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> November 17
Event Notification Report for November 17, 2005
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/15/2005 - 11/17/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42033 |
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 1
City: Raleigh State: NC
County:
License #: 092-0104-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHARN JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 10/03/2005
Notification Time: 08:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2005
Event Time: 07:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
E-MAIL (TAS)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES
"Two Troxler Gauges stolen from storage container at temporary jobsite. NCDOT Gauge Manager called NC Radioactive Materials Branch at 7:45 AM to alert AGENCY. Only two gauges were stolen, and a torch was used to cut the security lock from the container.
"Location of job site: NC Highway 98 Bypass in Wake Forest, NC.
"Troxler Model 3450, Serial #298 - 8 mCi (milliCuries) CS-137, 40 mCi Am-241.
"Troxler Model 4640B, Serial #952 - 8 mCi Cs-137."
The Agreement State notified: NC PIO, FBI, SBI, Troxler, and the NCHP.
NC Incident # 05-34.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/3/2005 @ 11:25 FROM JEFFRIES TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Troxler 3450 S/N 298 Cs-137 8 mCi S/N 750-5221 and Am-241:Be 40 mCi S/N 472355
"Troxler 4640B S/N 952 Cs-137 8 mCi S/N 50-9198
"Chain link fence was cut with bolt cutters. Gauges were stored in rear of tractor trailer storage unit. Torch and bolt cutters used to remove lock on trailer. Gauges with cases no longer on site. Both gauges had trigger locks and were locked in respective cases."
Contacted the R1DO (Rogge), the NMSSEO (Morell), and E-mailed TAS.
* * * UPDATE AT10:05 EST ON 11/16/05 FROM JEFFRIES TO KNOKE * * *
The State provided an update indicating one of the Troxler gauges (4640B, s/n 952) was recovered in a scrap metal yard. The source and shielding were intact and in place. Investigation is continuing.
Notified R1DO (Barkley), R2DO (Evans), NMSS (Burgess), and TAS (Whitney email) |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42143 |
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
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Notification Date: 11/16/2005
Notification Time: 09:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2005
Event Time: 04:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
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Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INCORRECT READING OF HPCI POSITION INDICATING LIGHTS ON CONTROL ROOM PANEL.
"At 0422, during a panel tour in preparation for shift turnover, a Reactor Operator identified that both position indicating lights for HPCI-MO-19 were not illuminated. For current plant conditions the closed position indication should have been illuminated. The position indication for this valve is powered from 125 VDC, which also provides control power for the valve operation. Without control power, the valve would not open upon HPCI system initiation. HPCI was declared inoperable. Per the discussion in NUREG 1022, inoperability of a single train system is reportable as an 8 hour report. Per Technical Specifications, RCIC was verified to be operable immediately, and restoration of HPCI to an operable condition is required within 14 days."
The licensee indicated that the valve position was always in the correct posture although the panel light did not reflect it true position. This is a 14 day LCO.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 42144 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: W.F. CAGE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
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Notification Date: 11/16/2005
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2005
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
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Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
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Event Text
REPORTABLE INCIDENT DUE TO DEVIATION FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
"At 1216 CST, on 11-15-05 the C-333, Unit 4, Cell 8, Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) system was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) in order to perform maintenance. Due to the inoperability of the system, a [Technical Specification Requirement] TSR required continuous smoke watch was put into place according to LCO 2.4.4.1. At 1330 CST a Tornado Warning was issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) for the area affecting the plant and surrounding area that remained in affect until 1400 CST. Based on the NWS warning, radar indications, and visual observations from on-site spotters, the PSS ordered the activation of the plants Take Cover Signal and [Public Address] PA announcements were made instructing the plant population to shelter in their designated 'take cover areas'. Upon activation of the Take Cover Signal, the individual performing the TSR required smoke watch at C-333, Unit 4, Cell 8, discontinued the smoke watch and reported to the 'take cover area' as required by plant emergency procedures. At this time, the PSS entered TSR 1.6.4, 'Conditions Outside TSR' due to discontinuing the TSR required smoke watch. TSR 1.6.4 requires that in an emergency, if a situation develops that is not addressed by the TSR, operations personnel should use their training and expertise to take actions to correct or mitigate the situation. In compliance with the TSR, the PSS instructed the Cascade Coordinator to reduce the operating pressure in the area affected by the Unit 4, Cell 8, PGLD outage, which would place the equipment in a non-applicable TSR mode of operation. Operating pressures were being reduced when the National Weather Service lifted the Tornado Warning at 1400 CST. At this time, the PSS lifted the Take Cover order and the TSR required smoke watch was put back into place at Unit 4, Cell 8 at 1405 CST. At this time the plant came into compliance with TSR LCO 2.4.4.1 and exited TSR 1.6.4.
"This event is being reported under the requirements of TSR 1.6.4, 'If emergency action is taken, both a verbal and written notification shall be made in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120'."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 42145 |
Rep Org: LOUISIANA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL QT
Licensee: HALIBURTON
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: GL-470
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
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Notification Date: 11/16/2005
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST DENSOMETER
The following was received via facsimile:
"On Wednesday 8/24/05 a densometer (serial number W28901) with a 9.25 mCi source of Cs-137 (serial number DA433) was secured to an iron truck after performing a job. There were multiple trucks that were convoyed in and there were no reports of anything falling off. The path that was taken was Texas 302 to 301 to loop 390 to Highway 79 to I-20 to Industrial drive exit. The truck had a bad transmission and was taken to Peterbuilt for repair that same day. The repaired truck was returned to the Bossier City yard on Thursday 8/25/05. On Saturday 8/27/05 during an inspection of the truck for a job on 8/28/05, it was noticed that the 2 inch densometer was missing. The mounting bracket which held the densometer does not appear to have been compromised however, the lock and densometer were missing. The route that was taken was checked, but the devise could not be located. An award was placed in the local paper on 9/2/05. As of this date the devise has not been located. To prevent reoccurrence, the densometer holder has been relocated from the rear bumper to the front center portion of the bed of the unit. The densometer is secured by means of a hammer union, bar, and lock."
Louisiana Report Number: LA050008.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42146 |
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE GIFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
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Notification Date: 11/16/2005
Notification Time: 18:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2005
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
POTENTIAL FAILURE TO MEET REQUIRED RESPONSE TIMES FOR SHUTDOWN OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM
"After a timed walk down of an Off Normal Operations procedure for shut down outside the Control Room, it appears that required response times were not met. This is due to a new assumption that all actions would not function due to plant configuration. Some valve circuits are not protected with a second fuse that is isolated from the control room portion of the circuitry. The only fuse in the circuit may blow during the early part of the event, prior to manipulating the isolation switch on the breaker. Since the fuse could blow, there would be no control power to electrically manipulate the valve and that would cause the operator to go to the 'Response not Obtained' column adding time to the actions taken.
"This issue was previously identified at Wolf Creek in 1985 in IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-09. However, additional research needs to be accomplished as to why some circuits have only one fuse.
"Compensatory actions include:
"1) A change to the procedure to direct additional actions.
"2) An hourly fire watch has been added to the control room."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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