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N95i/255 SECURE METERING MODULE (SMM)
SECURITY POLICY

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Issue N95i U3 – 02.07.2007

TITLE: N95i/255 SECURE METERING MODULE (SMM) SECURITY POLICY

ABSTRACT:

DATE	ISSUE	AMENDMENT DESCRIPTION
12.09.2001	A	First Issue
22.02.2002	B	Maintenance role renamed to Program Support role. Clarified definition of Program Support role in section 4.2. Included signature check in program down load rule (section 5.3.4).
22.03.2002	C	N90I references added.
25.03.2002	D	Correction made - N90I to N90i.
14.04.2003	E	Modified for FIPS 140-2 and for Wrapped Meter
19.05.2003	F	Additional CSP's added with descriptions
20.06.2003	G	Minor changes for FIPS submission. Addition of company name to title of document
30.06.03	H	Minor changes for FIPS submission.
01.08.03	J	Model name changed to N902i/152
29.03.2004	K	Add ECDSA cryptographic module and Model name change to N94i/152
13.05.2004	L	Correct section 4.1.2 *Zeroise Private Key Service.* Zeroization name replaces Commission name.
25.05.2004	M	Correct section 5.6.1 and 5.4.7. Remove Program Load service in section 7
24.06.2004	N	Improve some descriptions for FIPS.
28.02.2005	O	Update following OLS-2 launch
28.02.2005	P	Correct section1.4 and 4.2
29.07.2005	Q	Update following Fips audit
02.08.2005	R	New correction according to Fips audit
30.08.2005	S	IGL comment added to bring out the ols2 services
06.10.2005	T	Software release update and Model name change to N95i/255
06.10.2005	U	Update with the hardware part number following France naming rule
09.05.2006	N95i U1	Update following Fips Audit
26.06.2007	N95i U2	Update per CMVP comments
02.07.2007	N95i U3	Release of FW 4130379C Version E41

Originator: Date:
Authorised By: Date:

CIRCULATION LIST

ORIGINATOR'S MANAGER

ORIGINATOR

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N95i/255 SECURITY POLICY

1. INTRODUCTION

The N95i/255 Secure Metering Module (SMM) is a unit embedded within the Neopost IJ40 (IJ50 or IJ60) postal franking machine. Integrated within the SMM are a cryptographic subfunction and postal services subfunction.

The postal services relate to the ultimate objective of the SMM which is to store postage credit belonging to a customer until it is needed by the indicium dispensing system of the franking machine. The indicia are dispensed in the form of a digitally signed image. This image is a unique bit pattern that can be determined to have originated from a particular SMM at a particular point in time.

The cryptographic functions are used to restrict access to postal services and to authenticate where necessary postal service output.

1.1 SCOPE

This document contains a statement of the security rules under which the SMM must operate. A number of these rules are wholly or partially a consequence of the general franking machine environment in which the SMM is intended to be placed and for this reason a brief description of this environment is included.

1.2 REFERENCES

1.2.1 Information Based Indicia Program (IBIP), Performance Criteria for Information Based Indicia and Security Architecture for closed IBI Postage Metering Systems (PCIBISAIBIPMS), The United States Postal Service (USPS).

1.2.2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2

1.2.3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2

1.2.4 Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2

1.2.5 Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), American national Standard for Financial Services X9.62-1998.

1.3 GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ACRONYMS

DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm (Reference 1.2.3)
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (Reference 1.2.3)
G	DSA common parameter G
I/O	Input / Output
MTBF	Mean time between failures
NVEM	Non Volatile Electronic Memory
P	DSA common parameter P
Q	DSA common parameter Q
RNG	Random number generator
SHA-1	Secure Hash Algorithm (Reference 1.2.4)
SMM	Secure Metering Module
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
USPS	United States Postal Service (Reference 1.2.1)
X	DSA private key
Y	DSA public key

1.4 SMM VERSION IDENTIFICATION

Hardware 4127410K B
Firmware 4130379C E41 (Main)
4126898B A (Coprocessor)

2. SECURITY LEVEL

The SMM is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module as defined in Reference 1.2.2. The SMM shall meet the overall requirements for Level 3 security as defined in Reference 1.2.2. The following table shows the security level requirement, as defined in Reference 1.2.2, for each area of the SMM:

	Level
Cryptographic Module	3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	3
Roles, Services and Authentication	3
Finite State Machine	3
Physical Security	3 + EFP/EFT
Operating System Security	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	3
EMI/EMC	3
Self Tests	3
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

N/A = Not Applicable

3. SMM OVERVIEW

Figure 1

The SMM (figure 1) consists of a cryptographic subfunction and postal services subfunction sharing common hardware that is contained on a printed circuit board and enclosed within a tamper responsive enclosure. This enclosure constitutes the cryptographic physical boundary.

The SMM contains dual redundant non-volatile electronic memories, which enables both critical security parameters and postal related data items to be stored in duplicate if required. Duplicate storage is typically used to increase MTBF.

The SMM will input and output authenticated data that requires the services of the cryptographic subfunction. The SMM will also input and output certain other data that has no security implications and that is permitted to pass freely across the cryptographic physical boundary. This latter data relates to the general control and use of the franking machine in which the SMM is embedded.

The SMM has only a FIPS mode, it does not support any non-FIPS mode of operation. The SMM is not designed to mitigate specific attacks outside of FIPS 140-2 Reference 1.2.2.

3.1 I/O PORTS

A number of data channels extend outside the enclosure via specific pins on a single multi pin connector. Each of these pin groups has a predefined use (Appendix 3) and are henceforth regarded as a port. The ports are described in the following with respect to their use inside the SMM up to the point at which they enter/exit the physical enclosure. However for convenience of reference they are named according to their typical use externally to the SMM:

3.1.1 Weigh Platform Port

This is a serial communication port. Both authenticated and non-authenticated data will be input/output through this port.

This port is so named, as externally to the SMM it is the only connection that will support a weigh platform. The port will also however support connection to either a PC or stand alone scale via an RS232 link.

3.1.2 Printer Port

This is a serial communication port. Both authenticated and non-authenticated data will be input/output through this port.

This port is so named, as externally to the SMM it is the only connection that will support a printer. The port will also however support connection to either a PC or stand alone scale via an RS232 link.

3.1.3 Modem port

This is a serial communication port whose operation and role is the same as that described for the general port.

This port is so named as externally to the SMM its normal purpose is to interface via a Modem.

3.1.4 User Interface (UI) Port

This is a serial communication port whose operation and role is the same as that described for the General port.

This port is so named as externally to the SMM its normal purpose is to link to a user interface unit that comprises keyboard, display and memory card reader.

3.1.5 Print Mechanism Control Port

This is an output only data port whose only function is to output authenticated postal indicium.

3.1.6 Print Mechanism Status Port

This is an input only data port. No authenticated data is received via this port. The port inputs only non-security critical indicium dispensing progress data.

3.1.7 Power Supply Port

This is an input only port, which provides for the supply of power to the module firmware.

3.2 LIFE CYCLE STATES

The SMM assumes one of four main overall states during its life cycle. These states are relevant to the accessibility of cryptographic services. The states are:

Not Commissioned

- This is the default at manufacture. The SMM does not contain the cryptographic parameters necessary to support interaction with the Neopost Postal Administration Infrastructure. A factory initialisation is required.

Commissioned

- The SMM contains the cryptographic parameters necessary to support interaction with the Neopost Postal Administration Infrastructure but has not yet been registered with this Enabled infrastructure.

Customer

- The SMM is registered with the Neopost Postal Administration Infrastructure and will perform postal functions.

Customer disabled

- The SMM is deregistered from the Neopost Postal Administration Infrastructure and will not perform postal functions. It cannot be re-commissioned until it has undergone a factory initialisation, which will reconfigure the contents of the SMM system memory.

4. ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION

The SMM shall support two distinct operators. The SMM shall enforce separation of entities using identity-based authentication and by restricting the services available to each entity. Also some services are state dependent. The allowable operators are the Neopost Administrator and the Customer.

The Neopost Administrator incorporates both the Crypto officer and User roles referred to in Reference 1.2.2.

For identity based authentication the ID must first have been selected and then all input data must be accompanied by a cryptographic signature, which is derived from the input data, and from cryptographic parameters unique to that entity. The cryptographic parameters used must already be present in the SMM.

For the Administrator the cryptographic parameters must be input subsequent to manufacture.

Where services have a state dependency then the SMM must be first placed into an appropriate life cycle state. The relationship between SMM services and state is summarised in Appendix 1.

The relationship between SMM services and authenticated entities are summarised in Appendix 2.

4.1 NEOPOST ADMINISTRATOR

The Neopost Administrator shall provide the services required to commission and maintain the parameters within the SMM that are necessary for interaction with the Neopost metering infrastructure (correspond to crypto officer mode referred in Reference 1.2.2).

The Neopost Administrator shall also provide those services necessary to control, sustain, and monitor the postal operation of an SMM (i.e. installation, postage funding, usage auditing, withdrawal, etc.). These shall require the identity of the operator to be provided and authenticated (correspond to user mode referred in Reference 1.2.2).

The Neopost Administrator services are:

4.1.1 Commission Service

This service will carry out the following:

- Input a non-authenticated message containing a Neopost X509 certificate which will include the public key (Y) and DSA common parameters (PQG) corresponding to the Administrator.

- Verify that the SMM is in the appropriate state for acceptance of a ‘Commission’ service request (Appendix 1).

- Extract and store the PQGY values.

- Generate and store a new SMM public (Y) key based upon the newly input PQG and the SMM private key.

- Generate and store new SMM ECDSA public and private keys.

- Authenticate and output a message containing the SMM DSA (Y) and ECDSA public keys.

- Set the SMM state to ‘Commissioned’ so as to enable the Administrator.

4.1.2 Zeroise Private Key Service

This service will carry out the following:

- Input an non-authenticated message containing a request to zero the current private key.

- Verify that the SMM is in the appropriate state for acceptance of a ‘Zeroization’ service request (Appendix 1).

- Zero all CSP’s (i.e. including private keys).

4.1.3 Customer Enable Service

This service will:

- Input an authenticated message containing postal critical data items, plus two X509 Certificates containing certified SMM DSA and ECDSA public keys.

- Verify the authentication.

- Verify that the SMM is in the appropriate state for acceptance of a ‘Customer Enable’ service request.

- Extract and store the postal data items.

- Extract and store X509 SMM DSA and ECDSA public key Certificates.

- Set the SMM state ‘Customer Enabled’.

4.1.4 Postal Administration Service

This service will:

- Input an authenticated message containing a postal function command and optionally accompanied by postal critical data items required by the function.
- Verify the authentication.
- Verify that the SMM is in the appropriate state for acceptance of a ‘Postal Admin’ service request.
- Perform the specified postal function using the optionally provided postal data as required.

4.1.5 Customer Disable Service

This service will:

- Input an authenticated message requesting that the SMM set itself to the ‘Customer Disabled’ state.
- Verify the authentication.
- Verify that the SMM is in the appropriate state for acceptance of a ‘Customer Disable’ service request.
- Authenticate and output a message containing specific postal critical data items required by Neopost before an SMM is disabled.
- Set the SMM state ‘Customer Disabled’ thereby inhibiting further access to the Administrator services and certain postal critical customer role services.

4.1.6 Self Test Service

This service will perform those self tests required by Reference 1.2.2. The SMM performs the tests automatically and no authentication is required.

4.2 CUSTOMER

These services are available on behalf of the Neopost Administrator. They all require the SMM to be in an appropriate state. The services are:

4.3.1 Postal Indicium Service

This service requests printing of a postal indicium.

4.3.2 Postal Administration Request Service

This service requests that the Neopost Administrator authenticate to the meter and perform appropriate authenticated operations.

4.3.3 General Postal Service

This service requests status output

4.3.4 Self test Service

This service will perform those self tests required by Reference 1.2.2. The SMM performs the tests automatically and no authentication is required.

4.3.5 Postal Rate Update

This service requests a new postal rate table.

4.3.6 General Non-Postal Service

This requests access to OLS2 features. No authentication is required.

5. SECURITY RULES

5.1 AUTHENTICATION RULES

5.1.1 The SMM shall provide two distinct operators, the Neopost Administrator and the Customer.

5.1.2 The SMM shall provide identity-based authentication.

5.1.3 Message authenticating signatures shall be 40 byte codes derived using the DSA algorithm, as described in Reference 1.2.3, using 1024 bit common parameters (PQG). Random number generation employed by the DSA shall be according to section 3.2 and 3.3 of Reference 1.2.3.

Note that there will be only one random number implementation but with two separate states maintained, i.e. one for DSA signatures and one for generation of keys.

5.1.4 The cryptographic parameters (PQGY) for each identity authenticated shall be independent and shall be stored in predetermined fixed locations within the SMM. These shall be able to be superseded by subsequent input values if required. The parameters for the Administrator must be input after manufacture.

5.1.5 The SMM shall authenticate exported data with 40 byte codes derived using the DSA algorithm, as described in Reference 1.2.3, using 1024 bit common parameters (PQG). Random number generation employed by the DSA shall be according to section 3.2 and 3.3 of Reference 1.2.3.

5.1.6 For any attempt to use the authentication mechanism then the probability that a random attempt will be accepted or that a false acceptance will occur will be at least 1 in 2^{80} (equivalent to at least 12×10^{23}).

The DSA key is 160 bits and is considered to have at least 80 bits of strength. This is considerably more difficult to break than the 1 in 1,000,000 requirement.

5.1.7 The minimum time to generate an authentication shall be 100ms. For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism then the probability that a random attempt will be accepted or that a false acceptance will occur will be 1 in 2^{80} divided by 600 (equivalent to 2×10^{21}). This is considerably more difficult to break than the 1 in 100,000 requirement.

5.1.8 Stamp authenticating signature shall be ECDSA 163 Koblitz curve as describe in Reference 1.2.5. The private key used to sign data is stored in a protected area.

5.2 KEY GENERATION

5.2.1 The SMM DSA Private key shall be generated according section 3.1 and 3.3 of Reference 1.2.3.

Note that there will be only one random number implementation but with two separate states maintained, i.e. one for DSA signatures and one for generation of keys.

5.2.2 The SMM DSA public key corresponding to its the private key shall be calculated according to the relationship for derivation of a DSA public key defined in Reference 1.2.3.

5.2.3 The SMM ECDSA private and public keys shall be generated according Reference 1.2.5.

5.2.4 During private/public key pair generation data output from the SMM shall be inhibited.

5.3 CONDITIONAL SELF TEST RULES

5.3.1 If one of the keys pairs (DSA or ECDSA) is invalid then both the SMM private key and public key shall be erased (to zero) and the SMM shall inhibit the data output interface. The validity of a key pair shall be determined by a pair wise consistency check, i.e. the calculation and verification of a signature. This check shall be performed at the generation of each new key pair and at power up.

5.3.2 For both the private key and signature random number generators, the SMM shall perform the continuous random number generator test, as defined in Reference 1.2.2 for conditional self tests, for every number generated and inhibit the data output interface if its random number generator fails to a constant value.

5.3.3 For the private key random number generator, the SMM shall perform the statistical tests for randomness as defined by Reference 1.2.2 upon demand (i.e. when the module is requested to generate a private key). The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails. (These tests are no longer actually required by NIST).

5.3.4 If the key pair ECDSA is invalid then both the SMM ECDSA private key and ECDSA public key shall be erased (to zero) and

the SMM shall inhibit the data output interface. The validity of a key pair shall be determined by a pair wise consistency check, i.e. the calculation and verification of a signature. This check shall be performed at the generation of each new key pair and at power up.

5.3.5 If a conditional self-test fails, the module shall output a status indicator and not resume operation.

5.4 POWER UP SELF TEST RULES

5.4. 1 The SMM shall test the operation of RAM areas used for secure operations at power up. The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails.

5.4.2 The SMM shall test the contents of it's program memory area at power up by calculating the 32 bit checksum (sum of bytes) of the contents and comparing the result with a known answer. The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails.

5.4.3 The SMM shall test the accessibility and validity of all CSP values in NVEM at power up. If any are not accessible (i.e. device failure) or contain erroneous data then the SMM shall inhibit the data output interface.

5.4.4 The SMM shall test the DSA algorithm at power up by performing a known answer test for both signing and verification using predetermined data embedded into the SMM firmware. Known answer testing of the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1) and for the authentication random number generator (PRNG) shall be inclusive within the DSA test. The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails.

Note that the PRNG will have two separate states, i.e. one for DSA or ECDSA signatures and one for key generations. The states only differ by the maintenance of separate generator seeds. Hence the test suffices for both states.

5.4.5 For the signature random number generator, the SMM shall perform the statistical tests for randomness as defined by Reference 1.2.2 at power up. The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails. (These tests are no longer actually required by NIST).

If in an RNG error state the test will be repeated upon demand.

5.4.6 An authenticating signature shall be calculated and stored using the SMM's own key private key to sign DSA public keys. If this signature fails to be verified at power up then the public key for each identity shall be erased (to zero) and the SMM shall inhibit the data output interface.

5.4.7 The SMM shall test the ECDSA algorithm at power up by performing a known answer test for both signing and verification using predetermined data embedded into the SMM firmware. Known answer testing of the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1) and for the authentication random number generator (PRNG) shall be inclusive within the DSA test. The SMM shall inhibit the data output interface if the test fails.

5.5 CSP STORAGE

5.5.1 The SMM shall detect data corruption of the value held for any particular CSP by the incorporation of 16 bit error detection data.

5.5.2 Any CSP access failure shall cause the SMM to inhibit the data output interface. Exit from the inhibit condition shall require the SMM to re check access to, and the values of, all CSP.

5.6 TAMPER RESPONSE

5.6.1 The DSA and ECDSA private keys and the random number generator seed shall be erased (to zero) should the SMM physical cryptographic boundary be breached. At the same time the SMM shall enter an inhibited state.

5.6.2 The DSA and ECDSA private keys, the random number generator seed, and the last random number, shall be erased (to zero) if the temperature inside the SMM covers exceeds 77 degrees Centigrade. At the same time the SMM shall enter an inhibited state.

5.6.3 The private keys shall not be exported under any circumstances.

5.7 STATUS INDICATION

5.7.1 The following ‘module not ready’ module states shall be indicated:

- Private keys (DSA and ECDSA) zeroed
- Private/Public (DSA and ECDSA) keys pairs invalid (module not initialised)
- Tamper mechanism tampered
- Neopost Administrator public DSA key authorisation signature invalid.

Indication will be via a unique text message output by the module suitable for viewing on an alphanumeric display device.

The absence of one of these messages indicates that the module is in a 'ready' state.

5.7.2 The following 'module inhibited' error conditions shall be indicated:

- DSA error
- RNG error
- Firmware / RAM error
- High temperature detected error
- ECDSA error

Indication will be via a unique text message output by the module suitable for viewing on an alphanumeric display device. The absence of one of these messages indicates that the module does not have an error condition.

5.7.3 The module shall indicate the currently active role.

Indication will be via a unique text message output by the module suitable for viewing on an alphanumeric display device.

5.8 OPERATORS/CUSTOMERS

5.8.1 Operators/customers shall be instructed to check for any errors, indicated by the status output, or for tamper evidence. Detection of any such errors or tamper evidence shall be required to be reported to Neopost such that the return of the SMM to the factory environment for decommissioning can be arranged.

6. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSP)

The following table describes each CSP maintained by the SMM:

CSP NAME	DESCRIPTION
DSA random number 1 seed	Current status of the seed value used by the random number generator during signature generation. There is only one PRNG implementation with two separate states, i.e. one for DSA signatures (state 1) and one for generation of keys (state 2). This seed represents the state for the generation of signatures.
DSA random number 2 seed	Current status of the seed value used by the random number generator during key generation. There is only one PRNG implementation with two separate states, i.e. one for DSA signatures (state 1) and one for generation of keys (state 2). This seed represents the state for the generation of keys.
SMM DSA private key	The SMM private DSA key is used to sign messages and data output from the SMM for authentication.
SMM ECDSA private key	The SMM private ECDSA key is used to authenticate data output from the SMM.
DSA K value	Current random number derived from the 'DSA random number 1 seed' by PRNG state 1 and used during DSA signature generation.
Previous DSA K value	Previous random number derived from the 'DSA random number 1 seed' and used during continuous testing of the PRNG state 1 to ensure that consecutive random numbers are not equal.
Previous DSA X value	Previous random number derived from the 'DSA random number 2 seed' and used during continuous testing of the PRNG state 2 to ensure that consecutive random numbers are not equal.

The following table describes public key parameters of the SMM:

NAME	DESCRIPTION
Neopost Administration DSA public key	Public key used for the verification of authenticated messages input from the Neopost Administration server.
Neopost Administration DSA common P	Common cryptographic DSA parameter (P) associated with the Neopost Administration services.
Neopost Administration DSA common Q	Common cryptographic DSA parameter (Q) associated with the Neopost Administration services.
Neopost Administration DSA common G	Common cryptographic DSA parameter (G) associated with the Neopost Administration services.
Neopost Program Support DSA public key	Public key used for the verification of authenticated messages input from the Neopost Program Support: Factory or country key.
SMM DSA public key	DSA Public key of the SMM. Available to any operator with a need to verify authenticated data output by the SMM.
SMM ECDSA public key	ECDSA Public key of the SMM. Available to any operator with a need to verify authenticated data output by the SMM.

7. DEFINITION OF CSP MODES OF ACCESS

The section describes how CSP are accessed by the services that can be activated by an operator. The modes of access are defined as follows:

r The data item will be read for internal use.
e The data item will be read and exported.
w The data item will be updated directly from an imported value.
m The data item will be modified to a value created by an internal process.
z The data item will be zeroed.
s The data item will be initialised to a starting value created by an internal process.
i The data item will be initialised to a benign value (typically zeroed).

The following table summarises the relationship between all CSP maintained by the SMM and the services that access them:

Service Name ▸ / Public Key Parameter Name ▾	Commission	Zeroise Private Key	Customer Enable	Postal Administration	Customer Disable	Postal Indicium	Postal Administration Request	General Postal	Self Test	Postal Rate Update	General Non-Postal
DSA random number 1 seed	s	z				m	m		m		
DSA random number 2 seed	s	z									
SMM DSA private key	s	z				r	r		r		
DSA K value		z				m	m		m		
Previous DSA K value		z				m	m		m		
Previous DSA X value	s	z									
SMM ECDSA private key	s	z				r	r		r		

The following table summarises the service relationships for public key parameters maintained by the SMM:

Service Name ▸ / Public Key Parameter Name ▾	Commission	Zeroise Private Key	Customer Enable	Postal Administration	Customer Disable	Postal Indicium	Postal Administration Request	General Postal	Self Test	Postal Rate Update	General Non-Postal
SMM DSA public key	s								r		
Neopost Administration DSA public key	w		r	r	r						
Neopost Administration DSA common P	w		r	r	r	r	r		r		
Neopost Administration DSA common Q	w		r	r	r	r	r		r		
Neopost Administration DSA common G	w		r	r	r	r	r		r		
Neopost Program Support DSA public key										r	
SMM ECDSA public key	s								r		

APPENDIX 1

The following table summarises the legality of services according to the prevailing life cycle state of an SMM:

SMM STATE ▸ / SERVICE ▾	NOT COMMISSIONED	COMMISSIONED	CUSTOMER ENABLED	CUSTOMER DISABLED
Zeroise Private Key	✔			✔
Commission	✔			
Customer Enable		✔		
Postal Administration			✔	
Customer Disable			✔	
Postal Indicium			✔	
Administration Request			✔	
General Postal	✔	✔	✔	✔
Self Test	✔	✔	✔	✔
Postal Rate Update		✔	✔	✔
General Non-Postal		✔	✔	✔

A service is not permitted for a particular state unless indicated: -
✔ = permitted

APPENDIX 2

The following table summarises the relationship between services and operators for the SMM:

OPERATOR ▸ / SERVICE ▾	ADMINISTRATOR	CUSTOMER
Zeroise Private Key	✔	
Commission	✔	
Customer Enable	✔	
Postal Administration	✔	
Customer Disable	✔	
Postal Indicium		✔
Administration Request		✔
General Postal		✔
Self Test	✔	✔
Postal Rate Update		✔
General Non-Postal		✔

Service is not accessible to a particular entity unless specifically indicated:-
✔ = can be accessed

APPENDIX 3

The following table summarises the SMM ports on which services are permitted to be active. These ports are each a specific group of pins on the single multi pin connector provided for data access to the SMM:

PORT ▸ / SERVICE ▾	WEIGH PLATFORM PORT	PRINTER PORT	MODEM PORT	UI PORT	PRINT MECHANISM CONTROL PORT	PRINT MECHANISM STATUS PORT	POWER SUPPLY PORT
Zeroise	✔	✔	✔				✔
Commission	✔	✔	✔				✔
Customer Enable	✔	✔	✔				✔
Postal Administration	✔	✔	✔				✔
Customer Disable	✔	✔	✔				✔
Postal Indicium					✔		✔
Administration Request	✔	✔	✔				✔
General Postal				✔			✔
Self Test	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	✔
General Non-Postal			✔	✔			✔
Postal Rate Update			✔	✔			✔

A service is not permitted via a port unless specifically indicated: -
✔ = permitted

WJH / JF
30.06.2003
LT
03.02.2007