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Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events
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> 2005
> July 15
Event Notification Report for July 15, 2005
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/14/2005 - 07/15/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41833 |
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 1
City: WOBURN State: MA
County:
License #: 42-0146
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PACKARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 07/11/2005
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2004
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIAL EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"A radio pharmaceutical worker received an extremity dose for 2004 of 51 Rem according to her ring badge. 20 Rem of this dose occurred on April 26 - May 2. The licensee thought this may have been an erroneous reading so this is currently considered a potential extremity overexposure until further investigation."
The radiation source is described as mostly Tc-99m with a dose received to the left ring finger of 51050 mRem. The time and date of discovery for this event was 1100 hours on 7/7/05. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41835 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: QUEST TRU-TEC, L.P
Region: 4
City: LAPORTE State: TX
County:
License #: L03913
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 07/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
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Event Text
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVER EXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via email:
"Texas Radiation Control received a telephone call from [the licensee's RSO] . The RSO was contacted by Landauer regarding an exposure to a 'film badge' in excess of 1,000 (one thousand) rads.
"The badge was being worn by [name deleted]. His exposure for the previous quarter was 350 millirem and for 2004 he received a total exposure of 290 mR. The badge had been returned for evaluation with 4 other badges, which had no problems with excessive exposure.
"[The individual] only performed four tracer study jobs during the monitoring period and worked with a 34 mCi Ir-192 source. [The RSO] believes the badge was not worn. The licensee will be requesting the exposure be deleted.
"Texas Incident Investigation Program has contacted the licensee and requested additional information. A written report will be submitted within 30 days. The Event has received no media attention."
Texas Incident No.: I - 8242 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41837 |
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEN CHISM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 07/13/2005
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2005
Event Time: 09:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP
"On July 13, 2005, at approximately 0917 hours, Unit 1 received a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip and a Main Turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Plant response to the reactor shutdown resulted in a reactor coolant level transient that caused a Low Level 2 signal and subsequent High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation. The HPCI system started but did not inject into the vessel because reactor coolant level was already recovered by the Reactor Feedwater system. Proper operation of the RCIC system has not been conclusively determined. Both Reactor Recirculation pumps tripped, as expected, from the low reactor coolant level and high pressure transient.
"Additionally, primary containment isolation system actuation signals for valve groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were received and the valves, that were open, closed as required. The Reactor Building Ventilation System isolated and both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System automatically started and operated successfully.
"The RPS trip was reset and the HPCI turbine secured. Both trains of the SBGT system were secured. At 1119 hours, the plant exited the scram recovery procedure and entered General Plant Operating procedure 0GP-05, "Unit Shutdown." Investigation into the cause of the RPS and Main Turbine trip is still in progress.
"The plant is currently in Mode 3 (i.e., Hot Shutdown) and activities are in progress to transition to Mode 4 (i.e., Cold Shutdown). The resident inspector has been notified.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The plant responded as designed to the transient, with the exception of the verification of RCIC system performance, and the plant was safely shut down.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"An event investigation team has been assembled to determine the cause of the event. Plant response to the event is being evaluated and identified issues will be addressed prior to plant restart."
During the transient, four safety relief valves lifted and reset. The plant is currently in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Reactor vessel level is being maintained using normal feedwater. The bypass valves are available for cooldown. There was no effect on unit-2.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE TO ABRAMOVITZ AT 1741 ON 7/14/05 * * *
"On July 13, 2005, at approximately 0917 hours, Unit 1 received a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip and a Main Turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the plant safely shut down. A non-emergency notification (Event Number 41837) was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1303 hours. This follow-up notification discusses plant recovery from the Unit 1 event.
"After investigation team review of plant data, it was determined that the RCIC system performed appropriately (i.e., was not required to start) in response to the reactor coolant level transient. Reactor coolant level decreased to near, but did not exceed, the RCIC System actuation instrumentation setpoint. The investigation team determined that the direct cause of the RPS/Main Turbine trip is the shorting to ground of one phase of the Unit 1 Main Generator No-Load Disconnect Switch, which electrically connects the generator to the Main Transformer. The switch grounding caused a generator ground fault that resulted in a backup generator lockout and fast closure of the turbine control valves. Fast closure of the turbine control valves provided the trip input to the RPS.
"Unit 1 is now making preparations to go to mode 4, cold shutdown. Unit 1 and Unit 2 are currently in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 'AC Sources - Operating,' for one of two required Unit 1 offsite AC circuits inoperable. The resident inspector has been notified.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"Further testing of RCIC System Low Reactor Level actuation instrumentation will be performed to further verify satisfactory RCIC System performance during the event. Activities are in progress to address the damaged No-Load Disconnect Switch and to determine the cause of the switch failure."
Notified the R2DO (Fredrickson). |
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 41842 |
Rep Org: GLOBAL X-RAY & TESTING CORP
Licensee: GLOBAL X-RAY & TESTING CORP
Region: 4
City: MORGAN CITY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-0577-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 07/14/2005
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2005
Event Time: 08:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
20.2202(a)(2) - EXCESSIVE RELEASE
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Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
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Event Text
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE TEMPORARILY STUCK
Radiography was being performed on an offshore pipeline aboard the pipe lay barge "American Horizon" at Mustang Island 746/726. The source failed to return to the camera after an exposure. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was dispatched to the barge and was able to retrieve the source and return it to the camera. The RSO picked up 35 milliRem during this evolution. It is suspected that the source wire was broken. The camera and source are being returned to the manufacturer for inspection and repair.
Camera: AEA Technology model 880D
Serial number D1644
Source model A424-9
Source serial number 22601B
Source Ir-192 62.5 Curies |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41844 |
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 07/14/2005
Notification Time: 20:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2005
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
STATION BLACKOUT TEMPERATURE ANALYSIS HIGHER THAN RCIC GOVERNOR DOCUMENTATION
"During fact gathering in response to an NRC inspection inquiry, it was determined that documentation does not exist that demonstrates that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Electronic Governor Module (EGM) would be able to operate during the required Station Blackout (SBO) coping mission time at the postulated post SBO RCIC room temperature of 206.4F. Current documentation supports operation up to 150F.
"The EGM is a skid-mounted module that provides speed control signals for the RCIC Woodward Governor. Failure of the EGM would result in a loss of speed control for the RCIC turbine. This could result in an overspeed, underspeed or no change condition. Overspeed of the turbine would result in a mechanical overspeed trip. This device is not in the EQ program but is Augmented Quality.
"RCIC continues to perform its Technical Specification required functions as defined in the Bases of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3. The TS function is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC Room temperatures for the postulated TS transient events is less than the currently documented component qualification temperature. The RCIC is not an ESF system and no credit is taken in the safety analysis for RCIC system operation but is retained in the TS based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk per Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36. The RCIC system design requirements ensure that the criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC 33, are satisfied.
"Due to the lack of supporting documentation for the EGM, the beyond design basis regulatory SBO rule requirements of 10 CFR 50.63 may not be met. This condition could potentially result in an unanalyzed condition that could significantly degrade plant safety and is therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"An analysis of the RCIC Room Heat Up Rate calculation is being performed as there are conservatisms built into the calculation that when removed will result in a lower temperature than 206.4F. Additional actions in progress include, establishing appropriate protected pathways to minimize the potential for a Loss Of Off-Site Power which could result in a SBO, performance of temperature qualification testing at SBO temperatures for the EGM, and performance of an extent of condition review for remaining RCIC components to ensure temperature qualification is met for the SBO rule. In parallel with temperature qualification testing, a modification to relocate the EGM to an area outside the RCIC room that has a lower SBO profile temperature is being pursued in the event that temperature qualification is not successful."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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