



DIVISION OF
CORPORATION FINANCE

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-3010

February 26, 2008

Ann Robertson
Senior Counsel
Time Warner Inc.
One Time Warner Center, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10019-8016

Re: Time Warner Inc.
Incoming letter dated January 9, 2008

Dear Ms. Robertson:

This is in response to your letter dated January 9, 2008 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to Time Warner by The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership. We also have received letters on the proponent's behalf dated January 10, 2008 and January 23, 2008. Our response is attached to the enclosed photocopy of your correspondence. By doing this, we avoid having to recite or summarize the facts set forth in the correspondence. Copies of all of the correspondence also will be provided to the proponent.

In connection with this matter, your attention is directed to the enclosure, which sets forth a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals.

Sincerely,

Jonathan A. Ingram
Deputy Chief Counsel

Enclosures

cc: John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

CFOCC-00040403

February 26, 2008

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance

Re: Time Warner Inc.
Incoming letter dated January 9, 2008

The proposal recommends that the board adopt cumulative voting.

There appears to be some basis for your view that Time Warner may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2). We note that in the opinion of your counsel, implementation of the proposal would cause Time Warner to violate state law. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if Time Warner omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(2).

Sincerely,

Greg Belliston
Special Counsel

SEC Mail
Mail Processing
Section

JAN 10 2008

January 9, 2008

Washington, DC
106

VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL

Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549

RECEIVED
2008 JAN 14 AM 11:25
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL
CORPORATION FINANCE

Re: Time Warner Inc. – Proposal Submitted by The Great Neck Capital
Appreciation LTD Partnership

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter respectfully requests that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) advise Time Warner Inc. (the “Company”) that it will not recommend any enforcement action to the SEC if the Company omits from its proxy statement and proxy to be filed and distributed in connection with its 2008 annual meeting of stockholders (the “Proxy Materials”) a proposal (the “Proposal”) it received from The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership (the “Proponent”), naming John Chevedden as its proxy. The Proposal, which is entitled “Cumulative Voting,” recommends that the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) “adopt cumulative voting.”

The Company intends to omit the Proposal from its Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) because implementation of the Proposal by the Company would violate state law.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Exchange Act, we are enclosing six copies of each of this letter, the Proposal (Exhibit A) and a legal opinion from the Delaware law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. (Exhibit B). By copy of this letter, the Company hereby notifies the Proponent as required by Rule 14a-8(j) of its intention to exclude the Proposal from its Proxy Materials.

Ground for Omission

Implementation of the Proposal would cause the Company to violate State Law, and the Proposal may therefore be omitted from the Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2).

Rule 14a-8(i)(2) provides that a proposal may be excluded if it “would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.” The Proposal would cause the Company, a Delaware corporation, to violate Delaware law, which provides that cumulative voting is permitted only where it is authorized in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation. The Company’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation does not permit cumulative voting. The Proposal recommends that the Board “adopt cumulative voting.” In the case of the Proposal, adoption of cumulative voting by the Board would violate the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”) because adoption of cumulative voting rights by the Board is outside the Board’s powers and authority under the DGCL. See *AT&T Inc.* (February 7, 2006) (permitting exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) of a proposal requesting that the board “adopt cumulative voting as a bylaw or long-term policy” on the basis that it would violate Delaware law).

The Company has obtained a legal opinion from the Delaware law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. supporting this position, attached hereto as Exhibit B. This opinion from Delaware counsel states, in relevant part:

[T]he Board can not “adopt cumulative voting” as contemplated by the Proposal because implementing cumulative voting would require an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation and the Board does not have the power to unilaterally effect an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation. Moreover, the Board could not commit to propose an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to implement the Proposal because doing so would require the Board to abdicate its statutory and fiduciary obligations to determine the advisability of such amendment prior to submitting it to the stockholders (and, even if the Board were to determine that such amendment is advisable, the Company could not guarantee that the stockholders of the Company would adopt such amendment).

Because these issues are discussed at considerable length in the attached opinion of counsel, that discussion is incorporated in this letter and will not be repeated here.


For these reasons, the Company respectfully submits that the Proposal be excluded from the Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2).

* * * * *

The Company respectfully requests that the Staff confirm that it would not recommend enforcement action if the Company excludes the Proposal from its Proxy Materials for the foregoing reasons. If you have any questions or if the Staff is unable to agree with our conclusions without additional information or discussions, we respectfully request the opportunity to confer with members of the Staff prior to issuance of any written response to this letter. Please do not hesitate to call the undersigned at (212) 484-8952.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and its attachment by date-stamping the enclosed copy of the first page of this letter and returning it in the self-addressed stamped envelope provided for your convenience.

Sincerely,


Ann Robertson
Senior Counsel

AR:kba
Attachments

cc: The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership
c/o John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership
1981 Marcus Ave, Suite C114, Lake Success, NY 11042

November 5, 2007

Mr. Richard D. Parsons
Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
1 Time Warner Center
New York NY 10019
Phone: 212 484-8000

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Parsons,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is submitted for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communication to John Chevedden at:


*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

(In the interest of company cost savings and improving the efficiency of the rule 14a-8 process please communicate via email.)

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal by email.

Sincerely,



Mark Filiberto,
General Partner

cc: Paul F. Washington
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-484-6753
FX: 212-484-7174
Janet Silverman
Assistant General Counsel
T: 212-484-7961
F: 212-202-4124
E: 212-484-7278

[TWX: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, November 23, 2007]

3 – Cumulative Voting

RESOLVED: Cumulative Voting. Shareholders recommend that our Board adopt cumulative voting. Cumulative voting means that each shareholder may cast as many votes as equal to number of shares held, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. A shareholder may cast all such cumulated votes for a single candidate or split votes between multiple candidates, as that shareholder sees fit. Under cumulative voting shareholders can withhold votes from certain nominees in order to cast multiple votes for others.

Cumulative voting won 54%-support at Aetna and 56%-support at Alaska Air in 2005. It also received 55%-support at General Motors (GM) in 2006. The Council of Institutional Investors www.cii.org recommended adoption of this proposal topic. CalPERS has also recommend a yes-vote for proposals on this topic.

Cumulative voting allows a significant group of shareholders to elect a director of its choice – safeguarding minority shareholder interests and bringing independent perspectives to Board decisions. Most importantly cumulative voting encourages management to maximize shareholder value by making it easier for a would-be acquirer to gain board representation.

The merits of this proposal should also be considered in the context of our company's overall governance risk assessment. The Corporate Library <http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com>, an independent investment research firm said our executive pay policy is not tied closely to shareholder interests and explains our company's high corporate governance risk rating.

Time Warner Inc. was recently featured the May 2007 "Pay For Failure" report by Paul Hodgson of The Corporate Library. It notes that our CEO Richard Parsons received pay exceeding \$25 million over the last two fiscal years while shareholders experienced a 5-year return of minus-31%.

The above concern shows there is need for improvement and reinforces the reason to encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

Cumulative Voting
Yes on 3

Notes:

Mark Filiberto, General Partner, The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership, 1981 Marcus Ave., Suite C114, Lake Success, NY 11042 sponsored this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting.

Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email and advise the most convenient fax number and email address to forward a broker letter, if needed, to the Corporate Secretary's office.

RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER

A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

ONE RODNEY SQUARE

920 NORTH KING STREET

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801

(302) 651-7700

FAX (302) 651-7701

WWW.RLF.COM

January 8, 2008

Time Warner Inc.
1 Time Warner Center
New York, NY 10019

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as special Delaware counsel to Time Warner Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), in connection with a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership (the "Proponent") that the Proponent intends to present at the Company's 2008 annual meeting of stockholders (the "Annual Meeting"). In this connection, you have requested our opinion as to a certain matter under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "General Corporation Law").

For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have been furnished and have reviewed the following documents:

- (i) the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on July 27, 2007 (the "Certificate of Incorporation");
- (ii) the By-laws of the Company, as amended; and
- (iii) the Proposal and the supporting statement thereto.

With respect to the foregoing documents, we have assumed: (a) the genuineness of all signatures, and the incumbency, authority, legal right and power and legal capacity under all applicable laws and regulations, of each of the officers and other persons and entities signing or whose signatures appear upon each of said documents as or on behalf of the parties thereto; (b) the conformity to authentic originals of all documents submitted to us as certified, conformed, photostatic, electronic or other copies; and (c) that the foregoing documents, in the

forms submitted to us for our review, have not been and will not be altered or amended in any respect material to our opinion as expressed herein. For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have not reviewed any document other than the documents set forth above, and, except as set forth in this opinion, we assume there exists no provision of any such other document that bears upon or is inconsistent with our opinion as expressed herein. We have conducted no independent factual investigation of our own, but rather have relied solely upon the foregoing documents, the statements and information set forth therein, and the additional matters recited or assumed herein, all of which we assume to be true, complete and accurate in all material respects.

The Proposal

The Proposal reads as follows:

RESOLVED: Cumulative Voting. Shareholders recommend that our Board adopt cumulative voting. Cumulative voting means that each shareholder may cast as many votes as equal to number of shares held, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. A shareholder may cast all such cumulated votes for a single candidate or split votes between multiple candidates, as that shareholder sees fit. Under cumulative voting shareholders can withhold votes from certain nominees in order to cast multiple votes for others.

DISCUSSION

You have asked our opinion as to whether implementation of the Proposal would violate the General Corporation Law. For the reasons set forth below, in our opinion, implementation of the Proposal by the Company would violate the General Corporation Law. The fact that the Proposal purports to be precatory does not affect our conclusions as contained herein.

Section 214 of the General Corporation Law addresses cumulative voting by stockholders of Delaware corporations and provides:

The certificate of incorporation of any corporation may provide that at all elections of directors of the corporation, or at elections held under specified circumstances, each holder of stock or of any class or classes or of a series or series thereof shall be entitled to as many votes as shall equal the number of votes which (except for such provision as to cumulative voting) such holder would be

entitled to cast for the election of directors with respect to such holder's shares of stock multiplied by the number of directors to be elected by such holder, and that such holder may cast all of such votes for a single director or may distribute them among the number to be voted for, or for any 2 or more of them as such holder may see fit.

8 Del. C. § 214. Thus, Section 214 of the General Corporation Law provides that the certificate of incorporation of a Delaware corporation may provide the corporation's stockholders with cumulative voting rights in the election of directors. See, e.g., 1 Rodman Ward, Jr. et al., Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law, § 214.1, at GCL-VII-127 (2008-1 Supp.) ("Section 214 permits a corporation to confer cumulative voting rights in its certificate of incorporation."). The Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for cumulative voting.

Under Delaware law, a corporation may only provide its stockholders with the right to cumulative voting through a specific provision of its certificate of incorporation. A corporation may not authorize such right through any other means, including a bylaw provision or board-adopted policy. In Standard Scale & Supply Corp. v. Chappel, 141 A. 191 (Del. 1928), the Delaware Supreme Court found that ballots for the election of directors of Standard Scale & Supply Company ("Standard") that had been voted cumulatively had to be counted on a straight basis since Standard's certificate of incorporation did not provide for cumulative voting. The Court stated:

The laws of Delaware only allow cumulative voting where the same may be provided by the certificate of incorporation. It is conceded that the certificate of incorporation of the company here concerned does not so provide We think the Chancellor was entirely correct in determining that the ballots ... should be counted as straight ballots.

Id. at 192; McIlquham v. Feste, 2001 WL 1497179, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2001) ("Finally, because the MMA certificate of incorporation does not provide for cumulative voting, the nominees for director receiving a plurality of the votes cast will be elected."); Palmer v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 1978 WL 2506, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1978) ("In addition, since the certificate of incorporation of Arden-Mayfair does not provide for the election of directors by cumulative voting, its directors are elected by straight ballot."); David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation Law & Practice § 25.05, at 25-8 – 25-9 (2007) ("Under Section 214, a corporation may adopt in its certificate of incorporation cumulative voting either at all elections or those held under specified circumstances, but unless the charter so provides, conventional voting is applicable.") (emphasis added); 5 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. § 2048 (2007) (providing that "[m]ost jurisdictions have opted for provisions under which shareholders do not have cumulative voting rights unless authorized by the articles of incorporation" and citing Delaware

as one such jurisdiction) (emphasis added); 2 Model Business Corporation Act, Official Comment to Section 7.28, at 7-129 (2002 Supp.) ("Thirty-nine jurisdictions allow but do not require a corporation to have cumulative voting for directors. Permissive clauses take one of two forms: either the statutory provision allows cumulative voting only if the articles of incorporation expressly so provide (opt-in), or the statutory provision grants cumulative voting unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise (opt-out). Twenty-nine jurisdictions have 'opt-in' provisions: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware") (emphasis added); 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1209 (2007) ("A shareholder may demand cumulative voting where it is allowed under the certificate of incorporation."). Thus, the foregoing authorities confirm that Section 214 of the General Corporation Law should be read to provide that cumulative voting may be implemented exclusively by a certificate of incorporation provision.

The Delaware courts have repeatedly held that where the General Corporation Law provides that a particular type of voting or governance mechanism may be implemented by a certificate of incorporation provision and does not specify some other means of implementation, then the only means of implementing such mechanism is by a certificate of incorporation provision. For example, Section 228 of the General Corporation Law provides that stockholders may act by written consent "unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation." 8 Del. C. § 228(a). In Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Securities Co., 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a bylaw provision that purported to limit stockholder action by written consent was invalid. The Court stated:

This appeal by Datapoint Corporation from an order of the Court of Chancery, preliminarily enjoining its enforcement of a bylaw adopted by Datapoint's board of directors, presents an issue of first impression in Delaware: whether a bylaw designed to limit the taking of corporate action by written shareholder consent in lieu of a stockholders' meeting conflicts with 8 Del. C. § 228, and thereby is invalid. The Court of Chancery ruled that Datapoint's bylaw was unenforceable because its provisions were in direct conflict with the power conferred upon shareholders by 8 Del. C. § 228. We agree and affirm.

Id. at 1032-3.

Similarly, Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law provides that Delaware corporations "shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." 8 Del. C. § 141(a). Thus, Section 141(a) requires that any limitation on the board's managerial authority be set forth in a corporation's certificate of incorporation (unless set forth in another provision in the General Corporation Law). In Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a provision in a rights plan which restricted the ability of a

future board of directors of Quickturn Design Systems ("Quickturn") to exercise its managerial duties under Section 141(a) on the basis that the contested provision was not contained in Quickturn's certificate of incorporation. The Court stated:

The Quickturn certificate of incorporation contains no provision purporting to limit the authority of the board in any way. The [contested provision], however, would prevent a newly elected board of directors from completely discharging its fundamental management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six months. Therefore, we hold that the ... [contested provision] is invalid under Section 141(a).

Id. at 1291-1292 (emphasis in original). Additionally, Section 141(d) of the General Corporation Law provides: "The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation." 8 Del. C. §141(d) (emphasis added). In Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. Ch. 1998), the Delaware Court of Chancery invalidated a provision in a stockholder rights plan which purported to give directors different voting rights since "[a]bsent express language in the charter, nothing in Delaware law suggests that some directors of a public corporation may be created less equal than other directors." Cf. 18A Am. Jur. Corporations § 855 (2d ed. 2007) ("Under a statute allowing the modification of the general rule in the certificate of incorporation, neither a corporation's bylaws nor a subscription agreement can be utilized to deprive record shareholders of the right to vote as provided by the statute"). Thus, where a specific governance or voting mechanism may only be implemented by a certificate of incorporation provision, a corporate bylaw, policy or other agreement is ineffective under Delaware law to implement the mechanism.

The Certificate of Incorporation presently does not provide for cumulative voting. Because the Proposal recommends that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of the Company "adopt cumulative voting," which may only be granted to stockholders by a provision of the Certificate of Incorporation, implementation of the Proposal would require an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation. Any such amendment could only be effected in accordance with Section 242 of the General Corporation Law. Section 242 of the General Corporation Law requires that any amendment to the certificate of incorporation be approved by the board of directors, declared advisable and then submitted to the stockholders for adoption thereby. Specifically, Section 242 provides:

Every amendment [to the Certificate of Incorporation] . . . shall be made and effected in the following manner: (1) if the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either calling a special meeting of the stockholders entitled to

vote in respect thereof for consideration of such amendment or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next annual meeting of the stockholders. . . . If a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon, and a majority of the outstanding stock of each class entitled to vote thereon as a class has been voted in favor of the amendment, a certificate setting forth the amendment and certifying that such amendment has been duly adopted in accordance with this section shall be executed, acknowledged and filed and shall become effective in accordance with § 103 of this title.

8 Del. C. § 242(b)(1); see Balotti & Finkelstein The Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations § 8.10 (2007 Supp.) ("After the corporation has received payment for its stock an amendment of its certificate of incorporation is permitted only in accordance with Section 242 of the General Corporation Law.") (Messrs. Balotti and Finkelstein are members of this firm). Because the implementation of the Proposal would require the Board to exceed its authority under Delaware law, the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented by the Board, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

Even if the Proposal were changed to request that the Board propose an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to implement cumulative voting, the Company could not commit to implement such a Proposal. Under the General Corporation Law, any such amendment must be adopted and declared advisable by the Board prior to being submitted to the stockholders for adoption thereby. 8 Del. C. § 242. As the Court stated in Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996):

Like the statutory scheme relating to mergers under 8 Del. C. § 251, it is significant that two discrete corporate events must occur, in precise sequence, to amend the certificate of incorporation under 8 Del. C. § 242: First, the board of directors must adopt a resolution declaring the advisability of the amendment and calling for a stockholder vote. Second, a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote must vote in favor. The stockholders may not act without prior board action.

Id. at 1381. See also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 87 (Del. 1992) ("When a company seeks to amend its certificate of incorporation, Section 242(b)(1) requires the board to ... include a resolution declaring the advisability of the amendment..."); Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., C.A. No. 15012, slip. op. at 40 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1997) ("Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 242, amendment of a corporate certificate requires a board of directors to adopt a resolution which declares the advisability of the amendment and calls for a shareholder vote. Thereafter, in order for the amendment to take effect, a majority of outstanding stock must vote in its favor.");

David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporate Law & Practice, § 32.04, at 32-9 (2007) ("The board must duly adopt resolutions which (i) set forth the proposed amendment, (ii) declare its advisability, and (iii) either call a special meeting of stockholders to consider the proposed amendment or direct that the matter be placed on the agenda at the next annual meeting of stockholders. This sequence must be followed precisely, and may not be altered by charter provision."); 1 R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations, § 9.12, at 9-20 (2007 Supp.) ("Section 251(b) now parallels the requirement in Section 242, requiring that a board deem a proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation to be 'advisable' before it can be submitted for a vote by stockholders."). Because a board of directors has a statutory duty to determine that an amendment is advisable prior to submitting it for stockholder action, the Board could not purport to bind itself to adopt an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to implement the Proposal. In an analogous context (approval of mergers under Section 251 of the General Corporation Law), the Delaware courts have addressed the consequences of a board's abdication of the duty to make an advisability determination when required by statute. Section 251 of the General Corporation Law, like Section 242(b), requires a board of directors to declare a merger agreement advisable prior to submitting it for stockholder action.¹

The decision to propose an amendment to the certificate of incorporation and declare its advisability is a managerial duty reserved to the board of directors by statute; it therefore falls within the exclusive province of the board. As the Court of Chancery stated in the 1990 case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989):

The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm.

Even if the stockholders were to adopt the Proposal, the Board is not required to follow the wishes of a majority in voting power of the shares because the stockholders are not acting as fiduciaries when they vote. In fact, the stockholders are free to vote in their own economic self-interest, without regard to the best interests of the Company or the other stockholders generally. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1380-81 ("Stockholders (even a controlling stockholder bloc) may properly vote in their own economic interest, and majority

¹See 8 Del. C. § 251(b) ("The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability.") and 8 Del. C. § 251(c) ("The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement.").

stockholders are not to be disenfranchised because they may reap a benefit from corporate action which is regular on its face"); cf. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 ("This Court has held that 'a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation'") (internal citations omitted). Indeed, in our experience, many institutional investors vote on such proposals in accordance with general policies that do not take into account the particular interests and circumstances of the corporation at issue.

In light of the fact that the Company's stockholders would be entitled to vote their shares in their own self-interest on the Proposal, allowing the stockholders, through the implementation of the Proposal, to effectively direct the Board to propose an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation and declare such amendment advisable would have the result of requiring the Board to "put" to the stockholders the duty to make a decision that the Board is solely responsible to make under Section 242 of the General Corporation Law. See 8 Del. C. § 242. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that a board may not, consistent with its fiduciary duties, simply "put" to stockholders matters for which they have management responsibility under Delaware law. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 887 (Del. 1985) (holding board not permitted to take a noncommittal position on a merger and "simply leave the decision to [the] stockholders").² Because the Board owes a fiduciary duty to the Company and "all" stockholders, the Board must also take into account the interests of the stockholders who did not vote in favor of the proposals, and those of the corporation generally.

The Delaware courts have consistently held that directors who abdicate their duty to determine the advisability of a merger agreement prior to submitting the agreement for stockholder action breach their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricher, 770 A.2d 43, 62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding delegation by target directors to acquiring corporation of the power to set the amount of merger consideration to be received by its stockholders in a merger to be "inconsistent with the [] board's non-delegable duty to approve the [m]erger only if the [m]erger was in the best interests of [] [the corporation] and its stockholders") (emphasis added); accord Jackson v. Turnbull, C.A. No. 13042, slip op. at 41 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1994), aff'd,

² The Court of Chancery, however, recently held that a board of directors could agree, by adopting a board policy, to submit the final decision on whether or not to adopt a stockholder rights plan to a vote of the stockholders. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., C.A. No. 1699 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). The case of a board reaching an agreement with stockholders what is advisable and in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders—as was the case in Unisuper—in order to induce the stockholders to act in a certain way which the board believed to be in the best interests of stockholders, is different from the case of stockholders attempting to unilaterally direct the Board's statutory duty to determine whether an amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation is advisable (as is the case with the Proposal).

653 A.2d 306 (Del. 1994) (TABLE) (finding that a board cannot delegate its authority to set the amount of consideration to be received in a merger approved pursuant to Section 251(b) of the General Corporation Law); Smith, 488 A.2d at 888 (finding that a board cannot delegate to stockholders the responsibility under Section 251 of the General Corporation Law to determine that a merger agreement is advisable). Indeed, a board of directors of a Delaware corporation cannot even delegate the power to determine the advisability of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation to a committee of directors under Section 141(c) of the General Corporation Law. See 8 Del. C. § 141(c)(1) ("but no such committee shall have the power or authority in reference to amending the certificate of incorporation"); see also 8 Del. C. § 141(c)(2) ("but no such committee shall have the power or authority in reference to the following matter: (i) approving or adopting, or recommending to the stockholders, any action or matter (other than the election or removal of directors) expressly required by this chapter to be submitted to stockholders for approval").

In summary, the Board can not "adopt cumulative voting" as contemplated by the Proposal because implementing cumulative voting would require an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation and the Board does not have the power to unilaterally effect an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation. Moreover, the Board could not commit to propose an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to implement the Proposal because doing so would require the Board to abdicate its statutory and fiduciary obligations to determine the advisability of such amendment prior to submitting it to the stockholders (and, even if the Board were to determine that such amendment is advisable, the Company could not guarantee that the stockholders of the Company would adopt such amendment).

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") has previously taken a no-action position concerning a stockholder proposal similar to the Proposal in a situation where the corporation's certificate of incorporation did not provide for cumulative voting. In 2006, the SEC granted no-action relief to AT&T to exclude a stockholder proposal that proposed that the "Board adopt cumulative voting as a bylaw or long-term policy." AT&T argued to exclude this proposal from its proxy statement under Proxy Rule 14a-8(i)(2) as a violation of Delaware law. AT&T submitted a legal opinion of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. that concluded that the proposal, even if it were changed to request an amendment to AT&T's certificate of incorporation to implement the cumulative voting scheme, would be improper under Delaware law because any such amendment must first be adopted and declared advisable by the board of directors of the corporation and then submitted to the stockholders of the corporation for approval. The SEC apparently accepted these views, as no-action relief was granted under Proxy Rule 14a-8(i)(2) without comment. See AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 2006).

CONCLUSION

Based upon and subject to the foregoing, and subject to the limitations stated herein, it is our opinion that the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented by the Board, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

The foregoing opinion is limited to the General Corporation Law. We have not considered and express no opinion on any other laws or the laws of any other state or jurisdiction, including federal laws regulating securities or any other federal laws, or the rules and regulations of stock exchanges or of any other regulatory body.

The foregoing opinion is rendered solely for your benefit in connection with the matters addressed herein. We understand that you may furnish a copy of this opinion letter to the SEC in connection with the matters addressed herein and that you may refer to it in your proxy statement for the Annual Meeting, and we consent to your doing so. Except as stated in this paragraph, this opinion letter may not be furnished or quoted to, nor may the foregoing opinion be relied upon by, any other person or entity for any purpose without our prior written consent.

Very truly yours,

Richards, Layton & Fieret, P.A.

DAB/JMZ

January 10, 2008

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request
Rule 14a-8 Proposal: Cumulative Voting
The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Regarding the company January 9, 2008 no action request, the same or similar "Shareholders recommend that our Board adopt cumulative voting" text that was used in this proposal was also submitted to 9 large-cap companies for 2007. The result was that none of these 9 companies contested the same text as used in this proposal. These 9 companies had a market capitalization of \$1.3 trillion. And these 9 companies are not historically reticent to file no action requests. This same text then received a total of more than 6 billion yes-votes, which represented an average supporting vote of 35%.

The above could lead to the conclusion that the text "Shareholders recommend that our Board adopt cumulative voting" is *implicit* in stating that the board is requested to "take all the steps in their power" to adopt cumulative voting. And that the 9 companies that published the rule 14a-8 proposals and the shareholders who cast the 6 billion yes-votes understood this to be implicit. The proposal text is addressed to the board, which clearly must act first to adopt the proposal.

The non-excluded Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (March 20, 2007) precedent had the text "that the board 'take all the steps in their power' to adopt cumulative voting." However, in this instance Wal-Mart gave its proponent the opportunity to add the text "take all the steps in their power." On the other hand Time Warner did not give its proponent the opportunity to add similar text and instead filed a no action request.

The non-excluded Alaska Air Group, Inc. (March 1, 2004) precedent used the same "Board adopt cumulative voting" text of this proposal to Time Warner. The proponent response to the Alaska Air no action request made these two points:

- 1) "Shareholder participation in corporate governance via writing and submitting proposals is defined in simple English in the Question-and-Answer portion of Commission's instructions. We believe that the most reasonable understanding of this format is that it expects corporations to communicate with shareholder proponents to resolve structural and procedural details before appealing for guidance on disputed points to the Commission. The company declined to take this approach."

2) "Please be advised that [the proponent] Mr. Flinn is ready, willing and able to recast and revise his proposal based upon the guidance of the Staff."

The shareholder party here is willing to revise the text similar to the 2007 Wal-Mart precedent.

Additionally, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 refers to the long-standing staff practice of issuing no-action responses that permit shareholders to make revisions that are minor in nature (bold added):

1. Why do our no-action responses sometimes permit shareholders to make revisions to their proposals and supporting statements?

There is no provision in rule 14a-8 that allows a shareholder to revise his or her proposal and supporting statement. **However, we have a long-standing practice of issuing no-action responses that permit shareholders to make revisions that are minor in nature and do not alter the substance of the proposal.** We adopted this practice to deal with proposals that generally comply with the substantive requirements of the rule, but **contain some relatively minor defects that are easily corrected.** In these circumstances, we believe that the concepts underlying Exchange Act section 14(a) are best served by affording an opportunity to correct these kinds of defects.

For this resolution the minor revision would be to insert *take all the steps in their power* into "Shareholders recommend that our Board *take all the steps in their power* to adopt cumulative voting ..." or "Shareholders recommend that our Board *take the steps necessary* to adopt cumulative voting ..." similar to this 2007 Staff Reply Letter (bold and italics added):

[STAFF REPLY LETTER]

August 29, 2007

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance

Re: Torotel, Inc. Incoming letter dated June 5, 2007

The proposal calls for the articles of incorporation to be amended to revoke a provision of the by-laws to remove advance notice requirements for shareholders to bring business before a shareholder meeting.

We are unable to concur in your view that Torotel may exclude the proposal under rules 14a-8(b) and 14a-8(f). Accordingly, we do not believe that Torotel may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rules 14a-8(b) and 14a-8(f).

We are unable to concur in your view that Torotel may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(c). Accordingly, we do not believe that Torotel may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(c).

There appears to be some basis for your view that Torotel may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(1) as an improper subject for shareholder action under applicable state law or rule 14a-8(i)(2) because it would, if implemented, cause Torotel to violate state law. **It appears that this defect could be cured,**

however, if the proposal were recast as a recommendation or request that the board of directors *take the steps necessary to implement the proposal.* Accordingly, unless the proponent provides Torotel with a proposal revised in this manner, within seven calendar days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if Torotel omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rules 14a-8(i)(1) or 14a-8(i)(2).

Sincerely,

/s/

Ted Yu

Special Counsel

A copy of this letter is forwarded to the company in a non-PDF email. In order to expedite the rule 14a-8 process it is requested that the company forward any addition rule 14a-8 response in the same type format to the undersigned.

For these reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,

John Chevedden

cc:

The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership

Ann Robertson <Ann.Robertson@timewarner.com>

January 23, 2008

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

**# 2 Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request
Rule 14a-8 Proposal: Cumulative Voting
The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Regarding the company January 9, 2008 no action request, there is no text in the cumulative voting resolution asking the board to act unilaterally to adopt cumulative voting.

Consistent with the text of the resolution the board can adopt cumulative voting by setting in motion the required steps for adoption and monitoring those steps. If the board made up its mind to adopt cumulative voting, the company does not describe how the board could likely fail to adopt cumulative voting.

A copy of this letter is forwarded to the company in a non-PDF email. In order to expedite the rule 14a-8 process it is requested that the company forward any addition rule 14a-8 response in the same type format to the undersigned.

For these reasons, and the January 10, 2008 reasons, it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,

John Chevedden

cc:

The Great Neck Capital Appreciation LTD Partnership

Ann Robertson <Ann.Robertson@timewarner.com>