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Event Notification Report for June 9, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/08/2005 - 06/09/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41725
Facility: HATCH Region: 2 State: GA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DOUG SIMKINS HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 05/23/2005 Notification Time: 20:07 [ET] Event Date: 05/23/2005 Event Time: 17:47 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	57	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO CONDENSER HOTWELL CHEMISTRY

"Based on increasing conductivity in the reactor vessel and condenser hotwell, a power reduction was initiated from 100 percent power. A manual scram was inserted at 57 percent RTP and 49 percent Core Flow based on Chemistry recommendations due to sulfates and chlorides in the hotwell. Following the scram a reduction in reactor water level to -28 inches resulted in a Primary Containment Group 2 Isolation (ESF) occurring. All isolations and systems responded as expected.

"Current plant status is Hot Shutdown with plans to proceed to cold shutdown."

All control rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed with the bypass valves into the condenser.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SHIFT SUPERVISOR (TONY SPRING) TO ABRAMOVITZ AT 16:33 ON 6/6/2005 * * *

"After further review and evaluation it has been determined that the four hour call made May 23, 2005 per the guidance of 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) should be retracted.

"A review of the event with respect to NUREG 1022 Revision 2 determined that:

"The manual scram was part of a pre-planned sequence to shut the plant down due to an equipment problem. The manual scram was part of a pre-planned sequence. The guidance to scram the reactor was established by the plant's Abnormal Operating Procedure addressing a condenser tube leak and was part of a preplanned sequence to prevent future equipment and component failures. The Manual Scram was not inserted to protect the plant against an event that presented a challenge to an FSAR analyzed event. In other words, this was not an Anticipated Operational Occurrence, an Accident, or a Special Event as defined in section 15.1.3 of the Unit 2 FSAR. Rather it was part of a plan to shutdown the reactor to protect against future potential equipment problems due to out of limits chemistry parameters. Further justification is provided by the fact that the manual scram was not initiated in anticipation of an automatic scram.

"Per NUREG 1022 Rev. 2: 'The staff also considers intentional manual actions, in which one or more system components are actuated in response to actual plant conditions resulting from equipment failure or human error, to be reportable because such actions would usually mitigate the consequences of a significant event. This position is consistent with the statement that the commission is interested in events where a system was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event.'

"However, the reporting requirement itself indicates that actuations that result from pre-planned sequences are not reportable. An example is provided in the NUREG of an equipment problem involving the loss of recirc pumps. In this example it is stated that: 'Even though the reactor scram was in response to an existing written procedure, this event does not involve a preplanned sequence because the loss of the recirc pumps and the resultant off-normal procedure entry were event driven, not pre-planned.'

"This is similar to our event, however, in the NUREG example, the reactor is scrammed to protect against the possibility of a stability event and stability is an FSAR analyzed event. In our case we were shutting down for chemistry reasons, not an FSAR type event.

"It is concluded that when the RPS is used to shutdown the reactor as part of a plan for the resolution of equipment problems, and the RPS is not needed to mitigate the consequences of an FSAR analyzed event, i.e., one which threatens a fission product boundary (i.e., fuel cladding, RCPB, primary and secondary containments), the RPS actuation is not reportable under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag).

* * * RETRACTION RESCINDED - S. BURTON TO M. RIPLEY 1524 EDT 06/08/05 * * *

"On May 23, 2005 a four hour report was made per the guidance of 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in an actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This was made per event # 41725. The report was made within the four hour time frame of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2).

"The four hour report for event # 41725 was retracted on June 6, 2005.

"After further consideration, the retraction made on June 6, 2005 is being cancelled and the original report re-instated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (K. Landis)

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41744
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS Region: 4 City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX County: License #: L03875 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BOB FREE HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 06/03/2005 Notification Time: 13:10 [ET] Event Date: 06/03/2005 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/03/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): MIKE RUNYAN (R4) SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The gauge was damaged by a construction vehicle while the moisture density gauge was in use. The probe was not extended at the time of the accident. There was no release from the radioactive source. The state will follow up with the licensee.

Troxler Serial 28753
Sources: Am-241 40milliCuries
Cs-137 8 milliCuries

Texas Incident Number: I-8235

Other Nuclear Material	Event Number: 41750
Rep Org: PENN STATE UNIVERSITY Licensee: PENN STATE UNIVERSITY Region: 1 City: UNIVERSITY PARK State: PA County: License #: 37-185-4 Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: ERIC BOELDT HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT	Notification Date: 06/07/2005 Notification Time: 10:44 [ET] Event Date: 06/06/2005 Event Time: 11:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X	Person (Organization): TODD JACKSON (R1) JOHN HICKEY (NMSS) CHUCK CAIN (R4)

Event Text

LOST OR STOLEN VIAL OF PHOSPHORUS 32

"In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material [the Penn State University Radiation Safety Officer called] to report missing radioactive material in excess of 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to part 20. The missing material is one vial of phosphorus-32. The vial contained a nominal 74 MBq (2 milliCuries) of P-32. The material in question was never in the possession of Penn State University.

"On June 4, 2005, a Type-A package containing three vials of radioactive P-32 was shipped from California to Penn State University via FedEx (tracking number 689818990843). When the package arrived at Penn State University on June 6, 2005, it only contained two of the three vials of P-32. When the vendor was contacted by Penn State University personnel, the vendor insisted that the material had been placed inside the package as was indicated on the shipping papers. The Penn State Health Physics Office staff member who opened the package reported that the security seal tape was properly attached and that the package displayed no evidence of tampering.

"The frozen liquid radioactive material that was not received was in the chemical form of Adenosine 5-Triphosphate (gamma P-32) End Labeling (P-32). Lot number J5E32. The package also contained dry ice.

"All other packages in the shipment were double checked to verify that the vial was not present in a separate package. The activity reported on the package's shipping label indicated the that the vial was within the package, the shipping papers indicated that the vial was within the package. The package was shipped by the vendor via FedEx in accordance with their normal procedures."

The licensee does not believe the box was opened or the material misdirected.

Vendor:
MP Biomedicals, Inc
15 Morgan
Irvine, CA

* * * UPDATED AT 0730 EDT ON 6/8/05 BY HUFFMAN TO MAKE A CORRECTION IN THE EVENT HEADER * * *

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41753
Facility: HOPE CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: ANDREW SCHIRMER HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 06/07/2005 Notification Time: 15:30 [ET] Event Date: 06/07/2005 Event Time: 14:37 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): TODD JACKSON (R1) IAN JUNG (NRR) TIM MCGINTY (IRD) TODD JACKSON (R1) AKERS (DHS) AUSTIN (FEMA) RAWLS (NRC) WYATT (DOE) DALZIEL (HHS) BRZOSTEK (USDA)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED DRYWELL LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM

"Hope Creek manually scrammed the reactor from 100% power at 1413 and declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified drywell leakage exceeding 10 gpm (EAL 2.1.1.b) at 1437. The drywell unidentified leak rate peaked at approximately 15 gpm and is currently 12 gpm and slowly lowering. All safety systems were operable prior to the transient and responded as expected. Drywell pressure peaked at approximately 0.5 psig and is steady using normal drywell cooling (the normal pressure band is 0.1 to 0.7 psig). Drywell and suppression pools sprays were not required to mitigate the drywell pressure transient. Reactor vessel level lowered to approximately -30 inches following the scram and was returned to the normal level band using the feedwater and condensate systems. The expected vessel level 3 (setpoint +12.5 inches) ESF actuations occurred. The plant is proceeding to cold shutdown to investigate the drywell leak."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE BY NRC (HOLIAN) TO HUFFMAN AT 0330 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

As of 0330, Region I IRC in consultation with NRC/IRD (McGinty) secured from Monitoring Mode based on the plant being stable at about 55 psig (about 300 degrees F) and preparing to initiate shutdown cooling. The leak rate remains at about 8 gpm, and an initial drywell entry determined the source of the leakage to be from the A-loop of shutdown cooling testable check valve (50A ). The valve was found with the position indication failed/separated and an approximate 20 foot plume of steam/liquid coming out. Plans are to continue to cool down the plant, go onto the B-loop of shutdown cooling , and isolate valve 50A. The licensee has conservatively remained in the UE and plans to exit when leak rate is assured to remain below 10 gpm (EAL entry condition) or cold shutdown is achieved and the EAL is no longer applicable.

The licensee's outage center remains manned, and an NRC inspector remains on site around the clock.

DHS (Hoisington), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Turner) EPA (Crews), USDA (Pimmons), HHS (Williams) were notified.

* * * UPDATE BY NRC (MANGAN - RG 1) TO HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

The licensee has placed RHR loop B into service and reached Mode 4 (cold shutdown) at 0455. Preparations are in progress to isolate the leak by closing manual valve 183.

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (WILSON) TO HUFFMAN AT 0530 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0515 EDT based on reaching cold shutdown with the leak rate less than 10 gpm.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. DHS (Hoisington) and FEMA (Sweetser), R1D0 (Jackson), NRR EO (Hannon), and IRD (Leach) notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (BAUER) TO HUFFMAN AT 1101 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

"On the morning; of 06/08/05, investigation into a previously reported increase in unidentified drywell leakage (Event #41753) identified the leak location as the F050A residual heat removal (RHR) check valve. The F050A check valve is on the return line to the 'A' recirculation loop,. The F050A check valve was isolated at approximately 0545 hours. The position indication magnatrol assembly for the F050A check valve appears to be the source of the leakage. Additional investigation is proceeding to identify the exact location of the leak as well as address the structural integrity of the valve.

"This updated report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). At the time of this notification Hope Creek Generating station is in OPCON 4 [Cold Shutdown] at 122 degrees reactor coolant temperature."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Jackson) and NRR EO (Jung) notified.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41755
Facility: SUMMER Region: 2 State: SC Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: STEVEN WEBSTER HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 06/08/2005 Notification Time: 02:48 [ET] Event Date: 06/07/2005 Event Time: 20:20 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): KERRY LANDIS (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

TWENTY-EIGHT EARLY WARNING SIRENS TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE

"On June 7th 2005 at 20:00 hours our EWSS System performed an automated poll of active Early Warning Sirens. Normally this action is completed in 15 to 20 minutes. This polling indicated not all sirens had responded to the automated signal. Emergency planning department personnel were notified and called to site to determine system status. Their attempts to manually poll the active sirens determined that twenty eight (28) sirens were not responding. Our EWSS system consists of one hundred six (106) sirens. A loss of twenty eight (28) sirens left our system at seventy three percent (73%) of its capacity. South Carolina state and the four (4) local counties were notified of the systems condition within one hour as required by our Nuclear Licensing procedure (NL-122). This same procedure requires an eight (8) hour telephone notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This requirement is based on 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 00:15 hours June 8th 2005 our communications department located the faulty siren and disabled its radio transponder, this action restored the other twenty seven (27) sirens to service. This restoration was verified by performing a manual poll of active sirens. The South Carolina state and local counties were notified of system restoration.

"During the evening hours of June 7th 2005 a thunder storm passed through the station's ten (10) mile emergency planning zone. One siren, Fairfield fifty two (F-52) had apparently been struck by lightning and caused its radio transponder to go into a continuous transmit mode. This errant radio signal blocked the polling signal from the other twenty seven (27) sirens. Based on communications department report had the EWSS system been actuated those twenty eight (28) sirens would not have sounded as required."

The licensee has notified State and local authorities as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41758
Facility: POINT BEACH Region: 3 State: WI Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: MIKE MYER HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 06/08/2005 Notification Time: 22:15 [ET] Event Date: 06/08/2005 Event Time: 17:24 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): JULIO LARA (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - FIRE ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN NO LONGER ALIGNED WITH SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS

"It has been identified that during a revision change between Revision 5 of FOP 1.2 (July 20, 2004), and Revision 6 of FOP 1.2 (November 1, 2004), a number of omissions of safe shutdown equipment occurred. Because of these omissions, FOP 1.2 is no longer aligned with the Safe Shutdown Analysis. As a result, some of the manual actions that would be necessary to accomplish safe shutdown are no longer identified in FOP 1.2.

"FOP 1.2, Fire Organizational Plan is used by Operations to provide guidance on plant operation for fires within safe shutdown areas. Included in this guidance is a list of safe shutdown equipment affected by a postulated fire and the manual actions that may be required to compensate for the fire damage.

"It has been determined that this condition is reportable because the missing procedural guidance may result in safety significant operator actions not being performed which are credited in the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Corrective actions have been entered into the Corrective Actions program, and a procedure revision to correct FOP 1.2 is currently in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.