NSS Cryptographic Module

Version 3.11.4

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Level 1 and 2 Validation

Red Hat, Inc.

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

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Introduction

The NSS cryptographic module is an open-source, general-purpose cryptographic library, with an API based on the industry standard PKCS #11 version 2.20 [1]. It is available for free under the Mozilla Public License, the GNU General Public License, and the GNU Lesser General Public License. The NSS cryptographic module is jointly developed by Red Hat and Sun engineers and is used in Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird, and many server applications from Red Hat and Sun.

The NSS cryptographic module has two modes of operation: the *FIPS Approved* mode and *non-FIPS Approved* mode. By default, the module operates in the non-FIPS Approved mode. To operate the module in the FIPS Approved mode, an application must adhere to the security rules in the **Security Rules** section and initialize the module properly. If an application initializes the NSS cryptographic module by calling the standard PKCS #11 function `C_GetFunctionList` and calls the API functions via the function pointers in that list, it selects the non-FIPS Approved mode. To operate the NSS cryptographic module in the FIPS Approved mode, an application must call the API functions via an alternative set of function pointers. Rule 7 of the **Security Rules** section specifies how to do this.

In addition, for Security Level 1, the operating system must be configured in a single operator mode of operation by removing all other user accounts and turning off all remote login and access services. If the module is operating at Security Level 2, the environment variable `NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT` must be set to 1 before the application starts.

Platform List

FIPS 140-2 conformance testing of the NSS cryptographic module was performed on the seven platforms listed below. The list also specifies the level of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) support tested on each platform. (The module is configured at compile time with one of the two levels of ECC support: *Basic ECC* only supports the NIST-recommended curves P-256, P-384, and P-521, whereas *Extended ECC* supports all the NIST-recommended curves and has additional performance optimizations.)

- Security Level 1
  - Compaq Evo with Pentium 4 CPU (x86), Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, Basic ECC.
  - Dell Dimension 2400 with Pentium 4 CPU, Microsoft Windows XP SP 2, Basic ECC.
  - Sun W2100z workstation with dual AMD Opteron CPUs, 64-bit Solaris 10, Extended ECC.
  - HP Visualize J5000 Workstation with PA-RISC 2.0 CPU, HP-UX B.11.11 with the HP-UX Strong Random Number Generator (KRNG11i) bundle installed, Extended ECC.
  - Mac mini with PowerPC G4 CPU, Mac OS X 10.4, Basic ECC.

- Security Level 2
  - IBM xSeries 336 with Intel Xeon CPU (x86_64), Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 4 Update 1 AS, Extended ECC.
    Common Criteria URL for EAL4 Certificate:
    http://niap.bahialab.com/cc-scheme/st/ST_VID10133-CI.pdf
    Redhat Common Criteria URL:
    http://www.redhat.com/solutions/government/commoncriteria/

  - Sun Blade 2500 Workstation with UltraSPARC IIIi CPU, Sun Trusted Solaris Version 8 4/01, Extended ECC.
    Common Criteria URL for EAL4 Certificate:
    http://www.sun.com/software/security/securitycert/images/cesg.jpg
    Solaris Common Criteria URL:
    http://www.sun.com/software/security/securitycert/index.xml

The NSS cryptographic module supports many other platforms. If you would like to have the module validated on other platforms, please contact us.

Note on Calling the API Functions

The NSS cryptographic module has two parallel sets of API functions, **`FC_xxx`** and **`NSC_xxx`**, that implement the FIPS Approved and non-FIPS Approved modes of operation, respectively. For example, `FC_Initialize` initializes the module's library for the FIPS Approved mode of operation, whereas its counterpart `NSC_Initialize` initializes the library for the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. All the API functions for the FIPS Approved mode of operation are listed in the **Specification of Services** section.

Among the module's API functions, only `FC_GetFunctionList` and `NSC_GetFunctionList` are exported and therefore callable by their names. (The `C_GetFunctionList` function mentioned in the **Introduction** section is also exported and is just a synonym of `NSC_GetFunctionList`.) All the other API functions must be called via the function pointers returned by `FC_GetFunctionList` or `NSC_GetFunctionList`. `FC_GetFunctionList` and `NSC_GetFunctionList` each return a `CK_FUNCTION_LIST` structure containing function pointers named `C_xxx` such as `C_Initialize` and `C_Finalize`. The `C_xxx` function pointers in the `CK_FUNCTION_LIST` structure returned by `FC_GetFunctionList` point to the `FC_xxx` functions, whereas the `C_xxx` function pointers in the `CK_FUNCTION_LIST` structure returned by `NSC_GetFunctionList` point to the `NSC_xxx` functions.

For brevity, we use the following convention to describe API function calls. Again we use `FC_Initialize` and `NSC_Initialize` as examples:

- When we say “call `FC_Initialize`,” we mean “call the `FC_Initialize`

function via the `C_Initialize` function pointer in the `CK_FUNCTION_LIST` structure returned by `FC_GetFunctionList`."

- When we say "call `NSC_Initialize`," we mean "call the `NSC_Initialize` function via the `C_Initialize` function pointer in the `CK_FUNCTION_LIST` structure returned by `NSC_GetFunctionList`."

Security Rules

The following list specifies the security rules that the NSS cryptographic module and each product using the module shall adhere to:

1. The NSS cryptographic module shall consist of software libraries compiled for each supported platform.
2. The cryptographic module shall rely on the underlying operating system to ensure the integrity of the cryptographic module loaded into memory.
3. The cryptographic module shall support the NSS User role and the Crypto Officer role.
4. A cryptographic module user shall have access to **all** the services provided by the cryptographic module.
5. Cryptographic module services shall consist of *public services*, which require no user authentication, and *private services*, which require user authentication. Public services do not require access to the secret and private keys and other critical security parameters (CSPs) associated with the user. **Note:** CSPs are security-related information (e.g., secret and private keys, and authentication data such as passwords) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module. Message digesting services are public only when CSPs are not accessed. Services which access CSPs (e.g., FC_GenerateKey, FC_GenerateKeyPair) require authentication.
6. Public key certificates shall be stored in plaintext form because of their public nature.
7. Applications running in the FIPS Approved mode shall call `FC_GetFunctionList` for the list of function pointers and shall call the API functions via the function pointers in that list for all cryptographic operations. (See the **Note on Calling the API functions** section.) The module changes from FIPS Approved mode to non-FIPS Approved mode when a `FC_Finalize`/`NSC_Initialize` sequence is executed; it changes from non-FIPS Approved mode to FIPS Approved mode when a `NSC_Finalize`/`FC_Initialize` sequence is executed.
8. In the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the cryptographic module shall enforce

rules specific to FIPS 140-2 requirements.

9. The cryptographic module shall not allow critical errors to compromise security. Whenever a critical error (e.g., a self-test failure) is encountered, the cryptographic module shall enter an error state and the library shall need to be reinitialized to resume normal operation. Reinitialization is accomplished by calling `FC_Finalize` followed by `FC_Initialize`.

10. Upon initialization of the cryptographic module library for the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the following power-up self-tests shall be performed:

    a) Triple DES-ECB encrypt/decrypt,
    b) Triple DES-CBC encrypt/decrypt,
    c) AES-ECB encrypt/decrypt (128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys),
    d) AES-CBC encrypt/decrypt (128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys),
    e) SHA-1 hash,
    f) SHA-256 hash,
    g) SHA-384 hash,
    h) SHA-512 hash,
    i) HMAC-SHA-1/-SHA-256/-SHA-384/-SHA-512 keyed hash (296-bit key),
    j) RSA encrypt/decrypt (1024-bit modulus *n*),
    k) RSA-SHA-1/-SHA-256/-SHA-384/-SHA-512 signature generation (1024-bit modulus *n*),
    l) RSA-SHA-1/-SHA-256/-SHA-384/-SHA-512 signature verification (1024-bit modulus *n*),
    m) DSA key pair generation (1024-bit prime modulus *p*),
    n) DSA signature generation (1024-bit prime modulus *p*),
    o) DSA signature verification (1024-bit prime modulus *p*),
    p) ECDSA signature generation (Curve P-256; the Extended ECC version of the module also tests Curve K-283),
    q) ECDSA signature verification (Curve P-256; the Extended ECC version of the module also tests Curve K-283),
    r) random number generation, and
    s) software/firmware integrity test (the authentication technique is DSA with 1024-bit prime modulus *p*).

11. Shutting down and restarting the NSS cryptographic module with the `FC_Finalize` and `FC_Initialize` functions shall execute the same power-up self-tests detailed above when initializing the module library for the FIPS Approved mode. This allows a user to execute these power-up self-tests on demand as defined in Section 4.9.1 of FIPS 140-2.

12. The NSS cryptographic module shall require the user to establish a password (for the NSS User and Crypto Officer roles) with the `FC_InitPIN` function in order for subsequent authentications to be enforced. See the **Sample Cryptographic Module Initialization Code** section below for the sample code to establish the initial user password.

13. A known password check string, encrypted with a Triple-DES key derived from the

password, shall be stored in the private key database (key3.db) in secondary storage. **Note:** this database lies outside the cryptographic boundary. See #16 below.

14. Once a password has been established for the NSS cryptographic module, the module shall allow the user to use the private services if and only if the user successfully authenticates to the module. Password establishment and authentication are required for the operation of the module at both Levels 1 and 2 even though level 1 does not require such authentication method. Password authentication in the Level 1 module does not imply that any of the roles are considered to be authorized for the purposes of Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation.

15. In order to authenticate to the cryptographic module, the user shall enter the password, and the cryptographic module shall verify that the password is correct by

    - deriving a Triple-DES key from the password, using an extension of the PKCS #5 PBKDF1 key derivation function with an 16-octet salt, an iteration count of 1, and SHA-1 as the underlying hash function,
    - decrypting the stored encrypted password check string with the Triple-DES key, and
    - comparing the decrypted string with the known password check string.

16. The user's password shall act as the key material to encrypt/decrypt secret and private keys. **Note:** Since password-based encryption such as PKCS #5 is not FIPS Approved, password-encrypted secret and private keys should be considered to be in plaintext form in the FIPS Approved mode.

17. Secret and private keys, plaintext passwords, and other security-relevant data items shall be maintained under the control of the cryptographic module. Secret and private keys shall only be passed to higher-level callers in encrypted (wrapped) form with `FC_WrapKey` using Triple DES or AES (symmetric key algorithms) or RSA (asymmetric key algorithm). **Note:** If the secret and private keys passed to higher-level callers are encrypted using a symmetric key algorithm, the encryption key may be derived from a password. In such a case, they should be considered to be in plaintext form in the FIPS Approved mode.

18. Secret and private keys shall only be stored in encrypted form (using a Triple-DES key derived from the password) in the private key database (key3.db) in secondary storage. **Note:** password-encrypted secret and private keys in the private key database should be considered to be in plaintext form in the FIPS Approved mode.

19. Once the FIPS Approved mode of operation has been selected, the user shall only use the FIPS 140-2 cipher suite.

20. The FIPS 140-2 cipher suite shall consist solely of

    - Triple DES (FIPS 46-3) or AES (FIPS 197) for symmetric key encryption and decryption.
    - Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) (FIPS 180-2) for hashing.

- HMAC (FIPS 198) for keyed hash.
- random number generator (FIPS 186-2 with Change Notice 1).
- Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman, or Key Wrapping using RSA keys for key establishment.
- DSA (FIPS 186-2 with Change Notice 1), RSA (PKCS #1 v2.1), or ECDSA (ANSI X9.62) for signature generation and verification.

Algorithm validation certificates:

Algorithm	Cert#	Description
Triple DES	410 (x86 CPUs) 469 (non-x86 CPUs)	TECB(e/d; KO 1,2,3); TCBC(e/d; KO 1,2,3)
AES	352	ECB(e/d; 128,192,256); CBC(e/d; 128,192,256)
SHS	426	SHA-1 (BYTE-only) SHA-256 (BYTE-only) SHA-384 (BYTE-only) SHA-512 (BYTE-only)
HMAC	152	HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS) HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS) HMAC-SHA348 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS) HMAC-SHA512 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS)
RNG	208	FIPS 186-2 [(x-Change Notice); (SHA-1)] FIPS 186-2 General Purpose [(x-Change Notice); (SHA-1)]]
RSA	152	ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]; SIG(gen); SIG(ver); 1024 , 1536 , 2048 , 3072 , 4096 , SHS: SHA-1 , SHA-256 , SHA-384 , SHA-512

Algorithm	Cert#	Description
DSA	172	PQG(gen) MOD(ALL); PQG(ver) MOD(ALL); KEYGEN(Y) MOD(ALL); SIG(gen) MOD(ALL , 960); SIG(ver) MOD(ALL);
ECDSA (Extended ECC)	30	PKG: CURVES(ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B) PKV: CURVES(ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B) SIG(gen): CURVES(ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B) SIG(ver): CURVES(ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B)
ECDSA (Basic ECC)	37	PKG: CURVES(ALL-P P-256 P-384 P-521) PKV: CURVES(ALL-P P-256 P-384 P-521) SIG(gen): CURVES(ALL-P P-256 P-384 P-521) SIG(ver): CURVES(P-256 P-384 P-521)

Caveats:

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement, key establishment methodology provides between 80 bits and 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement, key establishment methodology provides between 80 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength)
- RSA (PKCS #1, key wrapping, key establishment methodology provides between 80 bits and 192 bits of encryption strength)

The NSS cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms, which shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation:

- RC2 , RC4, or DES for symmetric key encryption and decryption.
- MD2 or MD5 for hashing.

21. Once the FIPS Approved mode of operation has been selected, Triple DES and

AES shall be limited in their use to performing encryption and decryption using either ECB or CBC mode.

22. Once the FIPS Approved mode of operation has been selected, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-386, and SHA-512 shall be the only algorithms used to perform one-way hashes of data.
23. Once the FIPS Approved mode of operation has been selected, RSA shall be limited in its use to generating and verifying PKCS #1 signatures, and to encrypting and decrypting key material for key exchange.
24. Once the FIPS Approved mode of operation has been selected, DSA and ECDSA shall be used in addition to RSA to generate and verify signatures.
25. In the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the cryptographic module shall perform a pair-wise consistency test upon each invocation of RSA, DSA, and ECDSA key pair generation as defined in Section 4.9.2 of FIPS 140-2.
26. The cryptographic module shall generate the primes *p* and *q* used in the DSA and perform primality test using the algorithms described in Appendix 2 of FIPS 186-2.
27. The cryptographic module shall perform pseudorandom number generation using Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1, with the one-way function G constructed using SHA-1 and *b* equal to 256 bits.
28. The cryptographic module shall initialize its pseudorandom number generator by obtaining 1024 bytes of random data from the operating system. The data obtained shall contain at least 256 bits of entropy. Extra entropy input is added by invoking a noise generator. Both initialization and noise generation are specific to the platform on which it was implemented (e.g., Macintosh, UNIX, or Windows). The pseudorandom number generator shall be seeded with noise derived from the execution environment such that the noise is not predictable. The source of noise is considered to be outside the logical boundary of the cryptographic module.
29. A product using the cryptographic module should periodically reseed the module's pseudorandom number generator with unpredictable noise by calling `FC_SeedRandom`.
30. In the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the cryptographic module shall perform a continuous random number generator test upon each invocation of the pseudorandom number generator as defined in Section 4.9.2 of FIPS 140-2.
31. At level 2 in the FIPS Approved mode of operation the operator shall authenticate successfully before utilizing random number generation services provided by the module. Using random number generation services without authentication will automatically transition the module to the non-Approved mode of operation. The module shall not share CSPs between an Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation.
32. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation shall be generated in the FIPS Approved mode or imported while running in the FIPS

Approved mode.

33. The cryptographic module shall perform explicit zeroization steps to clear the memory region previously occupied by a plaintext secret key, private key, or password. A plaintext secret or private key shall be zeroized when it is passed to a `FC_DestroyObject` call. All plaintext secret and private keys shall be zeroized when the NSS cryptographic module is shut down (with a `FC_Finalize` call) or reinitialized (with a `FC_InitToken` call), or when the state changes between the FIPS Approved mode and non-FIPS Approved mode (with a `NSC_Finalize`/`FC_Initialize` or `FC_Finalize`/`NSC_Initialize` sequence).

    All zeroization shall be performed by storing the value 0 into every byte of the memory region previously occupied by a plaintext secret key, private key, or password.

34. The NSS cryptographic module consists of the following shared libraries/DLLs and the associated `.chk` files:

- Windows XP Service Pack 2
    - `softokn3.dll`
    - `softokn3.chk`
    - `freebl3.dll`
    - `freebl3.chk`
- 32-bit HP-UX B.11.11 PA-RISC 2.0
    - `libsoftokn3.sl`
    - `libsoftokn3.chk`
    - `libfreebl_32fpu_3.sl`
    - `libfreebl_32fpu_3.chk`
- Mac OS X 10.4
    - `libsoftokn3.dylib`
    - `libsoftokn3.chk`
    - `libfreebl3.dylib`
    - `libfreebl3.chk`
- 64-bit Trusted Solaris 8 UltraSPARC IIIi
    - `libsoftokn3.so`
    - `libsoftokn3.chk`
    - `libfreebl_64fpu_3.so`
    - `libfreebl_64fpu_3.chk`
- 64-bit Solaris 10 AMD64, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 x86, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 x86_64
    - `libsoftokn3.so`
    - `libsoftokn3.chk`
    - `libfreebl3.so`
    - `libfreebl3.chk`

The NSS cryptographic module requires the Netscape Portable Runtime (NSPR)

libraries. NSPR provides a cross-platform API for non-GUI operating system facilities, such as threads, thread synchronization, normal file and network I/O, interval timing and calendar time, atomic operations, and shared library linking. NSPR also provides utility functions for strings, hash tables, and memory pools. NSPR is outside the cryptographic boundary because none of the NSPR functions are security-relevant. NSPR consists of the following shared libraries/DLLs:

- Windows XP Service Pack 2
  - `plc4.dll`
  - `plds4.dll`
  - `nspr4.dll`
- HP-UX B.11.11 PA-RISC 2.0
  - `libplc4.sl`
  - `libplds4.sl`
  - `libnspr4.sl`
- Mac OS X 10.4
  - `libplc4.dylib`
  - `libplds4.dylib`
  - `libnspr4.dylib`
- 64-bit Solaris 10 AMD64, 64-bit Trusted Solaris 8 UltraSPARC IIIi, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 x86, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 x86_64
  - `libplc4.so`
  - `libplds4.so`
  - `libnspr4.so`

The installation instructions are:

Step 1: Install the shared libraries/DLLs and the associated `.chk` files in a directory on the shared library/DLL search path, which could be a system library directory (`/usr/lib` on Unix/Linux or `C:\WINDOWS\system32` on Windows) or a directory specified in the following environment variable:

- Windows XP Service Pack 2: `PATH`
- HP-UX B.11.11: `SHLIB_PATH`
- Mac OS X 10.4: `DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH`
- Solaris and Linux: `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`

Step 2: Use the `chmod` utility to set the file mode bits of the shared libraries/DLLs to **0755** so that all users can execute the library files, but only the files' owner can modify (i.e., write, replace, and delete) the files. For example, on most Unix and Linux platforms,

```
 $ chmod 0755 libsoftokn3.so libfreebl*3.so libplc4.so libplds4.so
libnspr4.so
```

The discretionary access control protects the binaries stored on disk from being tampered with.

Step 3: Use the `chmod` utility to set the file mode bits of the associated `.chk` files to **0644**. For example, on most Unix and Linux platforms,

```
$ chmod 0644 libsoftokn3.chk libfreebl*3.chk
```

Step 4: As specified in Rule 7, to operate the NSS cryptographic module in the FIPS Approved mode, an application must call the alternative PKCS #11 function `FC_GetFunctionList` and call the API functions via the function pointers in that list. The user shall initialize the password when using the module for the first time. Before the user password is initialized, access to the module shall be controlled. See the **Sample Cryptographic Module Initialization Code** section below for sample code.

(End of Security Rules)

Authentication Policy

Specification of Roles

The NSS cryptographic module supports two authorized roles for operators.

- The NSS User role provides access to all cryptographic and general-purpose services (except those that perform an initialization function) and all keys stored in the private key database. An NSS User utilizes secure services and is also responsible for the retrieval, updating, and deletion of keys from the private key database.

- The Crypto Officer role is supported for the installation and initialization of the module. The Crypto Officer must control the access to the module both before and after installation. Control consists of management of physical access to the computer executing the NSS cryptographic module code as well as management of the security facilities provided by the operating system.

The NSS cryptographic module uses a combined role approach -- by authenticating to the module, an operator assumes both the NSS User role and the Crypto Officer role at the same time.

The NSS cryptographic module does not have a maintenance role.

Role-Based Authentication

The NSS cryptographic module uses **role-based authentication** to control access to the module. To perform sensitive services using the cryptographic module, an operator must

explicitly request to assume the NSS User role by logging into the module and performing an authentication procedure using information unique to that operator (**password**). The password is initialized by the Crypto Officer as part of module initialization. Role-based authentication is used to safeguard a user's **private key** information. However, discretionary access control is used to safeguard all other information (e.g., the public key certificate database).

Authentication shall always be required upon initializing the NSS cryptographic module library in the FIPS Approved mode. If a function that requires authentication is called before the operator is authenticated, it returns the `CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN` error code. Call the `FC_Login` function to provide the required authentication. The only exception to this is the random number generator function. The Level 2 module cannot be used in FIPS mode if the NSS User role is not authenticated and the random number generator is called from this role.

Strength of Authentication Mechanism

In the FIPS Approved mode, the NSS cryptographic module imposes the following requirements on the password. These requirements are enforced by the module on password initialization or change.

- The password must be at least **seven** characters long.
- The password must consist of characters from **three or more character classes**. We define five character classes: digits (0-9), ASCII lowercase letters, ASCII uppercase letters, ASCII non-alphanumeric characters (such as space and punctuation marks), and non-ASCII characters. If an ASCII uppercase letter is the first character of the password, the uppercase letter is not counted toward its character class. Similarly, if a digit is the last character of the password, the digit is not counted toward its character class.

To estimate the probability that a random guess of the password will succeed, we assume that

- the characters of the password are independent with each other, and
- the probability of guessing an individual character of the password is less than 1/10.

Since the password is at least 7 characters long, the probability that a random guess of the password will succeed is less than (1/10)^7 = 1/10,000,000.

After each failed authentication attempt in the FIPS Approved mode, the NSS cryptographic module inserts a one-second delay before returning to the caller, allowing at most 60 authentication attempts during a one-minute period. Therefore, the probability of a successful random guess of the password during a one-minute period is less than 60 * 1/10,000,000 = 0.6 * (1/100,000).

Multiple Concurrent Operators

The NSS cryptographic module doesn't allow concurrent operators.

- For Security Level 1, the operating system has been restricted to a single operator mode of operation, so concurrent operators are explicitly excluded (FIPS 140-2 Section 4.6.1).
- On a multi-user operating system, this is enforced by making the NSS certificate and private key databases readable and writable by the owner of the files only.

Note: FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance Section 6.1 clarifies the use of a cryptographic module on a server.

When a cryptographic module is implemented in a server environment, the server application is the user of the cryptographic module. The server application makes the calls to the cryptographic module. Therefore, the server application is the single user of the cryptographic module, even when the server application is serving multiple clients.

Access Control Policy

This section identifies the cryptographic keys and CSPs that the user has access to while performing a service, and the type of access the user has to the CSPs.

Security-Relevant Information

The NSS cryptographic module employs the following cryptographic keys and CSPs in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. Note that the private key database (key3.db) mentioned below is outside the cryptographic boundary.

- AES secret keys: The module supports 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit AES keys. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- Triple-DES secret keys: 168-bit. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- HMAC secret keys: HMAC key size must be greater than or equal to half the size of the hash function output. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- DSA public keys and private keys: The module supports DSA key sizes of 512-1024 bits. DSA keys of 1024 bits shall be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- RSA public keys and private keys (used for digital signatures and key transport): The module supports RSA key sizes of 1024-8192 bits. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).

- EC public keys and private keys (used for ECDSA digital signatures and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement): The module supports elliptic curve key sizes of 256-521 bits in the Basic ECC version and 163-571 bits in the Extended ECC version. EC keys of 160 bits or higher shall be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. (See the **Non-NIST-Recommended Elliptic Curves** section below.) The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- Diffie-Hellman public keys and private keys (used for key agreement): The module supports Diffie-Hellman public key sizes of 1024-2236 bits. The keys may be stored in memory or in the private key database (key3.db).
- TLS premaster secret (used in deriving the TLS master secret): 48-byte. Stored in memory.
- TLS master secret (a secret shared between the peers in TLS connections, used in the generation of symmetric cipher keys, IVs, and MAC secrets for TLS): 48-byte. Stored in memory.
- seed-key of the Approved random number generator: 256-bit. Stored in memory.
- authentication data (passwords): Stored in the private key database (key3.db).
- audited events and audit data (Security Level 2 only): Stored in the system audit logs.

Note: The NSS cryptographic module does not implement the TLS protocol. The NSS cryptographic module implements the cryptographic operations, including TLS-specific key generation and derivation operations, that can be used to implement the TLS protocol.

Non-NIST-Recommended Elliptic Curves

The Basic ECC version of the NSS cryptographic module only implements the NIST-recommended elliptic curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 specified in FIPS 186-2.

The Extended ECC version of the NSS cryptographic module implements all the NIST-recommended elliptic curves and the following non-NIST-recommended curves:

Curve family	Curve names
ANSI X9.62-1998 prime curves	prime192v2, prime192v3, prime239v1, prime239v2, and prime239v3
ANSI X9.62-1998 binary curves	c2pnb163v1, c2pnb163v2, c2pnb163v3, c2tnb191v1, c2tnb191v2, c2tnb191v3, c2tnb239v1, c2tnb239v2, c2tnb239v3,c2tnb359v1, and c2tnb431r1
SEC 2 prime curves	secp160k1, secp160r1, secp160r2, secp192k1, secp224k1, and secp256k1
SEC 2 binary curves	sect163r1, sect193r1, sect193r2, and sect239k1

Although FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance Section 1.6 allows the use of non-NIST-recommended curves in the FIPS Approved mode of operation, we recommend that the non-NIST-recommended curves not be used in the the FIPS Approved mode.

The Extended ECC version of the NSS cryptographic module also implements the following non-NIST-recommended curves, which **shall not** be used in the FIPS Approved mode.

Curve family	Curve names	Reason
ANSI X9.62-1998 binary curves	c2pnb176w1, c2pnb208w1, c2pnb272w1, c2pnb304w1, and c2pnb368w1	disallowed in ANSI X9.62-2005
SEC 2 prime curves	secp112r1, secp112r2, secp128r1, and secp128r2	key sizes smaller than 160 bits
SEC 2 binary curves	sect113r1, sect113r2, sect131r1, and sect131r2	key sizes smaller than 160 bits

Specification of Services

Some services require the user to assume the Crypto Officer or NSS User role. In the table below, the role is specified for each service. If the Role column is blank, no role needs to be assumed for that service; such a service (e.g., random number generation and hashing) does not affect the security of the module because it does not require access to the secret and private keys and other CSPs associated with the user. The table lists each service as an API function and correlates role, service type, and type of access to the cryptographic keys and CSPs. Access types **R**, **W**, and **Z** stand for Read, Write, and Zeroize, respectively.

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
FIPS 140-2 specific		FC_GetFunctionList	returns the list of function pointers for the FIPS Approved mode of operation	none	-
Module Initialization	Crypto Officer	FC_InitToken	initializes or reinitializes a token	password and all keys	Z
	Crypto Officer	FC_InitPIN	initializes the user's password, i.e., sets the user's initial password	password	W
General purpose		FC_Initialize	initializes the module library for the FIPS Approved mode of operation. This function provides the power-up self-test service.	none	-
		FC_Finalize	finalizes (shuts down) the module library	all keys	Z
		FC_GetInfo	obtains general information about the module library	none	-

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Slot and token management		FC_GetSlotList	obtains a list of slots in the system	none	-
		FC_GetSlotInfo	obtains information about a particular slot	none	-
		FC_GetTokenInfo	obtains information about the token. This function provides the Show Status service.	none	-
		FC_WaitForSlotEvent	This function is not supported by the NSS cryptographic module.	none	-
		FC_GetMechanismList	obtains a list of mechanisms (cryptographic algorithms) supported by a token	none	-
		FC_GetMechanismInfo	obtains information about a particular mechanism	none	-
	NSS User	FC_SetPIN	changes the user's password	password	RW

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Session management		FC_OpenSession	opens a connection ("session") between an application and a particular token	none	-
		FC_CloseSession	closes a session	keys of the session	Z
		FC_CloseAllSessions	closes all sessions with a token	all keys	Z
		FC_GetSessionInfo	obtains information about the session. This function provides the Show Status service.	none	-
		FC_GetOperationState	saves the state of the cryptographic operation in a session. This function is only implemented for message digest operations.	none	-
		FC_SetOperationState	restores the state of the cryptographic operation in a session. This function is only implemented for message digest operations.	none	-
		FC_Login	logs into a token	password	R
	NSS User	FC_Logout	logs out from a token	none	-

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Object management	NSS User	FC_CreateObject	creates an object	key	W
	NSS User	FC_CopyObject	creates a copy of an object	original key	R
				new key	W
	NSS User	FC_DestroyObject	destroys an object	key	Z
	NSS User	FC_GetObjectSize	obtains the size of an object in bytes	key	R
	NSS User	FC_GetAttributeValue	obtains an attribute value of an object	key	R
	NSS User	FC_SetAttributeValue	modifies an attribute value of an object	key	W
	NSS User	FC_FindObjectsInit	initializes an object search operation	none	-
	NSS User	FC_FindObjects	continues an object search operation	keys matching the search criteria	R
	NSS User	FC_FindObjectsFinal	finishes an object search operation	none	-

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Encryption and decryption	NSS User	FC_EncryptInit	initializes an encryption operation	encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_Encrypt	encrypts single-part data	encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_EncryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part encryption operation	encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_EncryptFinal	finishes a multiple-part encryption operation	encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_DecryptInit	initializes a decryption operation	decryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_Decrypt	decrypts single-part encrypted data	decryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_DecryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part decryption operation	decryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_DecryptFinal	finishes a multiple-part decryption operation	decryption key	R
Message digesting		FC_DigestInit	initializes a message-digesting operation	none	-
		FC_Digest	digests single-part data	none	-
		FC_DigestUpdate	continues a multiple-part digesting operation	none	-
	NSS User (see the note at the end of the table)	FC_DigestKey	continues a multi-part message-digesting operation by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested	key	R
		FC_DigestFinal	finishes a multiple-part digesting operation	none	-

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Signature and verification	NSS User	FC_SignInit	initializes a signature operation	signing/HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_Sign	signs single-part data	signing/HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_SignUpdate	continues a multiple-part signature operation	signing/HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_SignFinal	finishes a multiple-part signature operation	signing/HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_SignRecoverInit	initializes a signature operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature	RSA signing key	R
	NSS User	FC_SignRecover	signs single-part data, where the data can be recovered from the signature	RSA signing key	R
	NSS User	FC_VerifyInit	initializes a verification operation	Verification/ HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_Verify	verifies a signature on single-part data	verification/ HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_VerifyUpdate	continues a multiple-part verification operation	verification/ HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_VerifyFinal	finishes a multiple-part verification operation	verification/ HMAC key	R
	NSS User	FC_VerifyRecoverInit	initializes a verification operation where the data is recovered from the signature	RSA verification key	R
	NSS User	FC_VerifyRecover	verifies a signature on single-part data, where the data is recovered from the signature	RSA verification key	R

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Dual-function cryptographic operations	NSS User	FC_DigestEncryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption operation	encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_DecryptDigestUpdate	continues a multiple-part decryption and digesting operation	decryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_SignEncryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part signing and encryption operation	signing/HMAC key	R
				encryption key	R
	NSS User	FC_DecryptVerifyUpdate	continues a multiple-part decryption and verify operation	decryption key	R
				verification/ HMAC key	R
Key management	NSS User	FC_GenerateKey	generates a secret key (used by TLS to generate premaster secrets)	key	W
	NSS User	FC_GenerateKeyPair	generates a public/private key pair. This function performs the pair-wise consistency tests.	key pair	W
	NSS User	FC_WrapKey	wraps (encrypts) a key	wrapping key	R
				key to be wrapped	R
	NSS User	FC_UnwrapKey	unwraps (decrypts) a key	unwrapping key	R
				unwrapped key	W
	NSS User	FC_DeriveKey	derives a key from a base key (used by TLS to derive keys from the master secret)	base key	R
				derived key	W

Service Category	Role	Function Name	Description	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Accessed	Access type, RWZ
Random number generation	NSS User	FC_SeedRandom	mixes in additional seed material to the random number generator	RNG seed-key	RW
	NSS User	FC_GenerateRandom	generates random data. This function performs the continuous random number generator test.	RNG seed-key	RW
Parallel function management		FC_GetFunctionStatus	a legacy function, which simply returns the value 0x00000051 (function not parallel)	none	-
		FC_CancelFunction	a legacy function, which simply returns the value 0x00000051 (function not parallel)	none	-

Note: The message digesting functions (except `FC_DigestKey`) don't require the user to assume an authorized role because they don't use any keys. `FC_DigestKey` computes the message digest (hash) of the value of a secret key, therefore the user needs to assume the NSS User role for this service.

Mitigation of Other Attacks

The NSS cryptographic module is designed to mitigate the following attacks.

Other Attacks	Mitigation Mechanism	Specific Limitations
Timing attacks on RSA	**RSA blinding** Timing attack on RSA was first demonstrated by Paul Kocher in 1996 [2], who contributed the mitigation code to our module. Most recently Boneh and Brumley [3] showed that RSA blinding is an effective defense against timing attacks on RSA.	None
Cache-timing attacks on the modular exponentiation operation used in RSA and DSA	**Cache invariant modular exponentiation** This is a variant of a modular exponentiation implementation that Colin Percival [4] showed to defend against cache-timing attacks.	This mechanism requires intimate knowledge of the cache line sizes of the processor. The mechanism may be ineffective when the module is running on a processor whose cache line sizes are unknown.
Arithmetic errors in RSA signatures	**Double-checking RSA signatures** Arithmetic errors in RSA signatures might leak the private key. Ferguson and Schneier [5] recommend that every RSA signature generation should verify the signature just generated.	None

Access to Audit Data

The NSS cryptographic module may use the Unix `syslog` function and the audit mechanism provided by the operating system to audit events. (Auditing is not yet implemented on Windows.) Auditing is turned off by default. To turn on the auditing

capability, you need to set the environment variable `NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT` to 1. You also need to configure the operating system's audit mechanism.

Access to the audit data is described in the next two subsections.

Access to syslog Log Files

On Unix (including Linux and Mac OS X), the NSS cryptographic module uses the `syslog` function to audit events, so the audit data are stored in the system log. Only the root user can modify the system log. On some platforms, only the root user can read the system log; on other platforms, all users can read the system log.

The system log is usually under the `/var/adm` or `/var/log` directory. The exact location of the system log is specified in the `/etc/syslog.conf` file. The NSS cryptographic module uses the default *user* facility and the *info*, *warning*, and *err* severity levels for its log messages. We give two examples below.

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4: The `/etc/syslog.conf` file on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 has:

```
*.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none        /var/log/messages
```

which specifies that `/var/log/messages` is the system log.

Solaris 10: The `/etc/syslog.conf` file on Solaris 10 has:

```
*.err;kern.debug;daemon.notice;mail.crit        /var/adm/messages
```

which specifies that `/var/adm/messages` is the system log.

Access to System Audit Log

To meet the audit requirements of FIPS 140-2 at Security Level 2, on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 and Trusted Solaris 8, the NSS cryptographic module also uses the audit mechanism provided by the operating system to audit events. The audit data are stored in the system audit log. Only the root user can read or modify the system audit log.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, the system audit log is in the `/var/log/audit` directory. On Solaris, default audit records are stored in `/var/audit/`.

Configure the Solaris Auditing

To configure the system audit mechanism on Solaris, the following administration tasks need to be completed. Create the audit class 'fp', then create the audit event 'AUE_FIPS_AUDIT ' and add the class 'fp' to the audit_control file.

Edit /etc/security/audit_class add line: 0x99000000:fp:NSS FIPS Security Msgs

Edit /etc/security/audit_event add line: 34444:AUE_FIPS_AUDIT:fp

Edit /etc/security/audit_control add 'fp' to the "flags:" as in: flags:lo,ap,fp

On Trusted Solaris 8, auditing is enabled by default; for non-trusted Solaris run: / etc/security/bsmconv (either as root or a user that has been given the Audit Control RBAC profile in Solaris 8) and reboot your system. After the system has rebooted, ensure auditd is running: ps -ecf | grep auditd

Viewing the Audit Trail

By default, the audit logs are stored in /var/audit. To view the active audit trail, ensure there is only one *not_terminated* audit file. If there are others, delete the older ones before executing this command.

1. cd /var/audit
2. tail -0f *not_terminated* | praudit

Note: On Trusted Solaris 8 you need to assume a role with the tail and praudit commands with the proc_audit_appl and proc_audit_tcb privileges.

You can also view the existing audit files using auditreduce.

1. cd /var/audit
2. auditreduce -m 34444 *not_terminated* | praudit -l

Sample Cryptographic Module Initialization Code

The following sample code uses NSPR functions (declared in the header file "prlink.h") for dynamic library loading and function symbol lookup.

```
#include "prlink.h"
#include "cryptoki.h"
#include <assert.h>
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

/*
 * An extension of the CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS structure for the
 * NSS cryptographic module. The 'LibraryParameters' field is
 * used to pass instance-specific information to the library
 * (like where to find its config files, etc).
 */
typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS {
    CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
    CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
    CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
    CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
    CK_FLAGS flags;
    CK_CHAR_PTR *LibraryParameters;
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS;

int main()
{
    char *libname;
    PRLibrary *lib;
    CK_C_GetFunctionList pFC_GetFunctionList;
    CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
    CK_RV rv;
    CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
    CK_SLOT_ID slotList[2], slotID;
    CK_ULONG ulSlotCount;
    CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
    CK_UTF8CHAR password[] = "1Mozilla";
    PRStatus status;

    /*
     * Get the platform-dependent library name of the NSS
     * cryptographic module.
     */
    libname = PR_GetLibraryName(NULL, "softokn3");
    assert(libname!= NULL);
    lib = PR_LoadLibrary(libname);
    assert(lib!= NULL);
    PR_FreeLibraryName(libname);

    pFC_GetFunctionList = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)
        PR_FindFunctionSymbol(lib, "FC_GetFunctionList");
    assert(pFC_GetFunctionList!= NULL);
    rv = (*pFC_GetFunctionList)(&pFunctionList);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    /* Call FC_xxx via the function pointer pFunctionList->C_xxx */

    initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
    initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
```

```
initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)
    "configdir='.' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' "
    "secmod='secmod.db' flags= ";
initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
rv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

ulSlotCount = sizeof(slotList)/sizeof(slotList[0]);
rv = pFunctionList->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, slotList, &ulSlotCount);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
slotID = slotList[0];

rv = pFunctionList->C_OpenSession(slotID,
    CKF_RW_SESSION | CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &hSession);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* set the operator's initial password, if necessary */

rv = pFunctionList->C_GetTokenInfo(slotID, &tokenInfo);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

if (!(tokenInfo.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) {
    /*
     * As a formality required by the PKCS #11 standard, the
     * operator must log in as the PKCS #11 Security Officer (SO),
     * with the predefined empty string password, to set the
     * operator's initial password.
     */
    rv = pFunctionList->C_Login(hSession, CKU_SO, NULL, 0);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    rv = pFunctionList->C_InitPIN(hSession,
        password, strlen(password));
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    /* log out as the PKCS #11 SO */
    rv = pFunctionList->C_Logout(hSession);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);
}

/* the module is now ready for use */

/* authenticate the operator using a password */
rv = pFunctionList->C_Login(hSession, CKU_USER,
    password, strlen(password));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* use the module's services ... */

rv = pFunctionList->C_CloseSession(hSession);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

```
    rv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    status = PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
    assert(status == PR_SUCCESS);
    return 0;
}
```

The mode of operation of the NSS cryptographic module is determined by the second argument passed to the `PR_FindFunctionSymbol` function.

- For the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation, look up the standard PKCS #11 function `C_GetFunctionList`.
- For the FIPS Approved mode of operation, look up the alternative function `FC_GetFunctionList`.

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