

**Statement of Chair Jane Harman
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing &
Terrorism Risk Assessment**

**“Homeland Security Intelligence at a Crossroads: the
Office of Intelligence & Analysis’ Vision for 2008”**

**4:00 P.M., Tuesday, February 26, 2008
311 Cannon House Office Building**

We’re here to discuss your priorities in the wake of the President’s budget request, but I have a major issue with the state of affairs at I&A.

I&A is not a vacuum. Of all the agencies across the Federal government, DHS was the one that Congress expected would make breaking down stovepipes the number one priority.

As the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, and others have adjusted their missions to do just that, it seems that the only stovepipe left standing is yours. I&A’s mandate in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was straightforward: find out the needs of State and locals and then build an organization that meets them.

Instead – as the CENTRA Report discussed in the Wall Street Journal this morning makes clear – you’re still struggling with this more than two years after you came on board. And some of your struggle, Charlie, is misguided.

I have a major issue with I&A’s endless refusal to take the ITACG seriously and to build a robust State, local, and tribal presence at the NCTC that makes the intelligence production process for State and locals better.

Although you promised last year that your staff would make a full effort to ensure the ITACG’s success, and although you told us you were proud to be leading the ITACG effort, you did not have it going in a few weeks as you had described.

When nothing happened, Congress spelled out what the ITACG needed to do in the 9/11 Act and the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanied it.

It has been almost seven months since the President signed the 9/11 Act into law, and all we’ve seen since then is DHS’s continuing effort to put obstacles in the ITACG’s path.

Last summer, at the tail end of the 9/11 bill negotiations, you and former Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson came to my office to make the case for why the ITACG should not be included in the bill.

You both explained that DHS had already “done so much” for State and locals so it wasn’t necessary. We moved forward with the ITACG because we thought you could do more.

And then the turf battles began.

On the eve of Mr. Jackson's retirement, he demanded changes to what should have been a non-controversial Memorandum of Agreement by DHS, FBI, and others about how the ITACG should operate.

In so doing, DHS made two things clear:

First, it wants to control what homeland security information should be disseminated to State and locals.

Second, it wants the ITACG to "go away" once the Information Sharing Environment "matures organizationally and culturally."

Let me be clear. The ITACG is NOT going away.

Instead of treating it as a golden opportunity for I&A, your Office has complained that this Committee has the "harebrained idea" of staffing it with 50 State, local, and tribal police officers in order to create a NCTC-based "national fusion center."

This is not true. No one is trying to set up an entity or program that competes with your information sharing work.

Nevertheless, some on your staff argue that State and locals working in the ITACG should be concern themselves with only the "federally-coordinated" intelligence produced at the NCTC – and NOT any intelligence developed "in house" at DHS.

Charlie, I&A should be hungry for the State and local input that the ITACG offers – whether products created for those communities are produced at the NCTC, the FBI, or by your staff at the Nebraska Avenue Complex.

I was also disappointed to learn that your office is still debating about when State and locals detailed to the ITACG should become involved in preparing analytic products.

The law is clear: those products should be created by ITACG officers at the unclassified level whenever possible and should be shared on accessible, unclassified networks.

Moreover, those products should be identified as just that – "ITACG products" – so police chiefs and sheriffs everywhere can see the value of sending their people to Washington to help the NCTC in this important work.

Effective information sharing is a major focus of this Subcommittee, and I have hoped that you would build an I&A that makes that happen.

Our hearing record, however, is full of testimony from State and local entities that tells us that they aren't getting the products they need.

The CENTRA Report you commissioned only confirms that fact.

Bottom line, Charlie: you are not effectively serving the State and locals who are the people who will prevent the next attack.

I am not enthusiastic about fixing any budget shortfalls for other I&A priorities until you fix these fundamental problems.