

# Selected Comments and Issues

on the July, 2001 draft  
“Recommendation for Block Cipher  
Modes of Operation.”

# Many thanks for...

- detailed, helpful comments received so far:
  - Don Johnson, Certicom
  - Miles Smid, Entrust-Cygnacom
  - Phillip Rogaway, University of California at Davis and Chiang Mai University
  - Francois Rousseau, Communications Security Establishment
- Comments accepted until August 31.

# General Considerations

- The usual tension:
  - for security, interoperability: restrict options
  - to accommodate current practices: provide flexibility
- Are there issues for which 3DES should be handled differently than AES?
- The goal is to issue the recommendation around the time the AES FIPS is approved.

# How to apply CBC-MAC to any Number of Blocks

- Problem with vanilla CBC: Forgeries can be constructed by extending a message with known MAC.
- Draft restricts each key to messages that consist of a fixed number of blocks.
- This restriction is too severe for most applications.

# Some Possible Solutions

- XCBC (MAC)
- RMAC
- Double/Triple Encrypt the final block
- Prepend the message with number of blocks
- Truncate the MAC
- Warning to user
- Other solutions?

# Messages of Arbitrary Bit Length

- Ciphertext Stealing for CBC?
- XCBC methods for CBC-MAC?
- Padding schemes
  - Out of scope?
  - How many and which should be specified?
  - Recommended or mandatory?
  - Warnings about potential protocol attacks?

# Guidance

- Should the document give more systematic guidance in the selection and use of modes?
- NIST is considering whether to develop a separate guidance document
  - might allow for more detailed guidance than is feasible in Phase 1
  - would allow more time for appropriate review

# What guidance, specifically?

- Deprecate ECB?
- Discuss advantages and disadvantages of modes? A la Annex A of ISO/IEC 10116?
- Discuss specific applications/environments, e.g., constrained environments?
- Discuss interaction of encryption and authentication? Other protocol issues?

# Requirements on IVs

- In CBC and CFB, an adversary that can predict the IVs of messages may obtain information that allows the ciphertexts of certain messages to be distinguished.
- Should IVs for CBC and CFB be required to be unpredictable by an adversary?
- Proposal to set  $C_0 = \text{CIPH}_K(\text{IV})$
- What should be the required of IVs in OFB?

# Segment Length in CFB Mode

- Draft allows any segment length,  $s$ , up to the block size
- Should  $s$  be limited to a small set of values to limit option proliferation?
  - $\{1, 8, 128\}$  suggested
- Should example vectors be provided for more values of  $s$ ?

# Other Comments

- What truncation values of the MAC should be permitted or required?
- Should interleaved modes be described?
- Other comments?