

1 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S

2 INDEPENDENT PANEL REVIEWING THE

3 IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA

4 ON COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

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FRIDAY MAY 12, 2006

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Federal Communications

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Commission

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445 12th Street SW

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Washington, D.C.

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The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m.

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12th Street Level Commission Meeting Room, 445 12th Street

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SW, Washington, DC, Nancy J. Victory, chairman of the panel,

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presiding.

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PROCEEDINGS

(10:00 a.m.)

MS. VICTORY: I think we should get going if I could get everyone to take their seats. Well, welcome everyone. This is our fourth meeting of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks. This is our penultimate meeting.

We're going to have our -- as you know our charter ends on June 15th , so we need to complete our report and recommendations by then. And at our last meeting in early June will be when we will be considering the final draft of the report and the final draft of the recommendations and voting on those. But today we're going to be finishing up a hearing from some experts that will help inform our thinking. We're also going to be discussing the various drafts of a couple of sections of the report -- sort of the observation section of how the networks did and how the recovery effort went and how effective the emergency communications were. We'll also be discussing the draft recommendations.

Now we had an opportunity at the last meeting to have some of the working groups present their recommendations, you know, such as they were at the time. As you know from the draft that's gone out, many of those have been added, and many have been revised based on some further work of the working groups and the discussions at our last meeting.

So we do have a lot to go through today; this is going

1 to be a working meeting. But hopefully we'll get you all out
2 of here to catch a plane back this afternoon or tonight. I
3 wanted to start with a presentation by Tom Fitzpatrick from
4 Giuliani Partners, who has been kind enough to be here today.
5 You'll recall at the last meeting we had an opportunity to
6 hear from some of the other Advisory Committees that have
7 been looking at disaster preparedness issues -- both FCC
8 Committees and White House Committees. And at that time we
9 were not able to schedule anyone to be here from the Media
10 Security and Reliability Council. But fortunately, Tom is
11 able to be with us today.

12 And so, in order to make sure that we were fully
13 informed about the works of these other groups, I thought it
14 would be helpful to start off with some remarks from Tom
15 about what the MSRC has been focusing on, and what issues and
16 recommendations they may have already made that might be
17 useful for us to understand and know about. So at that,
18 Tom, if I could ask you to be kind enough to share that
19 information with us, and we may have a couple questions for
20 you when you're done.

21 MR. FITZPATRICK: Thanks, Nancy. One thing we can all
22 agree on, no matter where we come from or who we represent,
23 is that it's easy to keep people out of trouble as to get
24 them out of trouble. So one of the things that we
25 concentrated on in MSRC in our council, the Media Security
26 and Reliability Council, was making sure that the public was

1 informed before, during, and after a disaster. That they
2 take the steps necessary to protect themselves.

3 Our Nation's first response as they're preparing to
4 meet the challenges of Homeland Security and a variety of
5 other natural and man-made disasters by building on their
6 core, capability, and strength. A critical piece of that
7 continuum is a public warning and information system. Public
8 warnings are an extremely efficient method of minimizing
9 casualties and damage.

10 The Media Security and Reliability Council was
11 established in 2002 to assess the current communications to
12 the public in response to physical attacks and natural
13 disasters, and to examine a means by which the government and
14 media can communicate emergency and public safety information
15 to the broadest possible constituency of the affected
16 population.

17 MSRC recommendations for improving the overall
18 efficiency and effectiveness of a local jurisdiction's
19 emergency public communications efforts were crafted to
20 reflect the balance of all appropriate emergency planning
21 elements, help jurisdictions to make adjustments to existing
22 services to approve their effectiveness, serve as a tool for
23 developing local and regional coordinating committees, and

1 provide state and local jurisdictions with new ways of
2 thinking about emergency public communications.

3 Within MSRC, the public safety-working group
4 recommendations were structured around the framework of
5 establishing government responsibility for risk communication
6 and warning. Facilitating a coordinated public/private
7 partnership to make effective use of mass media, encourage
8 private industry collaboration and planning to meet community
9 needs, and promote the best practices of government and media
10 to ensure ongoing improvement.

11 By forming a public/private partnership that includes
12 the effect and coordinated use of mass media, future risk
13 communication, and warning processes can be efficient,
14 robust, and inclusive of all the population at risk. But
15 even the most careful planning one-time methods will not
16 suffice.

17 The performance of risk communication and warning
18 systems and processes must be tested, monitored, and improved
19 on an on going basis to ensure their effectiveness in serving
20 their communities and protecting the public. The
21 Infrastructure Security and Restoration Working Group
22 presented to the Council the best practice recommendations
23 detailing prevention and restorations measures that local
24 media can implement.

25 The best practice is included recommendations
26 regarding physical security, backup power, and redundant

1 facilities for radio stations, local TV stations, and cable
2 TV companies. They also included recommendations related to
3 disaster recovery plans of radio and TV broadcasters, cable
4 companies, direct broadcast satellite, and digital satellite
5 radio providers and other delivery media.

6 In March of 2004, MSRC II was rechartered to further
7 refine the M-S-R-C best practices recommendations. The
8 second Council's goal was to encourage adoption of M-S-R-C's
9 best practices and force the coordination between media and
10 government at the local level.

11 The local coordination group set out to develop a
12 guide for establishing a partnership that is so critical to
13 successfully implementing our recommendations. The tool kit
14 working group developed model documents and other resources
15 for local broadcast use.

16 Documents and resources were developed based on best
17 practice recommendations adopted by MSRC I, and they included
18 vulnerability assessment check list, disaster recovery plans,
19 backup carriage plans, cooperative emergency response plans.
20 The key principles embodied in those guides with that plan
21 should provide for identifying processes critical to the
22 continuations of essential services, identification of
23 critical personnel who should develop and execute this plan,
24 periodic review no less than annually, and regular testing.
25 Additionally, availability of information, emergency

1 information for the deaf, hard of hearing, and non-English
2 speaking population.

3 The highly detailed disaster recovery planning
4 documents did not previously exist in the market place and
5 are specific to each media industry. The objective of these
6 efforts was to create voluntary public/private partnerships
7 that would ensure uninterrupted delivery of emergency
8 information to the public. To mitigate the impact of a
9 disaster, our ultimate goal in MSRC II was to actually
10 implement these plans in a media market.

11 To be successful, all local media and public health
12 and safety officials must work together before, during, and
13 after emergencies to provide necessary information to the
14 public. Organizations, people, procedures, and technology
15 must be coordinated.

16 The first success story and the best example of how
17 this can happen in a short period of time, if people have a
18 mind set to do so, comes from our experience in Wisconsin.
19 Dean Maytag, Director of Operation for WISN TV in Milwaukee,
20 and Pat O'Connor, Director of the Southeast Region of the
21 Wisconsin Department of Emergency Management, took up the
22 challenge trying to make our committee recommendations really
23 work for public benefit.

24 Within a period of about three months, they convened
25 an initial planning group consisting of local broadcasters,

1 cable TV managers, and key emergency management personnel.
2 The state mission in their plan was to provide timely
3 information from emergency management to the media, to the
4 public and to insure the continuity of service for the
5 broadcast stations, cable systems, and news services. The
6 plan is a formalized agreement with all broadcasters and
7 contains a list of all broadcasting resources available in
8 the market for potential use by all. The plan identifies an
9 emergency communication coordinator to streamline
10 communications in an emergency situation and, lastly, the
11 county has agreed to test and plan the exercise this year.

12 The Milwaukee Plan highlights include incorporation
13 into the City of Milwaukee's Comprehensive Emergency
14 Management Plan, formal agreements with all the broadcasters,
15 and broadcast restoration plans, identifying backup
16 facilities for emergency use. The plan was extended to Green
17 Bay and Madison and currently all markets in Wisconsin this
18 year.

19 The group is also working with the Great Lakes
20 Partnership, whose vision is a public/private partnership
21 including nine states and two provinces surrounding the Great
22 Lakes. Of note, they are continuing to update their plan
23 with emphasis on persons with disabilities. All of the M-S-
24 R-C Working Groups reports and recommendations, including the
25 generic templates for planning based on the Milwaukee plan,
26 are available on our website Mediasecurity.org.

1 Local governments and responders will have to rely on
2 current technology and existing local media channels
3 including radio, television, Internet, sirens, personal
4 communication devices, community infrastructure, and word of
5 mouth to relay warning information and instructions about
6 protective action before, during, and after a disaster.

7 Mass media, TV, radio, cable, television, and radio
8 satellite broadcasters who own and operate and maintain a
9 communications infrastructure play a critical role in
10 emergency communication given their ability to rapidly and
11 simultaneously reach a large and diverse group of people. We
12 believe their efforts could be used as a national model for
13 regional planning.

14 Further work needs to be done to bring conversions
15 between Homeland Security and FCC efforts. DHS and
16 capability standards for responders included requirements to
17 inform the public before, during, and after a disaster.
18 Increased state and local engagement is needed in that area
19 and, naturally, leadership is the key. The model
20 implementation plans were developed at MSRC over the last
21 four years including the following five important principals
22 as the basis for their continued refinement and should be
23 considered in any actions this panel may recommend: Number
24 one, state, and local government are directly accountable to
25 their constituents.

26 Local jurisdictions are responsible for arranging for

1 the continuity of public communication and information
2 services as they determine may be necessary according to
3 their needs and circumstances. Since broadcast media
4 companies own and operate the vast majority of the
5 infrastructure, this kind of planning is best accomplished by
6 establishing public/private partnerships to form local
7 coordinating committees following nationally established
8 recommendations and best practices as described in our
9 previous reports. Number two. There must be planning
10 opportunities for appropriate local stakeholder involvement
11 and consultation. Regional emergency public communications
12 plans developed in consultation with local public safety
13 officials, broadcasters, and a variety of community
14 stakeholders will be the key vehicle for fulfilling the role
15 of supporting local communities.

16 This process should continue on an ongoing basis to
17 ensure the plans change and evolve to reflect trends,
18 changing circumstances, and new technology. To be useful,
19 the plans must be rank, current, tested, and must have the
20 support and acceptance of local jurisdictions and a
21 constituent. Three, local needs and circumstances vary
22 widely across jurisdictions. Therefore, the measures required
23 to address these needs and conditions will also vary.
24 Primary role of the state is to provide leadership,
25 resources, and support to regional and local jurisdiction in
26 the exercise of their responsibility and to ensure that

1 public safety is not compromised by a lack of such planning.

2 Local jurisdictions require flexibility to employ
3 different strategies to achieve similar objectives. Regional
4 and local committees will determine the extent to which their
5 needs and circumstances will be addressed. Some may choose
6 to address specific risk more comprehensively than others.

7 Lastly, federal entities play a role in the
8 development of national standards, making recommendation for
9 the use, and for facilitating and monitoring their
10 application. However, to be useful and effective, day-to-day
11 management of local plans should be a state and local
12 responsibility. I thank you for your time and would be glad
13 to answer any question you might have.

14 MS. VICTORY: Thanks very much, Tom. Can I throw
15 this now open to the panel for any questions of our speaker?
16 Well, I actually had one -- go ahead, Billy, go ahead.

17 MR. PITTS: Thank you, Nancy. Mr. Fitzpatrick, we want
18 to thank you for your testimony and the work of both MSRC II
19 and MSRC I. We studied the work that Jiong Shen did during
20 MSRC I. It was a wonderful effort, and you have built on that
21 effort. And I think it's great.

22 Our concern is that we've been hearing since 2000, and
23 you guys reinforced it -- your best practices that the EAS
24 needs to be strengthened. It needs to be improved; it needs

1 to reach out to more people. And the second aspect of this
2 is in risk communication. It's the credible spokesperson
3 that really will get the attention of the people, and the
4 people will act. And during Katrina, there were mixed
5 messages out there.

6 So I wanted to get your reactions both to the EAS and
7 how can we get a consistent message best from a credible
8 spokesperson, which was what EAS was meant to do.

9 MR. FITZPATRICK: EAS in our studies was a system that
10 had been designed and developed for specific purposes and
11 that fell into neglect to the extent that it was not adapted
12 or changed to reflect change in technologies or changing
13 interest in a public sector. One of the things about EAS is
14 that it was not something that was exercised on a regular
15 basis; it was not included and it was not enforced, as it
16 should be.

17 It was not included in local planning activities. For
18 instance, in New York the question that I'd -- which got me
19 into this whole situation from the first place, the question
20 that I got a few weeks after thought was why didn't we
21 transmit a EAS message to alert the country that we're under
22 attack? And I frankly couldn't answer it because I had no
23 idea what that endeavor would take. But secondly, and also
24 the more I thought about and the more I learned about, is it
25 seems as if the 24 and 7 news cycle had overtaken the EAS.

26 Just to relate this to something more mundane, the

1 Heidi incident with the NFL, if we had an interrupted or even
2 tried to interrupt a live broadcast of what was going on at
3 the World Trade Center to give you a blue screen and tell you
4 that there was an EAS message coming, that there was tune
5 into your TV to tell you that was something going on -- How
6 would that have been reflected of you? And was that even a
7 practical thing to consider at the time?

8 But not all events are as big or as complex as the
9 World Trade Center or the Pentagon. There are day-to-day
10 events, which occur locally, and we go back to the phrase to
11 say that all disasters are local no matter how big they are.
12 One of the most frustrating things that I saw, having some
13 knowledge of the industry and not enough to be an expert
14 certainly, was to be able to sit home and watch the events
15 that were occurring and impacting on my partner here on my
16 left. In great detail, to see reports broadcasting live from
17 the Superdome and know that the local public safety officials
18 were not able to communicate with their residence in a same
19 manner. In the same way that people watching cable news and
20 national networks during the 9/11 attacks certainly knew a
21 lot more about what was going on than I did. The same was
22 true with the officials in New Orleans. The public and I
23 sitting in my living room at home knew more about what was
24 going on or what was being reported from New Orleans than did
25 these local officials.

1 And in terms of moving people in a local jurisdiction,
2 I don't believe that the public safety officials down there
3 had that capability. That had been wiped out and that there
4 was very little planning put in to how to keep those folks in
5 contact with their local constituents. So I would urge the
6 panel to consider that, and consider the fact that regardless
7 of the information that goes nationally, which at some time
8 becomes more entertainment for those who are not impacted,
9 there is a public safety need for local officials to be able
10 to continue to broadcast on the most simple of all devices
11 that little portable transistor radio. To let their
12 constituents know what's going on, and what actions they
13 should take to protect themselves.

14 With respect to the credible spokesperson, I had the
15 luxury of having my boss be the credible spokesperson for
16 9/11, and he did a great job. That is not the case -- those
17 talents and that the consideration of those characteristics
18 which make that spokesperson credible is not something that's
19 intrinsic to public safety officials. Quite often that
20 public spokesperson's role has been relegated to sort of a
21 subsidiary job that, you know, he must develop the press
22 release and have a press conference and that's it. If he has
23 that good, bad or indifferent, his job -- it is done.

24 I think the difficulty that this committee will have
25 to address, and that the nation must address, is that the
26 role of public communications in the new era of technical

1 disasters and terrorist events, and probably the one that's
2 lingering out there, is the public health crisis from bird
3 flu or anything else is that public communications is an
4 operational tool of emergency management. It's not just
5 something that impacts as a side issue. To report what
6 happened two hours after it happened is unacceptable to the
7 public. The public's appetite for information has gone way
8 beyond what it was 20, 30, 40 years ago. So in terms of
9 developing these credible spokesperson, I think the most
10 important thing would be to develop the public communications
11 tool as an operational aspect of emergency management. And
12 that's the best way I can sum it up.

13 The talent for that kind of thing would probably come
14 from your industry. In the -- in the smear that I've dealt
15 with before that was always the person who was sort of off-
16 the-line, was at the end of their career, or moving on to
17 another position. Budgets in public safety organizations
18 don't allow for many titles or staffing beyond our core
19 responsibility, such as fire fighting or police work. So if
20 you get a credible spokesperson, you are a lucky agency. And
21 we could use the help from had industry in training and
22 developing those people.

23 MS. VICTORY: Thank you very much. Steve Davis, you
24 had a question.

1 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and I
2 have been honored to serve with you on the MSRC Panel and
3 have enjoyed the opportunity to do that. I'm wondering
4 whether I think that your point about EAS and the need for
5 public communications to be a tool of emergency management
6 couldn't be more appropriate, and one piece we're trying to
7 get out of this panel is how to keep the information flow to
8 the public going.

9 As to the credible spokesperson issue, I'm wondering
10 whether that might be solved within the traditional EAS
11 system, which as you know could either activate a station
12 live or print a message and give the station maybe fifteen
13 minutes to relay that. So in those facilities where we have
14 such as a, you know, the big television stations, or radio
15 stations, we could have a reporter read that and not rely on
16 a harried emergency manager who may not be a public relations
17 expert. Whereas sometimes, unfortunately, when there isn't a
18 person like that on duty, it will fall upon the EOC person to
19 speak. Would you think that? And I don't remember if this
20 is in the MSRC recommendations, and you can maybe refresh my
21 memory. The training and installation of more EAS
22 origination equipment at local law enforcement or local first
23 responders -- is that a part of that or --?

24 MR. FITZPATRICK: Absolutely. The operation of the
25 EAS equipment has been facilitated by a number of technology

1 developments and software products that sort of make that
2 easy to do at a local level. I think that for a local
3 manager -- local emergency manager it should be as easy as
4 picking up the phone, and I don't mean literally picking up
5 the phone. But for an emergency manager to be able to -
6 let's go back a few years to sort of push that big button --

7 MR. DAVIS: Uh-huh.

8 MR. FITZPATRICK: That's not something you do
9 casually.

10 MR. DAVIS: Right.

11 MR. FITZPATRICK: And that's not something that's
12 generally done at a real low level without a high-level
13 approval. So it's taken out of the nature of the way that
14 it's used and the nature and the frequency in which it was
15 used. Raise the import of EAS message to very high level.
16 And in the 24 and 7 news cycle, it's anticlimactic. So it's
17 not something that a local fire chief could use; it's not
18 something that a local police chief could activate casually
19 when, in fact, if it was more accessible, it might be. And
20 then as it went up the chain, it could be filtered and the
21 scope of it broadened.

22 As far as having the local broadcaster read the
23 message, I think that would be great. I think what we have
24 to do is ensure that the, you know, the liability for that
25 information -- the reporter has to make sure that that's an

1 authenticated message.

2 MR. DAVIS: Sure.

3 MR. FITZPATRICK: Obviously, and that the reporter or
4 the spokesperson shouldn't be held liable for the relay of
5 that information if it has been authenticated. Respecting
6 the right of the news organizations to editorialize on that
7 statement further -- that's a balance that has to be worked
8 out between the local governments and the local broadcasters,
9 and it can be. It's done -- it's done a lot of places. My
10 friend from Orange County there knows very well that they
11 worked it out -- people in around the Seattle area have
12 worked it out -- California there are local pockets where
13 people have continuing disasters. Where they work the
14 situation out and it's very effective. That has to be spread
15 out to the rest of the country.

16 MR. DAVIS: Thank you.

17 MS. VICTORY: Sheriff Beary.

18 MR. BEARY: Just a comment and, Tom, we appreciate you
19 being here. It's good to see you again, and please tell your
20 boss I said hello.

21 MR. FITZPATRICK: Certainly will.

22 MR. BEARY: But folks, just for -- I know we're all
23 busy, but I had an opportunity to go to the website and pick
24 up a National Geographic Katrina CD. I would recommend that
25 we all look at that. It's about 75 minutes long and

1 misinformation -- it showed how we had so much
2 misinformation out there, and it also showed something that
3 Tom said very elegantly, and that was the Nation knew what
4 was going on, but the local authorities had no power, no
5 capability, and the fact that misinformation got out there -
6 - some decisions were made that really hurt New Orleans
7 - especially.

8 MR. FITZPATRICK: Uh-huh.

9 MR. BEARY: And I would recommend that. It is a very
10 intriguing job done by National Geographic, and it might put
11 it all together for all of us at this particular panel to
12 see what really went on in some situations. But you hit the
13 nail on the head. We were watching the Superdome. The
14 problem was people in New Orleans had no way --

15 MR. FITZPATRICK: That's right.

16 MR. BEARY: To watch what we were watching.

17 MR. FITZPATRICK: Yeah. I'd like to just build on
18 that and say that on the morning of 9/11 when both towers
19 were being attacked, there was a rumor that went through the
20 lobby of that building among the many things that occurred
21 that the Mall of America in Minneapolis had been attacked.
22 That there were a number of facilities, and so the scope of
23 the problem as we knew it in that little small area grew
24 immensely beyond what we could even imagine based on what we
25 were trying to suffer through.

26 One of the things that seems to overlap, and I keep

1 stressing that issue of local coordination and local
2 capability, is that if that news or report of news or
3 speculation by anybody even when I'll say the talking heads
4 about what might be going on there, can go nationally and
5 then come back locally through the rumor mill and become the
6 only source of information that local officials might have.
7 So that the local officials are working, on their best
8 information they have available, may have gone through a
9 whole cycle and come back to them and not be true at all.

10 The other thing that happens is that in the absence
11 of a local official being able to specifically and directly
12 communicate his interest to his local constituents and to
13 his local public safety organizations who may not have other
14 communications except the TV. It's important to get that
15 information out accurately without the interference of a
16 local official, speculation abounds. Two examples, the
17 first being 10 or 15 years ago, related to an incident in
18 Bridgeport, Connecticut called the L'enfant Plaza. It was a
19 building and hotel under construction, which collapsed,
20 trapped about 60 workers.

21 In the process of that recovery and rescue operation,
22 local news reporters reporting on the conditions, how
23 terrible they were, how it was raining, it was cold, it was
24 all these things, and one broadcaster casually said it looks
25 as if these people are going to need food; they're going to
26 need protective gear; they're going to need gloves, etc.,

1 etc. Within an hour, there were mountains of those things
2 surrounding the rescue operations, piles, more than you
3 could ever imagine.

4 During 9/11, there was some speculation that rescue
5 dogs, hundreds of rescue dogs, might be coming in to do -
6 to work on the search, which may have been a possibility. I
7 was unaware of it. But I could tell you within 24-hours, I
8 had enough boots for dogs to feel this little arena here. I
9 didn't request them. I didn't know what to do with them all
10 when I got them.

11 So in terms of what happened in New Orleans, I heard
12 a number of things that said that the people based on the
13 interviews, the live interviews, which I was privy to, and
14 these people were not coming from the Astrodome actually
15 said that these people somewhere down the road are going to
16 need counseling, and support groups, and things like that.
17 Not less than an hour later there was a report that
18 counselors, psychologist, people were showing, but they
19 weren't being given direction by the local officials.

20 Now that may appear that the local officials were
21 perhaps inept in managing this group. Well, this group had
22 never asked for that. They didn't ask for those resources.
23 The timing and placement of that kind of support group
24 Coming in those people have to be cleared; those people have
25 to be checked out. You can't imagine if you do an open
26 broadcast on a disaster and ask for psychological help, you

1 can't imagine what's going to show up. We had it at 9/11;
2 they had it at New Orleans. It's happened at every disaster
3 that you can think of, so the point is not to criticize or
4 reflect on anything that was said, but is to show the impact
5 of what taking the local emergency manager out of the
6 picture can result in, and the direction that he gives to
7 his local constituents can be enormous. The outcome can be
8 night and day. Yes.

9 MR. BEARY: Just a follow up, real quick. The other
10 thing in the documentary by National Geographic -- live
11 reports from the media New Orleans has dodged the bullet.
12 That's what we heard. Yes. So everybody had a sigh of
13 relief that the thirteenth largest city in the country has
14 dodged a bullet, but unbeknownst to the emergency managers
15 on a local level, they did not know about the levy breaking.
16 And then we found out that we didn't dodge the bullet at
17 all. So it's very good stuff.

18 MR. FITZPATRICK: Sometimes the local official can be
19 criticized for being too conservative and perhaps slow in
20 their call and reporting. But sometimes that's for a
21 reason, and that will vary from place to place, but
22 generally if they're waiting to make an announcement, it's
23 because if they make an announcement too soon, all kinds of
24 things are going to happen. And then that's a skill that
25 can be learned. It's something that local officials can
26 benefit from -- the news media. If the news media makes

1 local officials aware of what the public's appetite is for
2 information at any particular point, the message can be
3 crafted to suit both audiences.

4 There is no black-and-white; there is no this side
5 and that side. And what we're proposing in our partnerships
6 is that prior to the event, the planning and the -- and the
7 exchange of information that goes on in these public/private
8 partnerships will benefit both sides immensely in terms of
9 understanding what the other one's role and position is
10 during the crisis. The relationships that develop will be
11 invaluable in terms of getting the message out to the
12 public. And the only ones that will benefit from it is
13 going to be the public. Who have no part in the, all the
14 planning and all the hard work that goes on ahead of time.

15 MS. VICTORY: Thank you. Kay Sears had a question.

16 MS. SEARS: Yeah. It is a question maybe just for my
17 edification and others on the panel. When the media, the
18 broadcasters, and radio broadcasters get their public
19 licenses, is there any guidelines that are given in terms of
20 what role they play in public safety or is there any --
21 anything that is given to them as a part of their license
22 that would give them some guidelines in these types of
23 situations today?

1 MS. VICTORY: I don't know if any of our broadcasters

2 --

3 MS. SEARS: Steve do you know?

4 MS. VICTORY: on the panel want to address that.

5 MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry. Could you repeat that?

6 MS. SEARS: In terms of the licenses that you get,
7 the broadcast licenses to use for public broadcasting, is
8 there -- are there any guidelines that are given in terms of
9 what your role would be in public safety, in terms of
10 announcing messages and things like that?

11 MS. VICTORY: Yeah, I'm not aware that's a part of the
12 FCC license.

13 MR. DAVIS: Right. Other than the fact that the
14 broadcasters are licensed to serve in the public interest,
15 convenience, and necessity. That is certainly a broad
16 provide information critical to the public on a timely basis
17 to help them deal with the crisis. But, no, the licensing
18 mechanism doesn't specifically direct broadcasters to
19 provide any specific type of support.

20 MS. SEARS: Because I think what we're hearing, and
21 we all know, the power of the media to convey both accurate
22 messages but also potentially inaccurate messages.

23 MR. DAVIS: Yeah.

24 MS. SEARS: Is there a way to tie some guidelines,
25 very specific guidelines, in terms of the role that that

1 public broadcasters would play in a time of crisis? To
2 really tighten down and make it, you know, a very viable
3 means for communicating?

4 MR. DAVIS: Well, I think that the panel should
5 definitely recommend responsibility on the part of
6 broadcasters. I don't think that it would be in the power
7 of the FCC to actually regulate content because then you get
8 into the First Amendment questions. But I would say that
9 you know your point is a good one. And I think that one of
10 the ways we're trying to solve that on this panel is to get
11 access to the actual area.

12 Mr. Fitzpatrick's comments are very good in that we
13 had a lot of people in Washington DC, or New York, and
14 network offices speculating on what was needed and sometimes
15 things came in. And one of the great pleasures of being on
16 this panel is I've been able to speak with people such as
17 Sheriff Beary and Joey Booth, who couldn't make it today,
18 and Patrick Yoes, and others in law enforcement.

19 I've learned a lot about what their challenges are.
20 And I've come to understand that we had people that were
21 there in -- or law enforcement people -- there in the
22 Superdome, but we didn't have anybody in the Superdome to
23 really tell the story. And I think that we're trying to
24 solve that in a different way, and that is get credentialing
25 so that our people can get in there and hear from the
26 Sheriff Beary's and the others what really is going on and

1 communicate that information out as opposed to sitting back
2 in an anchor room somewhere in Los Angeles trying to
3 speculate as to what's going on.

4 We at Clear Channel tried to get as close to the
5 scene as we could. We had reporters in Baton Rouge trying
6 to get into New Orleans, but I think one of the problems was
7 access and credentialing and that's something that we're
8 trying to work more closely with law enforcement. And I
9 think that if we can get this other coordination committee
10 that is also on our panel's agenda where broadcasters would
11 know where to go to get access and where sheriffs and others
12 would know where to go to communicate with broadcasters -- I
13 think that that needs to happen. I think that you're
14 absolutely right, Kay, and that there has been some
15 irresponsible broadcasting going on, and you know I wouldn't
16 be able to comment on how that could be curtailed. Perhaps
17 others on this panel might recommend that. I would only say
18 that when we renew our licenses, and in the license renewal
19 process we have to demonstrate how we serve the public
20 interest. And I think to the extent that broadcasters did
21 not serve the public interest that would be a legitimate
22 complaint that could be raised that would then potentially
23 impact the renewal of a station's license, especially if
24 they engage in some really egregious misreporting and
25 misdirected vital resources. I think that that would be
26 something that I would say you know broadcasters should not

1 do.

2 MS. SEARS: Yeah. I think that would be when it
3 would come up because that's a public proceeding where you
4 can have comments on the renewal.

5 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

6 MS. SEARS: So.

7 MR. FITZPATRICK: I think to get back to the issue --
8 that's one of the things we discussed in MSRC at a number of
9 our Working Group meetings. Including the concept, which we
10 saw in Iraq of sort of the embedded reporter who understood
11 the actual day-to-day operations of the unit that they were
12 reporting on. I -- much of the reporting I wouldn't
13 characterize as irresponsible, but I would definitely say
14 some of it may have been misinformed. And that was a
15 combination of not being able to communicate with local
16 officials to find out what the actual story was. And it's
17 also, and I hesitate to say this because I can't verbalize
18 it in a way that wouldn't make it appealing to everybody,
19 but when I was in the fire department very often people who
20 were not engaged in our operations would suggest things that
21 never occurred to me -- not being in your business and not
22 being in the shoes of people who deliver information at the
23 pace and with the intensity that you have to deliver it to
24 the public.

25 Certain things and the pressure that's on you is not

1 always conveyed to public safety officials and sometimes it
2 should be. If it was conveyed to the public officials and
3 the medium was made available to them to make those kind of
4 decisions -- if someone had been able to say directly not
5 through my news bureaus and of course you know the number of
6 satellites however it all works, that there was a
7 constituency that was moving from the Astrodome to the
8 convention center.

9 I heard one comment that how could Mike Brown and, in
10 his defense, how could he not know that they moved from the
11 convention center to the Astrodome? Well I was watching,
12 and I have particular interest because of my background and
13 my training. I didn't know it either. I mean how would you
14 know that? How would you know that unless you had
15 communication with local officials and that didn't exist.
16 There was a -- it was sort of dealing and hiding in plain
17 sight -- was the fact that all of this broadcasting was
18 going on in different venues out to a huge audience. But
19 the audience that was most concerned about the outcome was
20 local and that was going right over their heads, right past
21 them. So we have to find a way to get that information and
22 those feeds and those decision-making sort of events back to
23 local officials whose infrastructure has probably been wiped
24 out. And I have watched your engineers do some amazing
25 things.

26 We did a pilot project in Oklahoma City in a room

1 similar to this. And we had live broadcast -- a questions
2 and answer session with people from all over the country. I
3 dare say I could sit in a room full of wire and devices
4 similar to that and never make that happen. But the
5 engineers, the broadcast engineers with one little satellite
6 truck, made that all happen in a matter of hours. If public
7 safety officials locally knew of that capability and had
8 that presented to them, the entire picture of some of these
9 events may change. You may do more good just explaining
10 what you do on a normal day than by any other regulation or
11 that we may try to pass or codify or implement -- just the
12 exchange of information about what you do and how you do it
13 is an eye opener for public safety officials.

14 We're building a Joint Information Center for Nuclear
15 Power Plant, and we had some local broadcasters come in and
16 explain how the news gets from here to there. Some of
17 emergency manager people want to build a pressroom with a
18 studio and all of this, you know, the backroom equipment.
19 And within minutes the local engineers come in and said,
20 "Listen, here's the way we do it." We take the picture; we
21 feed it to a satellite; it goes to Atlanta; they put this on
22 it; they put that on it; it comes back to here, and the next
23 thing you know, you're watching it on TV. WOW. We thought
24 it was going into the camera and coming out on channel 5; we
25 don't know that. That capability needs to be explained to
26 local officials. That would be an enormous tool for them if

1 they couldn't ever get to a city budget, that they could
2 never pass, never maintain, never manage, or never improve as
3 the technology changes. You have a tremendous tool. You
4 also have the knowledge of how your tools can be used to
5 influence and affect public opinion and public actions.

6 There needs to be a connection between the local
7 officials and that capability. And you can do that. And
8 that's what I would recommend to this panel. Get that
9 capability down to local officials, so they can get their
10 local constituents to move.

11 MR. BEARY: What has worked, Steve, just a follow up
12 -- what has worked in our location in central Florida is we
13 have all the local officials, and we have predetermined
14 times to go on television and radio.

15 MR. FITZPATRICK: Oh.

16 MR. BEARY: But the nice thing about it was we had
17 all our local TV and radio stations -- we had -- they had
18 24-hour coverage at the emergency operation center
19 pressroom. So if we had to get something out, they were
20 there. It's also, and probably nobody realizes it, but it's
21 a web. It's a communications web. Because if something
22 goes down, you take a look at the five or six different
23 major television channels in our area. They're not all in
24 one location. So we're still reaching the community and of
25 course, as said earlier in some testimony, we're able to
26 pump it out in English, Spanish, and Creole. And but having

1 -- if you take that New Orleans scenario -- if they had
2 somebody at the EOC all the time, there might have been a
3 link from somebody that was at the convention center that
4 nobody knew was open.

5 MR. FITZPATRICK: Yeah.

6 MR. BEARY: Or the Astrodome and people -- the local
7 officials -- because of your ability in the communications
8 and television, all would have been -- we would have had a
9 feat. Yeah. It's true.

10 MR. FITZPATRICK: Yeah. I can't tell you how many
11 times I was sitting at home wishing I could talk into that
12 little ear piece. Telling the guy to just move the camera
13 in that direction or go to the EOC and talk to this guy
14 about what he needs because I knew the needs in these kinds
15 of situations are much greater than the ones that seem
16 obvious. The second thing about local communications and
17 local relationships with broadcasters -- we had a discussion
18 on our working group about a supply of fuel. One of the
19 stations had backup fuel for their generators to remain on
20 the air, WDSU was it, WWL, two of the local stations that
21 survived that remained broadcasting had fuel trucks coming
22 in -- had prepared for all of that. That fuel got rerouted
23 or delayed or held up or sent somewhere else. It didn't show
24 up -- let's put it that way. And the discussion was how can
25 we -- what official -- who do we call in Washington? Who do
26 we talk to in FEMA? How do we make sure this doesn't happen

1 again? And I said if you go back to what we've been working
2 on for the last two years -- talk to your local officials.

3 Kevin Beary can solve those problems for you. You
4 don't have to go to Washington to get a fuel truck past the
5 state trooper. If Kevin Beary says that fuel trucks coming
6 this way and I want it here, it'll move. Those kind of
7 things happen at a local level, not national. Those are not
8 things that are solved by the Federal Government. I hate to
9 say that, but that's the reality of it. You can't legislate
10 relationships at the local level and make things happen, and
11 I dare say that if you relate this to the relationships that
12 your reporters have with local officials, that's how you get
13 your good stories.

14 Your good stories don't come from a phone call to an
15 official in Washington; they happen when local officials
16 discuss these kinds of things and have a relationship where
17 they can discuss events and situations that are unfolding.
18 So I would say again if you can do anything to promote local
19 partnerships without trying to legislate them, and I know
20 that takes years. There's nine different Senate and House
21 subcommittees that affect public information and emergency
22 public warning process. There's twelve different agencies
23 that issue emergency warnings. There's forty different
24 agencies that develop standards for all of these things.

1 Start at the local level and work your way up. And that
2 would do a tremendous service to the whole country.

3 MS. VICTORY: Tom, thank you very much.

4 MR. FITZPATRICK: You're welcome.

5 MS. VICTORY: These were great comments and very
6 helpful, and I think you know perhaps they raised some
7 issues we may want to add to our report and add to our
8 recommendations and we can talk about those later on today.
9 But thank you again.

10 MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you very much. I appreciate
11 it.

12 MS. VICTORY: I thought what I would do is turn next
13 to Gordon Barber of Bell South. Happen to be reading in the
14 Trade Press earlier this week that the NSTAC had a meeting
15 and, as you remember, we had David Barron from Bell South
16 who represented the NSTAC at our last meeting and told us a
17 little bit about the things they were working on and
18 particularly credentialing and access issues. But the NSTAC
19 just had a meeting earlier this week and has pushed forward
20 some additional recommendations and reports that I thought
21 it might be useful for this group to hear a little bit more
22 about. So, Gordon, if you wouldn't mind sharing with us
23 what transpired.

24 MR. BARBER: I'm going to ask David Barron to come
25 forward who is in the audience. David's from Bell South,
26 and he works very closely with NSTAC and maybe just the

1 three areas in particular that both this committee has been
2 working on as well as NSTAC. One being credentialing, which
3 we certainly have a great interest in, another being
4 emergency responder status, and then the third being
5 membership of NCC. So, David, could you just kind of give
6 us a thumbnail sketch on those three?

7 MR. BARRON: Yes, sir, I'd be glad to. Good morning.
8 It's a pleasure to be back with you again from the last
9 meeting, which was, what, about a month or so ago? We've
10 made a lot of progress with things in the NSTAC world
11 working with our partners and government, primarily the
12 Department of Homeland Security and the folks at the
13 Department of Defense and also at the White House. We did
14 meet this week. We did approve a new recommendation, Madam
15 Chair, on the National Coordinating Center, and I'll touch
16 on that as well.

17 A fundamental part of what we're trying to do ties it
18 back to the notion of the recognition of the need for
19 certain infrastructure owners and operators and, in this
20 case, telecommunications to have access as quickly as
21 possible to the site of a disaster. After it's been made
22 secure and safe by law enforcement, then we would like to be
23 able to get access so we can restore communications as
24 quickly as possible, which in turn lets you do your job.
25 The government does their job. So that whole notion has
26 been categorized, has been captured by what we call the

1 creation of an emergency responder category. It will be
2 recognized initially under the National Response Plan. DHS
3 has done that. That has been codified somewhat in the
4 National Response Plan, but there is a category of not first
5 responder, but an emergency responder that could include
6 telecommunications, electric power, broadcasters -
7 whomever's appropriate. That would be recognized as needing
8 access to the scene and, again, that has been done through
9 the National Response Plan and may be pushed out even
10 further, Madam Chair, to look at the issues of amendments to
11 the Stafford Act and some of those kind of things. But
12 that's been done; we're very pleased with that. Tied to that
13 is the issue of access control credentialing at the
14 barometer.

15 We've made a recommendation on that from NSTAC; the
16 Department of Homeland Security has reacted to that. A
17 pilot was done in Georgia that I was involved in looking at
18 what's the easiest way to deal with this near term and set a
19 foundation in place, for example, Sheriff -- of where we
20 might go long term. And the law enforcement folks in Georgia
21 said let's keep this simple. We don't need to overly
22 complicate this, and the pilot basically suggested this.
23 Yeah, for telecommunications -- that if you're in a marked
24 company vehicle and have a valid company ID, then you get
25 access.

26 It's our job to make sure that the right people show

1 up. But once they do show up, they should get access. If
2 it goes beyond that and you don't have a valid -- if you have
3 a valid ID, that's always a first requirement. If you don't
4 have a marked vehicle, for example, or if you're a
5 contractor, what do you need? Well, you need a valid ID.
6 You need a letter of authorization specific to that incident
7 and somewhat delineating what you're there to do and three
8 some kind of placard or hangtag in your vehicle that's issued
9 by the state with a serial number. That's also been somewhat
10 codified; it's been rolled out in Georgia. It's been
11 discussed in some detail in Florida, and it's been discussed
12 in some detail in Louisiana. Again, that's being implemented
13 through the Department of Homeland Security, the Critical
14 Infrastructure Protection Division led by Assistant Secretary
15 Bob Stephens. So that piece is also being implemented, and
16 we're very pleased with that.

17 There are plans to get to Mississippi and Louisiana,
18 excuse me, Mississippi and Alabama as soon as possible, and
19 then bring that process up the east coast as quickly as
20 possible. So we think we're making progress there. The
21 third thing that's new -- the recommendation was approved
22 just this week by the NSTAC principals and will be submitted
23 to the White House and the President within the next couple
24 weeks. That isn't an area of beefing up, if you will, for a
25 lack of a better term. The National Coordinating Center for
26 Telecommunications, the NCC, is an entity that's been around

1 for over twenty years. It's a physical facility where
2 industry and government set day to day together to plan for
3 and respond to incidents.

4 We think that that capability needs to be expanded
5 beyond traditional communications providers to include
6 information technology providers, possibly broadcasters and
7 non-traditional providers like cable telephony, Internet
8 service providers, so we've made a recommendation to fold.
9 There's a number of recommendations, but the two I think
10 you'll find most interesting, one is that that capability be
11 expanded as quickly as possible to include both traditional
12 and non-traditional telecommunications and information
13 technology with a convergence of technologies to what we
14 call the next generation of networks.

15 It's the line between communications and information
16 technology; it's getting where you can't distinguish the
17 difference. We think that true to be able to respond to a
18 disaster you've got to have those players at the table -
19 both communications and information technology. We
20 recommend that that be done as soon as possible. Also, tied
21 to that recommendation, is what we're beginning to implement
22 already. And that is a Regional Communications
23 Coordination's capability that somebody would host in the
24 Southeast. Bell South has agreed to host that physically.
25 Where communications providers in its broadest sense can
26 come together during a crisis, literally sit at the table

1 like this and say, "Okay, as an industry, what can we
2 collectively do to respond to this incident? What resources
3 do we have? What priorities do we have?" That capability
4 will be stood up by June the 1st in the Southeast. It will
5 be hosted by Bell South in Atlanta, and we're trying to get
6 as many communications providers, both traditional and non-
7 traditional, in there as we can.

8 With procedures and understandings ahead of time so
9 that when the crisis unfolds people know where to go, what
10 to do, what their responsibilities are, and that that whole
11 mechanism is plugged into both the joint field office that
12 will be set up wherever the disaster may be and also plugged
13 back into the National Coordinating Center we talked about
14 earlier. So that capability will be stood up in the
15 Southeast by June the 1st with a plan to roll out that
16 concept nationwide as quickly as possible because the next
17 incident may be in California, it may be in Chicago, it may
18 be in New York.

19 So that those two things from the NCC recommendation,
20 Madam Chair, are being implemented, and we're very pleased
21 about that and we think that some of the work we've done
22 ties directly to the work that you've done. We're willing
23 to answer any questions and cooperate any way that we can
24 because we're all in this together, and I think that
25 partnership between industry and government here at the
26 table is one that we can continue to foster and utilize as

1 a platform to move forward with a real sense of urgency.
2 Mr. Ackerman, who is the Chair of Bell South and also the
3 Chair of the NSTAC as appointed by President Bush -- his
4 manner of urgency, partnership, and trust. And we've got
5 to take that and move forward as quickly as we can to
6 implement some of these recommendations.

7 Again, some are underway, some are pending, but I
8 think that hopefully that will give you a little back of
9 where we are, what we've done, and I think some of these
10 things will be of interest to you as we move forward. So
11 thank you very much.

12 MS. VICTORY: Well, definitely a lot of similarities
13 with some of the things that this panel has come up with.
14 Steve Davis, did you have a question?

15 MR. DAVIS: Yes, I do. Thank you. We do appreciate
16 what NSTAC has been doing and, in fact, in my working group
17 and I'm sure the panel as a whole -- we're looking at
18 adopting and recommending the adoption of many of the
19 pieces that you've put together. So we clearly understand
20 there's no need to reinvent the wheel in that area. You
21 have done a lot of work, ground-breaking work on that. I
22 just want a little bit of clarification. You mentioned and
23 -- not first responder but emergency responder status, and
24 I think we're coming on board asking for pretty much the
25 same thing.

26 I think we recognized that although it is important

1 to have the communications infrastructure back up and
2 running ASAP, it is not of the critical level that hospital
3 and police and fire are. So we think that we are an
4 important part of any response but certainly a step below
5 the first responders status.

6 MR. BARRON: I totally agree with that statement.

7 MR. DAVIS: Excuse me.

8 MR. BARRON: I totally agree with that.

9 MR. DAVIS: And I want to know whether or not you
10 thought broadcasters were a part of the first responders.
11 We are asking --I mean emergency responders. We are asking
12 for that in our panel's recommendation. I just wanted to
13 know if we were able to align with NSTAC on that one?

14 MR. BARRON: We would certainly agree with that. We
15 did not recommend that because that's beyond our charter.

16 MR. DAVIS: Oh.

17 MR. BARRON: But we certainly would endorse that
18 because I think it's critical that broadcasters be included
19 in that category along with probably electric power.

20 MR. DAVIS: Right, oh, definitely electric power.

21 MR. BEARY: Power sewer, power sewage.

22 MR. BARRON: Right. People quite often forget about
23 the importance, Sheriff, of simple things like water and

1 sewage. I mean that's critically important. So we kind of
2 set the stage for that, but we didn't opine on that because
3 it's really beyond our charter. We just said
4 telecommunications but there could be other infrastructures
5 and they're obvious ones out there, broadcasters being one
6 of those.

7 MR. DAVIS: And since Mr. Fitzpatrick had said that
8 public communications is a tool of emergency management, I
9 would hope that in your incident response NCC coordinates
10 then you talked about IT and possibly broadcasters. I
11 would just urge you to please really consider in putting
12 broadcasters in that.

13 MR. BARRON: Yes, sir. Great points.

14 MR. DAVIS: Thank you.

15 MS. VICTORY: Okay. And I did -- I had one question,
16 and then I'm going to go to Marty. The regional
17 coordinating capabilities or council that you're putting
18 together that Bell South will be hosting -- is that going
19 to be industry only? And you did mention it would plug
20 into the NCC and the joint field office, but for most
21 meetings, is this going to be an industry only body? Or do
22 you expect that you will be asking a representative of the
23 states or some of the localities to join you in those
24 discussions?

25 MR. BARRON: Good question. Right now, Nancy, we
26 plan for it to be industry only. But with direct specific

1 linkages back to the joint field office and to the NCC so
2 that when we need to coordinate with government there are
3 mechanisms in place to do that. One thing that I think we
4 touched on last time and I'll mention just briefly -
5 Through The Department of Homeland Security, they are
6 standing up Federal Emergency Communications Coordinators
7 FECC's in each of the FEMA regions, specifically as DHS
8 employees are linked back to the NCC whose sole job is to
9 be in the field, on the ground, dealing with state and
10 local officials, and being that link between the government
11 entities if you will. Federal, State, and local plugged
12 back into the industry counterparts to facilitate that
13 communication interaction between those two groups. And
14 that person I know in the Atlanta region has been
15 identified, and I think it has been in the Dallas region as
16 well.

17 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Thank you. Marty Hadfield.

18 MR. HADFIELD: Yeah, hi. I first -- I wanted to
19 thank you for the very important information you're
20 bringing to us today.

21 MR. BARRON: You're welcome.

22 MR. HADFIELD: This is absolutely terrific in
23 bringing everybody together. I had a question regarding,
24 and I don't want to get too much in the nuts and bolts
25 about it, but you mentioned that one of the identification
26 protocols may include a placard that would have a serial

1 number -- something perhaps issued by an individual state.

2 MR. BARRON: Right.

3 MR. HADFIELD: Did you see that as or did the group
4 see that as an event specific placard, or is this one that
5 maybe would be issued on an annual basis or something?
6 Because one of my concerns is response -- time in getting
7 something like that issued.

8 MR. BARRON: Right. This notion of a placard or
9 hangtag really came from Florida, and Georgia thought it was
10 a great idea and they've adopted it and we think it's a
11 great idea as well. There's really two concepts we're
12 looking at. One is -- and I think the one preferred is,
13 prior to the hurricane season, you would issue a host of
14 these placards with serial numbers that would already be
15 deployed out to the industry partners. We would have them
16 in our hands and then use those as needed, but law
17 enforcement knowing there's a certain color, there's a
18 certain number on it so you could theoretically counterfeit
19 it, replicate it, but we'll have to work our way through
20 those issues. But it would be pre-positioned, pre-staged,
21 prior to the season if you will, so that those who need
22 access to it would already have it.

23 MR. HADFIELD: Uh-huh.

24 MR. BARRON: And it would be then come upon us as the
25 providers to get those in the right hands, and we've got
26 some control responsibilities as well to make sure that the

1 right people that should be at the scene are in fact at the
2 scene with the right credentials. But so, it would be pre-
3 done -- not incident specific, but it would be pre-staged.

4 MR. HADFIELD: Okay.

5 MR. BARRON: Does that answer your question?

6 MR. HADFIELD: That does from the standpoint of -- I
7 guess I'll call them predictable events, but what about the
8 --

9 MR. BARRON: 9/11.

10 MR. HADFIELD: Yeah, year. Terrorist or chemical
11 spills or some accidental event that was unforeseen.

12 MR. BARRON: You make a very good point, and one
13 thing that we've tried to do through our work is be sure to
14 maintain a balance between our focus right now on man-made
15 -- on national incidents like hurricanes but always keep
16 that balance between man-made incidents that could happen
17 and natural events. And, of course, tornadoes and things
18 like that -- you never know when they're going to really
19 hit us. So my recommendation would be, and I think the
20 pilot in contemplates that you would have these placards in
21 place it would used for anything. The driver right now is
22 hurricane season.

23 MR. HADFIELD: Sure.

24 MR. BARRON: But once they're deployed, they could be
25 used for whatever may happen. Does that make sense?

26 MR. HADFIELD: So, okay. Except for instance in

1 Salem, Oregon.

2 MR. BARRON: Right.

3 MR. HADFIELD: Did they pre-issue those on a annual
4 basis to key individuals or just wait until the event
5 happens and --

6 MR. BARRON: Well, I -

7 MR. HADFIELD: and I -- maybe we're getting too nuts
8 and bolts on that.

9 MR. BARRON: No, I think it's a very good point. I'd
10 like to touch on that. The issue of access was identified
11 by NSTAC well before Hurricane Katrina. We'd made a
12 recommendation before Katrina even happened about access
13 control and perimeter control. Our focus turned to Katrina
14 and hurricane issues very quickly and the recommendation,
15 quite frankly, was in the implementation of that pilot as
16 directed toward hurricane season, no question. I think what
17 I've taken back from the group, and that I will take back
18 from the group, is we've got to expand that concept quickly
19 nationwide with our state and local officials and our state
20 and local partners along with DHS to say, "Okay" if this
21 really works as well as we think it will. Can we deploy
22 that capability and that notion, if you will, nationwide as
23 quickly as possible and that the hangtags and the whole
24 process would be available no matter what the incident may
25 be?

26 MR. HADFIELD: Sure.

1 MR. BARRON: And it would've had to be triggered with
2 some communication between Federal, State, and local
3 officials about is this an incident that requires this?
4 And, if so, the capability's already in place. So it
5 wouldn't happen every time there's incident because you
6 don't have to.

7 MR. HADFIELD: Sure.

8 MR. BARRON: But when it arises at the --

9 MR. HADFIELD: Significant.

10 MR. BARRON: level of an incident of national
11 significance, then I think the trigger would be okay. We're
12 in a different league now. We're in a different scenario.
13 We got to implement this procedure as quickly as we can.
14 But it's already in place. I mean everybody knows what to
15 do. The placards are there; the letters of authorization
16 have already been pre-staged; people have ID's. I mean
17 it's the first step, but I think we've got more work to do.
18 There's a lot of work going on with very sophisticated
19 credentialing with biometrics and all kind of satellite
20 communication capabilities tied into scanners and a lot of
21 things going on with that and the national capitol region's
22 done a lot of work on that. We like that capability, but
23 we felt like that was going to be expensive and timely to
24 deploy. And we wanted something that was more simple, as
25 we said that would work for this hurricane season, and
26 that's what we got. So I hope that answered your question.

1 MR. HADFIELD: Okay. Thank you. That's excellent.

2 MS. VICTORY: I know we have a couple more
3 questions. I do want to try to stick to the schedule so we
4 wrap up. So anybody with a sort of pressing comment or
5 question?

6 MR. CANNON: I just have a comment here.

7 MR. BARRON: Yes, sir.

8 MR. CANNON: The -- it sounds like you're willing to
9 work out the - you said your second would be a company, a
10 marked company vehicle with someone with identification?

11 MR. BARRON: Right.

12 MR. CANNON: The only I would add to that is that
13 those list of approved companies or those people that would
14 be doing work that that list be provided to state EOC, so
15 that way they know that that company is actually authorized
16 to be coming in to do the work.

17 MR. BARRON: Good point and you're exactly right.
18 That is part of the process.

19 MR. CANNON: Okay. Thank you.

20 MR. BARRON: And also on the letter of authorization,
21 there's a number that says if there's a question or a
22 concern -- here's the clearing house for those problems,
23 and call that number. They'll be manned twenty-four hours
24 a day.

25 MR. BEARY: And to impress it, we all know on a local
26 level who some of those players are -- in fact, Mammoth

1 Florida Power -- its Progress Energy -- And they ought to be
2 pre-deployed or pre-positioned and given out early. I liked
3 your idea about marked vehicles, but I'll give you magnetic
4 stickers.

5 MR. BARRON: Uh-huh.

6 MR. BEARY: You know well I deal with the press on
7 other issues as Greg and I have talked about. I can change
8 every unmarked police vehicle into a marked vehicle by
9 putting on magnetic stars. I would throw that idea out to
10 you --

11 MR. BARRON: Yes.

12 MR. BEARY: As having an emergency catch, and that
13 way and this, is good for local government officials,
14 Federal officials; you know when FEMA responds, you see it.
15 FEMA emergency assistance team -- it's put right on the
16 car. Folks, that's one way to get through some of those
17 roadblocks and barriers. If you -- and it's all about
18 having your disaster kit already planned.

19 MR. BARRON: That's a very, very good point, and I
20 don't think the pilot touched on that, but we'll incorporate
21 that back into the plan.

22 MR. CANNON: Yeah. That's one of the things we did a
23 lot of, as you know, in Katrina is we brought in thousands
24 of employees from other companies across the country. We
25 used the magnetic signs and also some special
26 identification cards.

1 MS. VICTORY: All right. Well, thank you very much.
2 David, thank you again. This is very, very helpful --

3 MR. BARRON: Thank you.

4 MS. VICTORY: and very timely for our consideration.

5 MR. BARRON: You all are doing some great work and
6 our collaboration I think is very important. So thank you.

7 MS. VICTORY: Definitely. Thanks again. Okay. I
8 wanted to turn next to some of the meat of the meeting.
9 We've got to go through some of the drafts of the various
10 reports sections and talk about those and get some
11 comments. I wanted to turn first to the so the observation
12 section of the draft that was sent out a couple of days
13 ago. I wanted to kind of go through this. I guess Roman
14 numeral section by Roman numeral section might be the best
15 way. I know I've gotten some specific line edits from a
16 couple of you -- I think from Steve Delahousey, from Carson
17 Agnew, from Mike Sauter, and from Billy Pitts, and we're
18 working through those. And I think the goal would be with
19 those -- any line edits that would come in over the next
20 couple of days -- we'll incorporate those and get a red
21 lined draft out to everybody probably next Wednesday for
22 consideration.

23 But I wanted to talk through more the substance at
24 issues. Let's say if you have particular line edits or
25 corrections that are not a major substance of change, why
26 don't you go ahead and just e-mail those to me, but let's

1 talk today about whether we're getting the substance right,
2 whether the conclusions are right, and whether we're
3 missing any issues that we should be talking about in here.
4 So why don't we start by going through that. I think
5 that's been distributed and also distributed by e-mail.
6 The first Roman numeral section goes through network
7 reliability and resiliency. It sort of goes through by
8 industry sector or by -- and also breaks out public safety
9 and utilities as well. And really concludes I'd say, in
10 general, that the networks themselves were pretty resilient
11 during the storm. That the -- and they stood up. It
12 wasn't like towers were going down; it wasn't like
13 equipment was failing, but it seemed to be that the issue
14 was more of one of power and flooding were some of the
15 major problems associated with keeping the systems
16 running.

17 I think we heard from a number of individuals that
18 the systems were working after the hurricane passed, but
19 when the levies broke, it was a whole nother story because
20 you did have certain equipment that was flooded or at least
21 the access to that equipment was flooded, which blocked
22 personnel from getting to it and also blocked fuel from
23 getting to it. Obviously, the long power outages, the
24 power outages of long duration, and the geographic scope of
25 those outages was a problem. And while certain companies
26 had stock piles of fuel that they could bring in, not

1 everybody did. And even for those companies that had stock
2 piles of fuel, the flooding made getting it to the site
3 difficult, and access problems made getting it to the site
4 difficult, and sometimes the fuel was diverted to other
5 important purposes, which was a problem as well.

6 We also heard that the issue of redundant pathways
7 had come up in our discussion and you know should be -
8 should we be recommending anything else on redundancy and
9 redundant pathways? And I think what we heard was where
10 there were failures, there were redundant pathways. It was
11 just that sometimes all of the redundant pathways failed
12 just as a result of a fluke, or you know, the nature of the
13 storm here.

14 Just too various cuts or various oddities occurred so
15 that even though there were redundant pathways, which was a
16 good thing in which we should be endorsing, some of the
17 major problems we found here had to do with the fact that
18 all of the redundant pathways were affected in the same
19 way. And then finally the other area that we heard a bit
20 about were line cuts. And this really had nothing to do
21 with the storm; this had to do with folks trying to be very
22 proactive and to go in and clean up and to repair things
23 and inadvertently, unfortunately, cutting or severing or
24 damaging other lines while they were doing that, so I know
25 that was a particular problem.

26 I wanted to kind of throw this open for the group to

1 see if that is the right story and that is an accurate
2 depiction of what happened. The other thing I guess I
3 should mention is we did go sector by sector trying to
4 identify the resiliencies of the networks, and we basically
5 found that they were all pretty resilient. We did point
6 out that for a couple of sectors satellite, in particular,
7 and also paging seemed to have some particular resiliencies
8 because their infrastructure was largely not on the ground.
9 I mean paging obviously has transmitters on the ground but
10 the benefit -- there was a lot of their interconnection
11 with the public switch telephone network was done by
12 satellite, which was not affected by the storm.

13 So for this type of a disaster, those networks seemed
14 to do fairly well. Certain types of newer technologies that
15 may have been handed out to law enforcement and others that
16 may have had unique dialing issues or unique dialing
17 patterns or other types of unique means of operation that
18 the users were not familiar with and there was definitely
19 some training issues there. And equipment that could have
20 been more effective wasn't, but it seemed to be largely a
21 training issue on that. But I wanted to get some
22 comments. Is this accurate or is there anything that we're
23 missing, anything that we're mischaracterizing? Dave
24 Flessas.

25 MR. FLESSAS: One other item that kind of transcends
26 of it, I think, was missed as a taxing impact and that is

1 the whole issue that we were just discussing around
2 security and access. As you go through both introductory
3 paragraph and to Roman number I in terms of the, you know,
4 meteorological and power effects, I think that security
5 really contributed, you know, pretty greatly to the
6 security and access contributed pretty greatly to the
7 restoration. And throughout all of the network reliability
8 and resiliency category, there were multiple points along
9 the way where I think it would be important to note, for
10 example, in the -- in terms of what was affecting the
11 restoring of the cellular and PCS networks. It was power
12 and T1s, but that was exasperated by the lack of access
13 there to deliver fuel. In the same way when you look
14 at the major problem section in 1-B, I think it bears and
15 requires reporting that security accessing really took all
16 of these adverse factors and made them worse, substantially
17 worse.

18 So I would suggest that we add that in as either as
19 part of the or as one of the taxing effects and then making
20 sure it's emphasized throughout.

21 MS. VICTORY: I think that's an excellent point. I
22 think we struggled with whether we put it in the first
23 section or the second section. Is this a resiliency issue
24 or is this a recovery issue? And so it's discussed at
25 length in the second Roman numeral section, but I think
26 you're right that it would be helpful to mention it here as

1 dealing with certain resiliency issues and can certainly
2 work that in and direct folks to read about it in more
3 detail in Section II.

4 MR. FLESSAS: Great.

5 MS. VICTORY: Okay, great. Any other comments on
6 this specific or general? Yes, Kay Sears.

7 MS. SEARS: Yeah. I may have missed it, but I didn't
8 see any mention of the lack of pre-positioned equipment. We
9 talked about it several times on the panel and in one of our
10 recommendations. We're recommending kind of a cache of
11 equipment be on hand, so I think we need to identify that we
12 did hear that there was a lack of pre-positioned equipment.
13 We talk about fuel but not necessarily hardware. Maybe we
14 want to work that into one of the observations somehow.

15 MS. VICTORY: That sounds good. I might suggest that
16 may go in Section II dealing with recovery.

17 MS. SEARS: Yeah. Either way I didn't --

18 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think but that's an excellent
19 point. We can certainly do that. Other comments? Go
20 ahead, Steve Delahousey.

21 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Yes. Let's see Section II,
22 coordination between industry and government throughout the
23 document there -- I didn't see any mention --

24 MS. VICTORY: I don't think we've gotten a Roman II
25 yet. I'm still on Roman I.

26 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Oh, oh. I'm sorry.

1 MS. VICTORY: Okay. No, that's okay.

2 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I apologize.

3 MS. VICTORY: Hold your thought for one moment. One
4 other -- I wanted to bring up one other issue that one of
5 the panelists had mentioned about Section I and sort of
6 throw this out. Obviously, we have an imperfect amount of
7 information. I think we've tried to mind as many areas as
8 we can, and we've tried to use the knowledge of the
9 panelist here. But we don't necessarily have geographic-
10 specific data about failures and resiliencies. We have
11 more broad data. And I think it was certainly been pointed
12 out by a number of folks that the weather situation
13 differed tremendously in different geographic regions and
14 that may have had an impact on the resiliency issues.

15 One suggestion was whether or not we could break this
16 discussion out more granularly on the geographic level to
17 talk about those resiliencies. I'm not sure we have the
18 data to do that and be really specific about it, but I
19 think probably what we need to do in this draft a little
20 bit more is be a bit more precise about high impact areas
21 versus areas that may not have been as greatly impacted and
22 to be clear about that. I think we've -- in this current
23 version of the draft, we did talk about industry sectors in
24 general across the whole area and where the vulnerabilities
25 and the resiliencies, and I think that does work to a point
26 that probably what we need to go back and be a little bit

1 more specific about is to make clear that there was a
2 difference in the weather impact in different areas and
3 that may have affected resiliency. And I think that's
4 something that we would hope to do in this next draft.
5 Tim.

6 MR. CANNON: This is not a scientific way to tell
7 you how this happened, but from being in that whole area -
8 and I just yesterday left the National Hurricane or the
9 Governors Hurricane Conference in Fort Lauderdale and Dr.
10 Gray and Max Maxfield was there, and they had actually
11 taken information post-storm and recreated the high impact
12 areas as far as the storm surge. And if you follow what
13 their model is, they walk through the model, and it's an
14 automated model -- you can actually look at the high impact
15 areas of the storm surge, and I think you'll find that
16 that's the area where you had your biggest communication
17 failures.

18 MS. VICTORY: Hmm.

19 MR. CANNON: That whole mid-Mississippi all the way
20 to the Louisiana state line is where you had your 29 -
21 basically anywhere between 26 and 29 feet of water that
22 traveled in approximately nine miles. So I mean, if you
23 want to look at that, that would be another way that you
24 could actually have an automated model that you can look at
25 where they've recreated the storm surge based on, you know,
26 all the data they collected after the storm

1 MS. VICTORY: Would you be able to forward to me
2 information as to how to access that? Is that available on
3 the Web or something?

4 MR. CANNON: I would have to -- I could contact
5 probably Dr. Gray and get it.

6 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

7 MR. CANNON: It was part of his presentation at the
8 Florida Governors Hurricane Conference.

9 MS. VICTORY: It would be really helpful.

10 MR. CANNON: Yeah.

11 MS. VICTORY: It would be really helpful.

12 MR. CANNON: Okay.

13 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Greg Bicket.

14 MR. BICKET: It's in Roman numeral I-8. Just really
15 for precision more than anything else -- in the second
16 sentence, it talks about because cable facilities are
17 largely underground - well, largely it's true from the
18 standpoint of hundreds of miles of facilities but often
19 that's 10 to 15 percent to 35 or 40 percent of a system's
20 total plant miles. So it's a bit counterintuitive the way
21 it reads and it meaning that the majority of systems in the
22 United States have underground facilities as a minority of
23 their total plant miles

24 MS. VICTORY: Interesting. Okay.

25 MR. BICKET: So I wanted to get, you know, clarity
26 there. The other thing that is a little bit misleading

1 about the sentence is that while it's true that wind and
2 rain had a minimal effect on the underground plan as you
3 pointed out earlier, the flooding that took place in
4 underground plant there are above ground facilities and
5 that flooding devastated those pretty completely. The
6 final thing I wanted to mention is later in that same
7 section we talked about being up and running again in a few
8 days, four days following Katrina, and it's true that only
9 lack of access of fuel caused the company to cease
10 operations. But implicative in that is the return to
11 operations was to a hundred percent of our pre-storm homes,
12 and that's not true.

13 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

14 MR. BICKET: Some twenty-five percent of the network
15 was very, very heavily damaged so coming back up in our
16 central facilities does not equate to a market wide
17 revision of our signals.

18 MS. VICTORY: Would you be kind enough to maybe send
19 me some edits --

20 MR. BICKET: Happy to.

21 MS. VICTORY: to make that paragraph accurate with
22 those two points in it because I think that would be very,
23 very helpful.

24 MR. BICKET: Sure, would be glad to.

25 MS. VICTORY: That would be terrific. Marty
26 Hadfield.

1 MR. HADFIELD: I have a question or comment about its
2 I-A, 1-A tower failures.

3 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

4 MR. HADFIELD: Third sentence it says the main cause
5 for tower failures was loss of power. I think there's a
6 disconnect there.

7 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Good point.

8 MR. HADFIELD: I don't think that any towers fail
9 Over because there was no power in the area that I knew of
10 anyway. I'm just wondering if that -- I think I know what
11 the intent of the paragraph was, but do you want me to send
12 you a couple little messages, notes on that?

13 MS. VICTORY: That would be fabulous.

14 MR. HADFIELD: Okay.

15 MS. VICTORY: I would appreciate that.

16 MR. HADFIELD: Good, okay.

17 MS. VICTORY: That would be great.

18 MR. DAVIS: Yeah and I would just say transmission
19 failures.

20 MR. HADFIELD: Yep. I was saying communication or
21 transmission failures --

22 MS. VICTORY: Yes.

23 MR. HADFIELD: And subsystem failures and things like
24 that.

25 MR. DAVIS: I don't know that there's a need for an
26 edit here, but I think there were towers down. But I don't

1 think that we're saying that there weren't. It says in
2 general --

3 MR. HADFIELD: Yeah.

4 MR. DAVIS: antennas remain standing after the storm.

5 MS. VICTORY: Right. And this is specific to this
6 paragraph is specific to talking about the public safety
7 network.

8 MR. DAVIS: Right.

9 MS. VICTORY: Not all towers.

10 MR. DAVIS: We had some of the public safety network
11 on our tower there and a ATC tower site. We were providing
12 fuel to that out of Third Channel stock pile but that was --
13 still the issue there was fuel and that tower wasn't down.

14 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I want to -- there were, I
15 guess, transmission failures would be the better way to
16 speak about it so, yes.

17 MR. HADFIELD: I'll send you one.

18 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Great. Anything else on Roman
19 numeral I? Kay.

20 MS. SEARS: Just a note that I'll probably try to
21 send you some edits on the satellite section just to
22 distinguish a little bit between fixed and mobile.

23 MS. VICTORY: Perfect.

24 MS. SEARS: Okay.

25 MS. VICTORY: That would be great.

1 MS. SEARS: Okay.

2 MS. VICTORY: That would be great.

3 MR. HADFIELD: I'll send you something --

4 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Can you give me -- oh yes, we
5 need to put that in. Perfect. Yes. That would be very
6 helpful. And if I could ask if all of you could get me
7 those edits by Tuesday morning. Is that okay? And then
8 what we'll do is we'll turn a draft around and send them
9 out on Wednesday. That would be great. Thanks so much.
10 And if I could ask for anybody who is sending me edits on
11 Roman numeral I, if you could also CC Tom Denbrosky. Since
12 I'm going to be traveling on Tuesday, just that way he can
13 get anything dealing with Roman I. That would be great.
14 Thanks.

15 Let's move on to Roman II, and Steve Delahousey, I
16 know you have well actually let me tell you a little bit
17 about what's in here first before we go through with edits.
18 This section is focused in not so much on the resiliency of
19 the networks but on the recovery process. And talking
20 about what we discovered, what worked and what didn't work
21 in the recovery process. And obviously access to affected
22 areas and key resources was a huge issue, both perimeter
23 access and credentialing that we spent a long time talking
24 about and as has the NSTAC indicated that that was a an
25 impediment to communication works coming back in and
26 repairing. Probably it was more of an impediment to

1 lesser-known companies that might not have had the name
2 recognition with the perimeter personnel.

3 We did point out what we heard from law enforcement
4 that we had a particular problem where you had maybe
5 properly credentialed individuals that let improperly
6 credentials individuals ride along with them and that
7 created a security issue and probably a weariness on the
8 part of the perimeter folks that further slowed down the
9 credentialing the access process. So that is mentioned in
10 there as an issue. Fuel again, you know, we've talked
11 about indicating that to the extent that there were
12 generators in place, they probably only ran for a couple of
13 days. Following the power outages that required power fuel
14 stock piles to be brought to these facilities, and that was
15 often a challenge because of the flooding, because of
16 perimeter issues, and then finally also because sometimes
17 the fuel was diverted to other uses. And we did recognize
18 on a positive note the sharing of fuel that went on in
19 within the industry, even among competitors, as being a
20 real bright spot, and this occurred even though there was no
21 one staging area for folks to engage in these sorts of
22 discussions. Did mention security, which has come up
23 before. That security did appear to be a problem both for
24 protecting key facilities that generators were being stolen
25 and also for workers. The lack of security sometimes
26 delayed their ability to get access to the sights they

1 needed to deal with. And we talk a little bit about the
2 Stafford Act designation in there and what the role would
3 be. We also indicated different companies that had their
4 own private security forces.

5 Sometimes there were convoys that were formed on an
6 informal basis and that that sort of sharing is something we
7 should be encouraging occur in the future. The next part
8 talks a bit about coordination between industry and
9 government starting first with the Federal Government and
10 industry, indicating then at the Federal level coordination
11 with industry appeared to work fairly well. That the NCC
12 has had a historic role here -- that that process with the
13 NCC member companies appeared to be a strong one. But we
14 also recognized that it was a very limited membership, and
15 it was is a membership that does exclude certain members of
16 the communications industry. And as a result those folks
17 and their facilities were not part of the discussions for
18 redundancy and addressing outages. Also recognized the FCC
19 as playing a super role in the wake of Katrina, being open
20 24-7 and coming up with new and expedited procedures to
21 address waivers and STA's and to even assist communications
22 providers find other resources like fuel. We did recognize
23 that even though these were expedited procedures to get
24 relief, the lack of communications and the need to still
25 wait for a regulatory approval even though expedited, did
26 slow down the recovery process in some areas.

1 Also, the fact that these were, you know, new
2 procedures, new people to contact that folks did not know
3 about on a regular basis and did not use and were not
4 familiar with on a regular basis, could have caused some
5 delays as well. Also indicated a general lack of clarity
6 among communication providers even at the Federal level as
7 to who they needed to contact to get the relief that they
8 needed and that there was because there were so many
9 agencies involved where they needed to know somebody that
10 this was incredibly confusing.

11 At the state and local level, we noted that
12 coordination with industry was pretty spotty. Seemed to
13 occur more on an ad hoc basis that there did not appear to
14 be in the affected area any regular standing councils or
15 committees or coordination bodies where state and local
16 officials could interface with communication providers
17 either on a regular basis or immediately after the storm.
18 And local government officials had noted that to us that
19 they often did not know where to turn to figure out why
20 their own communication systems, which may have relied on
21 some commercial networks were not working. And therefore,
22 an exchange of information might have been helpful as would
23 some established relationships to facilitate credentialing
24 access, fuel sharing, and other recovery efforts. Finally,
25 on Federal Government and State and local government
26 coordination, at least with respect to communications

1 restoration issues, I think we indicated that we were not
2 aware that there were real established and strong methods
3 for this coordination.

4 At least nothing seemed to come up with before this
5 panel in the testimony, and that often with respect to
6 communications recovery matters, State and local authorities
7 seemed to be a bit out of the loop on this. And this is
8 probably a loop that needs to be closed. And then finally,
9 this section mentions the emergency communication services
10 and programs. These are the priority access services we've
11 talked about before. GETS wireless priority access and TSP
12 and noted that the services were available that they
13 seemed to work well for those the entities that used it,
14 but that among the eligible entities that could have
15 subscribed, only a very low percentage appeared to do so.

16 In particular, this was true among the public safety
17 community and certainly certain pockets of that community,
18 like emergency medical personnel who might have really been
19 able to use this, did not appear to subscribe in great
20 numbers. And so there was a tool that could have been used
21 and could have been helpful in had recovery effort that was
22 not used. We also noted that it -- for certain, commercial
23 providers including broadcast and cable, it wasn't clear
24 that these services were fully utilized nor was it clear
25 that those entities are eligible under the current
26 criteria, and so that's something that we noted as well.

1 Also indicate that certain users who did have access to
2 these services did not fully understand how to use them.
3 Like, for example that you had to plug in your GETS number
4 when you were making a wireless call because you'd only
5 have priority until you got to the public switch telephone
6 network, and you need GETS to get a priority on the wire
7 line network for the same call. So that's kind of what
8 that section covered, and I know Steve Delahousey, you said
9 you had a comment on this section.

10 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Yes. On page 11, I guess the
11 response from the military to this disaster was certainly
12 commendable -- the guard and the active duty. And I notice
13 that throughout the document, there's no mention of it being
14 the problems that were experienced there. We had a lot of
15 resources that the military brought to bear but it was a
16 very disorganized, primarily because we were not in the
17 civilian public safety arena. We were not able to
18 communicate with the military. And the rescue effort and
19 everything was very disorganized as a result, and I think
20 perhaps it should even warrant its own if that's the
21 appropriate place to put it, as in item number four
22 perhaps.

23 MS. VICTORY: We can certainly try to add in some
24 concepts about that. If you have any particular thoughts on
25 specifics that we should use, please go ahead and e-mail
26 those to me. But that's a very good point, and I think

1 probably it would go in that section three about Federal
2 government, State, and local government coordination
3 indicating that the military did seem to have a lot assets
4 and things that they could bring to bear, but the channels
5 of communications back and forth with the state and local
6 governments did not appear to be very strong and very
7 effective.

8 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Sure I'll be glad to.

9 MS. VICTORY: Other comments? Jim Jacot.

10 MR. PITTS: It's maybe -- this is probably more
11 appropriate in the recommendations section here but the work
12 of MSRC -- their best practices -- if the state and local
13 communities and local media companies had followed their
14 best practices, there would be a lot better coordination.
15 When you read through what they've put together, it's quite
16 a good action plan.

17 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think maybe that belongs in
18 our recommendations. I think to the extent we can note in
19 the pros of this section and highlight the fact that those
20 links were lacking and, if you have any suggestions for
21 that, let me know. I think the point is kind of in there,
22 but we can probably strengthen it a bit.

23 MR. PITTS: I think it is.

24 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Jim Jacot.

25 MR. JACOT: Yeah. I guess I'm a little bit surprised
26 that there's not a mention of the state EOCs in here.

1 During Katrina and the other hurricanes that happened this
2 year, we were in contact with the state EOCs, and while
3 there was areas where that communication did not bridge all
4 the problems and accreditation and access to the two
5 locations was one where they couldn't seem to provide much
6 help. In a number of other areas, we did find those in an
7 effective medium to communicate with the state and local
8 governments and get information back and forth.

9 MS. VICTORY: How did the communications work between
10 industry and the state EOCs? I mean is that something where
11 you guys have a standing, you know, body that you
12 participate in, in an on going relationship, or was this
13 something that was set up ad hoc in the wake of Katrina?
14 How did, just tell me a little bit about the relationship.

15 MR. JACOT: I don't specifically know the answer to
16 that, Nancy, other than we had a designated person in our
17 company who was in constant contact with the EOC during the
18 restoration process and a lot of the information we needed
19 to get or request we got a number. For instance, we got a
20 number of requests from the EOC about can we get wireless
21 service back up in this particular area? And we responded
22 to those. And so we had that was one of our when we wanted
23 to have communications back with the local jurisdictions,
24 we were grabbing a lot of this with this single point of
25 contact in our company.

1 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

2 MR. JACOT: But whether that was set up on an ad hoc
3 basis for that, my perception was, is that was a part of the
4 process that was pre-established before restoration and was
5 enacted, but I don't know that for sure.

6 MS. VICTORY: Okay. If you can get us some more
7 information about that because I think this is the first
8 that I kind of remember hearing that there was a something
9 other than an ad hoc line of communications between some of
10 the commercial providers and the State EOC. I've always
11 thought that there was some kind of discussions but not
12 aware of how those relationships were set up and what the
13 nature of those discussions were, so if it's possible, Tim,
14 I don't know if you have any more information on that.

15 MR. CANNON: Traditionally, I can't speak for all the
16 EOCs during Katrina but, traditionally in most of the EOCs,
17 there is -- they're all setup into ESFs, emergency support
18 functions. And I know that in ours, in the State of
19 Florida, we have private industry and the power companies
20 that actually provide people and send people to the EOC
21 prior to the storm. And they actually sit there at the ESF
22 desk to coordinate where power needs are, where the
23 priorities are if we have special needs shelters or if we
24 have, you know, certain areas that need power first,
25 hospitals. And they sit right at the EOC, which
26 traditionally if you're following all of the NIMS

1 and National Response Plans, they should have those private
2 industry partners sitting somewhere at the EOC if not at
3 another area of command where you have a line of
4 communications with them.

5 MS. VICTORY: Now we certainly heard that Florida
6 seems to have a very established process for that. You
7 know, I don't think we've heard much about that process for
8 the states that were most affected by Katrina. And I think
9 that's, you know, that's certainly something if we have
10 more information on that, I'd like to get that.

11 MR. CANNON: I'll get that from (Inaudible) too.

12 MR. FLESSAS: That would be very, very helpful.

13 MR. DAVIS: Yes. Gill may be able to answer that. I
14 don't know Gill.

15 MR. CANNON: In Harrison county -- I mean you had
16 some private industry partners at your EOC or --.

17 MR. BAILEY: We had, Steve. You were down there more
18 than I was. I don't think we had that many, did we?

19 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Well the, in Mississippi we did have
20 at the state EOC -- there was good representation and these
21 were all good points, but the problem is, and you've hit on
22 the very essence of the problem, is that the outside world
23 could communicate to the state EOC, but the state EOC could
24 not communicate to the local EOCs.

25 MS. VICTORY: Hmm.

1 MR. DELAHOUSEY: And Harrison and Hancock Counties'
2 total communications were cut off. We had people from the
3 state emergency management agency with us and the local
4 EOCs. They could not talk to their counterparts in
5 Jackson, Mississippi and that was the problem. And so
6 people were from around the country were calling Jackson to
7 the state EOC and committing to resources and finally, when
8 the state EOC couldn't communicate with us on the coast,
9 they just began deploying resources there without being
10 coordinated through the local EOCs and that we keep saying
11 it, "All disasters are local." And that is in fact the
12 case. It's more important then to be able to communicate
13 to the local EOC and have those representatives there and
14 that's where the breakdown occurred.

15 MR. CANNON: There were times where probably in the
16 first six or seven days that the way we communicated with
17 our law enforcements support functions was actually by
18 driving and telling them, I mean by mule even, basically.
19 You just drive back and forth and deliver messages to each
20 other.

21 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

22 MR. ROSENTHAL: I will tell you right now that the
23 State of Mississippi is looking at alternate communications
24 technologies to improve communication between Jackson and
25 the local EOCs. So that is going on now.

26 MS. VICTORY: All right. Thank you, Mike.

1 MS. SEARS: Nancy.

2 MS. VICTORY: Yes, Kay Sears.

3 MS. SEARS: Just along those lines on number three
4 the Federal Government and State and local coordination.
5 Just as I read that, especially the sentence about out of
6 the loop, I'm just wondering if we're not perhaps
7 conveying, or it might could be misconstrued that, I'm not
8 sure it was the local government that was out of the loop.
9 Maybe it was more of the Federal that was out of the loop
10 because what we've heard from this panel in all the
11 testimony is that the information on the ground at the
12 local level is really what held the key. You
13 know they knew where the communications needed to be
14 restored. They knew all of the inner workings of their
15 cities and their streets.

16 So I know we don't want to get into who the onus is
17 upon to communicate with who, but I just want to be sure
18 that we're not misstating who was out of the loop and
19 because, when the Feds came in with resources, those
20 resources couldn't be applied as effectively as they could
21 have if they had had that local knowledge or been
22 coordinating with the local community.

23 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Well, I also want to just make
24 sure the panel is in agreement that the local entities had
25 the information and were able to talk with the
26 communications providers because that is not what I

1 remember hearing from some of the discussions. So I want
2 to make sure we're getting it right because in terms of
3 having a anything other than ad hoc discussions with the
4 communications providers in an area. I'm not aware that
5 the, was sort of an organized local or even there may have
6 been something at the state EOC, but I don't know how
7 organized it was to really include all of the
8 communications providers in the area. I thought it was much
9 more ad hoc. But I'd definitely would like to get more
10 information on that.

11 MS. SEARS: And my point is more that the local, from
12 all the testimonies that we've heard, the local responders
13 are the ones that have the most critical information. Not,
14 I'm not really addressing the communication issue.

15 MS. VICTORY: Right.

16 MS. SEARS: Could they get that information out to
17 the right people?

18 MS. VICTORY: Right.

19 MS. SEARS: We've obviously heard they couldn't. But
20 in terms of recognizing somewhere in writing that of all the
21 testimonies --

22 MS. VICTORY: Good point.

23 MS. SEARS: We've heard the local guys are the ones
24 that had the information. And if we can solve the
25 communications problem as the Feds come into their states,
26 you know they can deploy their resources much more

1 effectively with that local knowledge than without it,
2 which it seems to be what happened this time around. And I
3 don't, I might be misrepresenting what I heard you say but-
4 -

5 MR. DELAHOUSEY: No. You're exactly right in our
6 situation. We did have southern link at the EOC with us; we
7 did have communications. We've converted the Board of
8 Supervisors meeting room to be the outlet for all media
9 representatives that that wanted to be there.

10 Where we could have done a better job of being able
11 to establish some type of communication between the EOC and
12 the TV stations, and the radio stations, directly through
13 wireless communications and -- We've included them in as
14 part of the counties' plan, so we've resolved that part of
15 it but, you know, I don't think in our situation -- I don't
16 think there was any lack of media being represented at the
17 seat of government in Harrison County in anyway.

18 MS. VICTORY: Well, let me ask you a question about
19 that. In terms of media, represent maybe for news gathering
20 purposes, but what about for communications recovery,
21 facilities recovery purposes, and going beyond, media,
22 including telephone and wireless. I guess that's the
23 question.

24 MR. DELAHOUSEY: The, you know the utilities were
25 represented there as well. There were designated PIOs for
26 the cities and the counties that were represented, given

1 continuous press releases and information.

2 MS. VICTORY: But in terms of a planning group for
3 coordinating the recovery effort, was that, I guess I'm
4 asking whether or not there is a group talking about some
5 of the same issues that the FCC and the NCC were talking
6 with industry about. Which was trying to facilitate
7 recovery access to fuel, access to the perimeter, sharing
8 of facilities, looking at what were they, sharing
9 information about what were the key areas that needed to be
10 restored in the communications facilities to support the
11 important governmental and law enforcement issues. And I
12 guess the question is were those sorts of discussions
13 taking place at the state or local level? I know it -
14 we've heard that they took place between Federal and
15 industry. But were they also taking place in an organized
16 manner at the local or state level?

17 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I think primarily through the 9/11
18 commission -- I think, yes that they were. And that all of
19 the governmental entities are represented through the 9/11
20 commissions who was the lead agency for ESF2 throughout the
21 disaster. Could it have been better? Yes. The biggest
22 problem, again, was that we had no problem communicating
23 locally but getting outside of the area to communicate to
24 our State capitol was almost impossible.

25 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

26 MR. DAVIS: I'd like to comment on that, and I'm

1 sorry for jumping on that.

2 MS. VICTORY: Thanks, Steve.

3 MR. DAVIS: But I think Steve is absolutely correct,
4 and I won't dispute that. But I think that maybe the
5 misunderstanding here is that there were different EOCs, and
6 I think that Marty Hadfield could help me to speak to this.
7 Marty and I had staff at one of the EOCs or one of the
8 parishes, and we had great communication and we were totally
9 informed and we had reported that on an the radio. There
10 were others that we were not allowed into; we couldn't even
11 get into the parish. We couldn't get into the EOC so I
12 guess what I would say, your mileage may differ.

13 Marty, could you talk about which EOCs we did have
14 trouble getting into. Because I do realize that, in the
15 case of Steve's area, that wasn't an issue. But I don't
16 want to generalize because there were issues in other
17 areas.

18 MR. HADFIELD: Well, I know we were set up in
19 Jefferson Parish EOC.

20 MR. DAVIS: Right.

21 MR. HADFIELD: And although we had previous to the
22 hurricane season communications with other EOCs, there
23 tended to be little interest in the broadcast aspect of
24 providing a, both a position to work from and other
25 supports that would be necessary to have someone from the
26 broadcast side specifically located at individual EOCs. I

1 don't recall the names of some of the other parishes that
2 had contacted us in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Rita,
3 but several of them suddenly became aware that there were
4 broadcast capabilities available to them if they only had
5 either allowed or entertained the possibility of putting in
6 some kind of a link from those facilities.

7 We now have in place two, at least two other EOCs,
8 communication links that will provide capabilities for the
9 EOC personnel to be in touch with broadcast entities and
10 vice versa, which is oftentimes -- we need to prompt them
11 to give us updated information. But more often than not,
12 it's them having an incident occur in real time and needing
13 to be able to jump on the air, and that was one of the
14 things that these other parishes learned the value of that
15 because they heard all the stories going on about what's
16 going on in Jefferson Parish but nothing from theirs.

17 So I'm not sure if that completely addresses the line
18 that Steve was talking about, but there have been inroads
19 made in that area. But I think part of it's just an
20 awareness that we actually have capabilities in our remote
21 pick up frequency assignments that are available to put in
22 some infrastructure that these people can operate on the
23 fly. So again, its awareness, cooperation, and continued
24 dialog on a local level to make sure that happens next
25 time.

26 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

1 MR. ROSENTHAL: Could I touch a little more on that?

2 MS. VICTORY: Mike.

3 MR. ROSENTHAL: Situation to between the coast and
4 Jackson because I think its an unusual situation that we
5 were able to keep the folks at the EOC that we were dealing
6 with or that Steve was dealing with the Mississippi Power
7 connected, but we were unable to connect to Jackson because
8 we don't have service in Jackson and are unable to get
9 roaming into Jackson. So while the technology was up and
10 running, and the ability to communicate with Jackson could
11 have been in there, there were some industry-specific
12 issues that were presenting that.

13 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I think that there a perhaps an easy
14 solution. And that is, you know, FEMA determines how your
15 comprehensive emergency management plans have to be written
16 or should be written. They give the guidelines on that.
17 And I believe it's the ESF2 section on. Perhaps a
18 recommendation from this group that in the rewrite of all
19 of the ESF2 plans and this, whether it occurs at a
20 regional, a state, or a local level that it's specifically
21 the EFS2 must include members of the media as part of that
22 planning process. That if that were published in an FEMA
23 guidelines, and people had to write their plans in order to
24 be eligible for grant funding, I feel reasonably sure that
25 it would be included and there would be good representation
26 at every level -- local, state, and regional level.

1 MS. VICTORY: All right. Good suggestion.

2 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I can send that information to you
3 if you'd like.

4 MS. VICTORY: That'd be great. Sheriff Beary.

5 MR. BEARY: Well, I have access to plans is great for
6 a natural disasters and things like that. You get into some
7 real concerns when you're dealing with tactical events.

8 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

9 MR. BEARY: The city of Seattle learned a very severe
10 lesson when they put all their emergency operations
11 procedures on the Internet during one of the economic
12 summits where the violent protesters and radical people
13 showed up and were throwing firebombs at the law
14 enforcement officers and fire fighters. So that has to be
15 pretty specific because you don't want to put the way
16 you're going to react to something in a tactical situation
17 so that the whole world knows and even, and the problem is
18 most of the bad guys these days watch the same stations we
19 watch.

20 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

21 MR. BEARY: So I just had that as a caveat.

22 MS. VICTORY: Excellent point. Excellent point.

23 Anything else on this? Otherwise, I think maybe we'll take
24 a crack at trying to smooth this over a little bit and send
25 that out in the rewrite on Wednesday. Tim.

26 MR. CANNON: Just that this may semantics under the

1 recovery coordination -- The whole leading paragraph doesn't
2 say anything about how the flooding affected the recovery
3 and coordination. It talks about wind and rain just if you
4 --

5 MS. VICTORY: Good point.

6 MR. CANNON: took this apart and, you know, just read
7 this section of it. I think the flooding had a significant
8 impact on the recovery effort.

9 MS. VICTORY: Good point and we'll add that.

10 MR. BAILEY: I just have --

11 MS. VICTORY: Gill Bailey.

12 MR. BAILEY: On state and local industry, state and
13 local government coordination is -- we did have eventually
14 coordination with the industry as they came in to provide,
15 you know, supplemental services, the mesh networks,
16 etcetera. However, as part of our local rewrite of EFS2 is
17 we're going to designate a pre-designated location for
18 these people to respond to and coordinate, to make sure
19 that the resources that they bring in are utilized most
20 effectively. And I think that's something that needs to be
21 looked at the state level -- also a clearinghouse at the
22 state of what's coming into the area so that they can be
23 deployed effectively. That was an issue we ran into. We
24 had people showing up with a lot of valuable resources that
25 either A. Didn't know where to go or B. Local government
26 didn't know those resources were available to be deployed.

1 So that's one thing we're working to readdress on the local
2 level.

3 MS. VICTORY: All right. Excellent point. Anything
4 else on Roman II? Okay. Let's go to Roman III, which is
5 focused on first responder communications. Here we
6 basically indicated for the reasons discussed in the first
7 section that this appeared to be a problem of operability
8 as opposed to interoperability. Although, there were
9 certainly interoperability issues that were raised as well.

10 We quote Sheriff Beary that public safety officials
11 plan for disasters but that Hurricane Katrina was a
12 catastrophe, and clearly, the scope and magnitude of this
13 event was much bigger than a lot of the public safety plans
14 and contingency plans that had been implemented. We noted
15 that there did not appear to be a large amount of stockpiles
16 of key equipment that would be on hand either to make quick
17 repairs or to address help from neighboring jurisdictions
18 that would come in to assist. We also indicated that in
19 many cases there were not plans for redundance systems that
20 could be used when the primary system went down, in large
21 part or completely.

22 Finally, we also indicate that we did not really hear
23 much about call forwarding or number portability, and we
24 were aware that there were a large number of local and
25 government offices that did need to relocate and did not
26 appear that they had plans in place for prearrangements for

1 call forwarding or number portability to what that remote
2 location would be. We did note that the public safety
3 relied heavily on their equipment vendors, and the
4 equipment vendors did react very quickly and, apparently,
5 very well in terms of getting the systems up and running.
6 We did indicate as well that the panel was made aware that
7 there were more nontraditional public safety technologies
8 that could have served as backup for emergency
9 communications and, in some cases, was deployed
10 during the storm. We noted a couple like satellite
11 infrastructure and paging that seemed to be particularly
12 resilient to this type of a disaster because their
13 facilities are, you know, largely through satellite link.
14 But we did also note that there were other types of
15 technology like Y-Fine, Y-Max where they may have been able
16 to set up a system very, very quickly to cover an area.
17 Noted that lack of training on alternative backup equipment
18 was a problem -- sometimes this backup equipment was part
19 of contingency planning, sometimes it was just handed to
20 people in an ad hoc manner, but we did hear stories of
21 folks not fully understanding how to use them to maximum
22 effectiveness, and this may have been a problem in
23 exercising the full utility of these resources. We were
24 also informed that there were communications assets that
25 could have been deployed and weren't both from the federal
26 government level. We were informed that there were some

1 Federal assets that might have been brought to bear but
2 were not utilized often because state and local folks
3 didn't know about them and know that they needed to ask
4 about them. And also, we did hear that there were certain
5 private sector folks who offered to bring their equipment
6 in, and since there did not appear to be a central place
7 for fielding those inquiries, sometimes those offers, which
8 might have been helpful, were not fully utilized. Did talk
9 about inoperability -- then draft a little bit again
10 recognizing that operability was the main concern
11 but that there was certainly a problem here, particularly
12 with respect to the limited number of mutual aid channels
13 that were relied upon heavily in this particular event.
14 And we did indicate that there are some solutions, such as
15 IP Gateways that might be very helpful for improving inner
16 operability in the near term and that certainly training is
17 needed to make sure you can utilize this equipment.

18
19 We talked a bit also -- there's a section here on
20 PSAP routing. Talking about the fact that Katrina, in this
21 case, disabled both primary and secondary PSAPs. You know,
22 so there was a contingency plan, but the contingency plans
23 were often overwhelmed by this particular event. And we
24 did recognize that as far as designating a further away
25 PSAP that perhaps FCC regulations that would restrict have
26 a PSAP across a lot of boundary is in an impediment in to

1 doing this.

2 And then finally, we do have a section, a small
3 section, on emergency medical communications, indicating
4 that this was a community that seemed to have particular
5 problems with their communications, and that in terms of
6 contingency planning, backup communication plan, and
7 general information about priority service like GETS and
8 WPS and TSP that this is a community that is probably
9 lacking in that information, and that's probably an area
10 that needs to be addressed. Also indicated that emergency
11 medical personnel did not always seem to be integrated into
12 a locality's public safety communications planning. And
13 that is section three. So, any particular comments on this
14 section? Okay. Sold. Certainly, if there are any edits
15 that you guys have for line edits or additional information
16 that we missed, please go ahead and send it my way.

17 And the last section, section four is on emergency
18 communications to the public. Now we've talked about that
19 at length today and it -- maybe that there've been some
20 other issues raised in our discussions today that we might
21 want to augment this section about. Basically, we talk
22 about two types of emergency communication to the public.
23 One the emergency alerting system and the second more
24 general or other types of emergency communications to the
25 public either through other notification means or through
26 the broadcast and cable media. With respect to the

1 emergency alerting system, we indicate that interesting
2 thing is this seemed to be utilized by the National Weather
3 Service during Katrina to provide information but, from all
4 reports, never appeared to have been activated at the local
5 level to provide more localized evacuation and other
6 information, and so it seems like this is an existing and
7 effective means of reaching out to the public. And it just
8 wasn't utilized. In terms of limitations on coverage, EAS
9 is great because it can go out over the broadcast and
10 networks and reach folks that are at home watching their TV
11 but, obviously, there is a segment of the population that
12 won't be covered by those notifications, folks who may not
13 be in front of the TV at the time or -

14 MR. DAVIS: EAS is also on the radio.

15 MS. VICTORY: EAS is on radio. Correct, correct.
16 Thank you. Good correction. But folks who may not be with
17 a device that is transmitting the EAS message at the time
18 may be out and about doing something else and, therefore,
19 we talked a little bit about that. Perhaps there are other
20 notification technologies out there that can more
21 individually reach folks. I know that the FCC has a
22 rulemaking looking at this issue but also indicated that
23 there are technologies that can also allow for much more
24 targeted notification to particular individuals as well.

1 Let me just finish this more, and then we'll go
2 to the comments on this. We also have a section in here on
3 particular needs of disabled and non-English speaking
4 Americans and indicating that the broadcast industry has
5 taken significant steps with sign language interpreters,
6 and closed captioning, and even broadcasting in a second
7 language where there's a large number of non-English
8 speaking residents in the community. But we've definitely
9 heard as a panel that not all of these steps have been
10 effective and that, you know, we also heard that personnel
11 who provided these critical services may not have been part
12 of the critical emergency team that remained behind when
13 everybody evacuated. Therefore, leaving stations without
14 those capabilities and -- noted that disabled individuals
15 also had a difficult time at shelters and recovery
16 areas because often while banks of phones were donated and
17 deployed, the specialized equipment they needed may not have
18 been donated and deployed in those locations. So I know I've
19 gotten already some suggestions for additional issues to
20 raise in this section, but let me throw this open for
21 additional comment. Marty.

22 MR. HADFIELD: Sure. Thank you. I was just going to
23 suggest that I just -- through this whole process that we've
24 been going through, I have this sense that local officials
25 had a hesitation or perhaps an unawareness that they had
26 the ability to issue an EAS. Even if they had the

1 equipment, I know that the EOC at Jefferson Parish -- we
2 have an EAS unit encoder/decoder combo sitting there. They
3 could've activated it at anytime. I -- maybe it was two
4 prong part of it was since we did have a news and staff
5 presence there, there may have been a reluctance to issue
6 an EAS just because they knew they had an open line of
7 communication, and perhaps they missed the vision that that
8 could have opened some additional doors. I think going
9 forward with this information in hand people, and now the
10 people are talking a lot more to their local EOCs.
11 Hopefully, they'll be more comfortable with activating
12 that, and I just wanted to say this.

13 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think that's an important
14 point and, obviously, one of the working groups did come up
15 with the recommendation for urging the FCC to educate state
16 and local personnel about this resource and how to activate
17 it, so we can take full use of it. Dave Flessas.

18 MR. FLESSAS: Just another angle on that I guess.
19 There's -- we want to make sure we're not logically
20 disconnected there where we emphasized lack of activation of
21 existing systems in one paragraph and then talk about the
22 need to explore alternative methods later. You know, we
23 probably should get our current act together first --

24 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

25 MR. FLESSAS: Before we go out looking for new stuff.

26 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. That's a good point. We try to

1 keep them in separate paragraphs just for that, but I agree
2 with you. We'll try to make sure that there's a definite
3 demarcation between the two. Okay. Others.

4 MR. DAVIS: Are we into recommendations or just what
5 went on?

6 MS. VICTORY: I think right on, let's just work on
7 this section now, and handle the recommendations perhaps
8 after lunch at this point.

9 MR. CANNON: I just had a comment.

10 MS. VICTORY: Sure, Tim.

11 MR. CANNON: Under three, first responder
12 communication.

13 MS. VICTORY: Yep. We can go back there, no problem.

14 MR. CANNON: I notice that the first paragraph about
15 two-thirds of the way down -- it says in contrast neither
16 Baton Rouge or Jackson.

17 MS. VICTORY: We've already, we're going to take
18 care of that.

19 MR. CANNON: Oh. You are?

20 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think I understand what you're
21 going to make to say a very different circumstances and --

22 MR. CANNON: Okay.

23 MS. VICTORY: And it's been pointed out to us, and we
24 have a good fix for that.

1 MR. CANNON: All right.

2 MS. VICTORY: Thanks. Anything else? One thing we
3 certainly heard this morning, and had discussed at length,
4 was the problem of confusing information going out to the
5 public. And I think I know Billy Pitts had suggested that
6 that might be a good thing that we add. So, I think one of
7 the things we'll try to do with Billy's help, and anybody
8 else who wants to throw in some suggestions, is put in a
9 paragraph in this last section four noting that there did
10 appear to be confusing information that was made available
11 to the public through because there were so many different
12 sources and apparently no one official source or no small
13 number of official sources that came through.

14 So, we'll try to draft something up, and perhaps one
15 of the things we may want to talk about when we get to the
16 recommendations this afternoon, is to whether or not we do
17 want to make any sort of a recommendation or send back to
18 Working Group Three to make a -- come up with a
19 recommendation on trying to deal with this issue, and I
20 think we heard some good suggestions from our MSRC speaker
21 this morning. Anything else on this section of the report?

22 Well, I think what I'd like to do is maybe start with
23 Working Group One and go through a couple of the
24 recommendations and maybe just take a break sometime around
25 12:30 for lunch, but let's see if we can get through some of

1 the Working Group One recommendations first. Okay. So let
2 me turn this over to Marion.

3 MS. SCOTT: All right. Thank you. We started with
4 about seven topics that we were going to work on in the
5 group as our ultimate challenge, and we have widdled those
6 down to about four and a half and with each of those team
7 leaders to talk about the recommendations and your feeling
8 about whether or not you feel that recommendation is
9 complete or needs some additional work. And, Dave, do you
10 want to start with that?

11 MR. FLESSAS: Sure. I'll speak to the readiness
12 checklist sub team under network reliability and resiliency.
13 Our recommendation includes suggesting that the FCC work
14 with and encourage each industry sector through trade
15 associations to be sure we've got industry specific
16 readiness requirements. Make sure that we're using
17 industry best practices as set forth in groups such as MSRC
18 and NRC. And make sure that the check list is fairly as
19 comprehensive as possible, which should include development
20 and implementation of business continuity plans, power
21 reserves, spare levels credentialing, coordinating with
22 with EOC, many of the things we've talked about in the
23 findings to this point.

24 Making sure that we've got exercising identify in
25 that readiness checklist and training, I think training was
26 mentioned repeatedly during the course of the feedback that

1 we got in our investigation. And then make sure that we
2 have developed and have a practice plan in place to
3 identify key players and make sure we've got multiple
4 channels of communication to contact them and those
5 multiple channels might include pagers, satellite phones,
6 the Internet, black berries, etcetera. So this
7 recommendation is that the FCC works with groups to develop
8 a very comprehensive checklist as a starting point for
9 readiness.

10 MS. SCOTT: Good, thank you. Keith Dean was the
11 Chairman of the second subcommittee backup and the
12 nontraditional technologies. And I think what we've
13 discovered during these meetings and these panel discussions
14 and all the speakers that have come in is that there are
15 technologies out there that I frankly was not aware of. So
16 we have some opportunity to look at some backup and other
17 non-traditional technologies different from what we see
18 today to give us even more reliability in the network. And
19 that what we're asking the FCC to do is to take steps to
20 educate about these non-traditional technologies, and we
21 were thinking that we could do that in some forms that
22 already exist. People who do that kind of research at the
23 local or regional level. Just kind of educate them on what
24 they are. And we've listed about five of them there and
25 then, Captain Yoes, would you like to talk about the one
26 that you'd like to add to this list?

1 MR. YOES: I'd like to add the National Fraternal
2 Order of Police Conference August 13th through 16th in
3 Louisville, Kentucky. There will be about seven thousand
4 attendees there.

5 MS. SCOTT: Okay. So we've got some good and varied
6 forums at which to introduce these backup or nontraditional
7 technologies to others and I hope that, of course, it gives
8 some examples of what some of those technologies are. But
9 as I said, I've been in the communications industry for 25
10 years, and I saw some things that I had never seen before
11 during these presentations, some real opportunities for us.
12 Marty, do you want to take number three?

13 MS. VICTORY: Patrick, could you email to me the
14 information on that? And we'll clean up the -- to see if
15 the numbering or the lettering got screwed up here, we'll
16 clean that up as well.

17 MS. SCOTT: Okay. Thanks. Marty.

18 MR. HADFIELD: Could I ask a question about the --

19 MS. SCOTT: Sure.

20 MR. HADFIELD: About Section II there?

21 MS. SCOTT: Sure.

22 MR. HADFIELD: Is there a reason that it's limited to
23 public safety? I mean, couldn't we encourage the FCC to be
24 the involved in other telecommunications forums? Like, I
25 know the FCC at least traditionally and NOAA, for instance,
26 go to the National Association of Broadcasters Conventions,

1 and I would think that there are many sectors that would
2 be far ahead if they knew about some of these technologies
3 coming directly from the commission as here are some
4 resources that are available. So, I don't know if it's
5 appropriate to keep it focused public safety or not. But I
6 just wanted to throw that out.

7 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think when the Working Group
8 was considering this, they felt that for the greatest need
9 for backup communications was probably in the public safety
10 community. But in terms of educating the rest of industry,
11 I think that's fine -- that probably we'll bump up a little
12 bit against a resource issue for the FCC, but I think
13 that's certainly we can mention that the FCC may want to
14 consider doing this on a broader basis to all sectors of
15 the industry, maybe putting public safety as the priority
16 for education and noting as well. Maybe that's a way of
17 addressing your comment, which I think is a very good one.

18 MR. HADFIELD: Okay. Thank you. Regarding automatic
19 waivers and STAs, we found that the FCC did in fact on
20 August 31st issue a procedures to promote the resumption of
21 radio and television broadcast service in areas impacted by
22 Hurricane Katrina. That went a long way to get things
23 started. But within our company and our industry,
24 percolated the thought that there are quite a few other
25 areas that could be touched on, and I think we've done a
26 fair job. I'm certainly open to anybody's comments with

1 additional items that they'd like to see added in here.

2 Two things that I'd kind of noodled here while we
3 were around is seeing if the FCC can modify their CDBS
4 online access requesting for special temporary authorities
5 to expand the capabilities of that service right now.
6 They've got numerous other application systems available in
7 CDBS, and they've started an STA request area, but I
8 believe it's very limited in scope as to what type of STAs
9 are available there. If they could see that, it's
10 appropriate to expand that. I think that would bring us
11 some additional latitude or kind of activity with the FCC.

12 The other one is in an area of seeking waivers for
13 the activation and post event reporting requirements that
14 are related to the transmission of point-to-point
15 communications during an emergency by broadcasts. You
16 know, we're normally a point to multiple point, in essence,
17 transmission medium. But one of the things that we found
18 during the hurricanes was that people would call in and ask
19 right on the air, in essence, to be able to address
20 specific sectors or people. Other individuals, family
21 members sometimes, so it became kind of a point-to-point
22 where they may not be able to call each other on the
23 telephone but they may have telephone circuits in to us
24 or other, we may run into them on the street or something.

1 And the FCC's pretty liberal in doing that somewhat on the
2 fly. But there are some requirements where I believe a
3 public official is supposed to request the point-to-point
4 communication occurrence and then, secondarily, there is
5 supposed to be a follow-up where somehow we're supposed to
6 keep track of this stuff and report. And I think those are
7 two areas that we'd like to see some added latitude in the
8 waiver arena.

9 MS. VICTORY: Okay. So these would be additions to
10 this recommendation.

11 MR. HADFIELD: To this list, yeah. I guess I would
12 call that item nine or something to that list. But I can
13 put some of that verbiage together, and I'll make sure that
14 gets to you.

15 MS. VICTORY: That would be helpful, and on the first
16 point that you raised, maybe perhaps we want to indicate
17 that the FCC should expand opportunities for, you know,
18 electronic filing for some of these.

19 MR. HADFIELD: Yes.

20 MR. ROSENTHAL: Could I ask a question?

21 MS. VICTORY: Yes. Mike. Mike.

22 MR. ROSENTHAL: Suggest on number two on the
23 nontraditional technologies and push talk communications
24 isn't really nontraditional; it's been around quite a
25 while. But there are newer bridging technologies that
26 allow bridging between one push to talk system and another,

1 and there are new gateways that allow direct connection
2 between a carrier's fairly modern push to talk systems that
3 would enable one carrier's, you know, for instance, a IDN
4 push to talk system to talk to IDN push to talk system. I
5 think that might come into the rubric of the nontraditional
6 technologies that we'd want to look at and think about how
7 that can create a very large, very wide area of public
8 safety push to talk systems.

9 MS. VICTORY: And would it be appropriate to call
10 that bridging technology and I gateways that will facilitate
11 inner operability?

12 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yep.

13 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Marion.

14 MS. SCOTT: Okay. Outage reporting, Dave, you and
15 John Thomas oms worked on that. Would you like to speak to
16 this one please?

17 MR. FLESSAS: We did, yeah. The language in item
18 four speaks to our over urging need to make sure we've got
19 coordinated requirements for outage reporting, making sure
20 between that the FCC has a role to play with other Federal
21 agencies to make sure we've got a single repository for
22 that. I think during the course of these events there is a
23 lot of well intention desire to solicit and collect as much
24 information as possible. Some of those requests are
25 sometimes competing and conflicting, and there is an
26 important function and value to be added in terms of having

1 a single point of contact for that.

2 Again we talked, speak to the FCC working with
3 industry members to make sure we've got a consolidated data
4 set, in other words, knowing what we're looking for as we,
5 prior to the event coming in and asking information once and
6 making sure that's consistently applied. I think, again, as
7 we went through the course of the event, there were changes
8 to those requirements that makes it difficult to catch up
9 as you're trying to respond to one request and get a
10 midstream change that makes the that process more
11 difficult. In that light, the frequency of reporting is an
12 important thing in terms of our ability to respond to that
13 making sure that reporting requirements are specified as
14 part of the plan that we talked about in the first item in
15 our recommendations. And then we felt that once a day
16 would be kind of an appropriate level of communications in
17 terms of usefulness in our, the response ability to provide
18 meaningful information, and we want to make sure at the end
19 that we've got all proprietary information is kept
20 proprietary and kept confidential and we may need to just
21 beef up that language a little and make sure that any
22 carrier specific data, you know, that there's appropriate
23 safeguards around making sure carrier specific data is kept
24 very closely held. I don't know if that requires
25 nondisclosure agreements or what we would need for that. So

1 if I may, I might add another sentence in there.

2 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Maybe we want to just say that
3 the something like appropriate safeguards and --

4 MR. FLESSAS: Yeah. Just --

5 MS. VICTORY: Try to figure out what the recognize
6 mechanism is.

7 MR. FLESSAS: Right. Just be sure that's locked in.

8 MS. VICTORY: Or carrier specific data, sharing
9 carrier.

10 MR. FLESSAS: I think a great need for of a unified
11 reporting structure during events.

12 MS. SCOTT: Okay, Dave. Thank you. The other item
13 that we worked on as a team was EAS communications to
14 disabled and non-English speaking, and I see that that's
15 covered later in the report, so we may add comment at that
16 time.

17 MS. VICTORY: Sounds great.

18 MS. SCOTT: Okay.

19 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Great. I think, as you'll see
20 we've Working Group One reported on all of these as they
21 were in progress at the last meeting, but this is the first
22 time that the committee is actually seeing them in a full
23 written form. So, as you are reflecting on them, if anyone
24 has any particular concerns and noted some of the comments
25 made already about adding the bridging technologies and
26 gateways to the backup and non-traditional technologies.

1 Adding the Fraternal Order of Police conference to that.
2 Adding that the FCC sure consider educating other industry
3 segments as well as appropriate about these technologies.

4 And we had on the other change -- we had is on
5 automatic waivers and STAs. Marty's two points about
6 expanding electronic filing opportunities and adding the
7 waiver for point-to-point transmissions, which we'll try to
8 work in. And on outage reporting, adding a sentence at the
9 end on making sure that the FCC takes appropriate safeguards
10 to ensure the protection of carrier specific data when
11 sharing with other government agencies, so we can put that
12 in. That's the first section of recommendations. Any
13 other comments on those? Okay. Why don't we take a break
14 for lunch and try to get back here? Can we get back by ten
15 after 1:00? That's about 50 minutes or so. That sounds
16 great all right. We'll see you then.

17 [Recess 12:20 p.m.]

18 [Reconvene 1:15 p.m.]

19 MS. VICTORY: Why don't we get started; I think a
20 couple of other folks who will straggle in but, since I've
21 been apprised that people do have some late afternoon
22 flights, want to try to make sure we make as much progress
23 as we can. So welcome back, and we are now up to the
24 recommendations that working group two has worked on, and
25 so let me go ahead and call on Steve Davis to present
26 those.

1 I think one thing I'll mention before Steve starts
2 speaking about some of these is at the last meeting we were
3 briefed on a number of these recommendations under Working
4 Group Two. However, the reason they're bolded in the latest
5 draft and designated as new or revised is because these
6 recommendations were kind of reorganized a bit to pull some
7 things out. Particularly, the first three were kind of
8 reorganized a little bit. So with that, I'll turn this over
9 to Steve Davis.

10 MR. DAVIS: Well thank you, Nancy. I appreciated
11 that, and unfortunately, for me, one of my key teammates
12 here, Joey Booth, was unable to attend, so I'll have to
13 present his portion as well. As Nancy mentioned, we've
14 already to some extent stated the goals that we had, and
15 I'm just going to review these briefly and then, of course,
16 open it up to any questions, comment, or adjustments that
17 you'd like to make.

18 One thing we started with was the idea of a National
19 Credentialing System or guideline, and we have decided that
20 the NSTAC recommendation and also the use of the NIMS
21 training, National Incident Management System, would be what
22 we recommend the FCC use. We basically are saying the FCC
23 would work with appropriate Federal department and agencies
24 to develop credentialing requirements -- sort of what we
25 talked about earlier today with regard to whether it's
26 going to be a hangtag on a car or individual credentials

1 carried by personnel, etcetera. So credentialing was a
2 part of our plan, and we know that for people to go into an
3 area where they could be facing a crisis situation a
4 certain level of training is required. And that's why
5 we're thinking that the National Incident Management System
6 training would be a prerequisite for somebody obtaining
7 this sort of credentialing.

8 The second piece that we had was emergency responder
9 status. Now I want to differentiate emergency responder
10 from first responder. We in telecommunications and
11 broadcast fields do recognize that the true first
12 responders are those people seated around the table here
13 such as Mr. Delahousey, and Beary, and Yoes, and other
14 police, fire, medical professionals who really are the
15 first responders and need to get in there before anybody
16 else. We would certainly not want to interfere with their
17 access or imply that media or infrastructure providers
18 needed to have that same level of access. We do believe
19 that there is a secondary level of access that's
20 appropriate because these important first responders often
21 cannot do their jobs if they are not provided with
22 communication infrastructure, whether that's to
23 communicate out to the public or to communicate amongst
24 themselves. So we are asking for something that NSTAC also
25 recommended, which is what they call emergency responder
26 private sector. And those would be those people like Kay's

1 company, and mine, and Billy Pitt's, and all the others who
2 are involved -- Southern Wireless, involved in attempting to
3 get into an area and restore communication infrastructure
4 that we would then have the ability to get in there and to
5 do some good in a structured and coordinated manner. And
6 so we would adopt most of NSTAC's recommendations. We had
7 a few comments and augmentations that we wanted to add to
8 that specifically to make sure that broadcast, and cable,
9 and some other media were, in fact, specifically identified
10 as belonging to the group that would qualify for that
11 status.

12 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. And the thing Steve based on the
13 discussion this morning -- I might suggest a slight
14 reworking of these words to make clear that we support
15 NSTAC's recommendation but believe it should be augmented
16 to include media companies as well. And I don't think
17 that's necessarily clear from the way this is written. I
18 think we probably need to do that.

19 MR. DAVIS: And I believe that NSTAC was supportive
20 of that from our brief conversation this morning but felt
21 it was beyond their purview to make such a recommendation.

22 MS. VICTORY: Right.

23 MR. DAVIS: Finally, the bigger part, and Joey
24 Booth's part, so I wish again that he could report on this,
25 and I know that he would love to, but in fact, you'll be
26 pleased to know that he is right now involved in a disaster

1 planning exercise and program to get ready for the very
2 onset of the hurricane season, which is expected to hit
3 sometime around June. So while we do our planning, he in
4 fact does his concurrently. And we're talking about
5 forming a regional state coordinating body. Although it's
6 true that all disasters are local, and things are going to
7 happen at the local level, many companies such as mine, or
8 Kay's, or Michael Rosenthal's are bringing people in to
9 solve problems from out of the impacted area. And we need
10 to have a way to bring people in and have them work well
11 with the local people who are on the scene. And so
12 we're hoping that by establishing a state regional
13 coordination body, although we wouldn't attempt to legislate
14 how to respond in a disaster, we would try and establish a
15 framework by which a response could be built and have some
16 hope of success and not becoming some sort of a confused
17 matter of goat rodeo as it were.

18 So we're hoping that we can facilitate communication,
19 coordination between our infrastructure providers and
20 between the broadcast media and those people who are on the
21 scene and the emergency operation center people. We're
22 going to want to work on identifying vulnerabilities in the
23 communications and telecommunications and media
24 infrastructure and to develop strategies to medicate those
25 vulnerabilities. Whether it's that single switch that one
26 of the police officers brought up to us in our last meeting

1 or whether it's a server or a tower or some other piece of
2 infrastructure that becomes a key component in attempting
3 to maintain meaningful communications in an impacted area -
4 We're looking again -- credentialing also figure factors
5 into this. But we would want the state regional
6 coordinating body to administer the credentialing
7 piece so that whether that's issued on an annual basis and,
8 if I can digress a minute, I would say that I would support
9 them. We can discuss this the ability of interested of
10 interested parties to apply on an annual basis for those
11 rather than waiting until there is a disaster. Because as
12 Mr. Hadfield pointed out, sometimes these earthquakes and
13 9/11 -- they don't schedule that in advance to where we can
14 get a pass, you know, and be ready to respond. So I think
15 to have those passes, whether you're a power company or a
16 telephone service provider or wireless or cable or
17 satellite or broadcast, I would think that it would behoove
18 us to have those credentials available to us and have them
19 on hand.

20 Also, we want to develop a facilitating inclusion in
21 the state's emergency preparedness plan one or more clearly
22 identified staging areas. So that we can know where to meet
23 and so often we can work together whether it's sharing fuel,
24 sharing equipment, sharing media trucks -- We need an area
25 where that can happen and were hoping that a state regional
26 coordinating body could help make that happen. While the

1 local people are busy actually addressing the emergency at
2 hand, they wouldn't have to be called aside to devote too
3 much time to trying to deal with those sorts of requests.

4 And finally, post disaster they would help with the
5 sharing of information and the coordinating of resources to
6 repair the key communications infrastructure components.
7 And that would be -- they would assign the priorities,
8 what's most important, hearing from people like Sheriff
9 Beary or Captain Yoes, what needs to be repaired so that
10 their communications can be back up and running so that
11 they can serve the public and do what they need to do. So
12 if they knew who to call and who to get to, and each of
13 them didn't have to call fifty different providers to get
14 their switch fixed but could go to one central coordinating
15 point that would then fan out and get the proper people to
16 come in and make those repairs that would be a huge benefit
17 of a coordinating body such as we're suggesting. So that
18 is really the post disaster piece of the state regional
19 coordinating body.

20 MS. VICTORY: Steve maybe it would be appropriate to
21 take some comments or questions on the first three, they're
22 kind of interrelated --

23 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

24 MS. VICTORY: and before we get to some of the other
25 ones. I know -- I think I have a comment on the State
26 Regional Coordination's Body, so the part A of that as to

1 what pre-disaster, what the parties should meet on and
2 share. I think what we may want to do on that is maybe
3 limit the activities to developing channels of
4 communications, and conducting joint preparedness response
5 plans, and conducting joint exercises, and deleting the
6 rest of it because I think some of those other areas really
7 get into a sharing of proprietary information problem. And
8 I think if we were trying to explain what's appropriate to
9 share and what's not appropriate to share I think we would
10 be expending a lot of energy and maybe never reaching
11 agreement.

12 So I think what I would propose on this one is
13 perhaps to change that last sentence of 3A to read that the
14 party should meet on a periodic basis to develop channels
15 of communications both pre and post disaster, to conduct
16 joint preparedness and response plans, and to conduct joint
17 exercises. And I think that's probably appropriate. I
18 think some of the post disaster sharing and coordinating
19 will get at some of the problems.

20 MR. DAVIS: Uh-Huh.

21 MS. VICTORY: You know what we're talking about but I
22 think otherwise we sort of run into a sharing of proprietary
23 information problem which would be difficult to solve.

24 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. That makes a lot of sense to us.

25 MS. VICTORY: Do you people have any problems with
26 that?

1 MR. DAVIS: Anybody else have a problem? I would say
2 that in my case the sharing of whom to contact is more
3 important.

4 MS. VICTORY: Is the most important.

5 MR. DAVIS: Is more important than the actual
6 technical specifics because then those people could meet and
7 contact one another and address the specific technical
8 matters that would arise.

9 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

10 MR. DAVIS: Other comments, thoughts. Yes, sir.

11 MR. FLESSAS: Not on that issue.

12 MS. VICTORY: And I'm going to remind everybody just
13 for purpose of our sound folks, if you could make sure
14 you're pulling the microphone close to you and if I don't
15 identify you, when I call on you, if you would do so to
16 help our sound folks. So Dave Flessas.

17 MR. FLESSAS: Thank you. Another question on the
18 State Regional Coordination Body is that recommendation,
19 should that not be a straight forward as saying that we
20 support the NSTAC recommendation for that coordination or is
21 that --

22 MS. VICTORY: You know you raise a good point.
23 Because I think their recommendation was for an industry
24 only body. And I think that may be something that we talk
25 about because as to whether or not that group would support
26 an industry only coordination body that would somehow be a

1 subgroup of this one.

2 I think one of the things we've talked about is a
3 need for some of the state and local folks to be involved
4 in this as well. And so maybe what we're talking about is
5 a group and a subgroup. And the subgroup is more like what
6 the NSTAC recommended.

7 But I don't know how folks feel about changing the
8 recommendation to embrace that idea as well. But there are
9 certain things that industry is going to do just and meet
10 among themselves. And then there are other places where you
11 want to make sure they're having a continuing dialog with
12 the state and local officials. That's a excellent point.

13 MS. SEARS: Is the NSTAC recommendation going into
14 the linkage between that group, state and local?

15 MR. FLESSAS: No.

16 MS. SEARS: Because if they don't we would have to
17 define that.

18 MS. VICTORY: I don't think it does. I think its
19 just industry only.

20 MS. SEARS: So I think that's a critical missing
21 piece.

22 MR. JACOT: Jim Jacot. As I understood, what was the
23 success point in NSTAC, they were recommending the
24 interfaces to some of the Government groups. I can't
25 remember their specific statement. They would have
26 interfaces with that group that would be dedicated

1 interfaces to support that communication.

2 But I believe their statement was they wouldn't
3 include the Government groups in their telecommunications
4 coordination body.

5 MS. VICTORY: I think that's right, and I got the
6 impression that those interfaces were going to be activated
7 in a disaster maybe not on a routine basis.

8 MR. JACOT: Yeah. Certainly, I don't think they're
9 specific to that point.

10 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. So it's a slightly different
11 concept and maybe it's one where we -- maybe we want to
12 address so we could see the utility of and industry only
13 body meeting. Similar to what the NSTAC has proposed as
14 well, but we also think that there needs to be a link with
15 state and locals.

16 MR. JACOT: Yeah. I do think that. And this gets
17 back to I think Dave's point. We need to make sure that
18 this final recommendation ties in well with the NSTAC
19 recommendation.

20 I think one of the risks we run here is you know
21 going from not having enough coordinating bodies to tie all
22 those things together and having too many coordinating
23 bodies, which really are kicked out by us, and by different
24 groups like NSTAC. And the difficulty of coordinating with
25 too many bodies is about the same as coordinating with
26 nobody.

1 MS. VICTORY: True.

2 MR. DAVIS: I would agree and I appreciate that
3 comment. But I'm wondering whether or not you know our
4 charter was to try and figure out what went wrong and how to
5 do it better.

6 And I would love to have our group add to the great
7 work that's been done by NSTAC and others. And if we could
8 encourage them to modify their coordinating body to
9 contemplate Government as well as industry than I think we'd
10 have something. But otherwise because I agree that having
11 separate bodies adds to the confusion I totally get that.

12 But if we're to recommend anything besides simply
13 let's just go with whatever everybody else has done, I'm not
14 sure that our panel is really serving -- you know in that
15 much of a purpose. And I would love to see us take the
16 great work that was done by NSTAC and others and build upon
17 that to make it something better and more valuable.

18 So I think that to the extent that industry
19 coordinates among themselves, absent the presence of local
20 government or state government, I think that we're missing a
21 huge opportunity.

22 MR. JACOT: Steve, I don't disagree with you I just I
23 do think -- I just want to make sure that whatever we
24 recommend, whether it adds to it, just ties into so they
25 don't look like separate unrelated recommendations.

1 MR. DAVIS: Nancy, should we change our language
2 possibly to say that we would, FCC should work with state
3 and local government or that they should work -- I'm not
4 sure how we posture that to deal with NSTAC.

5 But that we would encourage NSTAC to consider the
6 inclusion of state and local body, or is that beyond our
7 scope to make such a recommendation.

8 MS. VICTORY: I think that may be beyond our scope.
9 But you know maybe this is something for work group two to
10 kind of take as a responsibility to tweak this.

11 I mean it certainly, I think what we would be hopeful
12 to get is consensus from the group as to the direction we'd
13 like to go on this, and then have working group two take the
14 pen on it.

15 But I guess one alternative would be to have -- I
16 think we all feel strongly that you have to have state and
17 local participation, state and local government
18 participation on this.

19 MR. DAVIS: Yes.

20 MS. VICTORY: Although certainly in our
21 recommendation already, is a recognition that there may be
22 certainly things that industry is just going to do with
23 industry. And so maybe the recommendation we want is to
24 say that we support the NSTAC proposal for industry to get
25 together on a regular basis, but also believe that there
26 needs to be a interface and a regular interface with state

1 and local government. And therefore we would propose the
2 creation of this body and perhaps the industry only group
3 that NSTAC is recommending. Could be a subset or a
4 subgroup of this.

5 MR. DAVIS: Yeah.

6 MS. VICTORY: So maybe if that's -- if folks like
7 that concept, perhaps that's something that working group
8 two can take the pen on. Steve Delahousey.

9 MR. DELAHOUSEY: This may also be the appropriate
10 area to include what we had addressed earlier about the -
11 in the planning phase. For the comprehensive emergency
12 management plans for state, county, and city plans to
13 include in the ESF2 section, the private sector in there
14 with regard to media. And it would be probably more
15 appropriate for it to come under this section than our
16 working groups. So if -- I'll forward that language to you
17 for a possible inclusion, Steve I'll make sure an CC you on
18 that as well.

19 MR. DAVIS: That would be very helpful.

20 MS. VICTORY: That would be great. All right.

21 MR. DAVIS: Do be need to -- before I start to
22 rewrite things because I know that it will be our last
23 meeting and then we'll have another meeting in June.
24 Should I look to see if there's even a consensus that it's
25 good to recommend a state and regional coordinating body
26 with the NSTAC being a subgroup of that, because I don't

1 want to go down that road, and then find that to be a point
2 of contention at the June meeting.

3 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

4 MR. DAVIS: Is there anybody in this room that would
5 object to our proceeding in that direction, and if so could
6 you state your reasons why we should not proceed in that
7 direction.

8 MR. BEARY: Nancy, if I could just make a comment. I
9 think you need to include the regional and state, because if
10 you look into the Department of Homeland Security funding
11 and grant mechanisms, it says that you need to get the
12 state involved. And you need to start looking at things in
13 a regional response.

14 MS. VICTORY: True.

15 MR. DAVIS: So I think we're following DHS's
16 recommendations, so I'd say Steve, you're on track.

17 MS. VICTORY: Yes.

18 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Thank you Sheriff, I appreciate
19 that. Can we go on to the list then? Or is there any other
20 comments to the yes, sir, Jim.

21 MS. VICTORY: Let me go to Carson first and then Jim.

22 MR. DAVIS: Oh, okay. Carson.

23 MR. AGNEW: Just a question that might be useful to
24 find out why NSTAC decided to limit the scope. They may
25 have -- its possible that they have some reason relating to
26 proprietary information that they may have a good reason for

1 doing it their way.

2 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Well and I also think as we've
3 had discussions within working group two, we recognize that
4 there are certain functions of this committee that are best
5 handled by just industry alone and are probably more
6 effectively handled as inner industry discussions.

7 And so that I think back at some of the things that
8 the NSTAC has been looking at, however in order to address
9 some of the problems that this group has seen after Katrina,
10 I think plugging in the state and local government
11 officials is important. Although there are probably
12 different conversations that take place in the larger
13 group, including the state and local government than would
14 take place purely in the industry only group.

15 MR. AGNEW: And my experience with more NSTAC
16 episodes was that they kept it industry only so that they
17 didn't run into some of the Federal open meeting
18 requirements, that they had to deal with.

19 MS. VICTORY: That may be right. Yeah. That could be
20 another reason as well. So perhaps the sort of the
21 construct we've been talking about as to having an industry
22 only subgroup similar to what the NSTAC has recommended,
23 might be a good way to go on this.

1 And Steve, perhaps if I could suggest maybe a couple
2 of us workup some draft language and then send out, and
3 convene a working group and go over and see if we've hit it.

4 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Yes, Jim.

5 MR. JACOT: Jim Jacot. Another question,
6 clarification. You mentioned in and I wasn't sure that the
7 -- what your statement encompass, but you mention and I
8 think a single staging area for telecommunications
9 providers. Was your intent of the statement to indicate
10 that we would all have Alltel communication providers
11 staging their response out of a single staging area, or was
12 or did I miss understand that?

13 MR. DAVIS: I'm trying to -- I wouldn't think that
14 that would necessarily work. It depends on the kind of
15 disaster. But there was to be a means of coordinating so
16 that everybody's not getting in each other's way. Let me
17 see if I can find the --

18 MS. VICTORY: It was under C.

19 MR. DAVIS: Okay. That would be their contractor
20 works and if any together, well I don't see it sorry. To
21 develop and facilitate inclusion of the states emergency
22 preparedness plan, one or more clearly identified staging
23 areas for communications infrastructure providers, their
24 contracted workers.

25 So I think that that would be, yeah that might be

1 difficult and might be that for each disaster such an area
2 would have to be specified.

3 MR. JACOT: I guess my concern here and without
4 understanding the details of the recommendation, is I don't
5 think we want to be making a recommendation that Alltel
6 communication providers need to have to be using a common
7 staging area.

8 And my concern there is just the logistics of
9 creating that much fuel, and generator, and --

10 MR. DAVIS: Uh-huh.

11 MR. JACOT: Technician traffic in and out of a single
12 geographic location probably is not going to be feasible.
13 And so I just want to make sure that we're not, our
14 recommendation isn't specifying a common staging area for
15 telecommunication.

16 MR. DAVIS: Well you know actually Jim, I agree with
17 you although my working group came up with this, I didn't
18 write this specific language. I want to see if the law
19 enforcement people how they feel, whether that's a benefit
20 to them or maybe that's where that came from. Can any of
21 the law enforcement people speak to that?

22 MR. CANNON: Well, Tim Cannon. Traditionally you
23 want to stage your like resources in one area depending on
24 -- I mean you got to take it case-by-case basis. Obviously
25 the area of impact, if it's a large area of impact you may
26 have, I mean multiple staging areas.

1 But you want to put all your telecommunications, and
2 that way it's much easier to assign missions and deploy
3 those people based on the need and the other you know
4 mission specific needs. I mean all other resources that we
5 have through our logistical support that come in, we
6 usually stage them together you know by like --

7 MR. JACOT: I guess my concern on that is given the
8 size of the network that some of us are supporting, I mean
9 we've got four or five hundred generators just as one
10 company. You know a whole bunch of fuel trucks, a hundred
11 to two hundred technicians that we're trying to move out of
12 one area.

13 I think if you brought us and all the other big
14 telecommunications providers like Bell South, Verizon and the
15 others in one location, I just don't think we would be able
16 to feasibly support having everybody working out of the one
17 location.

18 MR. CANNON: Well one of the issues you're going to
19 have is how are you going to communicate. If you got -- you
20 know as it is already we have difficulty communicating. And
21 you're going to have five different location or ten
22 different locations where you have all the same like
23 services staged. Then you've got issues with being able to
24 communicate with all those people about where they need to
25 go.

26 MR. JACOT: Yeah, but we were --

1 MR. FLESSAS: Another angle on what Jim is saying I
2 think, is if there is a recommendation for the single
3 staging area it has to have a great deal of detail or
4 logistics in terms of numbers.

5 MR. CANNON: Sure.

6 MR. FLESSAS: And who can arrive, and how many
7 trucks, and how many generators. Because if you don't have
8 all that detail but just recommend a single staging area,
9 it probably is not workable. Important details.

10 MR. CANNON: Well if you work that into the plan, but
11 I mean obviously you know that if you're able to stage them
12 in one location, its much easier to deploy them based on
13 the missions.

14 And another issue you have to deal with if your going
15 to want security for law enforcement to provide security or
16 staging locations. If you have multiple staging locations
17 then you're going to have multiple requests for security
18 measures.

19 MR. DAVIS: I want to suggest a change to the
20 language that might satisfy everybody. Could we change to
21 simply say we recommend where practical the establishment
22 of a central staging area? Would that satisfy the group?

23 MS. VICTORY: Well -- I let me also raise what I
24 think Joey was getting at when he first raised this concept.
25 And I think the idea is he wanted to have some clearly
26 identified areas, and maybe it's one, and maybe its five

1 depending on the size of the area impacted.

2 Where you would have representatives from each
3 affected infrastructure providers come and that's where they
4 would interface with law enforcement. That's where they
5 would resolve credentialing issues. That's where they
6 would resolve sharing of security issues. That's where
7 they would solve some fuel sharing issues. I don't think
8 what -- we never talked about having every company bring
9 all of their supplies and store it at those areas.

10 MR. DAVIS: Oh. Okay.

11 MS. VICTORY: So I think we're talking a difference
12 between maybe a meeting area, I don't know staging was the
13 language we used but I think --

14 MR. JACOT: I think that was the original intent of
15 that.

16 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Its suppose to be more of a
17 meeting area where the representatives of those so --

18 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

19 MR. JACOT: And certainly you know I think we'd be
20 much more comfortable with that. But staging to us in this
21 way that we've applied to them, that's where you send all
22 your equipment to, and that gets to be quite a bit of
23 stuff.

24 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. Would the meeting area be the
25 right word, or I don't know how we're going, coordination?

1 MR. CANNON: Well unified what we, well what we
2 normally refer to it as is like a unified area of command.
3 But it would be the same thing for communications. You
4 would have a unified area of command; you'd have a
5 representative from all these communication industry
6 partners or whatever that are there. And I don't know that
7 you could put every piece of equipment in one place at one
8 time for everybody anyway, even if you wanted to.

9 But that's -- I think that was the just of where he
10 was going with it. Was a place so like we're doing right
11 now, we can all sit around and talk about it, and figure
12 out who's sending what where.

13 MS. VICTORY: Well maybe coordination area might be a
14 better way to identify it. Jim.

15 MR. JACOT: That might be. The one question I have
16 remaining from that is why wouldn't we use the EOC's assist
17 coordination. I mean that seems to be re-inventing an
18 established wheel.

19 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

20 MR. KENT: Yeah. I believe that's what was
21 originally put forward, was the suggest that the State EOC
22 be this coordinating point, and that each telecommunication
23 provider have a representative there to be able to
24 coordinate among themselves and --

25 MR. CANNON: Now you're going to have three hundred

1 people in the EOC.

2 MR. KENT: I mean that's not realistic. I mean how
3 many providers are you talking about putting at the EOC?

4 MS. VICTORY: You know and I think this is going
5 beyond just sort of the traditional land line and wireless
6 you know, so I think you would be -- you would have
7 broadcasters there. You're right this would be a large
8 group of people. Perhaps it would overwhelm the existing
9 facility.

10 MR. KENT: That was the original concept. Not to --

11 MS. VICTORY: Right.

12 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Nancy. Steve Delahousey.

13 MS. VICTORY: I'm sorry, go ahead Steve.

14 MR. DELAHOUSEY: You know traditionally you would
15 have ESF2 -- would be represented by one person at the EOC
16 and you really can't. In the operation section of the EOC
17 you really can't accommodate anymore than that.

18 Now to have -- if the facilities big enough to have a
19 separate area while all the representatives are there that's
20 certainly one thing. But there you're really limited on the
21 number of people you can have in the operation section.

22 MS. VICTORY: So maybe what we're really talking
23 about is this is where you'd have the coordination area for
24 all the communication folks and the ESF2 representative
25 would be able to communicate with this group.

26 MR. DELAHOUSEY: That's what needs to happen.

1 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Okay. We can, I think we can
2 make that fix, and Steve, and your group talk about what the
3 revised language would be?

4 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Then that moves us to some very
5 simple I think recommendations or hopefully so. Item number
6 four is very brief in succinct that we simply would -- the
7 FCC should move swiftly to implement the formation of the
8 Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. I don't
9 believe that's too controversial.

10 MS. VICTORY: No. I'm waiting to get some further
11 information as to what all is entailed there. It may be
12 that it's appropriate to put in some language like as
13 swiftly, as practical or something. But we're trying to
14 figure out what are all of the things that need to be done
15 in order to affect something like that so --

16 MR. DAVIS: One that I really liked, and thought
17 would be very useful, and would have been useful to us in
18 the last several hurricanes is a website for coordination
19 information. That we would create or the FCC would create
20 a website listing the key state emergency management
21 contacts as well as post disaster meeting areas. So that
22 we would know going in meeting and coordination areas, I
23 guess to get back to the verbiage from the other.

24 But in other words that we would know so Jim, or
25 Tony, or my company, could go to that website and then I
26 could direct my people here's where go to, you need to go -

1 - as opposed to trying to rely on calling somebody in a
2 middle of a storm and phones are out and then it becomes
3 a matter of confusion. Any discussion on or comments on
4 this item five?

5 MR. BEARY: Yeah. It's Kevin Beary. And the only
6 thing I'd add Steve is that it needs to be manned 24-7
7 during an emergency. Not just ship through a website. Well
8 don't just send an email to a website, if its going to be
9 activated it needs to be a 24-7 activation so that people
10 get an immediate response on it.

11 MR. DAVIS: Sheriff Beary. That's -- well that's a
12 good point and we're adding that to our recommendations,
13 updated 24-7 during an actual disaster. Website for FCC
14 Swat team information is similar proposal, basically it
15 would publicized the agencies emergency Swat team contact
16 information and procedures for facilitating disaster
17 response and outage recovery.

18 I think that that is more of a fixed sort of thing
19 that would be a continual source of information moving
20 forward. Any comments on that item, item six?

21 MR. AGNEW: What does S-W-A-T stand for in the FCC?

22 MS. VICTORY: Actually that's probably my term, I
23 just picked it maybe just taking it from the normal police
24 contact. The idea is this would be their emergency
25 responder team within the FCC to deal with disasters.

1 So yes that's another term I'm happy to use it. I
2 know it's not an FCC specific acronym.

3 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

4 MS. VICTORY: And I don't know what weapons they have
5 at their disposal.

6 MR. DAVIS: Hopefully none. NAO I think is the
7 weapon that they have. Okay. NCC membership. The FCC
8 should work with the NCS to broaden NCC membership to
9 include adequate representation of all types of
10 communication systems including broadcast, cable, and
11 satellites. I definitely support that.

12 I think that it was made pretty clear this morning
13 that that is a part of the emergency response as
14 communicating with the public. Does anybody have any
15 objection or issue to that item, item No. 7?

16 MR. ANDERSON: To include the nontraditional and ham
17 radio guys, the wire license exempt guys, all of those?

18 MR. DAVIS: That wasn't specifically called out.
19 Nancy, do you have feelings on that?

20 MS. VICTORY: I think originally the thought was to
21 have existing infrastructure represented as opposed to folks
22 who would be coming in and providing backup or quickly
23 implemental infrastructure.

24 We thought those folks would plug in more at this
25 state level, state or regional coordinating committee level.
26 But certainly I think the difficulty with opening it up more

1 to folk who don't have current infrastructure in the area
2 would be --

3 MR. ANDERSON: They do.

4 MS. VICTORY: They do?

5 MR. ANDERSON: People on the ham radio operators, the
6 license exempt list, all those guys have existing networks.

7 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

8 MR. ANDERSON: Every state has hundreds of them.

9 MS. VICTORY: I think the difficulty will be how do
10 you get those folks plugged in. Do you just do a represent
11 from the trade association, maybe that's the way to do it?

12 MR. ANDERSON: I'm just throwing it out there because
13 they were utilized significantly.

14 MR. DAVIS: I understand but they need to be a part
15 of the National Coordinating committee, which is what we're
16 talking about. If they do they do, I'm just asking the
17 question. Is that what you're saying?

18 MR. ANDERSON: Right.

19 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

20 MR. ANDERSON: I mean your including specific
21 industry there and I think you're missing one or two.
22 Maybe they can be combined or maybe I'm off the wall with
23 this.

24 MS. VICTORY: No. Any comments, Tim?

25 MR. CANNON: Well not on that one but I'd like to
26 just backup one. Just a real quick question on the website

1 for coordination of information. Is this going to be an
2 open website or is this based on credentialing or password
3 or can the public? I mean I'm just saying if you put it
4 out like that as a website and everybody in the public can
5 access it, everyone of these emergency managers are going
6 to be contacted everyday with hundreds of e-mails of
7 somebody trying to sell them something.

8 MR. DAVIS: Very good point. I think that it should
9 be limited to those people who have achieved the
10 credentialing that we are asking for. But that is
11 something we don't have in our recommendation Tim, and I
12 think that we should probably add that.

13 MR. CANNON: Well actually she should take the credit
14 for it.

15 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Are state emergency management
16 officials not identified publicly now?

17 MR. CANNON: Well they, I'm sure they are, but if
18 you're going to make it readily available where you're going
19 to list every person and all their emergency contact
20 information, it's just going to make it easier for the
21 billions of dollars in this industry you know they're going
22 to get, I mean I'll Gil you're an emergency manager what do
23 you think?

24 MR. BAILEY: I think one of the things if there could
25 be a central clearing point that as resources are made
26 available for the disaster area, you know that we're sending

1 these resources in so that those could be tracked etcetera,
2 and then allocated proper, that's one thing. But like you
3 said you know just allowing open access, whoever your points
4 of contact are that are listed, are going to be inundated
5 with everyone, by everyone, by all of the vendors.

6 MR. ANDERSON: So it can be secure. A secure
7 website.

8 MS. VICTORY: Based on credentialing.

9 MR. BAILEY: Based on credentialing.

10 MR. ANDERSON: Based on credential or an official e-
11 mail address, if you go to .gov than you know.

12 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. I think that that is a very
13 legitimate point. And I think that if we tie it to 3C which
14 is a developing -- I'm sorry 3B to develop credentialing
15 requirements and procedures, that with credentialing would
16 come a password to access that site.

17 I think that that would give us a level of comfort
18 that we could actually put information about what's
19 happening down there. Because you're right you don't want
20 people from you know Kuala Lumpur logging onto our website
21 and trying to raise a bunch of issues that they don't need
22 to have that information so.

23 MS. VICTORY: Well I think originally the purpose
24 behind this website was to provide information about sort of
25 where the State EOC was and where these instead of staging
26 areas, coordination areas would be.

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Sort of general information in a disaster where do you go if you are a communications provider and you're trying to help out. I don't think limiting that to the folks who are going to be credentialed who are more likely to be the repair workers is the right group to do that.

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It seems like this is information, I think originally the intent behind this recommendation was that this would be a public website so that if you were a provider or you were a equipment manufacturer, you would know where to go in a disaster to get your information, to let people know you have assets to be deployed etcetera.

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So it seemed like this would be information that should be okay to be public. And maybe providing the emergency managers name and phone number is not what we want to suggest here, maybe it's the address of the State EOC.

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MR. DAVIS: Well I --

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MS. VICTORY: Is that I mean -

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MR. DAVIS: I still disagree with all respect. I think that the problem you have there is either you're going to have information that's not useful as being so general that we already have it, or if it has some useful information even to the tune of where are we staging equipment etcetera. It could encourage looting or people that come in knowing there are generators being set out somewhere.

1 And when it comes to credentialing I guess my
2 expectation was that we would have people at our telephone
3 companies, radio stations, etcetera that would have the
4 credentialing and hopefully someone in management like
5 myself would also have the credentialing. Maybe not
6 because I'm going to personally be down there but because I
7 will be coordinating our response and therefore I would
8 have access to such a website.

9 So I think rather than I don't want to use the word
10 dumbing down but I can't think of another word. The website
11 so that it has list vial information, we should instead
12 expand our credentialing a little bit so that those people
13 that are going to like Kay Sears, perhaps who might mount
14 or coordinating nationwide response, would have the
15 appropriate credentialing to do that. Any comments on
16 that? You had your hand raised.

17 MR. ANDERSON: I might be confused here. Are we, I
18 was under the impression there's going to be like two
19 websites. One that list the EOC's, and contacts, and stuff
20 like that and I think that's what we're talking about now.
21 But that second list was going to be all the assets
22 available from the private sector because we're
23 recommending that the Federal Government --

24 MS. VICTORY: Correct.

25 MR. ANDERSON: Put all their assets you know list all

1 their assets and then we had a separate recommendation for
2 private industry.

3 MS. VICTORY: That's --

4 MR. DAVIS: Yeah you're right it's in a different
5 place.

6 MS. VICTORY: That's in a different - Yes. I thing
7 I'm not sure if we are or if we're not. I mean I think with
8 this recommendation was suppose to be was sort of a listing
9 of all the State EOC's. And under each state also a
10 listing of where this coordination, where the coordination
11 point would be.

12 So I think the first question is that worthwhile
13 information to pull together in one place, and is it
14 information that needs to be password protected or can be
15 public.

16 MR. JACOT: Jim Jacot. It seems to me following on
17 what was just said that the information about the contact
18 individuals would be something that we'd like to have in a
19 more limited access location where the general public
20 couldn't get to it. But it seems like there's also a need
21 here, I think its been described where a location which
22 would have public access where on one hand you'd have a
23 space where people could list resources, assets that they
24 would like to make available.

25 MS. VICTORY: Right. And that's a separate

1 recommendation.

2 MR. JACOT: And that would be a separate
3 recommendation and a separate website.

4 MS. VICTORY: So the feeling is for the State EOC
5 information and the information as to where communications
6 providers come together to coordinate in the event of an
7 emergency, that that information needs to password protected
8 and cannot be on a public website. Is that the consciences?

9 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Or else you're going to have
10 people calling the EOC about how's my grandma doing.

11 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

12 MR. ANDERSON: It needs to be real information. It
13 can't be the State ECO because you're going to get on hold
14 for two or three days or you're going to get passed around
15 for twenty different phone calls in different locations
16 until you finally end up maybe at the real EOC to talk to
17 the person you needed to talk to.

18 MS. SEARS: I just have a quick question.

19 MS. VICTORY: Sure Kay.

20 MS. SEASR: Is it just one-way information? In other
21 words would the state and local officials who are first
22 responders benefit from industry contacts also being on this
23 website? Or is it just a one way where, obviously industry
24 will benefit by knowing the state and local, but would state
25 and local benefit from knowing industry?

1 MS. VICTORY: I think it's first discussed it was
2 one-way information to provide to industry but that
3 certainly does not need to be our recommendation.

4 MS. SEARS: I think maybe some of the state and local
5 guys need to comment on the. If they know everybody that
6 the need to talk to that's great, but I doubt it.

7 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Nancy. Steve Delahousey.

8 MS. VICTORY: Yes. Thanks, Steve.

9 MR. DELAHOUSEY: On our committee we did, there are
10 two separate issues on page six towards the bottom of the
11 page there. Immediately following of any large disasters
12 establish a website through which private sector companies
13 can register communication assets that they can rapidly
14 make available to first responders and relief
15 reorganizations.

16 MS. VICTORY: Right.

17 MR. DELAHOUSEY: And that would be two-way. As
18 someone working in emergency management, I would want to
19 access that to see what was available for use from the
20 private sector. Also the website for emergency management
21 contact information would be different from this one, is
22 the way I understood it.

23 MS. VICTORY: Yes. That's correct.

24 MS. SEARS: So that would take care of the state and
25 local needs for contact information from industry. What if
26 who they're looking for doesn't get on there and do that?

1 MS. VICTORY: I think that thought was that through
2 the state regional coordinating body that it would be
3 exchanging contact information. Now that is either appear
4 on this website or not.

5 MS. SEARS: Okay.

6 MS. VICTORY: But you probably don't want to have it
7 just so anybody can, well it won't be anybody who can sign
8 up because you'd have a password so presumably you have to
9 qualify. But again whatever the group thinks in terms of
10 what needs to appear on this website you know happy to
11 expand the recommendation to include a listing of providers
12 who are credentialed and members of the coordinating
13 committee.

14 MR. AGNEW: Could I raise an issue as to why -- I
15 think we've made the assumption that on the contact on the
16 coordination website the information is somehow static.

17 But we learned that as switches went down there were
18 opportunities for reassigning numbers and there were
19 problems calling local, making local calls when you
20 couldn't make international calls. So I think or inner
21 state calls excuse me. So I think the real reason for this
22 website and the reason for the FCC to maintain it, is that
23 that information is not going to be static. And you need
24 it updated 24-7 because it just might change when you want
25 to reach the same person and the number has changed.

26 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Well what does the group think

1 in terms of this, in terms of what we should be saying now
2 in terms of this website?

3 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Well what about this. Have a single
4 website for disaster communications and then some trade
5 organizations that I belong to there's a members only side
6 that I, if you want to get into you have to have a password
7 for that. And you could, you know rather than have people
8 bouncing around have one homepage and if you want to see
9 what, if you want to register equipment in the private
10 sector that you have available, you can register that
11 equipment on there. If you want to actually communicate
12 with other people that are in emergency management and
13 public safety and you have a password as a member you can
14 get in to that site and you can do that to. That might be
15 a way to just wrap it all into one.

16 MS. VICTORY: Okay. So you would link up this, the
17 problem I think the other recommendation, the other website
18 recommendation for volunteering of equipment those are not
19 necessarily folks who will propos to that will not
20 necessarily be credentialed. And so that will need to be
21 on a public part of the website or a different website.

22 So one question is do you want to make, I might
23 suggest that you might not want to mix the two. You know
24 you leave this as a sort of as a members only area and then
25 the question is what information do you want to post on
26 this members only secure password protected website?

1 Something what would be appropriate to do here?

2 MS. SEARS: It sounds like the state and local guys
3 feel that on page six that would cover them. So why don't
4 we just go back to making it one-way on the members only?

5 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

6 MR. DELAHOUSEY: And there's several other things and
7 you know we're getting into and I guess there should be some
8 overlap into the comities. One of the things that we're
9 recommending is to have the public safety frequencies.
10 Where you certainly wouldn't want that available to
11 everybody, but on the members only site that would a good
12 place to house that.

13 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Good point. Yes.

14 MR. LYONS: I just wanted to mention it when we got
15 to it but, we've learned recently that NCS is intending and
16 beginning to put together a database both of frequencies and
17 technologies system by system. Starting in the gulf state
18 area, and then on east coast, and then eventually moving
19 through the rest of the country and presumably that
20 information will be kept confidential. But it would be
21 accessed I think through the NCC probably in the case of the
22 time of an emergency.

23 So that the radio cache equipment that they have can
24 be directed more efficiently to systems that can use them.
25 So I guess one of the things which given the fact that this
26 is moving forward, one of the things which you might want

1 to recommend is that the FCC coordinate with the NCS on
2 this. And they're also by the way they're doing it with
3 regard to equipment as well as frequency information. So
4 you can either contact NCS and volunteer that information
5 or they may contact you and ask for it.

6 MS. VICTORY: That's excellent information John.
7 Thank you. And let's revisit that again when we get into
8 the next group of recommendations but I think we may want
9 to modify our proposal there to take that development into
10 account.

11 If I would suggest because I want to make sure we
12 keep moving this along. For this website it sounds like we
13 need to slightly tweak this recommendation and maybe
14 working group two could take it upon themselves to kind of
15 work up this language and try to tweak us to that this
16 would be a password protected website. And perhaps be more
17 specific about the information that would be maintained on
18 that and that this would also need to be updated 24-7
19 during a disaster with any information.

20 Mike, you had also raised about augmenting the NCC
21 membership and again I think that's something perhaps that
22 working group two should figure out how best to do that, and
23 how best to describe that. So I think there, if I could go,

1 and then I think there are two more, one more recommendation
2 which is unchanged from the last meeting on GETS and WPS and
3 TSP. And I don't know if anyone had any further comments on
4 those.

5 MR. DAVIS: Right. Our recommendations simply that
6 we were to promote WPS, GETS and TSP which is the wireless
7 priority service and what is a telecommunication service
8 priority. I get these mixed up. And I don't think and we
9 would continue to see whether its financially feasible for
10 WPS calls to get GETS calls so that we can route them
11 through if you're making a priority call. It becomes a
12 priority call all the way through. We don't know whether
13 or not that even can be don't technically, but we would
14 want to recommend that that be looking in to. Are there
15 any issues, concerns or comments on those pieces, which is
16 item eight on our recommendations? Yes, Kay.

17 MS. SEARS: No.

18 MR. DAVIS: Oh. Any others.

19 MS. VICTORY: Okay. If I could just recap to make
20 sure we're all on the same page with the recommendations
21 under recovery coordination procedures. On credentialing
22 guidelines we talked about adding that you should be able
23 to apply in advance of a disaster for credentialing and add
24 that point to number one.

1 On emergency responder status we wanted to slightly
2 tweak the language to make clear that we were endorsing
3 NSTAC's recommendation but suggesting that we that it be
4 expanded to include media companies.

5 On the third one working group two is going to tweak
6 this a bit to be clear that this state regional coordination
7 body would include state and local governments members and
8 that there should be a perhaps a subgroups for certain
9 activities that would be industry only, which is consistent
10 with the NSTAC recommendation.

11 Under 3A we talked about deleting a couple of phrases
12 in that last sentence to avoid proprietary issue proprietary
13 data issues.

14 We talked about on 3C not calling them staging areas
15 but rather coordination areas and that this it would be this
16 coordination point ESF2 rep would interface with the group.

17 On the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, we
18 talked about adding perhaps as swiftly as practicable
19 because, I'm sorry. Go ahead Mike.

20 MR. ROSENTHAL: On number four, Steve and I, but I
21 wanted to through something for consideration. Steve
22 mentioned that Clear Channel kind of falls into a category
23 that's not quite in like utilities. That it's not quite
24 first responder but obviously very important. And in the
25 industry we often hear the term critical infrastructure.

1 One thing that I was thinking of for paragraph four
2 would it be a good place to suggest that in the creation of
3 the Homeland Security Bureau that there be a division for
4 critical infrastructure. And I know this is something that
5 people brought to the FCC recently and it might be a good
6 thing to endorse from this panel that the FCC at least take
7 in under our consideration the creation of a critical
8 infrastructure division in that bureau.

9 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Where is that stand right now,
10 on wireless or --

11 MR. ROSENTHAL: I guess right now it would fall under
12 wireless but I'm not sure that its, I'm not sure that there
13 is a current equivalent.

14 MS. VICTORY: Okay. And would this be for licensing
15 or for policy matters or both because --

16 MR. ROSENTHAL: For both.

17 MS. VICTORY: Okay. That may be something for
18 working group two to chat about. Does that make sense?
19 Maybe to talk a little bit more and have Lisa gather some
20 and Jean Ann gather some information about what the FCC is
21 exactly planning for this bureau. What the considerations
22 are so that we can make sure our recommendation is
23 appropriate.

24 And just to round this out I just want to make a note
25 of that. We talked about on the website that working group
26 two was going to go back and tweak this a little bit to be

1 clear this was a password protected website. And what the
2 information would and this would be 24-7 updated during a
3 disaster. So did I accurately capture all the comments on
4 the recovery recommendations? Okay. Great. Well let's
5 move on.

6 MR. DAVIS: That concludes my part of it. Thank you.

7 MS. VICTORY: Great. All right. Move on to Steve
8 Delahousey, if you could take us through the first responder
9 communications proposals, particularly highlighting any new
10 material.

11 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Certainly, the first recommendation
12 under emergency restoration for public safety communications
13 item A talking about the cache of equipment, there was
14 really no change in that section.

15 Item B on page six is a new section. Encourage
16 state, and local jurisdictions to utilize the cash through
17 training exercises on a regular basis.

18 Item C is particular significance I think. Urge
19 state and regions to maintain a database of frequency usage
20 by local emergency responders to allow for more efficient
21 spectrum sharing and rape on sight frequency coordination
22 in the event of system failures.

23 The FCC should work with the database manager to
24 insure exchange of current information and according to what
25 John says, it sounds like that maybe underway through the
26 NCS.

1 Particularly here that would allow some of the gateways that
2 are available now to be preprogrammed instead of waiting
3 until a disaster occurs.

4 If you know the people that are going to likely come
5 to your aid you could preprogram those gateways to allow
6 them to have access to your system, assuming its still
7 functioning rather than waiting till they arrive on the
8 scene.

9 So that's a particular importance there and that
10 would have to be a certainly a secure database.

11 MS. VICTORY: That might be something for working
12 group three to kind of if we can get more information about
13 what exactly NCS is doing, figuring out how to tweak this.

14 Because if they're already doing this I think maybe
15 then the tweak is going to be supporting those efforts and
16 making sure that there's a way for state and local
17 authorities to be able to use that database in an
18 emergency.

19 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Item D just one section added to
20 that. Working with DHS and NCS to develop an inventory of
21 Federal, and Government, and Military communications assets
22 that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a catastrophic
23 event. And they added section; the list should include any
24 land, mobile radios, portable infrastructure equipment, and
25 backup power components.

26 Item E we just addressed a moment ago immediately

1 following any large disaster. Establish a website through
2 which private sector companies can register communications
3 assets that they can rapidly make available to first
4 responders in relief organizations. The website would be
5 designated with a special area for registering available
6 equipment to assist disabled Americans in their
7 communications needs.

8 MS. VICTORY: One thing I might suggest in the and I
9 see that the numbering got a little screwed up here. But
10 what's on this list D, where we have that the list should
11 include land, mobile radios, portable infrastructure
12 equipment, and backup power components. We might also want
13 to include certain bridging or interoperability AC1000 type
14 equipment; because clearly that stuff would be extremely
15 helpful as well, I would think. Is that something that
16 folks would feel comfortable adding as a specific component
17 we want to identify taking advantage of through Federal
18 assets?

19 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I think, what is the correct term?
20 Is it gateway technology or bridging or --

21 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. We had it earlier; it came up
22 bridging and bridging technology and gateways. Right?
23 Okay. Maybe add that. I'm sorry Steve.

24 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Okay. That's fine. And item number
25 two, facilitating interoperability among first responders.
26 We addressed the support of the fully implementing the one

1 million dollar public safety interoperability program and
2 item B, on page 7, at the top of the page, work with the
3 NTIA to establish appropriate criteria for the distribution
4 of one billion dollars in the manner that best promotes
5 interoperability of the 700 megahertz band.

6 Among other things such criteria should mandate that
7 any radios purchased with grant monies must be capable of
8 operating on 700 megahertz and 800 megahertz channels,
9 established from mutual aid and interoperability voice
10 communications.

11 We had quite a bit of discussion about this on our
12 last conference call and rather than create another band
13 with, that would be -- it could possibly create more
14 interoperability rather than alleviating some of it. So if
15 and I think the technology currently exist and it's being
16 done probably now anyway that the radios are dual band with
17 compatible so that would be a recommendation that the group
18 had.

19 Item E as to work with the NTIA to develop strategies
20 and policies to allow Federal, state and local agencies to
21 share spectrum for emergency response purposes, particularly
22 the Federal incident response channels and channels
23 established for mutual aid and interoperability.

24 Item F publicize interoperability successes and/or
25 best practices by public safety entities to serve as models
26 to further interoperability.

1 MS. VICTORY: Any further comment on those?

2 MR. PITTS: We've --

3 MS. VICTORY: Go ahead Billy Pitts.

4 MR. PITTS: and we had a discussion about this and
5 about the role of the military and first responders being
6 able to communicate with the military. We didn't know
7 where to put it, we thought it was an important component
8 because obviously if the military comes down there and
9 there's no way to communicate with them we really haven't
10 facilitated very much.

11 And Steve, I know you'd been tasked to start thinking
12 about where an appropriate place for this might be. But I
13 want to throw that back out there because we've kind of left
14 the military out of this document. Now I know the FCC
15 doesn't have jurisdiction over the military per se but as
16 part of the interoperability section, I think there maybe
17 should be some mention of it.

18 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I agree and I think that if its
19 acceptable I'll come up with some language and if you have
20 any recommendations and so far I see two sides, two areas
21 that it could be include certainly right in here it would
22 be one of them. But as we spoke earlier in section one on
23 the section on recovery coordination procedures could
24 certainly be included in that area too.

25 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. One way of doing that if what
26 you're looking for is some sort of interoperability is under

1 E the working with NTIA to develop strategies and policies
2 for Federal, state and local agencies to share spectrum for
3 interoperability and mutual aid purposes. Perhaps putting in
4 there when we talk about Federal and putting in per
5 including the military would be one way of addressing that.

6 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Exactly.

7 MR. PITTS: I think that's good.

8 MS. VICTORY: That might be an easy fix.

9 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Yeah, that would be great, yeah.

10 MS. VICTORY: Because NTIA does have jurisdiction
11 over their frequencies. Mike Rosenthal.

12 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah. I would like to go back to B
13 for a second. I'm a little concerned with the sort of
14 getting specific at this point with the criteria for
15 receiving the grant money particularly with regards to the
16 bands that would have to be included in the radios.

17 Particularly sort of noting that you'd lock it into
18 those two bands, I think would have residual effect going
19 forward of other solution that might come along that would
20 be good for public safety interoperability and I'm
21 wondering if we couldn't make that a little more general at
22 this point.

23 MR. SAUTER: I'm --

24 MS. VICTORY: Mike Sauter.

25 MR. SAUTER: Mike Sauter. We're dealing with this

1 issue as well as the military an other things you'd
2 discussed here and have solutions an are working more for
3 them. This 700 and 800 megahertz thing has to do with the
4 push to talk that regular radios that most public safety
5 uses and most of them now are in 800 megahertz range. Some
6 are moving with the nexter revamping but also the 700
7 megahertz is what's coming out and a lot of us were looking
8 at moving to.

9 But basically everybody in the public safety arena
10 now on their regular traditional radios are an 800 and a
11 lot of them are moving to 700 because there's a lot more
12 band width and they can get the digital and pictures and
13 other things they can push over the radios that we
14 traditionally couldn't push.

15 So if you're talking about police, fire, and EMS most
16 of them are in 800 now and the ones that aren't, are in 700
17 and are going there now. So I guess that's why the
18 community put that in there. Because if you're looking at
19 police, fire, and EMS at least that's where there at there
20 they're in 800 and 700 megahertz ranges.

21 The thing that was brought up earlier I mean with the
22 military and it just so happens I saw on C-span that they
23 have given some presentations relative to this from their
24 side and they are stock piling ACU1000's and other things
25 to make sure that they have -- if they have to move in that
26 they interoperability also, that they can setup to talk

1 with us. So they are also stockpiling in cache that now
2 and said they in fact do have it or will have it place
3 before June 1st. And that's our solution locally for the
4 military also if you have ACU1000's they bring a radio and
5 military brings a radio you hook it up and there are
6 limitations there. But also we're looking at Motorola has
7 the IP Gateway stuff with Motor Bridge and Maycom's network
8 first that we're using for the militaries as a solution to
9 get them interoperable. Their bands are not compatible at
10 all and that's why we're have to do that.

11 MS. VICTORY: Mike.

12 MR. ROSENTHAL: I agree in part I think most public
13 safety uses on the 800 megahertz band and there's going to
14 be spectrum at around 700. There's also a lot of public
15 safety

16 at 150. But I guess my concern is the end part. That the
17 radios would have to be dual bands 700 and 800, if said or
18 in other words, you could get an 800 megahertz radio with
19 the grant money. I'd be less concerned, but this seems to
20 suggest that you can only use the grant money for a new
21 product that is not on the market yet, which would be dual
22 band at 700 and 800. Which I don't think there is a radio
23 out there that does that right now.

24 MR. DELAHOUSEY: I know that there -- I think --

25 MR. ROSENTHAL: There are.

26 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Both of the major vendors are

1 currently manufacturing them.

2 MR. ROSENTHAL: Or if there is that would be the only
3 product that you could use the grant money for, where as it
4 would restrict replacing current equipment for instance.

5 MS. VICTORY: Well my understanding is that the
6 legislation requires that this money be used for equipment
7 that is inoperable with the 700 megahertz. Did I get the
8 language, is that the language? So inoperable with 700
9 megahertz? So that would assume that it would have to
10 operate with the 700 megahertz band so I think all we're
11 doing here is adding --

12 MR. ROSENTHAL: Appropriate.

13 MS. VICTORY: 800 to it because that's existing. And
14 I leave it to the group as to whether they want to do this.
15 I know from the discussion and working group three one of
16 the concerns was to help insure we weren't just creating
17 another silo at 700 megahertz. And perhaps there's or
18 equipment like ACU1000's which would still be consistent
19 with this recommendation, because all we're saying is that
20 if you use to by ham radios that the radios have to
21 transmit on both.

22 MR. ROSENTHAL: I guess one solution would be allow
23 for 800 megahertz but as long as there's bridging capability
24 between 800 and 700 in the same network you could probably
25 achieve the same result.

26 MR. DELAHOUSEY: No, I'm-

1 MR. AGNEW: I think with coordinating -- not a
2 blanket requirement for either band.

3 MS. VICTORY: Right.

4 MR. DELAHOUSEY: And Major Sauter's comments were
5 right on target. The group specifically said, if you have
6 and there are literally hundreds or millions of 800
7 megahertz radios out there.

8 Now to create a 700 -- well to limit it to 700
9 megahertz you're immediately isolating most of the public
10 safety people that are out there now. And forcing them to
11 have to ditch their equipment to purchase yet another
12 spectrum so the idea is and the technology does exist and
13 it is being utilized currently.

14 If you're going to use Federal dollars to buy
15 emergency safety communications equipment, at least make it
16 be capable of talking to the majority of the equipment that
17 exist today. That was the specific goal of that
18 recommendation.

19 MS. VICTORY: And John I don't know if you had
20 anything to add on this, for some reason I was of the
21 impression that there were going to be a lot of 700
22 megahertz radios that were going to be dual band. And that
23 was going to be more the standard than the norm. Am I just
24 incorrect?

25 MR. LYONS: No that's correct. Even before the 700
26 megahertz was assured by the hard date in the Deficit

1 Reduction Act, 800 megahertz radios were being sold with the
2 700 megahertz capability built in.

3 I think what this language is, is consistent with the
4 statute. In fact the only -- it's very difficult to do
5 precisely what the statute calls for or the legislative
6 conference report language calls for, other than to
7 paraphrase it or to quote it.

8 And I guess I think the idea of putting some emphasis
9 on 800 megahertz because of all the equipment that's out
10 there today, and which was the basis of the recommendation
11 I think is -- was the basis of the recommendation. And I
12 think it's a notorious idea. But there always is the
13 possibility of simply quoting what the congress provided
14 for.

15 MR. DELAHOUSEY: And we had you know the FCC has
16 already undertaking the process of re-banding in the 800
17 megahertz frequency range, so a lot of the people who are on
18 the 800 will stay there probably for a long time. And so
19 you know while it's a good idea and should certainly be
20 promoted to go to the designated 700 megahertz frequency,
21 there are areas that are not going to be able the do that.

22 We had a bill in our legislator that failed in
23 Mississippi to create a statewide system. That's not going
24 to happen this year.

25 MR. ROSENTHAL: I'm basically agreeing with you as
26 far as the use of the 800 megahertz band and the not

1 wanting to force folks that already have a certain
2 equipment in place to completely overhaul it. I think
3 we're on the same page there. I guess my concern is how do
4 we -- with those goals in mind move forward and without
5 being completely understanding of what the product is that
6 has the dual 700 and 800. I'm not sure that that's widely
7 available for the folks that are using the 800 megahertz
8 band that we provide and that the folk of Mississippi are
9 using. So I would have to maybe -- I need to just
10 understand better of what you foresee there.

11 MR. DELAHOUSEY: It is though. You know we've
12 researched it and it is. For the public safety
13 communication more recent public safety communication
14 systems that are on 800. The new technology that's out
15 there, the new equipment enables us to either on seven or
16 eight hundred.

17 MR. ANDERSON: I have a question on that.

18 MS. VICTORY: Mike Anderson.

19 MR. ANDERSON: Oh, I'm sorry. The dual bands 700 and
20 800, is this going to be a flip of the switch type of thing?
21 Or is it going to be changing dials in a lab, or it has you
22 know if it's an 800 megahertz radio but it's capable of 700
23 also, but how does it switch? Is it a flip of the button or
24 a channel selection or --

25 MR. LYONS: It could be a switch.

26 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. So it can do both just -- okay.

1 MR. LYONS: That's right.

2 MR. ANDERSON: Okay.

3 MR. LYONS: I mean you have to have the capabilities
4 and the infrastructure.

5 MR. ROSENTHAL: Is there a product that's on the
6 market that someone could name that I could look at? Or is
7 it I mean I thought I heard someone say its there but I
8 haven't seen it.

9 MR. LYONS: Well I'm told that both Motorola and
10 Maycom have products that are available to do this now.

11 MR. ROSENTHAL: Okay. Okay.

12 MS. VICTORY: Okay. And I guess Mike if you can do a
13 little checking around and get back to us if you still have
14 a concern about this. Like I have not researched it but I
15 think my general understanding is this equipment was
16 available. But I think it is worth looking into if we're
17 going to make this recommendation. So that would be
18 terrific.

19 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Nancy, if I could jump to item
20 number four, emergency medical personnel and then Gil
21 Bailey's going to do item number three.

22 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

23 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Because I need to leave after I do
24 this section.

25 MS. VICTORY: Understood.

26 MR. DELAHOUSEY: This is a new section Chairman Cox I

1 think had some specific concerns about EMS and health care
2 communications, emergency health care communications during
3 times of disaster and these are the recommendations that we
4 came up with as a result of that.

5 The FCC should work to assist the emergency medical
6 community to facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of
7 their emergency communications systems.

8 Among other things the FCC should A. Educate the
9 emergency medical community about emergency communications
10 and help coordinate this sectors and emergency
11 communication effort. B. Educate the emergency medical
12 community about the various priority communication services
13 such as GETS, WPS and TSP and urge them to subscribe.
14 Number C. work with congress and the other appropriate
15 Federal departments and agencies to insure emergency
16 medical personnel are treated as public safety personnel
17 under the Stafford Act and D. support DHS efforts to make
18 emergency medical providers, eligible for funding for
19 emergency communications equipment under the State
20 Homeland Security Grant Program.

21 And I can tell you that item C. and D. are already in
22 the works under other agencies. DHS is working towards doing
23 that and then the Homeland Security Committee and Congress
24 is working on legislation to amend the Stafford Act to
25 include emergency medical services. And the intent here
26 was to just have another Federal agency to basically

1 endorse that and hopefully move it forward expeditiously.

2 MS. VICTORY: Great. Thank you very much Steve.

3 MR. PITTS: Nancy, could I just add a -- here?

4 MS. VICTORY: Sure, Billy.

5 MR. PITTS: And it's to the GETS, WPS, TSP Program.

6 There's a specific prohibition against that going to more
7 than one it's a one to one phone system. And obviously you
8 wouldn't want it going to all the citizens, but I think it
9 may be time to look at for instance in a medical situation.

10 If the head of a hospital wanted to call a bunch of
11 doctors and nurses to get them to report, right a way.
12 Under the GETS they'd have to call them individually. They
13 could not send a blanket call to all of them to get it.

14 And it seems like and the people I talked to that's
15 one of the reasons why they're not big on GETS. Well yeah,
16 they got the card but who are they going to call. Their
17 either going to call everybody individually, it may be time
18 to look at particularly in these important first responders
19 area to give them to capability to be able to call more
20 than one people using a priority line.

21 MS. VICTORY: I think that's something that may be
22 appropriate for working group three to talk about more. I
23 think the one issue that would jump to mind is to what
24 extent would other groups have a same or similar need for
25 more than one line calling at the time. And so I think one
26 of the things we should do perhaps is in the working group

1 talk a little bit about you know if that is the group to
2 single out for this and what are the other ramifications of
3 doing so. I just don't know.

4 MR. PITTS: Right.

5 MS. VICTORY: But it seems like you raised a good
6 point.

7 MR. PITTS: Yeah. You'd want to obviously limit the
8 number, but I think it may be time to reevaluate GETS in \
9 that context.

10 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

11 MR. DAVIS: Do you mean like a conference call or
12 where you'd call and have 50 people on the line, or do you
13 mean it would just go out to 50 people. I'm not sure I
14 understand.

15 MR. PITTS: Well you can't, you can't do either.

16 MR. DAVIS: Right. But what is your reaction?

17 MR. PITTS: But I was talking about going out sending
18 -- you can do a page to everyone, an email page to everyone
19 and primarily they're using pagers. But if you want -- but
20 if that were down and you wanted to use a priority phone
21 line to record a message and send it out to your 30 some
22 personnel you can't do that under the GETS.

23 MR. JACOT: Okay. Billy let me let me ask a
24 question. So what you're basically talking about is just a
25 voice broadcast capability right? You want to be able to
26 broadcast the message out to a large distribution from a

1 single source?

2 MR. PITTS: Yeah. Well that what GETS and WSP and
3 TSP are primarily used for right now, voice calls.

4 MR. JACOT: Well I guess my question, yeah, I
5 understand it voice. So I guess my question is, is the
6 limitation on GETS is that a technological limitation or is
7 it a limitation under the definition of the service itself?

8 I mean what would the technology be that would allow
9 you do a broadcast delivery of a voice message over GETS.
10 And does the GETS service definition as it is strictly
11 prohibit being able to do that or is it simply that there's
12 no technological ability to do that today over the PSTN?

13 MS. VICTORY: Or is there a technological reason not
14 to do that in an emergency?

15 MR. JACOT: Yes. Another question.

16 MR. PITTS: I think it's a its not a technological,
17 its flat prohibition and I think it comes from anxiety of
18 over using the line. Because there needs to be some frame
19 work under which if you're going to make those kind of
20 broadcast calls.

21 MR. JACOT: I think that's what needs to be explored.

22 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think that's something that
23 perhaps the working group can take a look at and see whether
24 it's able to gather enough data on this issue in the time
25 remaining to look at it. But I think they're some, I think
26 we have some questions that we just haven't looked at yet

1 and we need to talk about on that.

2 MR. DELAHOUSEY: If I could Gill, if you don't mind
3 going over recommendation number three there. And I
4 apologize having to leave, and Jim who is vice chair, if
5 you could handle the remainder of the call -- the
6 discussion, that would be great.

7 MS. VICTORY: Thank you, Steve.

8 MR. DELAHOUSEY: Thank you.

9 MR. BAILEY: I got a number three, resiliency and
10 restoration of the 911 infrastructure and PSAPS. We looked
11 at going with recommendations of NRIC and recommending to
12 the FCC that they address some of these following issues to
13 assure more robust 911 service.

14 Under A. Requiring service providers and network
15 operators to place and maintain 911 circuits so or diverse
16 interoffice transport facilities in order to eliminate
17 single points of failure.

18 And all of these are referenced back to particular
19 NRIC recommendations from there I believe it was December
20 05' meeting.

21 B. Encourage service providers network operators and
22 property managers to have available emergency backup power
23 IE batteries, generators, fuel cells, etcetera to maintain
24 critical communication service during time of commercial
25 power failures.

26 C. Require network operators to deploy dual active

1 911 selective router Alco textures to enable circuit from
2 the callers serving in office to be split between two
3 selected routers in order to eliminate single points of
4 failure.

5 D. Urging PSAPS to achieve alternate methods of
6 communications with a Lecs or local exchange carriers, to
7 coordinate restoration of 911 services.

8 And E. to recommend the designation or implementation
9 of even a second level of backup PSAPS, that is more than
10 200 miles away. To field calls when the primary and
11 secondary local PSAPS are totally disabled. And this would
12 require some FCC legislation or rule changing to eliminate
13 the current prohibition about transporting 911 across a lot
14 of boundaries.

15 And of course from a logistics standpoint also being
16 able to staff the dispatch center a couple hundred miles
17 away from the incident, to not only receive the calls from
18 the affected incident but also being able to get the
19 information back to the incident sight --

20 MS. VICTORY: Hum.

21 MR. BAILEY: is another major task. But we have
22 found from Katrina that even your first, second and even
23 third level of PSAPS at times are dramatically impacted.
24 That particular in the event of a hurricane or other
25 disaster that you may need to look at that capability
26 whether it be in at the State EOC or somewhere that you got

1 still another means of routing your 911 calls and getting
2 the information back to a local environment.

3 MS. VICTORY: Thanks Gill. Any questions or comments
4 on that particular recommendation?

5 MR. BAILEY: One, Nancy. It's not on here and I just
6 thought about it a few minutes ago as far as PSAPS in our
7 particular case 911 communications districts, and it goes
8 back to Homeland Security. And I don't know if this group
9 can make that recommendation and what brought it to life
10 was the request for emergency medical service to be
11 included in grant. 911 communications districts are not
12 allowed under the current Homeland Security regulations to
13 apply for communications grants of any type.

14 MS. VICTORY: Hum.

15 MR. BAILEY: We have to attempt the partner with
16 local law enforcement, or fire service grant, or something
17 of that nature. So if there was any way that we could also
18 be included as local governmental entities as a 911
19 district, to be eligible to apply for funding. And we're
20 task with providing the 911 service and the communications
21 but yet we're not eligible to apply for any of the funding
22 that's out there to make this happen.

23 MS. VICTORY: I would suggest that is an important
24 issue and something that working group three should take
25 under advisement and consider and try to explore a little
26 bit.

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The other thing that I was going to recommend also along these lines to working group three is I understand that as part of some recent legislation there are some monies that are going to NTIA. I think about forty-three and a half million, for E911 grants and I haven't had an opportunity to explore the specifics of that.

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But perhaps as a part of this working group three wants to incorporate some recommendation to the FCC with respect to assisting or making sure the criteria are correct on those grants as well. So that might be something for working group three to take a look at. Okay.

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Let me go ahead and recap the emergency communications changes and further work we talked about. We talked about revising 1C to take in to account what NCS is doing and that working group three would research that and take care of that change.

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We talked about on one what's labeled as "D" but really should be "E" that the list of equipment of Federal assets that we should be targeting should include bridging, technology, and gateways. We talked about in 2E adding the phrase after Federal a parenthetical saying including the military to be clear that we want to have a means of making sure the military is included in interoperability.

1 In three we've talked about working group three would
2 take a look at the idea of grants for PSAPS to complete 911
3 capabilities and try to incorporate into that the NTIA
4 program. And then finally we raised the issue under number
5 four for working group three to look at as to whether a
6 broader broadcast capability under GETS for emergency
7 medical and/or some other group would make sense and be
8 something that we would be prepared to recommend.

9 And I know Mike Rosenthal was going to do further
10 research about the 700 and 800 and make sure that he was -
11 did not have any problems with the availability of that
12 equipment. Is that correct, is that everything under three?

13 Tim Cannon.

14 MR. CANNON: I have one thing under on page 6, which
15 I guess should be "F" where it says immediately it's
16 probably just a wording issue. It says immediately
17 following any large disaster establish a website.

18 MR. VICTORY: Uh-Huh.

19 MR. CANNON: I spoke with Steve on the way out, I
20 think the intent with that by the group was that the website
21 be established now. And that it be populated you know in
22 advance of the storm but then can be updated or more
23 information can be put in during the storm.

24 MS. VICTORY: We --

25 MR. CANNON: I mean I think you're going to be behind
26 the eight ball --

1 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

2 MR. CANNON: if you're going to try to establish a
3 website after the disaster strikes.

4 MS. VICTORY: We have some back and forth in the
5 working group on this issue. And I think the reason it came
6 out and happy to revisit it, but I think the reason it came
7 up is following any large disasters there was a concern
8 that if the website was done in advance of the disaster you
9 might have information on it that was not current.

10 That you would have outdated information on it and
11 number one and number two it could end up being just one of
12 those check the box things for every communications provider
13 since there wasn't an urgency but it was in their leisure.
14 Oh yes we want to make sure our name is on this website and
15 so it might not be but.

16 MR. CANNON: I guess the point being that the
17 technical side of just developing the website and giving
18 people their passwords and all that stuff and then don't
19 populate it until --

20 MS. VICTORY: Okay.

21 MR. CANNON: at the storm. You know what I mean,
22 other than trying to go back and do that when you're in the
23 middle of dealing with a disaster you're going to go out and
24 create a website.

25 MS. VICTORY: Marty. A good point.

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MR. HADFIELD: Can I just suggest changing the established to activate?

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MS. VICTORY: Okay. That's a good point.

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MR. HADFIELD: That kind of infers that it's already to go.

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MS. VICTORY: Okay. Sounds great. I think that's a good way to do it. Any other comments on this section?

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MR. BEARY: That whole issue. Kevin Beary. That whole issue might be addressed by that group that we wanted to get congress to approve and it's at you know Homeland Security Infrastructure Group. You know make them responsible for that. I just throw that out on the table.

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MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think our recommendations are to the FCC and I think that's why we did this. But if there's another group that's more appropriate you know have the FCC work with them.

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MR. ANDERSON: I don't recall too much but I thought we -- I was under the impression that we decided -- the subcommittee decided that we weren't going to recommend the FCC maintain this website. It was going to be more of an industry thing. I mean --

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MS. VICTORY: I think we talked having the FCC create the website. I think the issue that we were still debating is whether or not there was going to be any sort of -- with

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2 the issue of having you know approved equipment and who was
3 going to approve that this was good equipment to use.

4

And that was something that I don't think we resolved
5 but we talked about, that if anyone would do it, it would
6 not be the FCC to do that. And it would need to be done by
7 the various industry sectors and I think that was an
8 unresolved issue that was left on the table about sort of
9 giving a good housekeeping seal of approval to anything.

10

MR. DAVIS: I think there's a little confusion here
11 and maybe I'm the one that's confused. I think Kevin Beary
12 was speaking to our recommendation of working group two,
13 item four, where we talked about the Public Safety and
14 Homeland Security Bureau. We recommended that once the
15 process for congressional notification is completed the FCC
16 should move swiftly to implement the formation of the
17 Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. And I believe
18 it's that group that Mr. Beary felt would be --

19

MS. VICTORY: Oh.

20

MR. DAVIS: appropriate to effectuate this website.

21

MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think that's right. I think we
22 can make the recommendation to the FCC and let them figure
23 it out who within the organization would do it. But most
24 likely it would be the Homeland Security Bureau when its
25 setup. But good point, I understand now.

26

I guess that takes us on to the last section and I

1 guess I'll go ahead and pick this one up. On the emergency
2 communications to the public, the first item emergency alert
3 system you've all seen before and we discussed at our last
4 meeting. There are only two changes to that one is you see
5 the words and compliment in there, because we do talk about
6 other warning systems beyond the EAS.

7 Also we did eliminate a section from that and move
8 that down into number two where we had some discussion about
9 wanting to have some specific recommendation to address
10 communications to disabled and non-English speaking
11 Americans. And the first one A. Promptly find a mechanism
12 to resolve any technical hurdles in the current EAS to
13 insure that non-English speaking people or persons with
14 disabilities have equal access to public warnings. That's
15 something that we had looked at before; we've now pulled it
16 out into a specific grouping for disabled and non-English
17 speaking Americans and to assist those individuals.

18 We also came up with two other recommendations. I
19 think one of the things we'd talked about in the working
20 group, was having the FCC sort of publicize best practices
21 for the broadcast industry, and other to assist making sure
22 these individuals had affective delivery of emergency
23 information. And we were reminded that the FCC has
24 repeatedly put out public notices reminding the industry of
25 those requirements.

26 And so we thought we'd take a different tact and

1 instead have the FCC work with the various industry trade
2 associations to create and publicize best practices for each
3 industry sector to serve these communities. And thought
4 that would be a way of taking a different approach, of
5 getting the word out, and to underscoring best practices.

6 Also and I believe this was suggested by Sheriff
7 Beary, is that for state and local government agencies that
8 provide emergency information whether its through video, or
9 audio broadcast, or through websites, to take steps to make
10 this emergency information accessible to disabled or non-
11 English speaking Americans.

12 And to make sure that to the extent that this
13 information was available, that it be produced with that
14 added capability for Americans, for all Americans to have
15 access to it. So those are those requirements I didn't
16 know if folks had specific comments on any of those. Steve
17 Davis first.

18 MR. DAVIS: I've always got a comment, I'm sorry.
19 Sheriff Beary, and I were discussing an aspect of the EAS
20 that I think we might be able to improve a little bit. He
21 was mentioning the weather radios that so many people have
22 at their homes. And we know that probably 90 percent of
23 actually broadcast EAS messages do not come from
24 government, but actually do come from the National Weather
25 Service.

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So there is a linkage where they can put on an alert and it triggers EAS. Since -- as I've been reminded repeatedly all disasters are local and there is always a local weather service even though it's a National Weather Service, there's a local office in every metropolitan area.

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I might wonder if we should add in to our EAS recommendations and I would push this back to working group three to discuss that perhaps we set up a link where sheriffs offices etcetera would communicate to the National Weather Service and then have it forwarded on to the EAS.

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Because A. The National Weather Service has working equipment to generate EAS alerts and B. This would augment the broadcast network, not that don't want to be the first place people turn to.

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But I acknowledge that people are asleep and they're not listening to their radio or their television set, and that the National Weather Service. Some people turn their weather radios on and leave them on that will go off if there is a tornado warning. And then Sheriff Beary, could get on there ask say everybody you need to evacuate, or there's been a chemical spill, or whatever.

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So I wonder whether we might add the National Weather Service existing alert system to our emergency alert program. I mean it's just a suggestion. I know it's a little late in the game to bring that up, but the Sheriff

1 brought it up and I thought it was a brilliant idea and I
2 wouldn't want to pass on including it. Thank you.

3 MS. VICTORY: Any comments or thoughts on that?

4 MR. PITTS: So they'd have one of the access to the
5 EAS now would that go over the broadcast television and
6 radio as well?

7 MR. DAVIS: Yeah.

8 MS. VICTORY: So the idea would -- this be a way of
9 getting non-weather emergency information out over the NOAA
10 weather radios.

11 MR. DAVIS: But we would have to coordinate with the
12 NWS on that, but we would recommend that maybe that be
13 started. Because I think that we're missing an opportunity
14 to wake people up if we need to tell them that there was a
15 chemical spill in their backyard.

16 MR. PITTS: I think any effort to utilize the EAS is
17 only for the good. So -- I you know -- I think we maybe
18 should chew on this a little bit to make sure that we're not
19 interrupting any current networking on it. But I think it
20 probably would work.

21 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Interesting suggestion.

22 MR. BEARY: Billy. I had promised I wouldn't use it

1 for political purposes so.

2 MS. VICTORY: Marty.

3 MR. HADFIELD: Yeah. I'm just wondering logistically
4 since the participation at EAS is voluntary at this level of
5 EAS type activity not an EAN. It's traditionally for
6 weather alert type events often times we don't actually
7 carry the NOAA coded message.

8 We'll take that you know roll it into a newscast or
9 perhaps put a blurb out over the air about it. But we won't
10 actually do the encoder tones and all of that.

11 MR. PITTS: And that's what I was saying.

12 MR. HADFIELD: You know there's a laundry list of
13 event codes. And kind of the trick is going to be deciding
14 which ones you want to turn the keys of your station over to
15 NOAA and I'm just throwing that out as a thought process to
16 keep in mind I guess.

17 MR. PITTS: Well that's what I was asking. That's
18 the very point I was asking. I think we need to chew on it
19 a little bit more.

20 MR. DAVIS: And I want to make sure that I'm not
21 suggesting that we require all broadcasters to carry all
22 alerts. I'm talking about a downstream sort of a thing
23 where the sheriff's or other law enforcement could activate
24 NOAA, and we at the station could determine whether or not
25 to act on that triggering.

26 So the NOAA would be the first thing activated

1 because that way they can wake people up in the middle of
2 the night. You know where a broadcast station may not be
3 able to do that. That was my suggestion for good or bad it
4 may be a bad suggestion but that was my suggestion.

5 MR. PITTS: So you're suggesting then it really only
6 be streamed primarily on the NOAA all weather alert system
7 and it's up to the broadcaster to make a determination
8 whether --

9 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. At this point it is up to the
10 broadcasters and I don't know what Intercoms vision on this
11 is. I know that at Clear Channel we have certain priorities
12 of alert that we do, for instance we do not interrupt our
13 programming for tornado watches as far as putting up the
14 EAS, but we do for a tornado warning.

15 And I don't know whether or not all broadcast -- now
16 that doesn't mean we don't announce the tornado watches, or
17 put up a crawler on the screen, if its television because we
18 also own television stations. But I guess what I'm saying
19 is we don't actually put the EAS alert live on the air when
20 it's a tornado warning or a flood warning. But when it's a
21 tornado watch, or flood watch we'll either manually talk
22 about that with one of our personalities or not depending
23 on how close to our listening area is but.

24 So I'm not suggesting Marty, and I don't want to be

1 taken as suggesting that broadcaster would have to carry
2 every NOAA triggering, but rather what I am saying is let's
3 tie the NOAA system in better. So that when again Tim, and
4 his people need to communicate with the public they're not
5 only able to access the broadcast band but also the NOAA
6 weather radios are becoming more and more prevalent can and
7 people homes.

8 MR. PITTS: Right. Well then I think the Sheriff
9 recognizes that people at risk that a lot of this disabled
10 and handicapped, have the weather alert systems on all the
11 time and they are.

12 MR. BEARY: And I wouldn't --

13 MR. PITTS: That's right and they're the people that
14 ought to be knowing quickly as quickly as possible what's
15 going on I think that's what you're suggesting.

16 MR. BEARY: And Billy, we also discussed a couple
17 meetings ago how we could get EAS more involved and up to
18 date in the 21st century. And you know we're talking
19 hurricanes, but you have chemical spills, we've been
20 dealing with wild fires, you know its we've got some or
21 systems like 911, reverse 911 in code red. But this is
22 just another way to you know not everything happens between
23 8:00 and 5:00.

24 And you know it sure would be nice if we had a train
25 derailment with chlorine leaking into a huge community or by
26 a school at 4 o'clock in the morning when we know kids are

1 going to start getting there three hours later to be able
2 to you know trigger the alarm.

3 MR. PITTS: I'm --

4 MR. BEARY: And I wouldn't do it through my
5 communications, I think the best way to control this would
6 be through the division of emergency management setup
7 through the county emergency operation center where they
8 could trigger it.

9 MR. PITTS: I certainly think its worth exploring but
10 EAS is primarily -- the broadcasters have to have the
11 ability at their broadcast stations and have to be the head
12 end of a cable and that's the only mandate. The
13 President's supposedly is the only one who can use it. The
14 rest of this is a voluntary system and that's why the EAS
15 doesn't have any real viability right now in any sense.
16 Because it's not really its not being carried universally,
17 lets characterize it that way.

18 So Sheriff I think it's worth exploring and I think
19 it might particular help this next section that Nancy's
20 talking about. The people at risk.

21 And that was one of the questions that I also had
22 Nancy, should we characterize it Adora Obi Nweza articulated
23 very well about poor people or people that don't have the
24 ability to buy water or transportation or whatever. And
25 they need to know as well. Could we maybe characterize
26 this in a broader sense about people at risk that would

1 bring in them the elderly, children, disabled, and non-
2 English speaking and maybe delineate that separately? Is
3 there a way to potentially do that?

4 MS. VICTORY: I'd appreciate any thoughts you have on
5 doing that.

6 MR. PITTS: Okay.

7 MS. VICTORY: So let me know. That would be yeah.
8 I'm sure there's a way of doing that.

9 MR. PITTS: I mean I'm talking about in the general
10 heading maybe.

11 MS. VICTORY: Yeah.

12 MR. PITTS: I'll give you some language.

13 MS. VICTORY: Yeah. I think we just need to speak
14 about how the best way to do that is.

15 MR. PITTS: Okay.

16 MS. VICTORY: I'd appreciate your thoughts on that.
17 Anything else? One of the things we heard about this
18 morning and talked about this morning was the problem of
19 confusion of the information out there. And I didn't know
20 if this group had any brain storms based on the testimony,
21 if we want to make any sort of a recommendation for
22 addressing that situation, or that might be something that
23 working group three may want to talk about on their next
24 call as well as to whether. Certainly I think we want to
25 add a section in the observations portion about the
26 confusion of information that was out there and some miss

1 information.

2 But in terms of a recommendation for how to deal with
3 that I'm open to thoughts. So I didn't know if anyone
4 wanted to bring anything up here or whether that would be
5 something for the working group to consider. If you wanted
6 to make any recommendations, that's not an area we've
7 really debated before it just really came up for the first
8 time today.

9 MR. DAVIS: Are you referring to specifically to
10 media broadcast or something more broad than that?

11 MS. VICTORY: I think its just what we were talking
12 about today that instead of I guess a number of issues that
13 state and local folk on the scene may not have had as good
14 of information as folks who were watching the broadcaster.
15 The fact that the -- you know that the broadcasters were
16 getting different information. I don't know what the
17 recommendation would be but this was a new issue that we
18 heard about today.

19 MR. PITTS: Essentially what the sheriff's are
20 talking about in a different way being able to get local
21 information to local people. They were getting national
22 information or outside the state information, which wasn't
23 always correct, and leading to confusion. Is there a way
24 to do that?

25 MS. VICTORY: We talked about a sort of a central
26 authoritative source for information and does it make sense

1 to recommend that for purposes -- for some purposes that
2 the be identified you know an identified source for this
3 information. You know I don't know whether we go there but
4 I just think it might be an interesting issue for working
5 group three to chat about a little bit.

6 Well anyhow I think just to recap on the emergency
7 communications to the public section, we've talked about
8 this issue as to whether there's a -- might want to
9 recommend coordinating with the Commerce Department to have
10 certain transmission to go through the NOAA weather radios
11 as a means of distribution.

12 We also talked about possibility of discussing this
13 information -- this issue of confusing information or
14 inconsistent information whether there's anything to be
15 done on that and that working group three can take a look
16 at.

17 Well that brings us to the end of our recommendations
18 did anybody have any comments or questions on anything so
19 far? What I would suggest is what I'd like to do is get a
20 red line out of the changes that we agreed upon today
21 versus any and also as well any line edits that I receive
22 from you all.

23 I would request that you get me any line edits on the
24 problem section. Or if there's a sort of what I would call
25 a non-substance of change to the recommendations, the
26 clarification, get me those by Tuesday morning to me and my

1 team and I'll send an email out as to who all you should be
2 copying on that so we can implement those quickly.

3 We will turn around on Wednesday and send out a red
4 line draft of both the recommendation section, and the
5 observation section on the changes made. And I would
6 suggest that I guess working group one got off pretty easy,
7 but working group two and three have a couple of -- they
8 had a lot of work initially working on all these resiliency
9 issues although I think there are a couple of things they
10 may be taking a look at perhaps with respect to some of the
11 maps and geographic details.

12 But working group two and three you have a couple of
13 issue areas to consider further and given that I think the
14 time frame of this is we tentatively have our final meeting
15 set for June 9th. We need to present the final report to
16 the Commission on June 15th. That means that a final
17 draft, the final draft needs to be circulated to this group
18 I would say probable somewhere around the first of June for
19 your review.

20 I would ask and as I'll indicate in my e-mail I would
21 request that if you have any changes to that draft that you
22 let me know that no later than June 7th. Because I'd like
23 to know about any suggested changes or problems ahead of
24 time so we can focus our discussion for our last meeting
25 since we do have a drop-dead date.

26 And so that would suggest that working the clock

1 backwards if we're getting the draft out on June 1st that
2 really means that the working groups need to complete their
3 work prior to the Memorial Day weekend, and circulate any
4 new recommendations. So that probable means that the
5 working groups need to get together I don't have a calendar
6 in front of me but probably sometime the end of next week I
7 guess. So just work in that schedule that's what we're
8 looking at.

9 So working groups meeting next week finalizing any
10 anything to us on change recommendations before Memorial Day
11 weekend we'll circulate that draft out to everybody probably
12 can look for it on June 1st or 2nd changes back to us, red
13 lines, anything else concerns by June 7th. We have our
14 meeting tentatively for June 9th , presenting this to the
15 Chairman on June 15th at their open meeting. Make sense to
16 everybody.

17 MR. DAVIS: Do any of us show up on meeting June
18 15th?

19 MS. VICTORY: We'll get back to you as to whatever
20 the Chairman's office will want and we'll get back to you
21 with anything.

22 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

23 MS. VICTORY: Okay. Thank you very much everybody
24 any questions please let me know. Thanks.

25 This hearing is adjourned.

26 [Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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