SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. DYE
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 As the ALJ properly noted, because placing advertisements seeking to recruit domestic, nonimmigrant "U.S. workers" satisfies the MSPA's definition of "farm labor contracting activity," whether the farm labor contractors ultimately hired any domestic, nonimmigrant "U.S. workers" is irrelevant. D. & O. at 5; see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1802(6); 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(i); Reilly, supra.
2 The ALJ also properly determined that Gonzalez's contention that he was not required to have a Certificate of Registration to work as an agent for farm labor contractors in obtaining H-2A temporary employment visas for nonimmigrant alien workers under 20 C.F.R. Part 655, Subpart B or other regulations implementing the Immigration and Nationalization Act is misplaced. D. & O. at 5. Because Gonzalez also recruited domestic, nonimmigrant "U.S. workers," which satisfies the definition of "farm labor contracting activity" under the MSPA, he was required to obtain a Certificate of Registration pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 1811(a), (b) and 29 C.F.R. § 500.40 for that purpose.
Similarly, Gonzalez's contention before the Board that he is entitled to exemptions from the requirement to obtain a Certificate of Registration under the MSPA or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is also misplaced. Specifically, although the "family business" exemption at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1803(A)(1), see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(6)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 500.30(a), exempts individuals who engage in farm labor contracting activity on behalf of a farm that they or a family member owns, the record contains no evidence indicating that Gonzalez owns a farm or that the family labor contractors for whom he worked were members of his family. Finally, while the "small business" exemption at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)(2), see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(6)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 500.30(b), excludes certain persons from MSPA coverage, the exemption expressly does not apply to farm labor contractors.
3 While the courts render the ultimate decisions on the Act's interpretations, Mitchell v. Zachry, 362 U.S. 310 (1960); Kurchbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942), on those matters that the courts have not determined, it is necessary for the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator to reach conclusions as to the meaning and the application of provisions of the law to carry out their administrative and enforcement responsibilities. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
4 29 C.F.R. § 500.144 provides:
Where the assessment is directed in a final order by the Secretary or in a final judgment issued by a United States District Court, the amount of the penalty is immediately due and payable to the United States Department of Labor. The person assessed such penalty shall remit promptly the amount thereof, as finally determined, to the Secretary by certified check or by money order, made payable to the order of "Wage and Hour Division, Labor." The remittance shall be delivered or mailed either to the Administrator, in Washington, DC, or to the Wage and Hour Division Regional Office for the area in which the violations occurred.