused sources for proper disposal when they determined that the Ni-63 source was missing. They have performed an extensive search of their facility but have not been able to locate the source. The end-user will be notifying Thermo-Fisher Scientific.
* * * UPDATED ON 6/14/08 AT 2100 EDT BY HUFFMAN TO CORRECT NRC LICENSE INFORMATION * * *
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 44286 |
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Region: 1
City: LAKE CITY State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
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Notification Date: 06/11/2008
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED NUCLEAR MATERIAL
The state provided this information via e-mail:
"It was reported today by [Pennsylvania Department of Radiation Protection] staff, that an orphan radioactive source was found in a lot of equipment and materials that had been acquired years prior from a bankrupt firm. The source is in Lake City, PA, and was inspected today for radionuclide identification, external exposure rates, and possible leakage. The source is in storage and appears to be in a shielded configuration (~ 3 mR/h contact with the device; background outside the storage area), with no leakage was detected. [The source is contained in an industrial density gauge.] Information is still being gathered, but it apparently has been in storage for years. It was identified as a cesium-137 source, activity noted as 100 millicuries (mCi) in 1979, thus, with a 30 year half-life, is now about 50 mCi. BRP is working with the owner and external agencies and organizations (i.e., NRC, DOE and CRCPD) to ensure the source remains secure, and, proper transfer and/or disposal is performed in a timely manner. There are also some records of prior ownership available, which may possibly assist in cost recovery with this abandoned 'generally licensed' (GL) source. An initial NRC 'NMED report' will be filed shortly. "
* * * UPDATE AT 1730EDT ON 06/13/08 FROM D. ALLARD TO NRC OPS CENTER VIA EMAIL * * *
The state provided this information via e-mail:
"Working with CRCPD, a health physics service provider was hired to take the Oakes Machine Corp density gauge. The cabinet was opened and a KayRay Model 7062P, Cs-137 source housing was found; serial # 7825. It contained an original activity of 100 mCi (May1978). CRCPD has arranged for transfer to another licensed firm, who will recycle or dispose of the source. BRP will submit a NMED report to NRC."
Notified R1DO (Summers) and FSME (Mauer). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 44293 |
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM RICHARDS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 02:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2008
Event Time: 01:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
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Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3DO)
CALDWELL (R3)
STEVE YORK (DHS)
KEVIN BISCOE (FEMA)
STU BAILEY (DOE)
DAVID TIMMONS (USDA)
YVONNE MAMMARELLI (HHS)
LAURENCE COLLIGAN (CANA)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS
The licensee is investigating a loss of greater than 75% of their annunciator indications. The annunciators lost include alarms for ECCS divisions 1 & 2, Reactor Control Panels, and electrical panels. "All normal methods of monitoring plant systems are available." Compensatory measures are being initiated. The plant is stable at 100% power and all maintenance has been stopped.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RALPH KOMBOL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 0612 ON 6/13/08 * * *
Troubleshooting revealed the "C" MUX to be the cause of the problem. "C" MUX was removed from service and the redundant unit is now supplying input. Based on satisfactory testing the Shift Manager terminated the Unusual Event.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Louden), IRD (McDermott, Gott), DHS (J. Craig), FEMA (J. Dunker), DOE (R. Foot), USDA (R Leadbetter), HHS (Y. Mammarelli), Canada (L. Colligan). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 44294 |
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 3 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
INADVERTANT DEENERGIZATION OF GROUP SIX LOGIC CIRCUIT
"This is a 60 day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) describing an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signal (Group 6) affecting more than one system.
"On April 14, 2008 at 1308 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), with Unit 3 in mode 4, an unanticipated Group 6 primary containment isolation signal (PCIS) was generated during the placement of a clearance. During the placement of the clearance, plant personnel removed a fuse which deenergized Group 6 PCIS logic. This resulted in the auto start of train A of the control room ventilation system, auto start of trains A and C of the standby gas treatment (SGT) systems, and the isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"All systems responded according to plant design. Train B of the SGT system did not auto start because only the A channel PCIS was affected during the implementation of the clearance. Train B of SGT is only affected by the B channel PCIS logic. By 1444 hours CDT, the fuse was reinstalled, the affected systems were returned to standby readiness.
There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety to the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program. The reference corrective action document is PER 142243.
"The Senior Resident inspector had been notified of this report." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 44295 |
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
VERN HODGE (email) ()
JOHN THORP (email) ()
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING COMMERCIAL GRADE RELAY CONTACTS CONTAINING POTENTIAL DEFECTS
The following Part 21 notification was received via fax:
"On June 13, 2008, AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) completed a reportability determination which concluded that relay contacts contained an underlying design vulnerability that created a failure mode, and were reportable under Part 21, since the underlying vulnerability could create a substantial safety hazard. The relay contacts are Commercial Grade items dedicated by AmerGen. The relay contacts are provided by Joslyn Clark Controls Inc. (formerly AO Smith) as Normally Closed (N/C) open top contact assemblies (part numbers KPM-44, KPM-46, KPM-6A, and KPM-4A). These contacts are used in safety related applications, primarily in the engineered safeguards actuation system (ESAS). They are also used in safety related applications in the makeup/high pressure injection (HPI) system, main steam system, and the heat sink protection system (HSPS).
"The underlying vulnerability associated with the N/C Joslyn Clark contact is the design of the nylon contact arm. The design allows the contact to become configured incorrectly during assembly or following maintenance. If installed improperly, the moving contactor can hang up on the lip of the slot in the nylon actuator. The hang up results in failure of the contact to fully close and perform its function.
"Following proper assembly, the N/C Joslyn Clark contacts will not become hung-up during normal relay operation.
"As a result of this exposed design vulnerability, the Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) plans as well as the maintenance procedures have been enhanced to prevent a relay from being placed into service with an improperly configured contact. Extent of condition reviews performed to date on relays installed in the plant, have not identified any of these deficiencies.
"The NRC resident inspector was notified of this part 21 notification by the licensee." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 44296 |
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM A. HARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2008
Event Time: 12:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
60-DAY REPORT INVOLVING AN INVALID GROUP II PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"At 1206 On May 31, 2008, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Reactor Building (RB) Radiation Monitor 17RM-452A failed resulting in a Group II Primary Containment Isolation.
"The failure resulted in actuation of the RB ventilation system isolation logic, start-up of the 'A- Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System, and a Half PCIS Group II Isolation. Operations department personnel verified that all expected isolations occurred and Radiation Protection verified that radiation levels in the Reactor Building were normal.
"The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event. While the isolation signal was falsely generated by the failure of the Radiation Monitor the actuation logic functioned properly and the plant equipment responded as designed. There were no other equipment failures associated with this event and neither plant operation nor the health and safety of the public were affected by this event.
"The condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(a) because the failure of the RB Radiation Monitor constitutes an invalid signal which resulted in a general Containment isolation signal affecting containment Isolation valves in more than one system ('A' SBGT, 'A' H2/02 Exosensors, 'A' Drywall Cam, 'A' Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD), 'A' PCP Vent and Purge). Since the signal was invalid this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) for being reported as a 60-day phone call rather than as an LER.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed. The results of the Equipment Failure Evaluation are not yet available."
The licensee also notified the State of New York of this report. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 44297 |
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK SCHALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 15:01 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2008
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
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Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
10 CFR 26.719 FITNESS-FOR-DUTY - UNLICENSED CONTRACT SUPERVISOR FAILED RANDOM DRUG TEST
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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