




2DEM

$$P = \langle P_1 P_2 P_3 \dots P_{16} \rangle$$

Each
$$P_i = \langle P_i^1 P_i^2 P_i^3 \dots P_i^{16} \rangle$$








Each
$$S_i = \langle S_i^1 S_i^2 S_i^3 ... S_i^{16} \rangle$$


Then
$$C = \langle C_1 C_2 C_3 ... C_{16} \rangle$$

Where Each
$$C_i = \langle S_1^i S_2^i S_3^i ... S_{16}^i \rangle$$

2DEM

BPR = Blocks Per Row








Accumulated Block Chaining Mode Lars R. Knudsen


ABC




Where h(x) = x or $h(x) = x^{<<1}$

ABC

- Has infinite error propagation
- Authentication is not intended as part of mode
- Infinite error propagation provides more diffusion
- 2 initial vectors and Key needed
- The mode acts more like a giant block cipher
- Resists birthday attacks




KFB



 $\label{eq:where R is mxn matrix} \text{ and B is multiplication of R and } K_i \, \text{mod 2}$

KFB


- Random Bit Generator
- Initial matrix, constant, and Key needed
- Does not assume that the block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation
- Does assume that one or more iterations of the block cipher (with varying keys and a fixed plaintext) are hard to invert
- Under this assumption, the KFB outputs are pseudo-random



L = # of plaintext blocks $P = (P_1, P_2, \dots P_L)$ Each P_i is m bits long

n = number of bits in the key


m = number of bits in each plaintext block





- Has two way error propagation
- Claims that no additional authentication is needed
- Authentication mode was proposed
- Initial vector and Key needed





P is padded with 0's to the next odd multiple of 128 bits and then appended with the 128-bit Big Endian encoding of the number of bits in the original file. Each P_i is 256 bits.



- Uses AES-256
- Variation of the Davies-Meyer hash construction
- Using last step prevents an adversary from creating a new hash for a related message
- Only the Key is needed

