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Event Notification Report for February 22, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/18/2005 - 02/22/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41409
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM Licensee: SHAW INDUSTRIES Region: 1 City: DALTON State: GA County: License #: GENERAL Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: LIZ SEALE HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 02/14/2005 Notification Time: 15:13 [ET] Event Date: 12/27/2004 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 02/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): RAYMOND LORSON (R1) TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

GEORGIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following information was received from the State via facsimile:

"Description of Event: On December 27, 2004, Shaw Industries, a general licensee, contracted with Graves & Phillips Engineering & Maintenance (Alabama License Number 1291) to have four sources removed and returned to the supplier, Omhart. Upon arrival at Omhart on February 4, 2005, the package contained only three sources and one detector. Shaw Industries reported that the fourth source was possibly left on the line where it was used to measure thickness of carpet and that line was sent to a scrap metal yard on January 11, 2005. However, it is still undetermined what has happened to the missing source.

"The Environmental Radiation Staff and representatives from Shaw Industries have been dispatched to the scrap metal yard to investigate the incident. The source holder was Omhart Vega Model BAL and serial number 3781 BC. Isotope: Sr-90. Amount of activity: 25 milliCuries."

Georgia Event Report ID GA-05-05.

* * * UPDATE FROM C. SANDERS TO J. ROTTON AT 1549 ON 02/15/05 * * *

2 personnel from the Georgia Environmental Radiation Staff, 5 representatives from Shaw Industries, and 5 representatives from Regional Recycle are scheduled to physically dismantle the trash pile on 02/16/05 where the missing source is believed to be located and conduct a thorough search for the source. The pile is approximately 40' high, 35 yards wide, and 85 yards long.

Notified R1DO (Cobey) and NMSS EO (Moore).

* * * UPDATE FROM L. SEALE TO J. KNOKE AT 11:18 ON 02/16/05 * * *

"February 14, 2005
The Radioactive Materials Program notified the NRC Operations Center of the event. Attempts to find the source by Shaw Industries' representatives and Environmental Radiation Staff were unsuccessful. The scrap pile that may contain the source is approximately 75-100 yards long, 30-40 yards wide, and 40' to 50' high. Regional Recycling stated that there was a 99% chance that the material was destined for the steel mill across the street from their facility, that is, a 1% chance that the material would be sent to a scrap yard in Kentucky.

"February 15, 2005
Environmental Radiation Staff notified the state of Alabama of the event and ongoing investigation due to Graves & Phillips Engineering & Maintenance, an Alabama licensee. Shaw Industries forwarded to the Environmental Radiation Program dose profiles and pictures of the source device received from Ohmart. Regional Recycling reviewed its records and no shipments had been sent to the Kentucky facility since November 2004. All facilities were notified of the event and pictures and descriptions of the device were sent to the facilities that may receive scrap metal from Shaw Industries.

"Shaw Industries and the Radiation Program were informed by Regional Recycling (scrap yard) that they wanted to dismantle the scrap pile to try to locate the source. Shaw Industries, Regional Recycling and the Environmental Program will provide staff to facilitate the search. The search is to begin on February 16, 2005. Regional Recycling has halted their operations until the search is completed. The Radioactive Materials Program updated the NRC Operation Center on the status of the event.

"February 16, 2005
Shaw Industries and the Environmental Program are currently at Regional Recycling and are visually inspecting the scrap as it is sorted by a crane. The Radioactive Materials Program updated the NRC Operation Center on the status of the event."

Notified R1DO (Cobey) and NMSS EO (Essig).

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY J. HARDEMAN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1423 EST ON 02/18/05 * * *

At 1000 EST on 02/18/05, the missing source was located at the Regional Recycling facility in a different scrap pile from the original search. The source is in the possession of Shaw Industries as of 1410 EST on 02/18/05. A representative from Ohmart will arrive at the Shaw Industries facility on 02/23/05 to perform a source inspection and leak test.

Notified R1DO (Lorson) and NMSS EO (Essig).

General Information or Other	Event Number: 41411
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Licensee: NUCOR STEEL Region: 4 City: NORFOLK State: NE County: License #: 07-04-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JULIA SCHMITT HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 02/15/2005 Notification Time: 18:00 [ET] Event Date: 02/04/2005 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 02/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): JACK WHITTEN (R4) SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

FAILURE OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT - FIXED GAUGE

The following information (Report # NE050003) was provided by the State of Nebraska (Julia Schmitt) via facsimile:

"Operators noticed that strand line #2 was showing erratic readings that were not consistent with the other three operating molds. Operations were suspended to investigate the cause. The assistant RSOs responded and observed that the gauge had separated between the top actuator flange and the shield housing. It was determined that the gauge's lead housing had separated from the flange, leaving approximately seven inches of the source rod unshielded. There was no visible exterior damage to the flange or housing. Leak tests and surveys were performed that verified that the gauge's actuator was locked-out. The device was removed from service and placed in an onsite storage vault awaiting analysis as to the cause of the failure."

The licensee reporting this malfunction is Nucor Corporation, located in Norfolk, NE 68702.

The source of radiation is a fixed gauge, model number P2608-100, manufactured by Berthold, and contained 0.003 curies of Co-60. The malfunctioned equipment is a fixed gauge, model number LB300 ML, also manufactured by Berthold.

Ms. Schmitt believed the radiation exposure to personnel was < 2mrem/hr, however, this has not been determined as fact.

Fuel Cycle Facility	Event Number: 41418
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL Region: 2 City: COLUMBIA State: SC County: RICHLAND License #: SNM-1107 Agreement: Y Docket: 07001151 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CONNELLY HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD	Notification Date: 02/18/2005 Notification Time: 11:24 [ET] Event Date: 02/17/2005 Event Time: 12:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: RESPONSE-BULLETIN PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2) SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR 91-01 RESPONSE BULLETIN AND PART 70 APP A UNANALYZED CONDITION

The following information was provided by licensee via email:

"The sponge jet blast system is a non-favorable geometry (NFG) decontamination unit that scours contaminated items with pressurized hydrogenous sponge media imbedded with aluminum oxide to decontaminate the items. The safety basis of the system is based upon extremely conservative calculations modeling 1-3g/cc Uranium dioxide in a specified, controlled sponge jet media. Based upon these calculations, criticality is not credible in the sponge jet system when using the specified media, which is the only media allowed in the unit. This critical item, for which an IROF (discussed below) was put in place, was that the physical characteristics of the sponge jet media could never be changed without criticality analysis.

"During a routine procedure review, a criticality safety engineer noticed that specific manufacturer and product information he had previously required was not present in the procedure for the sponge jet blaster.

"An IROF had been specified for the equipment with an action expected stating, 'Operator/Area Engineer utilize only approved aluminum oxide sponge media.' The configuration control process was bypassed and the approved sponge jet blast media was replaced with a media with double the specific gravity of the approved media and four times the content of hydrogenous material.

"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.'

"Also, in accordance with Appendix A to Part 70--Reportable Safety Events (b) Twenty-four hour reports. Events to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery:(1) Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of § 70.61.

" Sponge jet blaster contained the unauthorized material with contamination levels (2700 ppm U preliminary results) of Uranium. This is two orders of magnitude less than a critical concentration for an optimally moderated mixture. A very conservative mass estimate was made assuming the entire unit was filled with the 2700 ppm material, when less than 1/4 of the unit would contain material at any given time. This mass calculation estimates the mass total at 3.149 kg U which is an order of magnitude less than a critical mass. A more realistic estimate is 0.25 kg U [based on the amount of sponge media actually in the jet blaster (5 bags)].

"Summary of Activity: The Sponge jet blaster has been shut down.

"Conclusions: There was much less than a critical mass of SNM involved. There was much less than a critical concentration. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41423
Facility: KEWAUNEE Region: 3 State: WI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 02/20/2005 Notification Time: 00:47 [ET] Event Date: 02/19/2005 Event Time: 19:10 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD	Person (Organization): PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	10	Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS

"During continuing evaluation of the operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump discharge pressure switches, engineering determined that a high energy line break had the potential to affect the AFW Pump Suction line from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) due to the inability of the discharge pressure switches to protect the AFW pumps from a loss of suction from the CST. At 1910 CST on 02/19/2005 it was determined that all three AFW Pumps were inoperable as a result of the condition discovered by engineering. Due to the high energy line break, there is the potential for damage to the CST supply line to the AFW Pumps (due to pipe whip resulting from a feedwater line circumferential break). Damage to the CST supply line may result in air entrainment in the AFW Pump supply and potential AFW pump damage following an automatic AFW Pump Start.

"Technical Specification 3.4.b.7 allows AFW Pumps to be placed in "pull-out" at less than 15% power because analysis shows that there is at least 10 minutes available for an operator to manually initiate AFW flow if needed. At 2003 CST a power reduction to <15% power was initiated to restore the operability of an AFW Pump. When power is less than 15%, the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will be placed in "pull-out" and Service Water will be aligned to the suction of the Turbine Driven AFW Pump to restore Operability of the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. When operability is restored to one AFW pump, the plant will enter a 4 hour LCO as a result of two AFW Pumps remaining out of service. Since operability of the two motor driven pumps will not be restored within the 4 hour LCO time, plant cooldown to less than 350 deg F will continue in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.b.6."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Fuel Cycle Facility	Event Number: 41424
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL Region: 2 City: COLUMBIA State: SC County: RICHLAND License #: SNM-1107 Agreement: Y Docket: 07001151 NRC Notified By: RALPH WINIARSKI HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 02/20/2005 Notification Time: 11:17 [ET] Event Date: 02/19/2005 Event Time: 16:04 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS	Person (Organization): RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2) SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

24-HOUR CRITICALITY CONTROL REPORT - FAILURE TO OBTAIN REQUIRED POWDER SAMPLES

The licensee provided the following information via email:

"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia, SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt% U 235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors.

"Time and Date of Event: February 19, 2005, 1604 hours.

"Reason for Notification: Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and then by preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers.

"Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder container is assured through application of tiered layers of controls, such as limiting materials allowed to be utilized in the bulk powder blending room, requiring a double roof on the bulk powder room, and by rigorous controls on the handling of polypaks to be transferred into the bulk powder container.

"Rigorous controls are instituted on the moisture content of each polypak to ensure that the contents are less than 0.3 wt% moisture. Each filled polypak coming off of the Fitzmill is transferred to a polypak cart for handling and storage prior to transfer into a bulk powder container. Each polypak cart is capable of handling up to 56 polypaks. Prior to storage on the cart, each polypak is required to be sampled, with the sample material obtained being combined into a single composite sample for the entire cart. In addition, three additional polpaks on the cart are randomly chosen and sampled. These three additional samples are completely independent of the composite sample. Thus the composite sample and the three random samples comprise the double contingency protection for the moisture content of the polpaks to be transferred to a bulk powder container.

"During an audit of the operation, it was observed that the composite sample was not being taken in several instances. Thus the sample being analyzed may not have been representative of polypaks on the cart. This compromised a loss of one leg of double contingency for polpaks to be transferred into the bulk powder NFG. All of the random individual samples have been taken and analyzed properly, and thus no material has been observed that exceed the allowed moisture content.

"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'"

"As Found Condition: During an audit of the Fitzmill operation it was observed that the required samples for generation of the composite sample were not being taken consistently.

"Summary of Activity:
- All impacted operations/equipment affected has been shut down pending confirmation of the moisture content.
- Revised operational methods are being developed and implemented.

"Conclusions:
- At no time was material observed to have a moisture content above the allowed limits.
- At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
- The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
- A causal analysis will be performed."

The licensee is notifying NRC Region 2 and HQ NMSS.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41425
Facility: KEWAUNEE Region: 3 State: WI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: KENNETH RESSLER HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 02/20/2005 Notification Time: 16:37 [ET] Event Date: 02/20/2005 Event Time: 11:58 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Intermediate Shutdown	0	Intermediate Shutdown

Event Text

RPS ACTUATION ON STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL

The following information was reported by fax:

"During a plant shutdown from 100% power due to the condition as discussed in previous event notice EN #41423, a valid actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. The plant was in the intermediate shutdown mode at approximately 510°F, using the S/G's to cool the Reactor Coolant System, S/G water level was being controlled with one Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and manual control of its outlet valve.

"Following the initiation of RCS cooldown, Steam Generator levels began to decrease. The operator began to throttle the operating AFW pump's outlet valve open, however at 1158 on 2/20/05, the Control Room received the Annunciator for S/G B Low-Low Water Reactor Trip, which has a setpoint of 2/3 S/G level channels <17% narrow range level. This caused a Reactor Trip signal to be initiated by the Reactor Protection System. The trip signal was generated, however the plant was already in a shutdown condition with the reactor trip breakers open."

"All systems were functioning normally. The operator started an additional AFW pump and, at 1206, normal level was restored to S/G B and the automatic Reactor Trip signal cleared."

The lowest level during this transient in Steam Generator B was 14.5% narrow range level.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 41426
Facility: NORTH ANNA Region: 2 State: VA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: PAGE KEMP HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 02/21/2005 Notification Time: 09:37 [ET] Event Date: 02/21/2005 Event Time: 02:50 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/21/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN ONE HOUR

"On February 21, 2005, at 0250 hours [EST], the Unit 1 Plant Computer System (PCS) failed rendering the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) inoperable. The PCS and SPDS were restored at 0650 hours. This event is a major loss of emergency assessment capability for greater than one hour and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.