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Event Notification Report for September 15, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/14/2005 - 09/15/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41976
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: ALCOA WORLD ALUMINA ATLANTIC Region: 4 City: PORT COMFORT State: TX County: License #: L05186 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 09/09/2005 Notification Time: 12:07 [ET] Event Date: 08/31/2005 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/09/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) GREG MORELL (NMSS) TAS (Email) () MEXICAN GOVT - FAX ()

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NUCLEAR GAUGES

"Agency received notification of two found devices. The devices were found to belong to Alcoa Alumina Atlantic in Point Comfort. An on-site investigation at the licensee's facility was performed on 09/06-09/07/05, by two TX Radiation Control (RC) inspectors, who subsequently found that there was actually an inventory total of six devices that were missing from the Alcoa facility (all Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 gauges, with 20 milliCuries of Cs-137). The licensee stated that the six device/gauges were removed from the plant equipment [area] over the period of October 2003-October 2004, and placed into storage. They maintain that they do not know how or when two of the devices/gauges were taken from the facility as scrap metal for recycling, and do not know the location of the other four devices/gauge.

"The devices/gauges that have been found are: one (Serial Number B1683) at Nucor Steel Texas Division, Highway 79, Jewett, Texas 75846 (TX RAM L02504), and two (Serial NumberB1686) at GSD Trading USA, Inc. scrap yard, Houston, Texas. Nucor Steel has bee directed by TX Radiation Control to hold on to all scrap metal received from Alcoa. GSD has been surveying all scrap metal received from Alcoa for radiation detection. Impoundment orders were issued from TX Radiation Control on 09/09/05, for TX Radiation Control's RSO, to take possession of all radioactive devices containing Cs-137 at Nucor Steel and all radioactive material, excluding RAM exempt under 25 TAC §289 and naturally occurring material (NORM) possessed under a general license that is found at the GSD facility. All materials taken in possession by RC's RSO will be temporarily stored at RC headquarters in Austin, Texas.

"The four devices/gauges that were determined to be missing are: Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 with the respective Serial Numbers: B1682, B1684 B1685, & B1687. Efforts are still being made to recover the remaining missing four gauges.

"Texas Incident No. I-8258"

Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41978
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: MIKRON INDUSTRIES Region: 4 City: KENT State: WA County: License #: WN-R0483 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON	Notification Date: 09/09/2005 Notification Time: 04:58 [ET] Event Date: 06/29/2005 Event Time: 10:10 [PDT] Last Update Date: 09/11/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS) BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)

Event Text

WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

"This is an update and close of an event in Washington State as reported to and investigation by the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (ORP).

"STATUS: closed
"Licensee: Mikron Industries
"City and State: Kent, Washington
"License Number: WN-R0483
"Type of License: General License Registration
"Date and time of Event: 29 June 2005, 10:10 a.m.
"Location of Event: Kent, Washington

"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health, office of Radiation Protection (ORP) on-site investigation; media attention):

"ORP was notified, by telephone on 29 June 2005 by a Mikron Industries representative, the company was unable to locate 34 generally licensed Po-210 static eliminators. The devices were received between 15 May 2003 until 21 October 2004. Of the 34 devices, two are NRD Model P-2021 8101 (each originally containing 370 MBq [10 millicuries] Po-210); the remaining thirty-two are NRD Model P-2035 (each originally containing 1480 MBq [40 millicuries] of Po-210). The company seems not to know any more then that the devices are missing. ORP staff will make a site visit 30 June 2005 to help the company with their investigation.

"ORP staff performed site visits on 30 June and 8 July, 2005. Staff determined from November 2003 until about March 2005 the facility had not properly controlled the licensed material. The facility had not satisfactorily tracked receipt and disposal of the devices. During the visits, staff were able to locate 28 of the 34 missing devices. They had been set aside in work and storage areas. Recovered devices will remain secured on-site until analysis of leak tests will allow for return to the device manufacturer. ORP will follow up with Mikron to ensure proper disposition of the recovered devices. Mikron has instituted management control to ensure proper disposition of devices from now on.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240 (24 hour notification)

"Isotope and Activity involved: 34 devices total. 32 devices originally contained 1480 MBq [40 mCi] of Po-210, 2 devices originally contained 370 MBq [10 mCi] of Po-210. Total initial activities were 48.1 GBq [1300 mCi], decayed activity as of 29 June 2005 is 98.8 GBq [267 mCi].

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown but likely not.

"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number):
"34 missing NRD Models (2) P-2021 8101 & (32) P-2035 Static Eliminator Devices.

"Model Serial Number / status
"P-2021 8101 A2EA576 Found
"P-2021 8101 A2EA577 Found
"P-2035 A2EA554 Found
"P-2035 A2EA556 Found
"P-2035 A2EA557 Found
"P-2035 A2EA558 Found
"P-2035 A2EA559 Found
"P-2035 A2EA560 Found
"P-2035 A2EA561 Found
"P-2035 A2EA562 Found
"P-2035 A2EA563 Found
"P-2035 A2EA564 Found
"P-2035 A2EA565 Found
"P-2035 A2EA566 Found
"P-2035 A2EA567 Found
"P-2035 A2EA568 Found
"P-2035 A2EA569 Found
"P-2035 A2EA570 Found
"P-2035 A2EA571 Found
"P-2035 A2EA574 Found
"P-2035 A2EA575 Found
"P-2035 A2DU458 Found
"P-2035 A2DU459 Found
"P-2035 A2DU462 Found
"P-2035 A2DH035 Found
"P-2035 A2DH037 Missing
"P-2035 A2DH039 Found
"P-2035 A2DH040 Found
"P-2035 A2DH041 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA168 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA169 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA170 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA171 Missing

"Disposition/recovery:
"Disposition of the missing devices is unknown.

"Leak test?
"Initial, manufacturers leak tests are likely to have been performed. Succeeding, periodic leak tests are unknown. The 30 June 2005 site visit May determine leak test status. Leak tests taken during site visits have been sent for analysis.

Event Report "WA-05-039

"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)
N/A

"Release of activity?
Unknown

"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: see above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: unknown
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided to patient? N/A
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? No"

Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41979
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL Licensee: EARTHTECH Region: 1 City: Orlando State: FL County: License #: FL 3198-1 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOHN WILLIAMSON HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 09/11/2005 Notification Time: 11:29 [ET] Event Date: 09/11/2005 Event Time: 11:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/11/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): FRANK COSTELLO (R1) BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS) LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE

A CPN gauge was stowed and locked inside a trailer inside a locked shed in Orlando, Florida. An employee visited the work site and noticed the locks on the storage shed and trailer were broken. EarthTech reported the gauge stolen and reported the theft to the Florida Bureau of Radiation and the local police. The local police are currently at the scene.

These gauges typically contain 10 milliCuries Cs-137 and 50 milliCuries of Am-241:Be.

Less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. WILLIAMSON TO M. RIPLEY 2030 EDT 09/11/05 * * *

The gauge is a CPN model MC-3, serial number M330206877. The State also provided the licensee's license number and Radiation Safety Officer contact information.

Notified R1 DO (F. Costello), NMSS EO (L. Kokajko) and TAS (B. Sandler)

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41980
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM Licensee: MTGL, INC Region: 4 City: ANAHEIM State: CA County: License #: 3714-30 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/12/2005 Notification Time: 14:07 [ET] Event Date: 09/08/2005 Event Time: 13:00 [PDT] Last Update Date: 09/12/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): MIKE RUNYAN (R4) TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"On September 8, 2005, we received a call from the RSO that their [Troxler] gauge had been run over by a front loader. The gauge user was standing approximately 3' away from the gauge when this occurred. Although the gauge handle had originally been in the shielded position, the front loader drove the rod down into the ground when it ran over the gauge. The RSO met the gauge user at the site of the incident (Dooley Elementary in Long Beach). The RSO contacted Kent Prendergast, Senior HP for RHB-Richmond, who directed them to try to retract the source, which they were able to do. They placed the gauge in the gauge transport case and brought it directly to Maurer Technical Services (6163-30) in Laguna Hills. Maurer Technical are CPN manufacturer representatives who repair, leak test, and calibrate gauges. The gauge was a Troxler, model 3430, #35001.

"At 8:10 A.M, September 12, 2005*, Maurer reported the source rod was not able to be locked, the gauge was not repairable, but the sources appeared to be intact and was in the shielded position when it was brought in by the licensee. A leak test was performed. The gauge will be shipped to Troxler Labs once it is confirmed that the leak test is negative. There was no exposure to the workers at the site from this incident since the Cs-137 source ended up being extended into the soil and the soil shielded the source. I estimate the gauge user and RSO received from 5-10 millirem during the retrieval of the source. There are no corrective actions required because of this event.

"This event is also reportable within 24 hours by California Code of Regulations, title 17, Section 30295(b)."

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41981
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT Licensee: SPECIALIZED ENGINEERING Region: 1 City: HANOVER State: MD County: License #: MD-03-087-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BOB NELSON HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/12/2005 Notification Time: 15:07 [ET] Event Date: 09/09/2005 Event Time: 07:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/12/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) TOM ESSIG (NMSS) TAS (EMAIL) ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee reported a missing [moisture/density] gauge from its storage location at the Calvert Gateway construction site at Town Center Boulevard and Md Route 4 in Dunkirk, MD. The following are the gauge specifications: Campbell Pacific Nuclear (CPN) MC-3 Portaprobe Moisture/Density gauge, SE Gauge No. 15, S/N: M300405608, Radioactive Materials: Cesium-137, sealed source, 8 millicuries; Americium-241:Be, sealed source, 40 millicuries. The Anne Arundel County Police was notified (Report No.05-737156).

Less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41983
Facility: BRUNSWICK Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: KEITH HANZ HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/12/2005 Notification Time: 23:27 [ET] Event Date: 09/12/2005 Event Time: 23:14 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/15/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): JAMES MOORMAN (R2) EDWIN HACKETT (NRR) MELVYN LEACH (IRD) LIGGETT (FEMA) JASON (DHS)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HURRICANE OPHELIA WARNING

"On September 12, 2005, at 2300 hours, a hurricane warning was issued, which resulted in the declaration of an unusual event for both units. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating at 100 percent of rated thermal power. The plant area is not currently experiencing any hurricane force winds. The wind speed at the site is approximately 24 miles per hour. State and county emergency response organizations have been notified. The resident inspector has been notified.

"There is no significant impact to the safety of the plant at this time.

"The plant is currently in Abnormal Operating Procedure 0AOP-13.0, 'Operation During Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or Earthquake,' and Plant Emergency Procedure 0PEP-02.6, 'Severe Weather,' in preparation for hurricane conditions."

On-site facilities are not being activated at this time. No off-site assistance is requested. Request suspension of additional follow up notification unless plant conditions change. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.

* * * UPDATE AT 0758 EDT ON 9/14/05 FROM BRUCE HARTSOCK TO S. SANDIN * * *

"Commenced reduction in power on Unit 2 in anticipation of exceeding 74 mph winds. Prediction revised to maximum of 64 mph onsite. Power reduction stopped. Plant stabilized. Power will be restored."

Notified RCT (Hasselberg) and R2IRC (Casto).

* * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *

"As of 2300 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, the Hurricane Warning south of Cape Fear, North Carolina, has been discontinued; therefore, the Unusual Event has been terminated. Entry into the Unusual Event was reported by Event Notification 41983. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 continue to operate at 100 percent power. There has been no damage affecting safety equipment or causing operational constraints as a result of Hurricane Ophelia."

The licensee notified state/local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday), NRR (Mayfield), IRD (McGinty), FEMA (Snyder), and DHS (Gomez).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41987
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DAN JOHNSON HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 09/14/2005 Notification Time: 04:48 [ET] Event Date: 09/14/2005 Event Time: 02:13 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/14/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"An automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. The HPCI system started on low reactor level but did not inject, reactor level had risen above the initiation set-point. The RCIC did not receive an initiation signal. Overall plant response was as expected."

Prior to the transient the licensee was in the process of transferring UPS electrical loads to the alternate power supply. The momentary loss of UPS power locked-out the RFP controls during a downtrend in the reactor water level from the normal 201-203 inch operating band. Before Operators could establish manual control, reactor water level reached the 177 inch scram setpoint. Following the scram, reactor water level continued to decrease to the HPCI and RCIC initiation setpoint of 126 inches before recovering. HPCI received a start signal but RCIC did not for reasons under investigation. The unit will remain in mode 3 pending the results of the post-scram investigation and restart.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and is planning on issuing a press release.

* * * UPDATE ON 09/14/05 @ 1918 BY TIM PAGE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *

On September 14, 2005 at approximately 0213. an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. A level transient occurred causing reactor water level to lower, resulting in an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level. The HPCI system auto initiated on low reactor water level but did not inject as reactor water level had risen above the initiation setpoint. The RCIC system auto initiated (and sealed-in) and injected into the reactor vessel. Both systems operated as designed.

In addition, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 isolation occurred, resulting in multiple system isolations. This included isolation signals to Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, Containment Atmosphere Dilution. Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps, Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Lines, Traversing In-Core Probes, LPCI Inboard Injection Valves, Residual Heat Removal Drain to Radwaste, and auto initiation of Standby Gas Treatment. (Note that two Reactor Water Cleanup PCIS valves did not close due to their respective circuit breakers being in the open position for planned maintenance activities.)

The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation while the reactor was critical, as well as 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the valid actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), including general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system, the HPCI system, and the RCIC system.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41991
Facility: BRUNSWICK Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/14/2005 Notification Time: 14:11 [ET] Event Date: 09/14/2005 Event Time: 08:32 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): JOEL MUNDAY (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	93	Power Operation	93	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SIRENS

"On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours [EDT], Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 [EDT], eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected.

"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *

"On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).

Hospital	Event Number: 41993
Rep Org: VA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY Licensee: VA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY Region: 1 City: RICHMOND State: VA County: License #: 45-00048-17 Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: DEAN BROUGA HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/14/2005 Notification Time: 14:24 [ET] Event Date: 09/13/2005 Event Time: 15:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/14/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION	Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION DUE TO A PIPE CRACK

Licensee personnel noted a pipe crack in the waste water system which allowed contaminated water to drip onto the air handling equipment for the laboratory. The leaking sink was in the laboratory receiving area for waste disposal. The waste water penetrated the air handler and contaminated the unit. The air handling unit was shut down and access control for contamination was initiated for the entire area. Contamination was measured up to 20K dpm but no one has been injured nor contaminated. Most of the beta activity comes mainly from P-32, C-14 and S-35. Area decontamination procedures are currently underway. The licensee will provide a detailed written report of this incident to the U.S. NRC.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41995
Facility: HOPE CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BERNARD LITKETT HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 09/14/2005 Notification Time: 23:38 [ET] Event Date: 09/14/2005 Event Time: 21:38 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/14/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	98	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM FAILED SURVEILLANCE TESTING

"On 9/14/05 at 2138, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI Pump In Service Surveillance Test was in progress with system flow and speed being adjusted to establish surveillance test conditions. Speed and flow oscillations were observed when turbine speed approached 3900 rpm. Since speed and flow oscillations prevented the establishment of surveillance test conditions, HPCI was declared inoperable. Evaluations of these speed and flow oscillations are ongoing.

"Loss of the HPCI is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.