ICE Agents Search 18 Firms in 10 States Suspected of Illegally Exporting Military Components to Iranian Arms Network

Release Date: 07/10/03 00:00:00

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
July 10, 2003

The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) today announced that agents from ICE and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) executed search warrants on 18 U.S. companies as part of an ongoing probe into the illegal export of U.S. military components to a front company in London that procures arms for the Iranian military.

"Keeping sensitive U.S. military technology from falling into the wrong hands is one of the most important missions of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. This case is a prime example of cooperation between ICE and the DCIS in our efforts to protect the American homeland and U.S. troops deployed around the world," said Michael J. Garcia, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

"The Department of Homeland Security protects our homeland in many ways not normally seen by the public. This case illustrates one of those ways - keeping military components out of the hands of people who by law cannot possess them. We will continue to work with our partners throughout the world, like Her Majesty's Customs & Excise in England, to control the illegal shipment of arms and military parts, and to protect the world from terrorism on all fronts," said Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary for Border Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security.

"The lives of American warfighters can be placed at direct risk through illegal transfer of military components in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The protection of the American warfighter is the core mission of the DCIS, and as such, my office stands ready to deploy DCIS investigative resources, as necessary, to prevent any company from circumventing U.S. controls on technology transfer," said Defense Department Inspector General, Joseph Schmitz.

Yesterday, ICE and DCIS agents executed search warrants on 18 businesses in 10 states, including Louisiana, Texas, New Hampshire, Colorado, New York, Florida, Kansas, Wisconsin, Oregon, and South Carolina. In addition, agents served 7 grand jury subpoenas. Agents made no arrests during the searches. To date, no charges have been brought against the any of the U.S. companies searched. The investigation continues.

The firms are suspected of violating the Arms Export Control Act. According to affidavits filed in support of the warrants, the firms are suspected of illegally exporting items on the U.S. Munitions List without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department. These items allegedly included components for HAWK missiles, F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, F-4 Phantom fighter jets, F-5 fighter jets, C-130 Hercules aircraft, military radars, and other equipment.

The affidavits allege that these components were illegally shipped from the United States to MULTICORE, LTD. (a.k.a. AKS INDUSTRIES), a front company in London involved in procuring military items for the Iranian military. The affidavit alleges that Multicore conducts no legitimate business and receives military purchasing instructions from the Iranian government.

Yesterday’s searches represent the latest phase in an ICE / DCIS investigation that began in Feb. 1999. At that time, agents received information about a company in Bakersfield, Calif., called Multicore, Ltd, that was involved in the purchase of F-14 Tomcat fighter jet parts. The F-14 fighter jet is flown by two military services in the world: the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Air Force.

Agents soon determined that Multicore in London was the parent of Multicore in Bakersfield.

In December 2000, ICE and DCIS agents executed search warrants on Multicore's storage facility in Bakersfield and seized thousands of aircraft and missile components that were bound for Iran, via Singapore. These items included HAWK missile components and parts for F-14 Tomcat fighter jets. Agents documented more than 270 shipments of parts delivered to Multicore in Bakersfield from various U.S. companies.

In December 2000, ICE and DCIS agents also arrested Multicore (Bakersfield) officers, Saeed Homayouni, a naturalized Canadian from Iran, and Yew Leng Fung, a Malaysian citizen. Both defendants were charged with arms export violations. In June 2001, Homayouni pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act. Fung pleaded guilty to Misprision of a Felony. In Sept. 2001, both were sentenced in the Southern District of California.

Based upon information provided by ICE agents, British authorities soon launched an investigation into the illegal export of military goods to Iran by Multicore in London. In May 2002, Her Majesty's Customs & Excise Service executed search warrants on Multicore's London office, one residence, and two storage facilities.

British authorities found thousands of aircraft and missile components in these searches, as well as documents from the government of Iran requesting that Multicore in London purchase military components. British authorities also arrested Soroosh Homayouni (the brother of Saeed Homayouni) on charges of violating United Kingdom export laws. The prosecution of Soroosh Homayouni is pending in the United Kingdom.

In August 2002, ICE and DCIS agents met with British authorities to review evidence seized at Multicore's London office. ICE and DCIS agents found voluminous documentary evidence in the form of parts, correspondence, shipping documents, and invoices. The evidence indicated that more than 50 U.S. companies had shipped articles directly to Multicore in London after the U.S. raids on Multicore’s Bakersfield storage facility in December 2000.

Armed with this evidence, ICE and DCIS agents began an investigation into those U.S. companies that had supplied Multicore London. According to the affidavits supporting the search warrants executed yesterday, ICE and DCIS researched each U.S. company individually and the associated commodity it exported to determine if the company had complied with U.S. law by acquiring the necessary export license associated with that part or component.

This page was last modified on 07/10/03 00:00:00