<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VIII]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_ccxxxvi.wais]
Chapter CCXXXVI.\1\
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES.
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1. Committee act together on the report. Sections 2220, 2221.
2. Majority vote, a quorum being present, authorizes report.
Sections 2222, 2223.
3. Doubt as to authorization of a report. Sections 2224, 2225.
4. Minority views. Sections 2226-2229.
5. Rule as to presenting reports. Sections 2230-2233.
6. Requirement that reports indicate proposed changes in law.
Sections 2234-2250.
7. Privileged reports from certain committees. Sections 2251-
2252.
8. Privilege of the Committee on Rules. Sections 2253-2259.
9. Limitations on privilege of the Committee on Rules.
Sections 2260-2267.
10. Committee on Rules shall present reports within three days.
Sections 2268, 2269.
11. Report from Committee on Rules not subject to recommitment.
Section 2270.
12. Division of question on report from Committee on Rules.
Sections 2271-2275.
13. Privilege of the Committees on Elections. Sections 2276,
2277.
14. Privilege of Ways and Means Committee. Sections 2278-2281.
15. Privilege of the Committee on Appropriations. Sections
2282-2285.
16. Privilege of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors. Sections
2286, 2287.
17. Privilege of the Committee on Public Lands. Sections 2288-
2290.
18. Privilege of the Committee on Invalid Pensions. Sections
2291-2293.
19. Privilege of the Committee on Printing. Sections 2294-2298.
20. Privilege of the Committee on Accounts. Sections 2299-2306.
21. The requirement that reports be printed. Sections 2307-
2309.
22. General decisions. Sections 2310-2313.
23. Process of authorization. Sections 2314, 2315.
24. Discharging a committee. Section 2316.
25. Reports of commissions. Section 2317.
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2220. Committees can only agree to a report acting together.
On May 4, 1912,\2\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, from the Committee
on Rules, proposed to report the resolution (H. Res. 521) making
certain amendments in order in the consideration of a general
appropriation bill.
Mr. Irvine L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, made the point of order that the
committee had not authorized the report.
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\1\ Supplementary to Chapter CVI.
\2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 5889.
Sec. 2221
Mr. Henry conceded that while 9 out of the 11 members of the
Committee on Rules had been consulted on the floor of the House and had
agreed to report the resolution, the committee had not assembled for
that purpose in the committee room.
The point of order being insisted upon, Mr. Henry withdrew the
resolution.
2221. A bill having been recommitted because of a defective report,
further proceedings are de novo and all committee formalities
accompanying the first report are necessary to authorize a second
report.
A report may be authorized by a committee only when a quorum is
present and acting together at a duly authorized meeting.
On June 25, 1930,\1\ during the consideration of business in order on
Wednesday, Mr. Fred A. Britten of Illinois, by direction of the
Committee on Naval Affairs, with which the call rested on that day,
called up the bill (H. R. 1190) to regulate the distribution and
promotion of commissioned officers of the line of the Navy.
Mr. Ross A. Collins, of Mississippi, made the point of order that the
report on the bill had not been authorized by the committee.
From the debate it appeared that the bill had been called up for
consideration on the previous Wednesday, but had been recommitted on
the point of order that the report failed to comply with the rule
requiring indication of proposed changes in law; that the chairman of
the committee had informally consulted a quorum of the committee at
various times and places and had again filed a supplemental report
without authorization given at a formal session of the committee.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The question with the Chair is whether the committee at one of its
regular meetings authorized the report on the bill H. R. 1190.
Even though the committee was regularly and properly called, or met
on one of the regular meeting days, the question would then arise as to
whether the committee, a quorum being present, by a majority vote
authorized the report on the bill. That is the question.
In the opinion of the Chair, the bill having been recommitted to the
committee, the same formalities are required on a new report as on the
first report; and if the formalities are not complied with in this
case, the rule has not been complied with. Of course, the Chair has no
knowledge as to what happened.
Mr. Britten conceded:
I admit that no formal action was taken on the recommitted bill. The
bill itself did not go to the committee, but the report did.
The Speaker ruled:
Under those circumstances, the bill is again recommitted to the
committee.
The bill itself must be rereported in order that when the committee
authorizes the second report it shall be final.
2222. No report is valid unless authorized with a quorum of the
committee present.
Discussion of distinction as to requirement of quorum in House and
committee procedure.
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\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11705.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 2223
On June 17, 1922,\1\ Mr. Philip P. Campbell, of Kansas, ffrom the
Committee on Rules, proposed to report a resolution providing for the
consideration of the bill (S. 3425) to continue certain land offices.
Mr. Louis C. Cramton, of Michigan, made the point of order that the
report was invalid because authorized without a quorum of the committee
present.
In the course of the debate on the point of order, Mr. James r. Mann,
of Illinois, said:
The House does business on the theory of a quorum being present, but
it has always been my understanding since I have been a Member of this
House that a committee must develop a quorum before it can transact any
business. And it is the practice, at least in most of the committees,
to call the roll of the committee--a matter which is never called in
the House at the meeting of the House to ascertain whether a quorum is
present before the House can commence business--to ascertain whether a
quorum is present. I was chairman of two committees of this House for a
number of years and never acted upon any proposition or reported any
matter to the House until a quorum was developed in the committee and a
quorum acted upon the matter to be reported to the House. I think
myself that in the interest of good parliamentary procedure, in the
interest of orderly legislation, it would be wise for the Speaker to
hold that when the chairman of a committee or a member of the committee
reporting to the House did not state when the question was asked that a
quorum of the committee was present when the order was made, that order
would be held invalid, and that no committee had the right to report to
the House without a quorum of the committee being present. The custom
has always been of the House, where a question of that sort was raised,
for the Speaker to ask the man reporting the bill what action was taken
by the committee or whether a quorum was present, and his answer was
considered final.
After further debate, the Speaker \2\ decided:
The ruling of the Chair has been very much simplified by the frank
admission of the chairman of the committee that there was no quorum
present. Otherwise it would have raised a different question as to what
evidence was necessary to contradict the official minutes or record of
the meeting. But it is admitted that there was no quorum present, and
therefore it seems to the Chair that the conclusion is very clear.
The Chair was for many years a member of the Committee on
Appropriations, and it is the recollection of the Chair that that
committee was scrupulous that there should always be a quorum present.
That, of course, does not mean--and it has occurred to the Chair that
it might have happened in this present instance--that a quorum of the
committee was present every minute. Men would go in, and would go out,
and come back. But the roll call must disclose that a quorum was
present, and the Chair thinks that is the practice of most of the
committees. But inasmuch as it is admitted here that there was no
quorum present, the Chair sustains the point of order.
2223. While the presence of a quorum at the session of the committee
at which authorized is essential to the validity of a report, it is too
late to raise that question after consideration has begun in the House.
On October 9, 1919,\3\ Mr. Simeon D. Fess, of Ohio, by direction of
the Committee on Rules, presented a report on the resolution (H. Res.
327) for the consideration of the vocational rehabilitation bill.
After consideration of the resolution had proceeded for several
minutes, Mr. Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, made the point of order
that the report was invalid because authorized in the absence of a
quorum of the committee reporting it.
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\1\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 8928.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 6652.
Sec. 2224
After debate the Speaker \1\ held:
The gentleman from Virginia raises the point of order that the
resolution is not in order. It is not a question of the propriety of
the action of the committee. It is simply a plain question of the duty
of the Chair to decide that it is now out of order. It is well
established that a committee can act only with a quorum present, and
the Chair is disposed to recognize that there is a difference between
the Committee of the Whole House and the ordinary committees of the
House. The Chair has served on a great many committees and does not
recollect a single instance when any committee on which he served took
action without a quorum of the committee being present. On the
contrary, his recollection is that the committees were always
scrupulous to see to it that a quorum was present.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Cannon, was the first one to raise
the point which has been repeated a number of times during this
discussion, and which certainly is impressive, that if you say that a
committee can report without a quorum, unless the point is raised in
the committee, then a chairman can have a meeting by himself, can
report a bill, and it can not be questioned, because there is no one
present to raise the point of no quorum, and nobody but himself would
know whether there was a quorum present or not. That might lead,
naturally, to great abuse, and, of course, of itself it would be a
great abuse; but that does not determine the validity of the point of
order. It seems to the Chair that this discussion has illustrated the
wisdom of the rule that what takes place in a committee is not to be
divulged in public.
The Chair has been shown two precedents on this subject, one by Mr.
Speaker Reed and one further back. As far as the Chair can see, from a
cursory reading, the earlier precedent is directly in point, that such
action by a committee without a quorum does not make the report of the
committee subject to the point of order on the floor of the House after
its consideration has commenced. As Mr. Speaker Reed said, the line
must be drawn somewhere when irregularities can not be questioned, and
it seems to the Chair, according to these precedents, that after
consideration has begun the question of a quorum in the committee can
not be raised.
The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.
2224. The Speaker being satisfied that a committee had not exceeded
its jurisdiction in authorizing a report decided it should be received.
Direction to a committee to investigate and report ``with such
recommendations as it may care to make'' was held to warrant direct and
specific recommendations for final disposition of a Government project
under investigation.
On May 18, 1920,\2\ Mr. William J. Graham, of Illinois, chairman of
the Select Committee on Expenditures, announced that in pursuance with
an agreement with minority members, he would file through the basket a
report from that committee on nitrates and nitrate plants.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, made the point of order that the
select committee had both exceeded its authority and infringed upon the
jurisdiction of another committee in authorizing the report, and said:
I direct the attention of the Chair to finding No. 30 of the report
of the select committee now before us. Finding No. 30 of the majority
report says:
``It would be unwise and contrary to the Government's best interests
for the War Department or any agency of the Government acting under or
through such department to build and operate a plant in conjunction
with Nitrate Plant No. 2 at Muscle Shoals for the manufacture of
ammonium sulphate and other nitrogenous compounds for commercial
purposes.''
In other words, Mr. Speaker, that is a direct, specific
recommendation leveled at the very heart of a bill now pending, and
which has been for some time pending, before the Committee on
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\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 7236.
Sec. 2224
Military Affairs of the House, and upon which that committee has, I am
informed, held hearings. Therefore, although it does not mention the
bill by name, since it involves the legislative proposition, and the
only legislative proposition that is pending anywhere before any
committee of the House, it infringes upon the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Military Affairs.
I submit that under the resolution appointing this select committee
its jurisdiction may be tersely stated as follows. It has authority--
First. To investigate contracts and expenditures by the War
Department.
Second. To exercise the power and authority granted the Committee on
Expenditures in the War Department, to which I shall hereafter refer.
Third. To send for persons and papers.
Fourth. To administer oaths. It probably has that authority without
express statements in the resolution.
Fifth. To take testimony.
Sixth. To sit during sessions of the House.
Seventh. To appoint subcommittees.
Eighth. To report in one or more reports with recommendations.
Those recommendations must, I take it, be within the scope of the
committee's powers and jurisdiction.
Under the second item which I have mentioned the committee may
exercise the power and authority of the Committee on Expenditures in
the War Department. We must go to the general rules of the House to see
what that authority is. I submit that the jurisdiction is limited under
the general rules of the House so that the committee has authority
merely to inquire into and report upon the justness, the correctness,
and economy of expenditures and into the proper application of public
moneys, and into the economy and accountability of public officials. I
think by no possible stretch of the general rules of the House defining
the jurisdiction of the standing Committee on Expenditures in the War
Department can its powers go beyond those I have just enumerated.
To this argument Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, replied:
Mr. Speaker, this committee was created, as I understand it, June 4,
1919. The power given to the committee is as follows: ``Which said
committee is hereby authorized to fully investigate all contracts and
expenditures made by the War Department or under its direction during
the present war,'' and in addition, and so forth, power is conferred by
the rules of the House upon an expenditure committee, but the rules do
not extend the power of the committee as to making investigation. The
language in the bill gave them authority to investigate all contracts
and expenditures made by the War Department. Then the rules further
provide:
``That said select committee shall report to the House, in one or
more reports as it may deem advisable, the result of its
investigations, with such recommendation as it may care to make.''
It would clearly include any recommendation which in any way related
to the expenditures of the War Department, either as to the past or as
to the future, relating to the matters for which expenditures had been
made in the past. This committee had the power to investigate the
expenditures and to report its recommendation as to whether those
expenditures were made for a purpose which was wise, and whether
additional expenditures ought to be made to complete a project for
which the past expenditures were made, or whether the Government ought
to proceed to utilize the expenditures which were made, or whether the
Government ought to dispose of the things that were created by the
expenditures already made. The committee would have had that power, in
my judgment, even if there had been no provision made giving them the
power to make recommendation. But here is an express direction to the
committee that it not only report the results of its investigations,
but make recommendations based upon those investigations. If all the
committee could do was to report upon the investigation which was made,
what is the object in saying that it shall have the power to make
recommendations? It is already given the power to make the report of
its investigation.
Now, Mr. Speaker, in justice to myself, I doubt whether I am in
consonance with the recommendations of this committee as to the nitrate
plant, but as to the power of the committee to recommend, I do not
think there is a particle of question that, having investigated the
expenditures
Sec. 2225
for the nitrate plant, they could recommend that it be dismantled,
abandoned, and torn down; that it be used by the Government; that it be
leased by the Government; or that the Government exercise such power as
it pleased in various directions. That is what the committee was for,
namely, to recommend to Congress, after it made its investigation, the
best course that might be pursued by Congress, making utilization of
the immense sums of money which have been expended by the War
Department.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
The gentleman from Tennessee was so courteous as to notify the Chair
in advance of this point of order, so the Chair has had some
opportunity to study the report and the point of order. On that account
the Chair is peculiarly desirous that the case which the gentleman from
Tennessee presents shall have his impartial consideration. And, of
course, the statement of the gentleman that he does not intend to
appeal increases the desire of the Chair to give the gentleman every
benefit of doubt.
But it seems to the Chair very clear that this point of order is not
valid.
It seems to the Chair very clear that the rule which gives the
Committee on Expenditures its authority does cover this case. It says
that the committee shall report to the House the result of its
investigations.
Now, there can be no question that this investigation of a nitrate
plant was directly within the sphere intended by this rule. The rule
also says that the committee shall make recommendations.
The resolution gave the committee authority to do certain things in
addition to the authority which the ordinary Committee on Expenditures
had, and among these is ``the security of the Government against unjust
and extravagant demands'' and ``retrenchment.'' So this committee has
the power, among other things, of retrenchment. That is within the
strict scope of their duty. It seems to the Chair that if the committee
in investigating the subject entirely within its sphere finds as it did
in this case that there is a certain course of action by the War
Department which it thinks would bring about retrenchment, that to
recommend that course is a proper function of the committee.
It seems to the Chair very clear that they had a right to make a
recommendation in the line of retrenchment as to the further
prosecution of this project. The fact that another committee had
control of a bill which would continue the operation of this plant
which they are investigating in no way limits the scope of the
authority of this committee. The report of this committee does not take
away the jurisdiction of that committee. That committee can still
consider the bill and report it to the House, which could if it desired
adopt it.
So it seems to the chair that this report is strictly within the
scope of the committee's authority, and the Chair overrules the point
of order.
2225. The validity of a committee's action in reporting a bill may
not be questioned after actual consideration of the bill has begun in
the House.
It is not the duty of the Speaker to construe the Constitution as
affecting proposed legislation.
On May 21, 1930,\2\ the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 331) relative to
the Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law was being
considered by the House as in the Committee of the Whole.
After debate had proceeded for some time, Mr. John J. O'Connor, of
New York, raised a question of order against the bill on the ground
that it related to treaties and was therefore not within the
constitutional jurisdiction of the House.
The Speaker \3\ overruled the point of order and said:
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\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 9320.
\3\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 2226
It is very well known in the House that the Chair refuses to rule on
questions of constitutionality.
Whereupon, Mr. O'Connor made the further point of order that the
Committee on Foreign Affairs was not authorized to present the report.
The Speaker ruled:
If the gentleman from New York had made his point of order earlier,
before the House undertook the consideration of the resolution, the
Chair would have ruled on the question; but the resolution has been
debated, and the House has taken jurisdiction, and the question of the
jurisdiction of the committee to report it would now come too late.
2226. Views of the minority, although customarily printed in
connection with the report of a committee, are in fact no part of such
report.
On February 19, 1912,\1\ in the Senate, Mr. Nathan P. Bryan, of
Florida, presented his individual views on the bill (H.R. 1) granting a
service pension to Civil War veterans, which were ordered printed in
connection with the majority report and other minority views.
Mr. Weldon Brinton Heyburn, of Idaho, inquired:
Mr. President, I rise to a question of views. I inquire whether or
not a minority report is any part of the report of a committee. We are
falling into a habit of treating it as though it were a part of the
report of a committee. I understand that it is not. There is but one
report, and that should be the only report. The other might be
denominated views of certain members, naming them; but I think we fall
into an error by treating it as a part of the report.
The Vice President \2\ said:
Really it is not a report at all; it is the views of certain minority
members of the committee. The Chair thinks the customer has been to
print such matters as are now presented as parts 1, 2, and 3, whatever
the case may be, of the report.
2227. A committee having been given the right by special order to
report from the floor, members of the committee are entitled to the
same privilege in presenting minority views.
On March 3, 1919,\3\ Mr. Ben Johnson, of Kentucky, from the select
committee to investigate the National Security League, pursuant to
authority ``to report at any time'' granted in the resolution \4\
creating the committee, presented the report \5\ of the majority of the
committee from the floor.
The reading of the report having been concluded, Mr. Joseph Walsh, of
Massachusetts, demanded recognition to present minority views.
Mr. J. Thomas Heflin, of Alabama, made the point of order that Mr.
Walsh was not entitled to the floor for the presentation of individual
views.
The Speaker \6\ held that special authorization to present the report
of a committee included authorization for the presentation of minority
views, and overruled the point of order.
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\1\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 2188.
\2\ James S. Sherman, of New York, Vice President.
\3\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4925.
\4\ H. Res. 469, Record, p. 258.
\5\ Report No. 1173.
\6\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2228
2228. A ``Report'' of the minority may properly include excerpts and
citations quoted in the nature of argument and as sustaining the
minority contention.
On July 29, 1919,\1\ Mr. William J. Graham, of Illinois, from the
Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, called up the
report of that committee.
The report having been read, Mr. Henry D. Flood, of Virginia, asked
for the reading of the minority views.
During the reading Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, raised a
question of order and said:
The gentlemen submitting the minority views have not conformed to the
rules of the House, in that they have included excerpts from testimony
and from documents and letters which are not the views of the minority.
The minority report is not a report; simply an opportunity for the
minority members of the committee to express their views. If the Chair
will consult Hinds' Precedents, section 4607, he will see that where
the question was raised before during the consideration of the Coeur
d'Alene investigation, the Speaker ordered expunged from the Record
extraneous matters which were not in the nature of the views of the
minority.
Now, we have letters here from various officials. We have on page 12
excerpts from the testimony had at a hearing; we have quotations in
various matters added to the report as appendices. Clearly they are not
the views of the minority, and those matters are proper matters to be
presented to the House during the consideration of the matter upon
which the report is made but are not proper matters to be included in
the report made upon the measure if submitted by the minority to
express their views.
And I submit, Mr. Speaker, to the Chair, that the minority report is
not in accordance with the practice of the House nor with the precedent
laid down under the rule.
The Speaker \2\ rules:
This is a new question to the Chair, and apparently there has been
only one decision upon it, made by Speaker Henderson. That precedent
exactly sustains the point of order made by the gentleman from
Massachusetts. But Speaker Henderson apparently bases his decision on
the distinction between the term ``views'' and the term ``report.'' The
distinction is very technical, and the Chair thinks that on such a
question the technicalities should be observed equally on both sides.
The point made by the gentleman from Virginia that the House by
unanimous consent gave the minority the right to file a report instead
of views is no more technical than the point decided by Speaker
Henderson, and the Chair accordingly is disposed to think that,
inasmuch as the excerpts and arguments which are cited in the minority
views or the minority report appear to be relevant and such as would be
used in argument on the floor of the House, they should be allowed
unless the rules of the House clearly exclude them. But from the
decision as quoted in Hinds' Precedents the Chair is disposed to think
it reasonable and in the interest of expedition to overrule the point
of order. The general purpose of filing minority views is to give them
an opportunity to express their reasons against the majority report,
and this is the report of a select committee appointed only for the
purpose of investigation; and the Chair thinks the minority's right
should not be more narrowly limited than the strict interpretation of
the precedent requires. The Chair overrules the point of order.
2229. While committee reports are ordinarily submitted without
signature and minority views require signature by those subscribing
thereto, there have been exceptional instances in which the former were
signed and the latter submitted without signature.
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\1\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3331.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2230
On August 20, 1921,\1\ the bill (H. R. 8245), the revenue bill, was
under consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union, when Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, referring to the
minority views, asked:
The gentleman did not sign this report. Is this the minority report,
or what is it?
After interruption, he continued:
Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand perhaps the most remarkable document
that has ever been submitted to a Congress of the United States. It
purports to be the views of the minority on this revenue bill. It is
signed by but one member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
In reply Mr. James W. Collier, of Mississippi, inquired:
Do the gentleman and his colleagues on the committee approve and
indorse the majority report of the Ways and Means Committee as
presented to this House?
Mr. Longworth answered:
The gentleman from Mississippi is unmindful of the rules of the
House. The majority report is not signed by members. Is not the
gentleman aware of that fact? Did he ever see a majority report signed
by members of the committee?
To which Mr. William A. Oldfield, of Arkansas, rejoined:
The gentleman said that a majority report was not signed by the
majority members of the Ways and Means Committee. I hold in my hand a
report, Tariff Reports, Miscellaneous, 1911-12, on this excise tax
bill, reported March 14, 1912, signed by Oscar Underwood and all the
majority members of the Ways and Means Committee. That is the report.
You made a statement that we did not sign it. It was an error.
During the discussion, Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, explained:
A majority report is the report of the committee, and the minority
report contains the views of those who sign it. There is no difficulty
about the parliamentary law. The report of the committee is not usually
signed at all. It is presented by a member of the committee. Sometimes
it is signed. Minority views are not a report of the committee. They
are only the views of the gentlemen who sign. Under the rules those
minority views can be dropped into the basket and printed as a
supplement to the report, so that the minority views only represent the
views of those who sign.
2230. Privileged reports may not be submitted by filing with the
Clerk through the basket but must be presented from the floor.
On May 16, 1911,\2\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, by direction of
the Committee on Rules, proposed to call up a report from that
committee on the resolution (H. Res 148) providing for an investigation
of the United States Steel Corporation.
It then appeared that the report had been filed with the Clerk
through the basket and placed on the calendar.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, raised the question of order that
reports privileged under the rules must be submitted from the floor and
could not be presented by dropping in the basket on the Clerk's desk.
The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order.
2231. Minority views accompany reports of committees as a matter of
right, but unless filed simultaneously with the report, may be
presented only by consent of the House.
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\1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 5343.
\2\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 1229.
\3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2232
On December 10, 1929,\1\ Mr. Willis C. Hawley, of Oregon, from the
Committee on Ways and Means, announced that that Committee had directed
a favorable report on the bill (H. R. 6585) to authorize the settlement
of the indebtedness of the French Republic to the United States, and
that it would be taken up for consideration on the following Thursday.
Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, asked unanimous consent that the
minority be permitted to file views in connection with the report.
Mr. C. William Ramseyer, of Iowa, suggested that the request was
unnecessary, as minority views were filed with the majority reports as
a matter of right, and that the consent of the House was necessary only
when minority views were filed subsequent to the filing of the report
of the committee.
The Speaker\2\ said:
The minority has the right to file its views as a part of the
majority report.
The Chair would assume that the minority views will be ready at the
time the majority files its report. Ordinarily, the request put to the
House is that the minority may have until a certain time to file its
views.
The rule on the subject is as follows:
``All reports of committees, except as provided in clause 45 of Rule
11, together with the views of the minority, shall be delivered to the
Clerk for printing''----
And so forth.
The Chair thinks a proper interpretation of the rule would give the
minority the right to file minority views with the report, provided
they were ready at the same time.
Minority views would have to be filed in time for the printer to be
able to incorporate them along with the majority report; in other
words, except by unanimous consent, minority views could not hold up
presentation of the printed report.
2232. On April 14, 1914,\3\ when the Journal was read, Mr. James R.
Mann, of Illinois, called attention to the fact that it recorded the
Committee on Foreign Affairs as having reported by delivery to the
Clerk, through the basket, the bill (H. R. 15762) the diplomatic and
consular appropriation bill. Mr. Mann made the point of order that the
bill being privileged could not be so reported, but must be presented
from the floor and opportunity given for the reservation of points of
order.
The Speaker\4\ sustained the point of order and directed that the
Journal be corrected and that the bill be stricken from the calendar
until reported from the floor.
2233. While a privileged bill reported by delivery to the Clerk
through the basket thereby forfeits its privilege, it may be at any
time reported from the floor and is then privileged for immediate
consideration.
A bill relating to the number of internal-revenue collectors and
collection districts was held to be a revenue bill within the meaning
of the rule giving such bills privilege.
On May 4, 1922,\5\ business in order on Calendar Wednesday having
been transferred to that day from the preceding Wednesday, Mr. Thomas
A. Chandler, of Oklahoma, from the Committee on Ways and Means,
proposed to call up the bill (H. R. 10877) to increase the number of
collectors of internal revenue.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 429.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 6680.
\4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\5\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6342.
Sec. 2234
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, objected that the bill was
privileged and therefore not in order on Calendar Wednesday.
The Speaker \1\ held:
The question in the Chair's mind is--this bill having been reported
not from the floor but through the basket and put on the calendar--
whether it is now in control of the committee to report from the floor.
It is on the Union Calendar, and the question is whether it ought not
to be referred back to the Committee on Ways and Means and reported. It
has now been concluded, and the Chair thinks correctly, that it is a
privileged bill. The question arises whether it is still in the hands
of the committee to rereport, inasmuch as it has already been once
reported through the basket and is now on the Union Calendar. It seems
to the Chair logically that the bill is not now in the possession of
the committee, but the Chair finds an express decision by Mr. Speaker
Reed on that point, holding that it can be immediately reported where
it has been once reported through the basket. The Chair therefore
refers the bill to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union.
2234 Committee reports on measures repealing or amending a statute
shall include the text of such statute and a comparative print of the
measure showing by typographical devices the omissions or insertions
proposed.
Present form and history of paragraph 2a of Rule XIII.
Section 2a of Rule XIII provides:
Whenever a committee reports a bill or a joint resolution repealing
or amending any statute or part thereof it shall include in its report
or in an accompanying document--
(1) The text of the statute or part thereof which is proposed to be
repealed; and
(2) A comparative print of that part of the bill or joint resolution
making the amendment and of the statute or part thereof proposed to be
amended, showing by stricken-through type and italics, parallel
columns, or other appropriate typographical devices, the omissions and
insertions proposed to be made.
This section was first incorporated in the rules by a resolution
adopted January 28, 1929,\2\ and has been continued without
modification in subsequent revisions. The resolution proposing the
amendment was offered by Mr. C. William Ramseyer, of Iowa, and for that
reason the section is frequently referred to as the ``Ramseyer rule.''
2235. In order to fall within the purview of the rule requiring
indication of proposed changes in existing law by typographical device,
a bill must repeal or amend a statute in terms, and general reference
to the subject treated in a statute without proposing specific
amendment is not sufficient.
On February 7, 1931,\3\ during the consideration of bills reported by
the Committee on the District of Columbia, Mr. Frederick N. Zihlman, of
Maryland, by direction of that committee, called up the bill (H. R.
16045) to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to
close streets in the District of Columbia rendered useless and
unnecessary.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, made the point of order that
the report on the bill failed to comply with the provisions of the rule
requiring indication of changes in existing law by typographical
device.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Seventieth Congress, Record, p. 2371.
\3\ Third session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 4259.
Sec. 2236
Mr. Zihlman submitted that the bill was not amendatory of existing
law and merely provided a method of closing streets which under
existing conditions could be done only be special act of Congress.
The Speaker pro tempore \1\ ruled:
It has been generally held that section 2a of Rule XIII is applicable
where a bill seeks to repeal or amend specifically an existing law; but
when it applies to a general proposition or a general amendment of an
entire statute, it does not come under the rule. It must amend the law
directly and refer to the specific section of the statute that it seeks
to amend or repeal.
The Chair does not think that this bill comes within the provision of
the rule and, therefore, overrules the point of order.
2236. Although a bill proposed but one minor and obvious change in
existing law, the failure of the report on the bill to indicate this
change by typographical device, was held to be in violation of the
rule.
On Monday, February 3, 1930,\2\ the House was considering bills on
the Consent Calendar, when the bill (H. R. 8156) to change the limit of
cost for the construction of the Coast Guard Academy was reached.
Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that
the change proposed in the law was not properly indicated in the
report.
The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order and said:
It is perfectly apparent to anyone reading the bill that its language
is not exactly in the form prescribed by the Ramseyer rule, which
provides that--
``Whenever a committee reports a bill or a joint resolution repealing
or amending any statute or part thereof it shall include in its report
or in an accompanying document--
``(1) The text of the statute or part thereof which is proposed to be
repealed; and
``(2) A comparative print of that part of the bill or joint
resolution making the amendment and of the statute or part thereof
proposed to be amended, showing by stricken-through type and italics,
parallel columns, or other appropriate typographical devices, the
omissions and insertions proposed to be made.''
The Chair does not think that rule has been complied with. What is
required under the second part has not been done. Of course the rule is
intended to make it evident just what change in a bill or resolution is
intended. It is to make this change apparent to anybody without
consulting the statute which it is intended to amend.
After debate, the Speaker pro tempore \4\ ruled:
Section 64 of the bill provides:
``The provisions of this act apply to existing copyrights save as
expressly indicated by this act. All other acts or parts of acts
relating to copyrights are hereby repealed, as well as all other laws
or parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act.''
The gentleman from Indiana argues well that it would be a task of
considerable magnitude to do what is proposed here, and yet that seems
to be the purpose of the rule that the Member making the report of the
committee shall do the work of investigation and submit to the House
the information as to what statutes are to be repealed.
On March 17, 1930, a point of order was made against a bill in very
much the same situation as this bill, that did not conform to section
2a of Rule XIII. In that case the Speaker pro tempore
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
\2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 2982.
\3\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\4\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2237
who happened to be the gentleman from New York, Mr. Snell, chairman of
the Rules Committee, that reports this rule, sustained the point of
order. It seems clear to the Chair that the ruling then made was
correct and that no other ruling can be made here than to sustain the
point of order and send the bill back to the committee for a report in
accordance with the rule. The Chair therefore sustains the point of
order.
2237. Under clause 2a of Rule XIII the committee report on a bill
amending existing law by the addition of a proviso should quote in full
the section immediately preceding the proposed amendment.
Bills reported without indication of changes proposed in existing law
are automatically recommitted to the respective committees reporting
them.
On June 16, 1930,\1\ during the call of the Consent Calendar, the
joint resolution (H. J. Res. 303) proposing an amendment in the nature
of a proviso to a public resolution relating to the payment of certain
claims of grain elevators and grain firms was reached.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, made the point of order that
the public resolution proposed to be amended was not incorporated in
the report.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ held:
Under a strict application of paragraph 2a, Rule XIII, the Chair
thinks the immediate section of law preceding the proposed amendment
should have been printed in the report.
The point of order is sustained and the bill is recommitted to the
Committee on War Claims.
2238. Under the rule requiring committee reports to indicate proposed
changes in existing law, the statute proposed to be amended must be
quoted in the report and it is not sufficient that it is incorporated
in the bill.--On June 18, 1930,\3\ it being Calendar Wednesday, Mr.
Fred A. Britten, of Illinois, when the Committee on Naval Affairs was
reached, called up the bill (H. R. 1190) to regulate the promotion of
commissioned officers of the Navy.
Mr. Ross A. Collins, of Mississippi, made the point of order that the
report did not include the statute sought to be amended.
Mr. Britten submitted that while the statute was not quoted in the
report it was incorporated in the bill itself and that such
incorporation was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
rule.
The Speaker pro tempore \4\ dissented from this view and said:
Section 9 of the bill provides:
``The provision in the act approved August 29, 1916, prescribing
maximum age limits for the promotion of captains, commanders, and
lieutenant commanders is hereby repealed.''
The fact that the provision just read is not set out in the report
violates the rule to such an extent that the Chair is obliged to
sustain the point of order.
The Chair sustains the point of order, and the bill automatically is
referred to the committee for a report in accordance with the rules.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Journal, p. 16; Record, p.
10933.
\2\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11105.
\4\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2239
2239. The rule requiring reports to show proposed changes in existing
law by typographical device applies to bills amending statutory law
only and is not applicable to bills amending public resolutions.
On April 21, 1930,\1\ a Monday devoted to business on the Consent
Calendar, the Clerk read the title of the bill (H. R. 10818) to extend
the provisions of Public Resolution No. 47.
Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that
the report on the bill failed to comply with the requirements of the
rule providing for indication of proposed changes in existing law.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ overruled the point of order on the
ground that the rule applied to existing law only and did not extend to
public resolutions.
2240. A bill is not subject to the rule requiring comparative prints
unless it specifically amends existing law.
On April 13, 1932,\3\ in the course of the call of the committees
under the Calendar Wednesday rule, Mr. Edgar Howard, of Nebraska,
called up the bill (H. R. 8898), to defer collection of construction
costs against Indian lands in irrigation projects.
Mr. Edward W. Goss, of Connecticut, made the point of order that the
rule requiring comparative prints of proposed changes in law had not
been complied with.
The Speaker pro tempore \4\ held:
Under the rule a bill must specifically amend existing law. This bill
(H. R. 8898) does not purport to amend any law, and the point of order
is overruled. This bill is on the Union Calendar, and the House
automatically resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union.
2241. The rule requiring comparative prints in reports on measures
repealing existing law, while effective as to substantive legislative
provisions reported in general appropriation bills, is not otherwise
applicable to reports from the Committee on Appropriations and does not
extend to changes in paragraphs merely carrying stated appropriations.
On January 9, 1930, Mr.\5\ Henry E. Barbour, of California, moved
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for the consideration of the War Department
appropriation bill.
Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that
the bill had not been properly reported in that it failed to comply
with the provisions of clause 2a of Rule XIII by including the text of
laws proposed to be repealed and a comparative print showing by
appropriate typographical devices the omissions and insertions proposed
to be made.
After exhaustive debate the Speaker \6\ ruled:
In view of the fact that this is the first time that the Chair or the
House has been called upon to construe this rule, it becomes a matter
of considerable importance, because it will apply to all
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 7363.
\2\ Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 8144.
\4\ John J. O'Connor, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
\5\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Journal, p. 803; Record,
p. 1328.
\6\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 2241
appropriation bills to be considered in the House in the future. The
rule which was adopted January 28, 1929, Rule XIII, clause 2a, commonly
called the Ramseyer rule, is as follows:
``Whenever a committee reports a bill or a joint resolution repealing
or amending any statute or part thereof it shall include in its report
or in an accompanying document--
``(1) The text of the statute or part thereof which is proposed to be
repealed; and
``(2) A comparative print of that part of the bill or joint
resolution making the amendment and of the statute or part thereof
proposed to be amended, showing by stricken-through type and italics,
parallel columns, or other appropriate typographical devices the
omissions and insertions proposed to be made.
The point of order made by the gentleman from New York raises the
question whether the Ramseyer rule applies to the Committee on
Appropriations as well as to the legislative committees of the House.
When this rule was discussed on the day it was passed, January 28,
1929, the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Ramseyer, the author of the rule, in
explaining it, said:
``The proposal in this new rule is simply this: Many bills which are
introduced are to amend statutes. Such bills are reported back to the
House, and there is nothing, either in the bill or in the report
accompanying the bill, to advise Members of the House just what
specific changes the bill proposes to make in the statute under
consideration. If this amendment to rule XIII is adopted, then
hereafter a committee which reports a bill to amend an existing statute
must show in the report just what changes are proposed.''
Evidently the primary purpose of this rule applies only to
legislative committees, because only legislative committees have the
right to legislate. However, further on in the discussion the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Blanton, asked the gentleman from New York, the
chairman of the Committee on Rules:
``Will this rule apply to appropriation bills?''
The gentleman from New York replied:
``It will apply to all bills carrying any legislation. Appropriation
bills are not supposed to carry any legislation.''
It occurs to the Chair that if it were not for the existence of the
Holman rule, as the gentleman from Georgia indicated, it might be very
debatable whether this rule would apply to appropriation bills at all,
because the Appropriations Committee is not permitted to legislate by
the rules of the House except in the case of the Holman rule. Now, it
becomes a question whether when the committee frankly admits that it
proposes to change existing law, it then becomes bound by the
provisions of the Ramseyer rule. In this case, and in the case of all
appropriation bills that have been recently reported, there is a frank
admission in some part of the report that the committee recommends a
change of existing law. The chair finds on page 26 of the report the
following:
``Limitations and Legislative Provisions
``The following limitations on expenditure or legislative provisions,
not heretofore enacted in connection with any appropriation bill, are
recommended.''
And then follow three recommendations specifying changes in existing
law.
The Chair understands that those are the only cases in this bill
where recommendations are made for a change of existing statutes and
that therefore the Ramseyer rule was complied with.
The query now comes, that being admitted, whether the mere change of
a paragraph indicating how the money for this year is to be spent,
applying only for a year as the appropriations do in all appropriation
bills, the committee then is bound to indicate what those changes are
in the same way they are bound in the matters of change of existing
statutes.
The Chair thinks such a construction of the rule would cause endless
confusion, an immense amount of trouble, and does not think that the
House intended, when it passed the Ramseyer rule, to cover mere changes
in annual appropriations, because, after all, an appropriation is a
mere direction as to how the money for one year is to be spent--no
direction as to the future and no change of the legislation of the
past.
The Chair therefore holds that the Committee on Appropriations in
reporting a bill is always bound by the provisions of the Ramseyer rule
relating to changes in existing law, but it not bound
Sec. 2242
by that rule to indicate every change in every paragraph containing an
appropriation. The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.
2242. In construing the rule requiring reports to show proposed
changes in existing law, the bill as originally introduced governs, and
committee amendments striking out such proposals are not considered.
A bill is not exempted from the operation of the rule under which
reports are required to show proposed amendments of existing law by
committee recommendations eliminating such proposed amendments.
On June 23, 1930,\1\ the bill (H. R. 10676) to prohibit the handling
of certain mail matter where contractual conditions are inadequate, was
reached in the call of the Unanimous Consent Calendar.
Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, submitted the point of order
that the report of the bill failed to show proposed changes in existing
law.
Mr. Clyde Kelly, of Pennsylvania, argued that the requirements of the
rules in that respect were abrogated by the fact that the report
carried an amendment recommended by the Committee on the Post Office
and Post Roads eliminating the clause proposing such changes.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ held, however, that committee amendments
could not exempt the bill as originally drawn from the operation of the
rule and said:
What is before the House is the bill, H. R. 10676, as originally
introduced and as amended. As originally introduced, the bill does
undertake to change existing statutes, and in that respect it is a
violation of rule 13, paragraph 2 (a). The Chair sustains the point of
order. The bill is recommitted to the Committee on the Post Office and
Post Roads.
2243. The point of order that a report fails to comply with the
requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated typographically
is properly made when the bill is called up in the House and comes too
late after the House has resolved into the Committee on the Whole for
the consideration of the bill.
On April 13, 1932,\3\ it being Calendar Wednesday, Mr. Wilburn
Cartwright, of Oklahoma, by direction of the Committee on Indian
Affairs, when that committee was called, proposed to take up the bill
(H. R. 9071) to pay certain Indian claims.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, rising to a point of order,
called attention to the failure of the committee to set out
typographically the changes in the act of June 7, 1924, proposed by the
bill, and inquired whether the question of order should be raised
against the bill in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.
The Speaker pro tempore \4\ ruled:
The point of order should be raised when the bill is called up in the
House.
2244. The point of order that a report violates the rule requiring
typographical specification of proposed changes in existing law may not
be raised against a special order providing for consideration.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11539.
\2\ C. William Ramseyer, of Iowa, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 8142.
\4\ John J. O'Connor, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2245
On March 11, 1933,\1\ Mr. Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, offered a
resolution providing a special order for the consideration of the bill
(H. R. 2820), to maintain the credit of the United States Government.
Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, made the point of order that the
resolution failed to comply with the requirement that reports on
measures proposing changes in existing law indicate such changes
typographically.
The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order on the ground that the
requirement applied to the bills proposing such changes of law and not
to resolutions for their considerations.
The resolution having been agreed to, Mr. Rankin further inquired
when it would be in order to submit the point of order.
The Speaker said:
The gentleman can make the point when the bill is called up.
2245. Special orders providing for consideration of bills, unless
making specific exemption, do not preclude the point of order that
reports on such bills fail to indicate proposed changes in existing
law.
When a bill is considered under a special resolution, the point of
order that the report does not indicate proposed changes in law is
properly raised when the motion is made to resolve into the Committee
of the Whole.
Under a decision of the Chair sustaining a point of order that a
report failed to indicate proposed amendments of statutory law, the
bill reported was automatically recommitted to the committee reporting
it.
On June 12, 1930,\3\ the House agreed to a resolution making in order
a motion to resolve into the Committee of the Whole House on the state
of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12549) to amend
the copyright law and permit the United States to enter the
International Copyright Union.
Under this authorization, Mr. Albert H. Vestal, of Indiana, moved to
go into the Committee of the Whole for the purpose of considering the
bill, when Mr. Jeff Busby, of Mississippi, made the point of order that
the report on the bill failed to comply with the provisions of clause
2a of Rule XIII in that it did not indicate changes proposed in
existing law.
After debate, the Speaker pro tempore\4\ ruled:
Section 64 of the bill provides:
``The provisions of this act apply to existing copyrights save as
expressly indicated by this act. All other acts or parts of acts
relating to copyrights are hereby repealed, as well as all other laws
or parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act.''
The gentleman from Indiana well argues that it would be a task of
considerable magnitude to do what is proposed here, and yet that seems
to be the purpose of the rule that the Member making the report of the
committee shall do the work of investigation and submit to the House
the information as to what statutes are to be repealed.
On March 17, 1930, a point of order was made against a bill in very
much the same situation as this bill, that it did not conform to
section 2a of Rule XIII. In that case the Speaker
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Seventy-third Congress, Record, p. 198.
\2\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Journal; p. 15, Record, p.
10595.
\4\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2246
pro tempore, who happened to be the gentleman from New York, Mr. Snell,
Chairman of the Rule Committee, that reports this rule, sustained the
point of order. It seems clear to the Chair that the ruling then made
was correct and that no other ruling can be made here than to sustain
the point of order and send the bill back to the committee for a report
in accordance with the rule. The Chair therefore sustains the point of
order.
2246. When a point of order is raised that a report is in violation
of the rule providing for the quotation of statutes sought to be
amended, and requiring indication of proposed changes in existing law.
It is incumbent on the proponent to cite the specific statute which
will be amended by the pending bill.
Objection being made that a report failed to comply with the rule
requiring indication of proposed changes in existing law, the Chair, in
the absence of any citation to statutes which would be amended by the
pending bill, overruled the point of order.
On Wednesday, June 18, 1930,\1\ under the Calendar Wednesday rule,
Mr. Fred A. Britten, of Illinois, by direction of the Committee on
Naval Affairs, called up the bill (H. R. 10380) adjusting salaries of
the Naval Academy band.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, objected that the report
failed to include the statues proposed for amendment.
In the absence of citation to specific statues which would be amended
or repealed by the pending bill, the speaker pro tempo \2\ overruled
the point of order and said:
The Chair does not find in this bill a repeal or amendment of any
statute whatever. Therefore the Chair repeals that the Ramseyer ruled
does not apply in this case.
2247. Failure of a committee report to comply with the rule requiring
indication of statutory amendments by typographical device may be
remedied by supplemental report.
On February 16, 1931,\3\ when the bill (H. R. 14560) to amend the
organic act of Port Rico, was reached in the call of the Consent
Calendar, Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that
the report on the bill failed to indicate the proposed changes in the
act.
In rebuttal of the point of order it was explained that a
supplemental report had been filed by the committee setting forth the
proposed changes in the statute.
On that ground the Speaker \4\ overruled the point of order.
2248. Supplement reports may be filed only by consent of the House.
On March 27, 1928,\5\ Mr. Theodore E. Burton, of Ohio, by direction
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, presented for filing a
supplemental report on the bill (H. R. 10167) to authorize the
President to accept the invitation of the Cuba Government to appoint
delegates to the Second International Emigration and Immigration
Conference to be held at Habana commencing March 13, 1928.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11105.
\2\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ Third session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 5049.
\4\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\5\ First session Seventieth Congress, Record, p. 5446.
Sec. 2249
The Speaker \1\ found no provision in the rules authorizing the
proceedings and submitted the matter to the House in the form of a
request for unanimous consent.
2249. A bill having been recommitted for failure to comply with the
rule requiring indication of proposed changes in existing law, further
proceedings are de novo and the bill must again be considered and
reported by the committee as if no previous report had been made.
Committee reports are admissible only when authorized by a majority
vote taken at a formal meeting of the committee with a quorum present.
On June 25, 1930,\2\ it being Calendar Wednesday, Mr. Fred A.
Britten, of Illinois, proposed to call up for the Committee on Naval
Affairs the bill (H. R. 1190) to regulate the promotion of commissioned
officers of the line of the Navy.
Mr. Ross A. Collins, of Mississippi, objected on the ground that the
report had not been authorized at an actual meeting of the Committee on
Naval Affairs with a quorum present.
Mr. Britten explained that on the previous Wednesday the bill when
called up had been recommitted for the reason that it failed to comply
with the rules requiring reports to show proposed changes in existing
law, and contended that after such recommitment further authorization
by the committee was not necessary, and it was sufficient that the
report had been revised to conform to the requirements of the rule.
The Speaker,\3\ however, sustained the point of order and said:
Even though the committee was regularly and properly called, or met
on one of the regular meeting days, the question would then arise as to
whether the committee, a quorum being present, by a majority vote
authorized the report on the bill. That is the question.
In the opinion of the Chair, the bill having been recommitted to the
committee, the same formalities are required on a new report as on the
first report.
The new report must be authorized by the committee in the same manner
as the original report. The bill was recommitted, and the committee
must conform to the same formality as in the case of the first report.
2250. Reports of committees failing to conform to the requirements of
clause 2a of Rule XIII are automatically recommitted by a ruling of the
Speaker that they do not comply with the provisions of the rule.
On March 17, 1930,\4\ during a call of the Consent Calendar, the bill
(H. R. 7585) providing for Federal aid in the construction of rural
post roads was reached.
The Clerk having read the title of the bill, Mr. Fiorello H.
LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that the bill had not
been properly reported in that it failed to comply with the
requirements of the rule providing for a comparative print showing
omissions and insertions of the existing law which it proposed to
amend.
The Speaker pro tempore \5\ sustained the point of order and said:
The Chair is of the opinion that the report does not carry out the
provisions of the Ramseyer rule. Therefore, the point of order is
sustained, and the bill will be recommitted to the Committee
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11705.
\3\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\4\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Journal, p. 804; Record,
p. 5457.
\5\ Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2251
on Public Lands in order that the committee may make a report in
conformity with the Ramseyer rule.
2251. The Committees on Rules, Elections, Ways and Means,
Appropriations, Rivers and Harbors, Public Lands, Territories, Enrolled
Bills, Invalid Pensions, Printing, and Accounts may report at any time
on certain matters.
Revenue and general appropriation bills, river and harbor bills,
certain bills relating to the public lands, for the admission of new
States, and general pension bills may be reported at any time.
The privilege of the Committee on Printing is confined to printing
for the two Houses, and of the Committee on Accounts to expenditures
from the contingent fund.
Form and history of the first paragraph of section 56 of Rule XI.
The first paragraph of section 56 of Rule XI provides:
The following-named committees shall have leave to report at any time
on the matters herein stated, viz: The Committee on Rules, on rules,
joint rules, and order of business; the Committee on Elections, on the
right of a Member to his seat; the Committee on Ways and Means, on
bills raising revenue; the committees having jurisdiction of
appropriations, the general appropriation bills; the Committee on
Rivers and Harbors, bills for the improvement of rivers and harbors;
the Committee on the Public Lands, bills for the forfeiture of land
grants to railroad and other corporations, bills preventing speculation
in the public lands, and bills for the reservation of the public lands
for the benefit of actual and bona fide settlers; the Committee on the
Territories, bills for the admission of new States; the Committee on
Enrolled Bills, enrolled bills; the Committee on Invalid Pensions,
general pension bills; the Committee on Printing, on all matters
referred to them of printing for the use of the House or two Houses;
and the Committee on Accounts, on all matters of expenditure of the
contingent fund of the House.
Two amendments in this rule were made necessary in 1920 \1\ when
jurisdiction of the general appropriation bills was concentrated in one
committee. The Committee on Appropriations was given the right formerly
exercised by the committees having jurisdiction of appropriations to
report the general appropriation bills. And the right of the Committee
on Rivers and Harbors to report bills for the improvement of rivers and
harbors was transferred to bills authorizing such improvements. With
these exceptions, this portion of the rule retains the form adopted in
1890.
2252. Leave having been given to file a report while the House is not
in session a point of order that the bill so reported is not privileged
is properly raised when the motion is made to go into Committee of the
Whole for its consideration.
Leave to file a report or to file minority views while the House is
not in session is granted by unanimous consent.
On December 4, 1929,\2\ Mr. Willis C. Hawley, of Oregon, asked
unanimous consent to file a report after the adjournment of the House
for the day on the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 133) proposing a
reduction of income taxes for the year 1929 payable in 1930. To this
proposal Mr. C. William Ramseyer, of Iowa, coupled a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 8121.
\2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 97.
Sec. 2253
request that permission also be given to file minority views on the
bill after adjournment.
There being no objection to either request, Mr. Ramseyer asked when a
point of order could be properly raised against the privilege of the
bill, and in the debate which followed took the position that the
constitutional privilege conferred on bills ``raising'' revenue did not
extend to a bill reducing rates of taxation.
The Speaker \1\ replied.
The Chair is inclined to think that if it is not a privileged matter,
a point of order could be made at the time the gentleman from Oregon
moves to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union.
The Chair is inclined to think that a point of order would lie at
that time, because the point of order then would be against the method
of considering the resolution. If it can not be considered as a
privileged resolution, it must be considered in another way.
2253. A report by the Committee on Rules on matters within its
jurisdiction is in order at any time.
On January 26, 1920,\2\ Mr. Philip P. Campbell, of Kansas, from the
Committee on Rules, reported as privileged the following:
Resolved, That during the further consideration of the bill (H.R.
11960) making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1921, in Committee of the Whole
House on the state of the Union it shall be in order to consider,
without the intervention of a point of order, any section of the bill
as reported; and, upon motion authorized by the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, it shall be in order to insert in any part of the bill any
provision reported as part of the bill and heretofore ruled out on a
point of order.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, objected:
After a bill has been submitted to the House, the House has resolved
itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for
the purpose of considering that bill, general debate has been had on
the bill, the bill has been read for amendment under the five-minute
rule, various provisions of the bill have been adopted, and there are
still remaining portions of the bill left for consideration, I make the
point of order, Mr. Speaker, that it is not in order and not the
province of the Rules Committee to come in at this stage of the
legislation and make in order provisions of the bill which have gone
out on points of order in Committee of the Whole, which is sought to be
done in this case by the Rules Committee.
The Speaker \3\ ruled:
The Chair thinks that the Committee on Rules has that privilege
before the House acts on the bill. The point of order is overruled.
2254. The right of the Committee on Rules to report at any time is
confined strictly to reports pertaining to the rules, joint rules, and
order of business.
On February 24, 1908,\4\ the Committee on Rules, through Mr. John
Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, presented as privileged the following report:
Resolved, That the Immigration Commission be requested to make an
investigation into the treatment and conditions of work of immigrants
on the cotton plantations of the Mississippi Delta, in the State of
Mississippi and Arkansas, and upon the turpentine farms, lumber camps,
and railway camps in the States of Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
other Southern States; and to report thereon at as early a date as
possible.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 2063.
\3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\4\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 2395.
Sec. 2255
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, submitted that the report was not
privileged and said:
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules has no jurisdiction of these
resolutions. The rules provide that there shall be referred to the
Committee on Rules all proposed actions touching the rules, joint
rules, and order of business. Anything else that is referred to the
Committee on Rules is not properly referred to that committee, and is
certainly not referred under the rules, and certainly can not be
privileged matter. Here is a resolution to give to an outside
commission, entirely foreign to the House--created by an act of
Congress and not by the House--jurisdiction over matters that the House
has nothing to do with. There might as well have come from the
Committee on Rules a resolution directing the Secretary of War to make
certain investigations or creating an outside commission or committee
to make certain investigations. I take it that is not within the
province of the Committee on Rules. The Committee on Rules has
jurisdiction over the order of the business of the House. They can
bring in a rule relating to the order of business of the House, but
they have no jurisdiction to report upon the actual business of the
House. They can not report an appropriation bill; they can not report
upon any bills that come before the House except as to the order of
business. Now, here is a proposition reported from the Committee on
Rules to confer jurisdiction, not upon a regular committee of the
House, nor upon a select committee, but upon an outside committee
entirely, with which the House has nothing to do.
The Speaker \1\ held:
Rule XI provides that--
``The following named committees shall have leave to report at any
time on the matters herein stated:
``The Committee on Rules--on rules, joint rules, and order of
business.''
So the Chair is of the opinion that privileged reports from the
Committee on Rules are reports on rules, joint rules, and order of
business.
Now, undoubtedly, if this report had covered the creation of a
special committee of the House, or had designated any committee of the
House to perform this investigation, in the opinion of the Chair it
would have been privileged; or, perchance, even if it had designated a
joint committee of the two Houses. But the commission referred to is
one created by law, and consists of three Members of the last House of
the Fifty-ninth Congress, three Members of the Senate of the Fifty-
ninth Congress, and three others, not Members of Congress, but
appointed by the President. This is a continuing commission. It has
passed beyond the jurisdiction of the House or the jurisdiction of the
Senate as such.
The Chair is of the opinion, on examination, that the point of order
taken by the gentleman from Illinois is well taken.
2255. The privilege of the Committee on Rules to report at any time
is restricted to specified subjects, and reports on subjects other than
the rules, joint rules, and order of business do not come within the
privilege.
On August 15, 1912,\2\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, reported from
the Committee on Rules as privileged:
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the President of the Senate be, and is hereby authorized to
appoint a committee of five members of the Senate, to act in
cooperation with a similar committee to be appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, to inquire into the wisdom and ascertain
the cost of acquiring Monticello, the home of Thomas Jefferson, as the
property of the United States, that it may be preserved for all time in
its entirety for the American people.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, in raising a question of order,
argued:
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules is privileged to make a
privileged report on the rules of the House or joint rules or order of
business. I do not think this is any one of the three.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 11017.
Sec. 2255
The Speaker has held heretofore that unless the matter was
privileged, although it might be referred to the committee and the
committee might have authority to report it, it could not come in as a
privileged matter. That ruling was made by the Speaker when the
Committee on Rules reported a resolution introduced by the gentleman
from Alabama, Mr. Underwood, concerning a good-roads commission. While
the committee had the authority to report the resolution, because it
had been referred to them, they had no authority to bring it up as a
privileged matter. Any resolution which is referred to the Committee on
Rules is a resolution on which the committee has the right to report,
but the Committee on Rules has the right to report at any time only
those matters which relate to the order of business or the rules.
Mr. Speaker, it is quite true that the Committee on Rules may report
a rule for the consideration of any bill pending in the House. As far
as that matter goes, they can report a resolution to consider a bill
that was never introduced; they can report a rule for the consideration
of anything, but all they can do is to report the rule. It has no
vitality until the House has passed upon it.
Now, the Committee on Rules could have reported a rule to consider
the Underwood resolution for the appointment of a good-roads
commission. I have wondered on numerous occasions why they did not
report such a rule, but they have not, although they reported the
resolution as privileged, and the Speaker held that it was not
privileged, and it went on the calendar, where it remains until the
Rules Committee is reached on Calendar Wednesday or until they get it
up in some other manner. This is in the same category.
Mr. Speaker, will the chair allow me to refer to a precedent before
he rules? In the preceding Congress the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dalzell, then a member of the committee on Rules, reported to the
House a resolution, and the then Speaker of the House, my colleague,
the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Cannon, was on the Committee on rules
and helped to order that resolution reported. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania made the report, and I made the point of order that the
report was not privileged; that while the committee could make the
report, they could not call it up except as any other bill was called
up.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania read to Speaker Cannon the same rule
which the gentleman from Texas has now read:
``It shall always be in order to call up from consideration a report
from the Committee on Rules.''
He read this, I remember, with considerable glee, just as the
gentleman from Texas has read it with some glee, thinking that that
settled the question. But the Speaker ruled, and not only the Speaker
ruled, but he was advised by the best parliamentarian that has ever
been near this Chamber, that the report of the Committee on Rules, in
order to make it privileged, must be privileged report under the rules,
and that it had no right to call up at any time a report from that
committee except it be a privileged report.
Mr. Speaker,\1\ ruled:
The Chair rules that the point of order of the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Mann, is well taken, and will give the reason for the
ruling. In subdivision 56 of Rule XI, on page 357 of the Manual and
Digest, the matters which are privileged in reports of committees are
set out:
``The following-named committees shall have leave to report at any
time on the matters herein stated, namely: The Committee on Rules is
privileged to report rules, joint rules, and order of business.''
That is all the Committee on Rules is privileged to report on at any
time. The Chair will give an illustration. There are certain committees
which have the right to report at any time on certain things. For
instance, the Committee on Appropriations is privileged to report
general appropriation bills, but it is not privileged to report a
special appropriation bill, and, as a matter of fact, the chairman of
that committee. Mr. Fitzgerald, has asked several times unanimous
consent to consider bills from his committee, because he knew that they
were not privileged, and so did the Chair.
The Committee on Ways and Means is privileged to report revenue
bills, but every bill that it reports is not privileged. While the
present occupant of the chair was a member of that
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2256
committee the committee must have reported 50 bills into the House
which were not privileged, such as making a port of entry out of some
place or abolishing a port of entry, which latter, however, we never
succeeded in doing. The course of procedure in cases of this sort is
for these reports to go into the box. The gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Henry, can do exactly what he said he can do. He can get this committee
together and bring in a rule to pass this bill, and, as he said
himself, it is nearly as broad as it is long; but, nevertheless and
notwithstanding, the Chair must enforce the rules of the House.
2256. Reports form the Committee on Rules are privileged only when on
matters touching to rules, joint rules, and order of business.
Authorization to appoint a clerk is a subject within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Accounts and not the Committee on Rules, and its
inclusion by the latter committee in a resolution providing for an
order of business renders the resolution ineligible for report under
the rule giving that committee the right to report at any time.
On January 11, 1918,\1\ Mr. Edward W. Pou, of North Carolina, by
direction of the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution
as privileged:
Resolved, That the Speaker of the House be, and he is hereby,
authorized and directed to appoint a special committee of 18 members to
whom all bills and resolutions hereafter introduced during the Sixty-
fifth Congress pertaining to the development or utilization of water
power shall be referred (notwithstanding any general rule of the House
to the contrary), except, however, bills and resolutions of which the
Committee on Foreign Affairs has jurisdiction under the general rules
of the House.
Resolved further, That the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce be, and it is hereby, discharged from further consideration of
H.R. 3808, H.R. 7695, H.R. 8005, and S. 1419, and said bills are hereby
referred to the special committee herein provided for; that the
Committee on Public Lands is discharged from further consideration of
H. R. 7227, and the same is hereby referred to the special committee
aforesaid; that the chairman of said special committee be, and he is
hereby, empowered to appoint a clerk subject to its approval.
Mr. Rollin B. Sanford, of New York, made the point of order that the
provision for appointment of a clerk was a subject within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Accounts and destroyed the privilege
of the resolution.
Mr. Speaker, \2\ sustained the point of order.
2257. The right of the Committee on Rules to report at any time is
limited to reports on subjects within its jurisdiction and the
incorporation of extraneous matter destroys the privilege.
On May 3, 1933,\3\ Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, by direction of
the Committee on Rules, called up the resolution (H. Res. 110)
providing in part as follows:
Resolved, That, when in its judgment such investigations are
justified,the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives be,
and it is hereby, authorized to inquire into and investigate the matter
of appointments, conduct, proceedings, and acts of receivers, trustees,
referees in bankruptcy, and receivers in equity causes for the
conservation of assets within the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts.
Sec. 5 The said committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized
to sit and act at such times and places within the United States,
whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, P. 833.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\3\ First session Seventy-third Congress, Record, p. 3498.
Sec. 2258
or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to employ suitable counsel,
assistants, and investigators in aid of its investigation, as well as
such experts, and such clerical, stenographic, and other assistants, to
require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such
books, papers, and documents, by subpoena or otherwise, to take such
testimony, to have such printing and binding done, and to make such
expenditures as it deems necessary; and all such expenses thereof shall
be paid on vouches ordered by said committee and approved by the
chairman thereof. Subpoenas shall be issued under the signature of the
chairman of the Judiciary Committee or of the chairman of any
subcommittee and shall be served by any person designated by any of
them. The chairman of the committee or any member thereof may
administer oaths to witnesses.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged for the reason that it authorized the
committee to sit elsewhere than in Washington, to employ legal and
clerical assistants, and to have printing done, all of which involved
expenditures and were foreign to the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Rules.
Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, in opposing the point of order,
took the position that the committee had been exceeded its
jurisdiction, since specific amounts were not appropriated by the
resolution and further action by the House on reports from the
Committee on Accounts or the Committee on Appropriations would be
required in order to effectuate these provisions.
After further debate, the Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order
and said:
The Chair thinks that the provision incorporated in section 5 of the
resolution authorizing the committee to employ suitable counsel,
assistants, and investigators in the aid of its investigation, and also
the provision authorizing all necessary expenses of the investigation
to be paid on vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, is a
matter properly within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Accounts.
It has been held that where the Committee on Rules reports a resolution
of this kind and there is incorporated therein matter which is within
the jurisdiction of another committee the matter so included destroys
the privilege of the resolution in so far as it prevents consideration
at any time by the mere calling up of the report by the Committee on
Rules. For this reason the Chair thinks that the point of order is well
taken.
2258. A resolution authorizing the offering of an amendment otherwise
not in order during consideration of a bill pending in Committee of the
Whole was held to be privileged when reported by the Committee on
Rules.
On April 28, 1924,\2\ Mr. Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, by
direction of the Committee on Rules, reported this resolution:
Resolved, That when the House proceeds in Committee of the Whole to
the further consideration of H. R. 7962, entitled, ``A bill to create
and establish a commission as an independent establishment of the
Federal Government to regulate rents of the District of Columbia,'' it
shall be in order at any time to offer the following as a substitute
for the text of the bill:
``Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
`` `That it is hereby declared that the emergency described in Title
II of the food control and District rents act still exists and
continues in the District of Columbia, and that the present housing and
rental conditions therein require the further extension of the
provisions of much title.
``Sec. 2. That Title II of the food control and the District of
Columbia rents act, as amended, is reenacted, extended, and continued,
as hereinafter amended, until the 22d day of May, 1926. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 2 of the act entitled ``An act of extend for
the period of two years the provisions of Title II of the food control
and the District of Columbia rents act, approved October 22, 1919, as
amended,'' approved May 22, 1922.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker.
\2\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress Record, p. 7373.
Sec. 2259
`` `Sec. 3. That subdivision (a) of section 102 of the food control
and the District of Columbia rents act, as amended by section 4 of such
act of May 22, 1922, is hereby amended by striking out the figures
``1924'' in said subdivision and inserting in lieu thereof the figures
``1926'',' ''
Upon the offering of the substitute there shall be not to exceed two
hours general debate one-half to be controlled by those favoring the
substitute and one-half by those opposing.
At the conclusion of the general debate the substitute shall be
considered under the five-minute rule and during that consideration it
shall be in order to offer an amendment to the substitute providing for
the reduction of the number of commissioners provided for in said bill.
At the hour of 4 o'clock, if the consideration of the substitute
shall not have been sooner completed, the committee shall vote upon the
substitute as amended, if any amendments have been adopted, and
immediately upon the conclusion of that vote the committee shall
automatically rise and report the bill and any amendments, or the
substitute and any amendments, to the House; and the previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments for final
passage.
Mr. J. N. Tincher, of Kansas, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged, and Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, in support of
the point of order, said:
Mr. Speaker, I have spent quite a lot of time looking up this
question. The rules prescribe the jurisdiction of every committee of
this House. They give to the District of Columbia Committee
jurisdiction over all matters affecting the District of Columbia and
prescribe the limitations and jurisdiction of the Rules Committee. The
Chair will note that section 56 of Rule XI prescribes that the only
jurisdiction which the Committee on Rules has is on rules, joint rules,
and procedures; in other words, it fixes the procedure of the House.
This is the point: Part of this resolution is privileged in that it
fixes the order of procedures of the House. The first seven or eight
lines of the resolution as privileged, and the latter part of the
resolution is privileged under the rules because it fixes procedures,
but the past of the resolution which sets up three different sections
as a proposed substitute is legislative matter and is not privileged
because the Committee on Rules has no authority under its jurisdiction,
under the rules, to propose to the House legislation. The Committee on
Rules attempts to make in order a three-selection bill of its own
prescribing as a substitute for the Lampert measure. It has no right to
make in order legislation of this nature.
Applying this present rule, here is the Lampert measure of 35 pages
which has been considered by the Committee on the District of Columbia,
and the Committee on Rules attempts by this resolution not only to
prescribe procedure for the Lampert bill, which it has the right to do,
but it does not stop there. It attempts to provide a substitute for the
Lampert bill, an entirely new piece of legislation, and legislation
that is foreign to the provisions of the Lampert bill, and clearly that
is legislation. It is legislation that properly belong to another
committee. It goes beyond the jurisdiction that the House has conferred
upon the Committee on Rules. Mr. Speaker, if we were to permit the
Committee on Rules to offer this as a substitute for the Lampert bill,
it could come in and offer a substitute for every bill that comes from
every committee on this House. It would destroy the integrity and the
stability of the jurisdiction of every committee of this House, and I
submit that this Committee on Rules should be held within its
jurisdiction and not be permitted to report as privileged of its own to
this House.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
It seems to the Chair that this is one of the functions which the
Rules Committee is constituted to exercise. It is preparing the way for
the House to express its will on the pending bill. The Rules Committee
very often makes provisions in order which otherwise would not be in
order, it sends bills to conference, and provides for legislation, and
the Chair overrules that point of order.
2259. A special rule providing for the consideration of a bill is
not invalidated by the fact that at the time the rule was reported the
bill was not on the calendar.
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\1\ Frederick H. Gilbert, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2260
The privilege conferred on a bill by a special rule making in order a
motion to resolve into the Committee of the Whole for its consideration
is equivalent to that enjoyed by revenue and appropriation bills under
clause 9 of Rule XVI.
On June 28, 1930,\1\ Mr. Fred S. Purnell, of Indiana, by direction of
the Committee on Rules, called up the resolution (H. Res. 264),
reported on June 20, 1930, making it in order to move to resolve into
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the bill (H.R. 12549), reported on June 24, 1930, to
amend and consolidate the copyright laws.
Mr. Carl R. Chindblom, of Illinois, objected that the resolution was
not in order for the reason that it provided for the consideration of a
bill which had not been reported and was not on the calendar at the
time the resolution was reported to the House, and said:
The situation is novel and arises, so far as I can learn, for the
first time, and it raises the question whether the Committee on Rules
has authority in advance of the report of a bill, and in advance of the
placing of a bill on any calendar of the House to bring in a rule for
the consideration of the bill under the general rules of the House, as
this resolution does, because the rule merely makes it in order to move
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill. As I construe
the rule, it does not suspend any of the rules of the House in
reference to the consideration of legislation. It does not suspend the
rule which requires bills to be upon the calendar of the House before
they can have consideration. It merely makes it in order to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union for the consideration of the bill.
The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order and held:
As the bill now appears, so far as the Chair is advised, it is
properly on the calendar as of June 24, 1930, and this special rule is
properly reported to consider that bill. The Chair thinks that all that
special rules of this sort do is to put bills for which they are
provided in the same status that a revenue or appropriation bill has
under the general rules of the House. Clause 9 of Rule XVI provides:
``At any time after the reading of the Journal it shall be in order,
by direction of the appropriate committees, to move that the House
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union for the purpose of considering bills raising revenue, or
general appropriation bills.''
Now all that this special rule does is to give the same status to
this particular bill at this particular time. The Chair has no
hesitation in saying that the Committee on Rules has acted with
authority, and that it will be in order to move that the House resolve
itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union
for the consideration of this bill after the resolution is passed.
2260. A report from the Committee on Rules has a special and high
privilege, and one motion to adjourn, but no other dilatory motion may
be entertained during its consideration.
Unless agreed to by a two-thirds vote, a report from the Committee on
Rules shall not be called up on the same day on which presented except
on the last three days of the session.
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\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 11995.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 2261
No resolution shall be reported by the Committee on Rules to set
aside Calendar Wednesday by a vote of less than two-thirds of the
Members voting.
The Committee on Rules shall report no provision excluding the motion
to recommit after the previous question has been ordered on the passage
of a bill or joint resolution.
Form and history of the second paragraph of section 56 of Rule XI.
The second paragraph of section 45 of Rule XI provides:
It shall always be in order to call up for consideration a report
from the Committee on Rules (except it shall not be called up for
consideration on the same day it is presented to the House, unless so
determined by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members voting,
but this provision shall not apply during the last three days of the
session), and, pending the consideration thereof, the Speaker may
entertain one motion that the House adjourn; but after the result is
announced he shall not entertain any other dilatory motion until the
said report shall have been fully disposed of. The Committee on Rules
shall not report any rule or order which shall provide that business
under paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV shall be set aside by a vote of less
than two-thirds of the Members present; nor shall it report any rule or
order which shall operate to prevent the motion to recommit being made
as provided in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.
That portion of the paragraph relating to reports from the Committee
on Rules and dilatory motions during the consideration thereof dates
from February 4, 1892.\1\
The limitations prohibiting the committee from reporting provisions
dispensing with Calendar Wednesday and the motion to recommit after the
ordering of the previous question were added March 15, 1909,\2\ as a
result of the parliamentary revolution of that session.
The parenthetical exception requiring reports from the committee to
lie over for a day unless agreed to by a two-thirds vote was adopted
January 18, 1924.\3\
2261. Consideration of a report from the Committee on Rules on the
day on which reported is not in order until the House has by a two-
thirds vote authorized consideration.
On July 15, 1932,\4\ Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, from the
Committee on Rules, by direction of that committee, presented as
privileged the following resolution:
Resolved, That all Members of the House shall have leave to extend
their own remarks in the Congressional Record until the last issue of
the Record of the present session.
Mr. Carl E. Mapes, of Michigan, raised the question of order that the
resolution could not be considered except by unanimous consent or by a
two-thirds vote of the House, until it had been on the calendar one
day.
The Speaker \5\ said:
The Chair thinks he could recognize any member of the Committee on
Rules to call up any resolution reported by that committee; and if two-
thirds of the Members voted for its consideration, it would become the
order of the House.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Fifty-second Congress, Record, pp. 734, 862.
\2\ First session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 22.
\3\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1143.
\4\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 15468.
\5\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 2262
Mr. Mapes submitted:
The rule provides that it shall not be called up unless two-thirds of
the House determine that it shall be. Now, my point is that the Speaker
himself is determining that it shall be called up when he puts the
question before the House and that the House and that the House ought
to determine in advance whether it is to be called up or not.
The Speaker agreed:
The Chair is on the same opinion. The question is, Shall the House
consider this resolution?
2262. The Committee on Rules may report orders of procedure subject
to two limitations only: it may not provide for abrogation of the
Calendar Wednesday rule except by two-thirds vote or for denial of the
motion to recommit while the previous question is pending on final
passage.
While a question as to jurisdiction of a committee over a public bill
is not in order after the bill is under consideration in the Committee
of the Whole the question as to the right of a committee to report a
private bill may be raised at any time prior to passage.
On January 8, 1991,\1\ Mr. Edward C. Little, of Kansas, made a point
of order against the following resolution reported by Edward W. Pou, of
North Carolina, from the Committee on Rules:
Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution the
House shall resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union for the consideration of H. R. 13274; that the
amendment reported by the Committee shall be read and considered in
lieu of the original bill; that there shall be not exceeding three
hours of general debate, to be equally divided between those supporting
and those opposing the bill, which debate shall be confined to said
bill, at the end of which time the bill shall be read for amendment
under the five-minute rule, and at the conclusion of such reading the
committee shall rise and report the bill to the House, together with
the amendments, if any, whereupon the previous question shall be
considered as ordered upon the bill and all amendments thereto to final
passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.
After debate the Speaker pro tempore \2\ ruled:
The immediate matter before the House is House resolution 487,
presented by the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Pou, as a report
from the Committee on Rules. That resolution provides for the
consideration of H. R. 13274. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Little,
makes the point of order that the bill, when originally introduced, was
improperly referred, and further that because of the improper reference
the Committee on Rules has no authority to bring in a resolution for
the consideration.
Upon the question whether it was improperly referred the Chair does
not feel that it is now necessary to pass. That point would involve the
question of whether it is a public bill or a private bill. The Chair
has a very clearly defined idea about the character of the bill, but so
far as the immediate question before the Chair is concerned, it seems
that the question is whether the Committee on Rules has the authority
to report the resolution that has been presented by the gentleman from
North Carolina.
Paragraph 47 of the Rule XI, touching the question of reference of
resolutions, provides as follows:
``All proposed action touching the rules, joint rules, and order of
business shall be referred to the Committee on Rules.''
Then, paragraph 56 of Rule XI provides:
``It shall always be in order to call up for consideration a report
from the Committee on Rules, and pending the consideration thereof the
Speaker may entertain one motion that the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1135.
\2\ Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2262
House adjourn; but after the result is announced, he shall not
entertain any other dilatory motion until the said report shall have
been fully disposed of.''
The Committee on rules is not a legislative committee. It is merely a
procedure committee. This bill did not go to the Committee on Rules.
That which the Committee on Rules has reported is a mere resolution
providing for procedure. The only limitation laid upon the Committee on
Rules by the general rules of the House is that which I now read:
``The Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order which
shall provide that business under paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV shall be set
aside by a vote of less than two-thirds of the Members present''--
That refers to the Calendar Wednesday rule--``nor shall it report any
rule or order which shall operate to prevent the motion to recommit
being made as provided in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.''
Those two propositions are the only limitations placed by the general
rules of the House upon the Committee on Rules in reporting orders of
procedure. The Committee on Rules can report a resolution discharging
any committee of the House from further consideration of any bill that
has been referred to it, and providing that the bill shall be placed
upon its passage. It always rests with the House whether it will adopt
the rule reported by the Committee on Rules. The limitations upon the
power of the Committee on Rules to report are the two that the Chair
just read.
This is a resolution of procedure. The Chair overrules the point of
order.
The resolution being agreed to and the House having resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the bill, Mr. Little raised the question of order that
the bill was a private bill and not within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Military Affairs, which reported it, but should have been
referred to the Committee on Claims.
The Chairman \1\ held:
The Chair will state to the gentleman from Kansas that he was in the
Hall when the gentleman made his point of order, while the Speaker pro
tempore was presiding, and the present occupant of the Chair listened
to the argument of the gentleman from Kansas. In the opinion of the
Chair the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Garrett, the Speaker pro
tempore, correctly ruled upon the point of order, which I think is
binding on the present occupant of the Chair as chairman of the
Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union. The Committee on
Rules brought in a rule providing for the consideration of this bill by
number. Under the rules of the House, the Committee on Rules can bring
in a special order changing and abrogating any rule of the House, with
only two limitations, relative to Calendar Wednesday and a motion to
recommit. It is in order for the Committee on Rules to bring in a rule
providing that a bill that had never been before any committee at all,
whether public or private, should be considered, and if the House
adopts the special order it changes or abrogates any rules of the House
conflicting with the special order.
The Committee on Rules is not a legislative committee. The Committee
on Rules is not now considering any legislation. The Committee on Rules
can bring in a special order for the consideration of legislation and
could provide that any Member of the House or any committee could offer
a resolution or a bill for immediate consideration that had never been
before any committee at all. In the opinion of the Chair, the House
having adopted this special order providing that this bill should be
considered, and determining how it should be considered, it is not
proper for the occupant of the Chair, as committee chairman to rule
that the bill is not properly before the Committee of the Whole for
consideration. The Committee of the Whole is simply a creature of the
House. The House has provided that this bill shall be considered. In
the opinion of the Chair, the bill before the House is a public bill,
and it is too late to raise a question of jurisdiction. The question of
estoppel would apply. If the bill--a public one--had been improperly
referred, any time before it was reported to the House by the committee
a motion would have been in order
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, Chairman.
Sec. 2263
to correct the reference. Not having been made, it is now too late to
make it. Therefore the Chair overrules the point of order.
2263. The Committee on Rules may not report a resolution which shall
operate to prevent consideration of the motion to recommit after the
previous question has been ordered on the passage of a bill.
Provision that ``the House shall immediately proceed to vote upon he
bill without any intervening motion'' was construed to prevent the
offering of the motion to recommit and to be in violation of the second
paragraph of section 56 of Rule XI.
On May 14, 1912,\1\ the House was considering the resolution reported
on a previous day \2\ by Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, and reading as
follows:
Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution the
House shall proceed to consider H. R. 23635, a bill to amend an act
entitled ``An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the
judiciary,'' approved March 3, 1911. That there shall be three hours'
general debate on said bill and one substitute to be offered, and
considered as pending, by the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Sterling,
and at the expiration of such time the previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the bill and said substitute to final passage,
and the House shall immediately proceed to vote on the bill and
substitute without any intervening motion.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, in insisting on a point of order
previously reserved against the provision authorizing a vote on the
passage of the bill without intervening motion, said:
Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the resolution reported
by the gentleman from Texas is not a privileged resolution, that it is
not in order, and that the Committee on Rules had no jurisdiction to
report the resolution. The rule provides that--
``At the expiration of such time the previous question shall be
ordered on the bill and said substitute to final passage, and the House
shall immediately proceed to vote on the bill and substitute without
any intervening motion.''
Mr. Speaker, it became the practice in the Congresses prior to the
Sixty-first Congress to adopt resolutions of this kind reported from
the Committee on Rules. For instance, on November 16, 1903, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dalzell, reported a resolution for the
consideration of the Cuban reciprocity bill, which conclude din this
language:
``And whenever general debate is closed the committee shall rise and
report the bill to the House, and immediately the House shall vote,
without debate or intervening motion, on the engrossment and third
reading and on the passage of the bill.''
The question was raised at that time whether that shut out any
intervening motion, and it was so ruled, although an appeal was taken
and the appeal was overruled. Subsequently various other resolutions
were asked from the Committee on Rules, which eliminated even the right
of appeal.
Following that course, many Members of the House have come to believe
that the right to offer a motion to recommit, which originally was
designed to permit the gentleman in charge of the bill to move to
recommit for the purpose of correcting an error in the bill--that the
right to offer a motion to recommit had become a right of the minority,
and there was incorporated in the rules of the Sixty-first Congress,
and it is in the rules of this Congress, this provision, on page 359 of
the Manual, referring to the Committee on Rules:
``The Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order which
shall provide that business under paragraph 7, Rule XXIV, shall be set
aside by a vote of less than two-thirds of the Members present; nor
shall it report any rule or order which shall operate to prevent a
motion to recommit being made, as provided in paragraph 4 of Rule
XVI.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 6408.
\2\ Record, p. 6373.
Sec. 2264
Now, this rule endeavors to cut out the motion to recommit, because
it expressly provides that the House shall immediately proceed to vote
on the bill and substitute without any intervening motion; while the
rule provides that the committee on Rules is not authorized to report
any rule which shall operate to prevent a motion to recommit being
made.
The right to offer the motion to recommit is preserved by the rules,
and preserved in such a manner that the Committee on Rules can not
report a rule which shuts it out. Doubtless they could report a rule
which would amend the rule providing for a motion to recommit, or the
Committee on Rules could report a rule eliminating the rule to
recommit, but they can not report a rule which violates the rule
providing for the motion to recommit.
The Speaker \1\ held:
You can report any rule which you see fit to put upon the books, but
as along as that section stands there the Committee on Rules is
precluded from bringing in such a resolution as this one. If you bring
in a resolution amending the rules, that is a proposition which, of
course, the Chair would entertain; but you are not bringing in a
resolution to amend the rules, you are bringing in a resolution which
violates a rule of the House.
Subseuqently Mr. Henry was permitted, by unanimous consent, to amend
the resolution by adding after the last word:
Except a motion to recommit.
Whereupon the Speaker announced:
If the House will permit, it seems to the Chair that it will save
trouble in the future if the Chair will now give his own construction
of this rule under which the gentleman made his point of order. The
question is liable to come up again at any time. The last clause of
paragraph 56 of Rule XI provides:
``Nor shall it''--
That is, the Committee on Rules--``report any rule or order which
shall operate to prevent the motion to recommit being made as provided
in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.''
Jefferson's manual opens with the paragraph:
``Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the Speakers of the House of Commons,
used to say, `It was a maxim he had often heard when he was a young
man, form old and experienced members, that nothing tended more to
throw power into the hands of administration, and those who acted with
the majority of the House of commons, than a neglect of, or departure
from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by our
ancestors, operated as a check and control on the actions of the
majority, and that they were, in many instances, a shelter and
protection to the minority against the attempts of power.''
The Chair does not think the essence of the proposition was ever
better stated than it is in those words. Rules are made primarily to
fix an order of business and to preserve and maintain decorum. But they
are also fixed in order that the minority and the individual member
shall have all the rights that are permissible in a legislative body.
It is not necessary to go into the history of how this particular
rule came to be adopted, but that it was intended that the right to
make the motion to recommit should be preserved inviolate the Chair has
no doubt whatever. if this arrangement as to amending the resolution
had not been made, the Chair would have sustained the point of order of
the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann.
2264. The Committee on Rules may not report any order of business
under which it shall not be in order to offer the motion to recommit
after the previous question is ordered on the passage of the bill.
A resolution reported by the Committee on Rules authorizing the
Speaker to appoint conferees ``without intervening motion'' was held to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2264
be in conflict with the limitation placed upon the Committee on Rules
in section 56 of Rule XI.
On April 24, 1916,\1\ Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, from the
Committee on Rules, presented as privileged the following:
Resolved, that upon the adoption of this resolution the Committee on
Military Affairs be, and hereby is, discharged from the consideration
of H. R. 12766, a bill to increase the efficiency of the Military
Establishment of the United States, with the Senate amendments thereto;
that the said Senate amendments be, and hereby are, disagreed to by the
House and a conference asked of the Senate on the disagreeing votes of
the two Houses on the said bill; and the Speaker shall immediately
appoint the managers on the part of the House, without intervening
motion.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, having raised a question of order,
Mr. Irvine L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, differentiated between the pending
point of order and one under discussion on October 9, 1913:
I would like to offer for the Chair's consideration the note in the
Manual upon that ruling, giving the understanding of the compiler of
the Manual of the Chair's decision. I read from the note under section
725:
``Ruled by Speaker Clark (Oct. 9, 1913, 1st sess. 63d Cong., p. 5522)
that a special rule providing that a House bill with Senate amendments
shall be taken from Speaker's table, Senate amendments disagreed to,
conference agreed to, and that Speaker shall without intervening motion
appoint conferees, is not in violation of clause 56 of Rule XI, since
the motion to recommit may be made on the conference report.''
That was true in respect to the question that was then before the
House, but it is not true with reference to this case. Because in the
case that was before the House then, the Senate had asked for a
conference, and the Senate would act upon the conference report last.
Therefore both sets of conferees would be in existence at the time the
motion to recommit would be made. In this case the House asks for the
conference, and the Senate will act first, agreeing to the conference
report; the Senate conferees will be discharged, and therefore a motion
to recommit would not be in order, because there would be no Senate
conferees to recommit to.
After extended debate the Speaker \2\ ruled:
The matter in controversy is the following resolution:
``Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the Committee
on Military Affairs be, and hereby is, discharged from the
consideration of H. R. 12766, a bill to increase the efficiency of the
Military Establishment of the United States, with the Senate amendments
thereto; that the said Senate amendments be, and hereby are, disagreed
to by the House and a conference asked of the Senate on the disagreeing
votes of the two Houses on the said bill; and the Speaker shall
immediately appoint the managers on the part of the House, without
intervening motion.''
As the Chair understands it, no one is objecting to any part of this
rule except the last three words, ``without intervening motion.'' By
reason of those three words the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann,
makes the point of order against the rule. Subdivision 4 of Rule XVI
provides:
``When a question is under debate no motion shall be received but to
adjourn, to lay on the table, for the previous question (which motions
shall be decided without debate), to postpone to a certain day, to
refer, or to amend or postpone indefinitely; * * *
``After the previous question shall have been ordered on the passage
of a bill or joint resolution one motion to recommit shall be in order,
and the Speaker shall give preference in recognition for such purpose
to a Member who is opposed to the bill or resolution.''
The gentleman from Illinois claims that the proposed rule deprives
Members from the right to move to recommit. He bottoms his contention
on rule XI, section 725, of the Manual, which is as follows:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 6761.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2264
``It shall always be in order to call up for consideration a report
from the Committee on Rules, and, pending the consideration thereof,
the Speaker may entertain one motion that the House adjourn; but after
the result is announced he shall not entertain any other dilatory
motion until the said report shall have been fully disposed of. The
Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order which shall
provide that business under paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV shall be set aside
by a vote of less than two-thirds of the Members present''--
That refers to Calendar Wednesday--
``nor shall it report any rule order which shall operate to prevent the
motion to recommit being made as provided in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.''
On the 4th of March, 1911, Mr. Speaker Cannon, in ruling on a point
of order raised by Mr. Dalzell to a motion of Mr. Fitzgerald to commit
the Senate amendments to the bill to create a tariff commission to the
Committee on Ways and Means, said:
``The Chair has ruled out, and in the opinion of the Chair properly
so, all dilatory motions, as was his duty under the rules of the House.
There are certain motions, there are certain demands, that can not be
held as dilatory. One is a demand for the yeas and nays. The rules of
the House govern the House, and the Chair finds a precedent in this
case exactly in point, which the Chair believes to be sound in
principle. The chair reads from page 287, volume 5, of Hinds,
Precedents:
`` `The previous question having been ordered on a motion to agree to
a Senate amendment to a House bill, a motion to commit is in order. On
November 1, 1893, the House was considering the Senate amendments to
the bill (H. R. 1) to repeal a part of the act of July 14, 1890,
relating to the purchase of silver bullion.
`` `Mr. Leonidas F. Livingston, of Georgia, submitted the question of
order whether, after the previous question should have been ordered on
the motion to concur in a Senate amendment, it would be in order to
commit the bill and amendment to a committee with instructions.
`` `The Speaker expressed the opinion that the motion to commit would
in such case be in order.'
``That is the ruling by Mr. Speaker Crisp, and the Chair, therefore,
overrules the point of order made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania to
the motion to commit the Senate amendments to the Committee on Ways and
Means.''
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann, and the gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Lenroot, and others contend that this rule, if adopted,
cuts out the right of any gentleman to move to recommit the Senate
amendment. That is one branch of this discussion. That seems to have
been settled by these two decisions.
Jefferson's Manual provides:
``And in all cases of conference asked after a vote of disagreement,
etc., the conferees of the House asking it are to leave the papers with
the conferees of the other; and in one case where they refused to
receive them they were left on the table in the conference chamber.''
The present occupant of the chair has passed substantially on both of
those questions. When the first Underwood tariff bill was in process of
passage the Senate conferees were entitled to the papers, which would
enable them to pass on the conference report first, but Mr. Underwood
came in here with the papers in his hand and the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Mann, raised the point that we were not required, or had
no right as far as that is concerned, to pass on the conference report
first, because the Senate conferees were entitled to the papers. The
Chair interrogated the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Underwood, as to how
he got possession of the papers. Of course, the Chair did not suspect
he had used violence or had purloined them, but he wanted to know how
he got them for the purpose of deciding, and the gentleman from Alabama
stated that the Senate conferees threw the papers down on the table and
intimated they did not care what was done with them. So under that set
of circumstances the Chair ruled that the House would pass on the
conference report first. That has been done on other occasions.
This very question came up here once before, October 9, 1913, but on
a different presentation. In that case the House was entitled to pass
on this question first and the Senate afterwards, and after a long
wrangle the Chair overruled the point of order against the special
rule, because the situation was different from what it is now and such
that a motion to recommit could be made
Sec. 2265
The situation now, stated briefly, is as follows: If this rule is
adopted the minority can not make a motion to recommit this Senate
amendment, with or without instructions, and if the conference report
is finally made up, then the Senate, under the practice, not the
universal practice but the general practice, passes on it first, and
usually when one body agrees to a conference report, or whatever it
does to it, the conferees of that body are discharged automatically. In
this case under the practice the Senate passes on the conference report
first; that leave the House in a position where we can not make a
motion to recommit the conference report because the Senate conferees
have been discharged.
Usually these special rules provide that the Speaker shall do thus
and so ``without an intervening motion, except one motion to
recommit.''
The rule to recommit was one of the most troublesome that ever
pestered the House.The gentleman from Illinois did not state it fully.
It was used as a sort of legislative trick frequently. The chairman, or
whoever had charge of the bill, simply moved to recommit, because only
one motion to recommit is permissible--just like the motion to
reconsider--and the Chair would recognize the gentleman is control of
the bill, and he would make the pro forma motion to recommit and
thereby cut the minority out of making a motion to recommit that had
some substance in it. So, finally, after must tribulation the rule was
changed so that it makes one motion to recommit in order, and makes it
imperative on the Speaker to give first recognition to the minority, if
the minority member qualifies. That does not necessarily mean a
minority politically in the House. It means a minority as to that
particular bill, and it may not be improper to refresh the mind of the
House of the ruling this Speaker made in an earlier Congress about
recommitment, and that was that he would recognize a Member of the
minority who said he was opposed to the bill to make the motion to
recommit, and he would recognize Members of the minority--minority
Members of the committee having the bill in charge--seriatim, if they
qualified; and if they did not qualify, any gentleman who would qualify
would be recognized.
The provision of the rule requiring the Speaker to give preference to
the minority in recognitions for motions to recommit was placed there
after profound deliberation, and is of great importance for the purpose
intended. The proposed rule deprives the minority of the privilege and
right to move to recommit and is therefore, in the judgment of the
Chair, obnoxious to subdivision 4, Rule XVI; also to that subdivision
of Rule XI which says: ``Nor shall it''--that is, the Committee on
Rules--``report any rule which shall operate to prevent the motion to
recommit being made as provided in paragraph 4 of Rule XVI.''
Now, taking all these things into consideration, the Chair sustains
the point of order that the proposed rule is not in order.
2265. The limitation on the Committee on Rules in reporting orders of
business operating to prevent the motion to recommit while the previous
question is pending, applies to resolutions for the consideration of
bills only and not to a resolution designating a day to be devoted to
motions to suspend the rules.
On March 23, 1992,\1\ Mr. Philip P. Campbell, of Kansas, from the
Committee on Rules, reported this resolution as privileged:
Resolved, That it shall be in order on Thursday, March 23, 1922,
after the adoption of this resolution, to move to suspend the rules
under the provisions of Rule XXVII of the House of Representatives:
Provided, however, Instead of 20 minutes' debate being allowed to each
side for and against the motion, there shall be two hours for such
debate to each side.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, made the point of order that the
resolution was in violation of the limitation placed upon the Committee
on Rules in reporting orders operating to prevent the motion to
recommit.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 4350.
Sec. 2266
After debate, the Speaker \1\ ruled:
The Chair thinks, as intimated by the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Garrett, and as quoted by the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Campbell, that
his decision is determined by the ruling made two years ago, that the
Committee on Rules has the right to bring in a rule providing that on
certain days suspensions shall be in order. This practice, as the
gentleman from Kansas suggested, has not bee availed of much of late,
but formerly it was a frequent practice. The Chair remembers one
Congress when suspension was made in order for weeks, and he thinks for
months, and where the vote need be only a majority instead of two-
thirds. The Chair thinks that the provision in Rule XI, cited by the
gentleman from Tennessee, applies to rules reported by the Committee on
Rules for the consideration of bills and does not apply to a rule like
this setting apart a day for suspensions, and the Chair over rules the
point of order.
2266. A resolution reported by the Committee on Rules providing that
a House bill with Senate amendments be taken from the Speaker's table,
Senate amendments disagreed to, conference agreed to, and that Speaker
``without intervening motion'' appoint conferees, was held not to be in
violation of the second paragraph of section 56 of Rule XI, since
opportunity would be afforded to offer the motion to recommit on the
conference report.
On October 9, 1913,\2\ the House agreed to a resolution taking from
the Speaker's table and sending to conference the urgent deficiency
appropriation bill with Senate amendments, and providing that the
Speaker should ``without intervening motion appoint managers on the
part of the House.''
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, raised the point of order that the
Committee on Rules was without authority to report a resolution in
violation of section 4 of Rule XVI and the resolution was therefore
unprivileged, as it precluded the motion to recommit.
The Speaker \3\ overruled the point of order on the ground that the
special order did not prevent the motion to recommit, which could be
made on the conference report when presented, and as to the previous
question was not operating, the motion to recommit was not in order
under section 1 of Rule XVII.
2267. While the Committee on Rules is forbidden to report special
orders abrogating the Calendar Wednesday rule or excluding the motion
to recommit after order of the previous question, a resolution making
possible that ultimate result was on one occasion held in order.
On May 29, 1920,\4\ a special order was reported by Mr. Philip P.
Campbell, of Kansas, from the Committee on Rules as follows:
Resolved, That it shall be in order for six legislative days,
beginning May 29, 1920, for the Speaker to entertain motions of members
of committees to suspend the rules under the provisions provided by the
general rules of the House.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, made the point of order that
unless passed by a two-thirds vote the resolution violated provisions
of section 56 of Rule XI in that it set aside Calendar Wednesday and
excluded the motion to recommit.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ First session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 5522.
\3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\4\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 7923.
Sec. 2267
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, said in support of the point of
order:
Here is the rule:
``The Committee on Rules shall not report any rule or order which
shall provide that business under paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV shall be set
aside by a vote of less than two-thirds of the members present.''
Now, here is an order forbidding the Committee on Rules reporting any
rule with permits other business on Calendar Wednesday than Calendar
Wednesday business unless it is set aside by a two-thirds vote; but
when the Speaker is given the right on Calendar Wednesday to recognize
for suspension of the rules he may take up the entire time recognizing
for suspension of the rules, although not a single motion is even
seconded by the Members of the House, and may never get to a vote in
the House on any motion. It gives the right to the Speaker to dispense
with the proceedings on Calendar Wednesday by recognizing Members to
move to suspend the rules, and absolutely abrogates the rule. Here is a
rule of the House forbidding the Committee on Rules to report any rule
which sets aside Calendar Wednesday without a two-thirds vote. Of
course, if the Committee on Rules can do that in this way they can do
it in some other way. The rule does not except Calendar Wednesday. I
suppose the Committee on Rules might have reported a rule making in
order suspension for six legislative days except Calendar Wednesday,
but they have not so reported. They had better take it back to the
committee on Rules and bring in a rule that is in consonance with the
rule of the House.
Mr. Mann then made the further point of order that the Committee on
Rules was not authorized to report the resolution for adoption by a
two-thirds vote, and said:
I make the point of order that the Committee on Rules is not
authorized to report this rule, regardless of the number of votes it
may take to pass it. I read a moment ago to the Chair a rule, which the
Chair was already familiar with, forbidding the Committee on Rules to
report a rule which sets aside Calendar Wednesday. Now, this rule as
reported makes the next six days, including to-day, suspension days.
That is what the rule does. It authorizes a motion to suspend the
rules on next Wednesday. Now, the rule not only forbids the Committee
on Rules to report such a rule--that is, Rule XI--but Rule XXIV
provides, in reference to Calendar Wednesday, that on Wednesday of each
week no business shall be in order except as provided by paragraph 4 of
this rule unless the House, by a two-thirds vote on motion to dispense
therewith, shall otherwise determine.
The Speaker recalls the long fight that there was in reference to
inaugurating Calendar Wednesday, the right of the House to set aside
one day of the week beyond the control of the Committee on Rules, when
the committees of the House should have the right to call up bills
reported from those committees, whether the Speaker or the Rules
Committee wanted them to come up or not, unless the House by a two-
thirds vote should set it aside. They provided twice in the rules that
no other business should be in order, nothing else should be in order,
except Calendar Wednesday business. And then in addition to that,
fearing that that rule might be set aside by a report from the
Committee on Rules, they expressly provided that the Committee on Rules
could not report a rule setting aside the provisions in Rule XXIV about
Calendar Wednesday. That is exactly what this rule does. It does not
make a particle of difference whether the Speaker on Wednesday intends
to recognize anybody to move the suspend the rules or not, this gives
him the authority to do it. The Committee on Rules has no authority to
report such a rule.
The Speaker \1\ said:
The Chair naturally knew that this question would be raised and has
been considering it and will not deny that it has caused him a good
deal of perplexity. But the Chair has in his own mind come to a
conclusion which is clear, though, of course, he may not make it so to
others.
The Chair, in the first place, thinks that this rule making in order
for six legislative days motions is suspend the rules does include
Calendar Wednesday; that by ordinary construction it
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2268
means six consecutive days; and that the Chair would have the right to
entertain a motion to suspend the rules on Calendar Wednesday. The
clause which creates the trouble is that ``the Committee on Rules shall
not report any rule or order which shall provide that business under
paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV shall be set aside by a vote of less than two-
thirds of the Members present; nor shall it report any rule or order
which shall operate to prevent the motion to recommit being made.''
It seems to the Chair that the same argument applies to both. They
stand together. It seems to the Chair that this clause means that the
Committee on Rules shall not bring in a rule which is aimed strictly at
overthrowing either of these privileged matters. But it does not mean
that the committee shall not report any resolution which may have that
ultimate result. The Committee on Rules, for instance, could bring in a
report repealing all the rules of the House; that would dispense with
Calendar Wednesday, but that would be in order. It could bring in a
rule repealing a part of the rules, including the Calendar Wednesday
rule, which would, of course, produce that effect. It seems to the
Chair that the Committee on Rules is not permitted to do anything which
directly dispenses with Calendar Wednesday or the motion to recommit,
but it can bring in a general rule, like the present one, which
indirectly produces that result as a minor part of its operation.
Of course, this resolution is brought in, as we all know, on the
anticipation that the House will adjourn next Saturday. If a resolution
to adjourn should be brought in by the Committee on Rules and passed by
the two Houses, that makes the suspension in order for the next six
days; that would dispose of Calendar Wednesday and the motion to
recommit. Would anyone contend that on that account it was out of
order? The Chair thinks that this motion is not so directly aimed at
the rule which provides for Calendar Wednesday and the motion to
recommit as to make it out of order.
The argument is made that this report from the Committee on Rules is
not privileged. The subject matter seems to strictly within the
language of the rule which gives the Committee on Rules jurisdiction
over ``rules, joint rules, and order of business,'' and the reports of
that committee on the subjects over which they have jurisdiction are
privileged under the general rule, and in addition there is a special
section stating that ``it shall always be in order to call up for
consideration a report from the Committee on Rules.''
The Chair overrules the point of order.
2268. Reports from the Committee on Rules shall be presented within
three legislation days and if not immediately considered shall be
referred to the calendar and if not called up by the Member reporting
them within seven legislative days may be called up by any member of
the committee.
Adverse reports may be called up by any Member of the House on
discharge days.
Form and history of the last paragraph of section 45 of Rule XI.
The last paragraph of section 45 of Rule XI provides:
The Committee on Rules shall present to the House reports concerning
rules, joint rules, and order of business, within three legislative
days of the time when ordered reported by the committee. If such rule
or order is not considered immediately, it shall be referred to the
calendar and, if not called up by the member making the report within
seven legislative days thereafter, any member of the Rules Committee
may call it up as a question of privilege and the Speaker shall
recognize any member of the Rules Committee seeking recognition for
that purpose. If the Committee on Rules shall make an adverse report on
any resolution pending before the committee providing for an order of
business for the consideration by the House of any public bill or joint
resolution, on days when it shall be in order to call up motions to
discharge committees it shall be in order for any Member of the House
to call up for consideration by the House any such adverse report, and
it shall be in order to move the adoption of the House of said
resolution adversely reported not-withstanding the adverse report of
the Committee on Rules, and the Speaker shall recognize the member
seeking recognition for that purpose as a question of the highest
privilege.
Sec. 2269
The first provision of this paragraph was adopted January 18,
1924,\1\ It was formulated for the purpose of insuring prompt
presentation of reports ordered by the committee and thus avoiding
delay in the filing of reports, a recourse known as the ``pocket
veto,'' by means of which unsympathetic chairmen could render nugatory
majority action of the committee.
The provision for the consideration of adverse reports was added
December 8, 1931.\2\
2269. Under a former ruling a report ordered to be made by a
committee was required to be made within a reasonable time.
The time within which a member of a committee authorized to make a
report to the House should present such report was formerly held to
depend on the circumstances of the situation.
While failure to present within a reasonable time a report ordered to
be made by a committee was formerly construed to present a question of
privilege, a delay of 23 days was held insufficient to support such a
question under exceptional circumstances.
A rule requires the presentation of privileged reports from the
Committee on Rules within three legislative days from the time ordered
to be reported by the committee.
It is not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of a
committee unless the committee have formally reported their proceedings
to the House.
On May 26, 1922,\3\ Mr. Royal C. Johnson, of South Dakota, rose to a
question of the privileges of the House, and offered the following
resolution:
House Resolution 323.
Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives be, and he
is hereby, directed to appoint from the membership of this House a
select committee of 15 Members for the Sixty-seventh Congress, and
which said committee is hereby authorized to fully investigate all
contracts and expenditures made by the War Department, or under its
directions, the Navy Department, or under its directions, and the Alien
Property Custodian, or under his direction, during and since the late
war with Germany, and the settlement of any of such contracts by any
officer or agent or department of the Government, and to investigate
the criminal and civil prosecution, or lack of prosecution, of any or
all of the claims of the Government arising out of such contracts, or
the settlement thereof, by the Attorney General, the Alien Property
Custodian, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy, and in
addition to the powers herein conferred shall have the same powers and
authority as are now conferred by the rules of this House upon the
standing Committee on Expenditures in the War Department. Said
committee is hereby authorized to send for persons and papers, to
administer oaths and affirmations, to take testimony, to sit during the
sessions of the House and during any recess which may occur during its
sessions, and may meet at such places as said committee deems
advisable. Said committee is also hereby authorized and empowered to
appoint such subcommittee as it may deem advisable, and such
subcommittees, when so appointed, are hereby authorized to send for
persons and papers, to administer oaths and take testimony, and to meet
at such times and places as said committee shall from time to time
direct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1143.
\2\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 83.
\3\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 7744.
Sec. 2269
Resolved further, That said select committee shall report to the
House, in one or more reports, as it may deem advisable, the result of
its investigations, with such recommendations as it may care to make.
Resolved further, That the Speaker of the House is hereby authorized
to issue subpoenas to witnesses, upon the request of said committee or
any subcommittee thereof, during any recess of Congress during the
sessions.
Resolved further, That the Sergeant at Arms of the House be directed
to serve all subpoenas and other process put into his hands by said
committee or any subcommittee thereof.
Mr. Johnson said:
Mr. Speaker, that resolution was on May 3 of this year ordered to be
reported out by the Rules Committee on a motion which I made that the
chairman of the committee be instructed to bring it before the House at
the earliest possible moment.
Mr. Johnson was proceeding to relate the circumstances attending the
adoption of the report in the committee when the Speaker \1\
interposed:
The Chair must say, of course, that it is not in order to repeat what
occurs in the committee. The records of the committee will show what
occurred.
Mr. Johnson continued:
This resolution was not reported by the chairman of the Rules
Committee, but it has been resting in his pocket since May 3, and it is
very evident there is no intention on the part of the chairman of the
Rules Committee to report it. I do not question the motive of the
chairman of the Rules Committee. The question of privilege, Mr.
Speaker, is this: Whenever a resolution is ordered reported by a
committee of the House, and that committee has spoken, the House is
entitled to have the action of that committee translated into action
and the report of the committee given to the House.\2\
Mr. Johnson then cited a decision \3\ by Mr. Speaker Reed, rendered
in the Fifty-first Congress, holding that failure to present the report
of a committee within a reasonable time gave rise to a question of
privilege.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged and, after debate, the Speaker ruled:
The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from Georgia has stated
explicitly and clearly the purpose and bearing of the rule, and the
only decision the Chair is aware of is the one cited by the gentleman
from South Dakota, Mr. Reed, whose reputation and intellect entitle it
to great weight. The Chair thinks, according to that authority, the
question is whether the chairman of the Committee on Rules makes his
report in a reasonable time. There is a question whether this can come
up on Calendar Wednesday, but the Chair waives that. In the case
decided by Mr. Reed the committee had waited from September until
January without making any report. It appears that in this case the
Committee on Rules has adopted within the last month a number of rules,
including this, and has instructed the chairman to report them. There
is at least one that is much older than this still pending, and there
are others which are a little older. According to the argument made by
the gentleman from South Dakota, if he is correct, if he has the right
to raise the question of privilege, then anybody interested in the
adoption of any one of the rules which were adopted by the Committee on
Rules previous to this one has still more right to come forward and
demand its consideration. If we should adopt the doctrine that when the
Committee on Rules had adopted several rules any individual interested
in one of these rules had the right, as a matter of the privilege of
the House, to rise and claim that that rule should immediately be
reported, and that it was unreasonable for the chairman to withhold it,
the business of the House
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Such contingencies are now provided for in the last paragraph of
section 45 of Rule XI. See section 2268 above.
\3\ Hinds' Precedents, III, 2609.
Sec. 2270
would be in confusion. Mr. Reed that it is a question of reasonable
time. For some time the business of the House has been mostly on rules
which have been reported by the chairman of the Committee on Rules.
They are all of them in their time older than the one which the
gentleman claims the right to call up.
If he could make that claim now, he could have made it at any time in
the last weeks when we have been transacting business under the
leadership and orders of the Committee on Rules, and any other Member
interested in one of the other rules could have insisted on his rule.
That would occasion interminable confusion. Therefore it seems to the
Chair that, inasmuch as the House has been largely occupied with these
rules, at least until the Committee on Rules has disposed of the rules
that are older than this one it is preposterous to claim that a
gentleman can rise as a matter of privilege and say that the chairman
of the Committee on Rules is unreasonable in not bringing up this
junior rule. Of course, this is under the complete control of the
Committee on Rules, which can at any time instruct its chairman in what
order to bring up its bills. The Chair, therefore, sustains the point
of order, without considering the question of whether Calendar
Wednesday business should be interrupted by this matter or not.
2270. The motion to recommit is not in order after the previous
question has been ordered on a report from the Committee on Rules.
On October 5, 1917,\1\ Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, by
direction of the Committee on Rules reported this resolution:
Resolved, That the bill (H. R. 5723) entitled ``An act to amend an
act entitled `An act to authorize the establishment of a Bureau of War
Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department,' approved September 2, 1914,
and for other purposes,'' be, and hereby is, taken from the Speaker's
table, with the Senate amendments thereto, to the end that the said
amendments be, and hereby are, disagreed to; and the conference
requested by the Senate on the disagreeing votes on said amendments be,
and hereby is, agreed to, and the Speaker shall immediately appoint the
conferees.
The previous question having been ordered, Mr. Frederick H. Gillett,
of Massachusetts, moved to recommit the report to the Committee on
Rules with instructions.
Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, made the point of order that
after the previous question had been ordered it was not in order to
move to recommit a report from the Committee on Rules.
The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order.
2271. A division of the question may be demanded on a privileged
report from the Committee on Rules containing more than one substantive
proposition.
On April 8, 1908,\3\ Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, by direction
of the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged
resolution:
Resolved, That on this day and on Thursday of this week the House
shall take a recess at 5 o'clock p.m. until 11.30 a.m. of the next
calendar day; that on Friday, April 10, at 11.30 a.m., the Speaker
shall declare the House in Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union for consideration of H.R. 20471, the naval appropriation
bill; that at 5 o'clock p.m. on Friday, April 10, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union shall declare
the committee in recess until 11.30 a.m. on Saturday, April 11; that at
5 o'clock p.m. Saturday, April 11, the Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union shall declare the committee in
recess until 11.30 o'clock a.m. on Monday, April 13.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 7849.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4509.
Sec. 2272
That general debate on the naval appropriation bill shall close not
later than at 5 o'clock p.m., Saturday, April 11; the time to be
equally divided between the majority and minority and controlled by the
chairman of the Naval Committee and by the senior member of the
minority: Provided, That if general debate shall be concluded prior to
5 p.m. on Saturday the 11th, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
shall at once declare the committee in recess until Monday, April 13,
at 11.30 a.m.
Debate on the resolution having been concluded, Mr. John J.
Fitzgerald, of New York, demanded a division of the question and said:
The rule provides that at 5 o'clock to-day and 5 o'clock on Thursday
of this week the Speaker shall declare the House in recess until 11:30
o'clock the next calendar day. That is one substantive proposition.
That at 11.30 on Friday of this week the Chair shall declare the House
in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the naval appropriation bill. That is the second
distinct substantive proposition. That at 5 o'clock on Friday the
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union
shall declare the committee in recess until 11.30 on Saturday. That is
the third distinct substantive proposition. And at 5 o'clock on
Saturday of this week that the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
House on the state of the Union shall declare the House in recess until
11.30 o'clock on Monday of next week.
Then, there is a provision, Mr. Speaker, a distinct substantive
provision, that if the general debate shall not be concluded on the
naval appropriation bill at 5 o'clock on Saturday of this week, that
the chairman of the committee shall then declare the committee in
recess. Now, these are distinct substantive propositions, any one of
which being taken from the resolution, other distinct substantive
propositions remain. Under this rule of the House, which the Committee
on Rules has not yet abrogated, a Member of the House is entitled to
demand, before the question is put, that a separate vote be taken upon
each substantive proposition in this resolution.
After further debate the Speaker \1\ ruled:
On a careful examination of this rule, the Chair finds that there are
five substantive propositions and five only, so that if the gentleman
demands a separate vote upon either or all of them, a separate vote
will be taken.
2272. On April 18, 1912,\2\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, from the
Committee on Rules, reported a resolution providing a special order for
the consideration of the bill (H.R. 21279) the post office
appropriation bill.
After debate Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, demanded a division of
the question on the substantive propositions contained in the
resolution.
Mr. Henry made the point of order that the request was not in order.
The Speaker \3\ ruled:
There are not very many precedents on this subject, one way or the
other.
The two precedents cited from Speaker Henderson are really parts and
parcels of one precedent. A division was demanded in a resolution. His
first decision was that there should be a separate vote taken on each
resolve. When that was through with, somebody undertook to divide the
first resolve, and he held that could not be done.
The most elaborate precedent in the lot, and the last one, is that on
page 4509, Congressional Record, first session of the Sixtieth
Congress. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann, was himself mixed up
in that debate. He seems to have agreed that a division could be had,
but he differed from gentlemen as to how many substantive propositions
there were involved.
Mr. Speaker Cannon, after listening to the debate, decided that the
division could be had.
So it seems to the Chair that the precedents are in favor of the
contention of the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann, and against the
point of order of the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Henry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 5006.
\3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2273
In addition to that, it seems to the Chair that the reason of the
thing is the same. There are several substantive legislative
propositions embraced in this rule that have no connection whatever
with one another. A Member might, and most probably would, be in favor
of some and against others. He has a right to vote his sentiments on
each, which he can not do if they are bunched together. Therefore the
point of order is overruled, and the Clerk will report the first
proposition.
2273. On January 30, 1923,\1\ Mr. Philip P. Campbell, of Kansas,
submitted, as a privileged report from the committee on Rules, this
special order:
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the House shall
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union for the further consideration of Senate Joint Resolution No.
12; that there shall be not to exceed one hour additional general
debate on said resolution, one-half of the time to be controlled by
those favoring the resolution and one-half by those opposing it. Upon
the conclusion of such general debate the resolution shall be read for
amendment under the five-minute rule, whereupon the resolution with
amendments, if any, shall be reported back to the House, the previous
question shall be considered as ordered on said resolution and all
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except
one motion to recommit.
That immediately upon the conclusion of the consideration of Senate
Joint Resolution No. 12 in the House, the House shall resolve itself
into the Committee on the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of Senate Joint Resolution No. 79; there shall be not to
exceed one hour and thirty minutes general debate on said resolution,
one-half of the time to be controlled by those favoring the resolution
and one-half by those opposing it; that at the conclusion of the
general debate the resolution shall be read for amendments under the
five-minute rule, whereupon the resolution with amendments, if any,
shall be reported back to the House, the previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the resolution and the amendments thereto to
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.
Debate having been concluded Mr. Marvin Jones, of Texas, demanded a
separate vote on the two propositions carried in the resolution.
Mr. Campbell raised a question of order against the demand for a
division.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The Chair finds that there is a precedent for dividing the rule.
Therefore, the Chair thinks that this is divisible, and the vote will
first come upon the portion of the rule which applies to Joint
Resolution No. 12. The question is on that portion of the resolution
applying to Senate Joint Resolution No. 12.
2274. On January 18, 1924,\3\ the House having under consideration
the resolution (H. Res. 146) adopting the rules of the Sixty-seventh
Congress with certain amendments, as the rules of the Sixty-eighty
Congress, reported as privileged from the Committee on Rules, Mr. John
Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, demanded a division of the question on
agreeing to the resolution.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made a joint of order that a
division was not in order after the previous question had been ordered.
The Speaker \4\ ruled:
The Chair does not see how the previous question can affect it. The
Chair's attention has been called to a precedent in the Digest, from
which it would seem that a report from the Committee on Rules has a
different rule applied to it from a report from any other committee.
Mr. Speaker Clark held that if a report from the Committee on Rules
contained substantive
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress. Record, p. 2734.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1142.
\4\ Federick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2275
propositions a separate vote can be had on each proposition. It is hard
for the Chair to see why that does not cover the cause.
The Chair does not see that the gentleman from Texas has
discriminated or suggested any reasons why the Chair should not follow
this very clear decision. The Chair thinks, while, of course, all
amendments have been offered and considered, yet the bill was not read
by sections and no vote had upon any section separately; and the Chair
thinks the gentleman from Connecticut, if he so desires, is entitled to
demand a division.
The Chair overrules the point of order.
2275. A division of the question was denied on a privileged
resolution reported by the Committee on Rules wherein the structural
relation of the clauses containing several propositions was such as to
render them interdependent and indivisible.
On April 20, 1908,\1\ the following privileged resolution was
reported by Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on
Rules:
Resolved, That during the remainder of this session Rule XXVIII shall
be, and hereby is, modified in the following particulars:
First. The use of the motion shall not be restricted to the first and
third Mondays of the month.
Second. The vote on agreeing to the motion shall in all cases be by
majority instead of by two-thirds; and upon the demand of any Member
opposed to the motion a second shall be considered as ordered.
The previous question having been ordered, Mr. John Sharp Williams,
of Mississippi, demanded a separate vote on the three substantive
propositions carried in the resolution.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ ruled:
The resolution reads:
``Resolved, That during the remainder of this session rule 28 shall
be, and hereby is, modified in the following particulars--''
That would mean nothing unless the particulars were stated. If that
were voted down or up, it would have no effect whatever. And then it
reads:
``The use of the motion shall not be restricted to the first and
third Mondays of the month.''
Now, those two propositions, taken together, do make a substantive
proposition; but if they were voted down and the House voted for the
other proposition--the second propositon--it would have no effect
whatever. It would be without sense; it would be nonsense if the House
would adopt only what comes after the word ``second.'' Each proposition
must stand alone; each proposition must be a substantive proposition.
Neither of these propositions will stand alone or could have any effect
unless some of the others are adopted. It says:
``Second. The vote on agreeing to the motion--''
What motion? There is no explanation of that proposition.
``Shall in all cases be by majority instead of by two-thirds, and
upon the demand of any Member opposed to the motion a second shall be
considered as ordered.''
There is nothing in the second proposition to show what motion it is
or what rule is being affected. The Chair is very clear about it, and
will put the motion on the adoption of the resolution.
2276. A resolution to procure testimony in a contested election case
is privileged when reported by a committee on elections, and is in
order on Calendar Wednesday.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4978.
\2\ Sereno E. Payne, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2277
On Wednesday, January 30, 1924,\1\ Mr. Richard N. Elliott, of
Indiana, by direction of the Committee on Elections No. 3, reported as
privileged the resolution (H. Res. 166) directing members of the board
of elections of the city of New York to appear and testify before the
Committee on Elections No. 3 in the contested-election case of Chandler
v. Bloom, and to bring with them for counting the disputed ballots in
the case.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, questioned the privilege of the
resolution and the right of the Committee on Election No. 3 to report
it on Calendar Wednesday.
The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order, holding the report to
be privileged, and to take precedence of the business in order on
Calendar Wednesday.
2277. A rule provides that all contested election cases shall be
reported within six months after the convening of the first regular
session of Congress.
An exception allows nine months within which to report contested
election cases from the territory of Alaska.
Form and history of section 58 of Rule XI.
Section 58 of Rule XI provides:
The several elections committees of the House shall make final report
to the House in all contested-election cases not later than six months
from the first day of the first regular session of the Congress to
which the contestee is elected except in a contest from the Territory
of Alaska in which case the time shall not exceed nine months.
This rule was provided for in 1924 \3\ in the adoption of rules for
the Sixty-eighth Congress to remedy a tendancy to unduly prolong cases
in which the sitting Member was unseated. Such cases were often delayed
and frequently were not reported until shortly before final
adjournment.
Originally the rule required reports on contested election cases
within six months after the convening of the first session, but in
order to avoid complications arising in extra sessions, it was amended
in adopting the rules for the Seventy-first Congress \4\ by computing
the time from the opening of the first regular session.
2278. The term ``raising revenue,'' while broadly construed to cover
bills relating to the revenue, does not apply to bills remotely
affecting the revenue, as bills extending time of payment of foreign
debts.
On March 29, 1922,\5\ Mr. Joseph W. Fordney of Michigan, from the
Committee on Ways and Means, moved that the House resolve itself into
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 160) authorizing an
extension of time for payment of the debt incurred by Austria in the
purchase of flour from the United States Grain Corporation.
Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1715.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1143.
\4\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 26.
\5\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 4736.
Sec. 2278
In debating the point of order Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois said:
We have in bills on irrigation projects and on a good many sales of
public lands the provision that certain amounts of money shall be paid
to the Government by those who purchase the land. We frequently extend
the time of payment. Would the gentleman from Ohio claim that a bill to
extend the time of payment of any of those sums should go to the
Committee on Ways and Means and have a privileged status in the House
as a bill affecting the revenue of the Government?
What is the distinction between a payment due to the Government that
is not privileged and an extension extending the time for the payment
of a loan due a private corporation owned by the Government and making
that privileged?
The Committee on Ways and Means has reported in my day bills
establishing a collection district and relative to any employee in a
customhouse as privileged, but none of them ever got by as privileged.
They used to call up those bills as privileged until some gentleman--I
think I was the first one--made the point of order that those were not
privileged. And the Speaker sustained the point of order that it was
not a privileged bill, because it was not a bill raising revenue or a
bill affecting the revenue, although it affected the customs service.
The Speaker \1\ decided:
When this bill came over from the Senate the question was raised
whether it was obnoxious to the provision of the Constitution that all
bills for raising revenue must originate in the House, and, secondly,
whether if that were not true that it was within our rule which gives
the Ways and Means Committee power to report from the floor bills for
raising revenue--both phrases being the same in the Constitution and
the rules.
The Chair has had time to investigate the question with some care,
and it seems to the Chair quite clear that this is not a bill for
raising revenue as defined in the Constitution. The best definition the
Chair has seen is in the Thirteenth of Blatchford, where the court
says:
``Certain legislative measures are unmistakably bills for raising
revenue. These impose taxes upon the people either directly or
indirectly, or lay duties, imports, or excises for the use of the
Government, and to give to the persons from whom the money is exacted
no equivalent in return, unless in the enjoyment in common with the
rest of the citizens of the benefit of good government.''
It seems to the Chair that that is a good definition of the phrase
``for raising revenue,'' and that it does not include this bill. At the
same time the Chair does not feel that it is necessary in this case to
define exactly what the phrase does mean. The Chair was struck by the
prudence of the court in another case, where in the One hundred and
sixty-seventh United States it said:
``What bills belong to the class of bills for raising revenue is a
question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom
not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase
of the subject.''
In accordance with that the Chair will not attempt to rule what bills
could and what may not come under this phrase ``bills for raising
revenue.'' While it seems very clear that a bill which postpones the
payment by the Government of Austria of an obligation incurred to the
Grain Corporation is not a ``bill for raising revenue,'' the Chair
recognizes force in the argument that there is a difference by
construction in the meaning of the same phrase when it occurs in the
Constitution and in our rules. That has arisen somewhat out of
necessity or convenience because every tariff bill, for instance,
contains necessarily administrative features which are connected with
raising revenue and yet which strictly are not ``bills for raising
revenue.'' Because of that and similar cases there have grown up by
rulings of Speakers, acquiesced in by the House, precedents which hold
some bills privileged, though not strictly and exclusively raising
revenue, but relating to or affecting the revenue. But the Chair does
not think these precedents can sustain the point made by the gentleman
from Michigan that this bill is privileged. It seems to the Chair that
it is not a bill for raising revenue under the rule any more than under
the Constitution, and therefore the Chair sustains the point of order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2279
2279. A bill merely affecting the revenue incidentally does not come
within the privilege of the Ways and Means Committee to report at any
time.
A bill regulating the importation of drugs and utilizing the customs
office in that connection was held not to come within the rule.
On May 4, 1922,\1\ a day on which Calendar Wednesday business was in
order, Mr. Lindley H. Hadley, of Washington, by direction of the
Committee on Ways and Means, when that committee was reached in the
call of the committees, called up the bill (H. R. 2193) prohibiting the
importation of narcotics for other than medicinal purposes.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, made the point of order that the
bill provided for the raising of revenue and was privileged and
therefore was not in order under the Calendar Wednesday call.
The Speaker \2\ ruled:
The Chair will state that he investigated that subject, and was
conferred with by members of the Ways and Means Committee as to whether
it was privileged or not. Of course, if it is privileged, that
committee can call it up some other day. The Chair concludes that it is
not privileged; that while, as the gentlemen from Massachusetts, Mr.
Walsh, says, it relates to the revenues, yet that is incidental; that
the main purpose of the bill is not to raise revenue; and that
therefore it is not privileged. Of course, the fact that it was
reported from the floor simply indicated what the gentleman reporting
it thought at that time.
The Committee on Ways and Means reported the Harrison Act. That bill
did not come from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. If
the Chair should hold that the bill is not in order today, he would be
in an embrassing position, because the Chair refused to recognize the
Committee on Ways and Means to call up the bill as a privileged matter,
on the ground that in his opinion it was not privileged, and that the
only way in which the committee could bring it up would be either to
get a rule or to bring it up on Calendar Wednesday. So the Chair not
only by his individual opinion but by his conduct is bound to rule that
the bill is in order to-day. Of course, the House can decide
differently if it desires to do so. The Chair overrules the point of
order.
2280. To come within the privilege given the Committee on Ways and
Means to report at any time a bill must show on its face that it
relates to the raising of revenue.
In passing upon the privilege of a bill for report at any time the
Speaker does not take into consideration his personal knowledge and
estimate of the probable effects of the passage of the bill.
Where the major feature of a bill relates to the raising of revenue,
lesser provisions incidental thereto but not strictly revenue producing
do not destroy its privilege when reported by the Committee on Ways and
Means.
A bill relating to the method of packing dutiable tobacco for parcel-
post shipment was held not to be a revenue bill within the meaning of
the rule giving such bills privilege.
On January 22, 1927,\3\ Mr. William R. Green, of Iowa, by direction
of the Committee on Ways and Means, called up as privileged the bill
(H. R. 8997)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6332.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 2121.
Sec. 2281
providing for the admission of tobacco in smaller packages under
parcel-post regulations.
Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, made the point of order that the bill
was not privileged because it did not show on its face that it affected
the revenue.
After debate, the Speaker \1\ ruled:
The Chair was advised yesterday that this point of order would be
raised, and he has given some time to the consideration of the
precedents.
The Committee on Ways and Means has larger authority in the reporting
of bills than any other committee. It is given leave to report any time
bills raising revenue while other committees given leave to report at
any time are confined strictly to the subjects which they may report as
privileged. The privilege of the Committee on Ways and Means has been
broadly construed to apply to bills relating to the revenue. As has
been stated, this privilege has been extended to a bill to provide for
reciprocal trade relations with Cuba and to a bill to repeal the joint
resolution in reference to the free zone on the Mexican frontier, which
involves the transportation of dutiable goods and its relation to
smuggling. But a bill providing for the consolidation and recognition
of customs collection districts, which involved a question affecting
the revenue and also commerce and shipping, was held by Speaker Cannon
not to be privileged on the ground that, while the matter affecting the
revenue was privileged, the matter affecting commerce was not
privileged and thereby destroyed the privilege of the bill as a whole.
The Chair thinks that a broad summation of all the precedents would
lead to about this statement of the rule:
If a major feature of a bill reported from the Ways and Means
Committee relates to revenue the bill is privileged, and matters
accompanying the bill not strictly raising revenue but incidental to
this purpose do not destroy this privilege.
In this case it seems fairly obvious, if one is permitted to go
outside of the face of the bill itself, that this bill will raise
revenue. It seems to the Chair that the cutting down of the limitation
necessarily would enable more people to import cigars than now import
them.
But the question is, Does that appear on the face of the bill? Now
the Chair has had a little inkling of the fact that some Members of the
House did not approve his ruling recently on a question which involved
the proper calendar for a bill to be placed upon. The objection made
was that the bill did not show on its face that it would create a
charge on the Treasury. This bill, while relating to an entirely
different question, raises indirectly the question as to whether, by
virtue of his knowledge of what will happen in all probability as
result of the passage of the bill, the Chair should allow his decision
to be influenced by that knowledge. The Chair regards this as one of
the closest questions he has had to rule on either as Speaker or
formerly as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state
of the Union. The Chair is very anxious, while giving full leeway to
the privileges of the Committee on Ways and Means, also to safeguard
the House. The Chair, after considerable thought, thinks that he ought
not to allow his knowledge of probabilities to affect his judgment of
the bill as it appears on its face. The Chair does not think that the
bill on its face shows that it necessarily will raise revenue or
directly affect revenue. Therefore, the point of order made by the
gentlemen from Texas is sustained.
2281. A bill reported by the Committee on Ways and Means exempting
profits on Treasury bills from taxation was held to be privileged.
On June 6, 1930,\2\ Mr. Willis C. Hawley, of Oregon, from the
Committee on Ways and Means, called up the bill (H. R. 12440) exempting
from taxation gains from sale or other disposition of Treasury bills.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, inquired if the bill was to be
considered as privileged.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 10191.
Sec. 2282
The Speaker \1\ held the bill to be privileged and recognized Mr.
Hawley to move to resolve into the Committee of the Whole for its
consideration.
2282. The right of the Committee on Appropriations to report at any
time is confined strictly to the general appropriations bills.
The privilege of the Committee on Appropriations to report general
appropriation bills at any time does not include resolutions extending
appropriations.
On July 1, 1912,\2\ Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, by direction
of the Committee on Appropriations, reported \3\ to the House the joint
resolution (H. J. Res. 331) extending appropriations for the necessary
operation of the Government under certain contingencies, and asked
unanimous consent for its consideration.
In explaining the necessity for enactment of the joint resolution as
due to failure of the President to approve bills passed by the House
and Senate, Mr. Fitzgerald gave the history of joint resolutions of
this character and conceded their lack of privilege.
Unanimous consent having been secured for its consideration, the
joint resolution, with brief debate, was ordered to be engrossed and
read a third time, and was agreed to.
2283. On July 2, 1918,\4\ Mr. Swagar Sherley, of Kentucky, from the
Committee on Appropriations, asked unanimous consent for consideration
of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 311) continuing appropriations for
the Government and District of Columbia for the month of July, 1918,
made necessary by the failure of the conferees on the District of
Columbia appropriation bill to agree on the ratio of District expense
to be borne by the Federal Government.
Subsequently,\5\ when the joint resolution was returned by the
Senate, Mr. Sherley asked unanimous consent to take the joint
resolution with Senate amendments from the Speaker's table for
consideration.
2284. On August 29, 1918,\6\ Mr. Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, asked
unanimous consent for the consideration of the joint resolution (H. J.
Res. 323) continuing appropriations for the Government and District of
Columbia for the month of September, 1918.
Mr. Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, objected.
2285. Bills providing special appropriations for specific purposes
are not general appropriation bills and therefore not privileged.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 8532.
\3\ Report No. 926. This report gives detailed statistics on the
instances in which appropriations had been continued since 1876. Mr.
Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, also printed in the Record as a part of
his remarks on August 1, 1919, a list of annual appropriation laws
enacted too late to be effective from the first days of the fiscal
year. First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3516.
\4\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 8639.
\5\ Record, p. 8821.
\6\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 9652.
Sec. 2286
On December 17, 1931,\1\ Mr. Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, by
direction of the Committee on Appropriations, asked unanimous consent
for the immediate consideration of the joint resolution (H. J. Res.
141) to provide additional appropriations for the Veterans
Administration for the fiscal year ending June 31, 1932.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that the
joint resolution was privileged and unanimous consent was not required.
The Speaker \2\ held:
The gentleman from Texas makes the point of order that this
resolution is privileged. The Chair will call the attention of the
gentleman from Texas to clause 45 of Rule XI, which provides:
``The following-named committee shall have leave to report at any
time on the matters herein stated, namely: * * *
``The Committee on Appropriations, the general appropriation bills.''
The Chair does not think this is a general appropriation bill. It is
merely a bill making a special appropriation for a specific
proposition. Therefore the Chair overrules the point of order.
2286. The right of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors to report at
any time is confined to river and harbor bills, and matter not germane
to such bills, although within the jurisdiction of the committee, is
subject to a point of order.
In exercising the right to report at any time committees may not
include matters not specified by the rule as within the privilege.
The subjects of construction, maintenance, and operation of locks and
dry docks are subjects within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Rivers and Harbors.
On June 26, 1917,\3\ while the river and harbor bill (H. R. 4285) was
being read for amendment in the Committee of the Whole House on state
of the Union, the following paragraph was reached:
That whenever any person, company, or corporation, municipal or
private, or any State, or any reclamation, flood-control, and drainage
district, or other public agency created by any State shall undertake
to secure any land or easement therein, needed in connection with a
work of river and harbor improvement duly authorized by Congress, for
the purpose of conveying the same to the United States free of cost, or
for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating locks, dry
docks, or other works to be conveyed to the United States free of cost,
and of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams for use in
connection therewith, and shall be unable for any reason to obtain the
same by purchase and acquire a valid title thereto, the Secretary of
War may, in his discretion, cause proceedings to be instituted in the
name of the United States for the acquirement by condemnation of said
land or easement, and it shall be the duty of the Attorney General of
the United States to institute and conduct such proceedings upon the
request of the Secretary of War.
Mr. Irvine L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, submitted the point of order
that the paragraph was not germane to the bill.
After debate, the Chairman \4\ held:
The Chair thinks that the Committee on Rivers and Harbors would have
jurisdiction of this bill and that that committee might have reported
it out and placed it upon the calendar. The
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 714.
\2\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4327.
\4\ Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, Chairman.
Sec. 2287
fact that part of it might be subject to a point of order would not
destroy the right of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors to report that
bill, let it take its usual place on the calendar, and come up in its
order, without having a privileged status.
Under section 56 of Rule XI the Committee on Rivers and Harbors has
the right to report as a privileged matter upon bills for the
improvement of rivers and harbors. The Chair thinks that the
proposition in this bill to amend the law so as to read as follows:
``That whenever any person, company, or corporation,, municipal or
private, or any State, or any reclamation, flood-control, or drainage
district or other public agency created by any State shall undertake to
secure any land or easement therein, needed in connection with a work
of river and harbor improvement duly authorized by Congress, for the
purpose of conveying the same to the United States free of cost, or for
the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating locks, dry
docks, or other works to be conveyed to the United States free of cost,
and of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams for use in
connection therewith''--
And so forth, destroys its privileged status, and destroys the right
of the Rivers and Harbors Committee to report such an amending
provision in this bill; and therefore the chair sustains the point or
order.
2287. The privilege of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors to report
at any time is confined to legislative propositions for the improvement
of rivers and harbors and does not extend to provisions for the
improvement of canals or artificial waterways.
Subjects relating to canals and their improvements are not within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.
On January 11, 1919, \1\ while the House was considering the river
and harbor bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union, the Clerk read as follows:
Waterway between Beaufort, S. C., and St. Johns River, Fla.: For
maintenance, $23,000; completing improvement of Generals Cut, Ga., in
accordance with the report submitted in House Document No. 581, Sixty-
third Congress, second session, $1,000.
Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, made the point of order that the
item related to canals, a subject which was not within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.
The Chairman \2\ ruled:
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Madden, makes a point of order on
that portion of the pending paragraph, beginning on line 24, on page 10
of the bill, and which reads as follows: ``completing improvement of
Generals Cut, Ga., in accordance with the report submitted in House
Document No. 581, Sixty-third Congress, second session, $1,000''--on
the ground that a portion of it relates to the improvement of a canal.
Now, it is very clear to the Chair that the Committee on Rivers and
Harbors does not in this bill have jurisdiction over the improvement of
canals. Under section 56, Rule XI, bills reported from the Committee on
Rivers and Harbors are given a privileged status where they relate to
the improvement of rivers and harbors. As far as the Chair knows, it
has been uniformly held heretofore that under this rule the Committee
on Rivers and Harbors has no authority or jurisdiction to report an
appropriation bill, which shall have a privileged status, for the
improvement of any existing canal or to make a canal.
In the view of the Chair, this is simply a question of fact as to
whether or not this paragraph relates to the improvement of a canal. It
is stated by the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Small, that this is
an existing waterway. But the gentleman from North Carolina also states
that it does not exclusively consist of a natural waterway. The
gentleman from Illinois,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1263.
\2\ Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, Chairman.
Sec. 2288
Mr. Madden, has called the attention of the Chair to the report and map
submitted by the Chief of Engineers, which show that this is, for a
portion of the distance, a canal; and in view of the ruling in the
Hennepin Canal case, and the uniform rulings that have been made since
that decision was rendered, the Chair does not think that this
provision is in order, and therefore sustains the point of order made
by the gentleman from Illinois.
On appeal, the decision of the Chair was sustained, yeas 67, nays 43.
2288. A bill authorizing those failing to perfect a prior entry to
make a second entry under the homestead law does not involve such a
``reservation of the public lands'' as to come within the privilege of
the Committee on Public Lands to report at any time.
On April 6, 1910, \1\ it being Calendar Wednesday, Mr. Frank W.
Mondell, of Wyoming, by direction of the Committee on Public Lands,
when that committee was reached, called up the bill (H.R. 15660)
providing for second homestead entries.
Mr. Herbert Parsons, of New York, raised the point or order that the
bill, being privileged under the rule granting the Committee on Public
Lands the right to report at any time, was not in order on Calendar
Wednesday.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, in debating the point of order said:
Mr. Speaker, the provision in the rule is ``and bills for the
reservation of the public lands.'' If it shall be held that every bill
relating to the settlement of public lands by homestead or other
settlers is privileged, it will give practically a privilege to every
bill reported from the Committee on the Public Lands.
The bill before us only provides that certain people who have
forfeited all rights to a homestead may have a right to homestead. It
does not purport in any way to be a reservation of affecting in any way
the public land. It only affects persons who may avail themselves of
existing public lands.
If it shall be held that this bill is in order, it must
correspondingly be held that every bill practically relating to the
subject-matter is in order, because the bill itself does not purport to
be a reservation of public lands, and the only way you can hold it to
be in order under the provision of the section is because it is on that
subject-matter; and if you do that you make all of these bills reported
from the Committee on the Public Lands, or practically all of them,
privileged. That may be a wise thing to do, but the committee has never
assumed that it had that jurisdiction.
The Speaker \2\ ruled:
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Parsons, makes the point of order
upon the bill H.R. 15660. The Clerk will read the text of the bill.
The Clerk read as follows:
``Be it enacted, etc., That any person who, prior to the passage of
this act, has made entry under the homestead laws, but from any cause
has lost, forfeited, or abandoned the same, shall be entitled to the
benefits of the homestead law as though such former entry had not been
made, and any person applying for a second homestead under this act
shall furnish the description and date of his former entry: Provided,
That the provisions of this act shall not apply to any person whose
former entry was canceled for fraud.''
The Speaker continued:
Clause 61 of Rule XI provides:
The following-named committees shall have leave to report any time on
matters herein stated, viz, * * * the Committee on Public Lands, bills
for the forfeiture of land grants to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 4334.
\2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 2289
railroad and other corporations, bills preventing speculation in the
public lands, bills for the reservation of the public lands for the
benefit of actual and bona fide settlers.''
Now, clearly it was the intention of the House in enacting the rule
to make those bills privileged that would forfeit railroad grants and
bills that would tend by their operation, if enacted into law, to
preserve the land for actual settlers. The Chair has glanced at the
precedents referred to by the gentleman from New York. Perhaps the
strongest one is the decision of Mr. Speaker Carlisle that the
privilege belonged to a bill repealing the preemption laws, the timber-
culture laws, and the laws authorizing the sale of desert lands, since
the repeal of these laws would leave in operation no method of
acquiring public lands except the homestead laws, which were for the
benefit of actual settlers.
But the gentleman will notice that in all of these decisions the
bills made a contest between those who were seeking to be actual
settlers and those who were seeking under prior grants and under the
general laws to obtain lands otherwise than by actual settlement.
This bill is merely to allow anybody who had made a prior homestead
claim and did not perfect it to make a second claim. So that, in the
opinion of the Chair, the point of order is not well taken, and
therefore the Chair overrules it.
2289. The right of the Committee on Public Lands to report at any
time is confined strictly to the subjects enumerated in the rule.
A bill providing preference for a class in the administration of the
homestead laws is not such a ``reservation of the public lands'' as to
come within the purview of the rule authorizing the Committee on Public
Lands to report at any time.
The inclusion of matter not privileged destroys the privileged
character of a bill.
A bill privileged under the rules cannot be called up on Calendar
Wednesday.
Historical statement that the privilege of the Committee on Public
Lands to report at any time has been seldom exercised.
On December 10, 1919,\1\ this being Wednesday, when the Committee on
Public Lands was reached in the call of committees, Mr. Nicholas J.
Sinnott, of Oregon, by direction of the committee, called up the joint
resolution (H. J. Res. 20) giving discharged soldiers preferred rights
of homestead entry.
Mr. Rollin B. Sanford, of New York, made the point of order that the
bill, being privileged, could not be called up on Calendar Wednesday.
Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, in opposition to the point of order
argued that the bill was not privileged because not reported from the
floor and did not in fact provide for a reservation of the public lands
but a preference for a certain class of citizens. He also contended
that the inclusion of Indian lands with public lands was sufficient to
destroy the privilege of the joint resolution if otherwise privileged.
Mr. Mondell also said:
Mr. Speaker, my recollection is that only once or twice in the last
20 years has the Committee on Public Lands exercised the privilege of
calling up a bill under the rule which has been referred to.
The Speaker \2\ decided:
The point raised by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Sanford, is an
interesting one. The Chair is disposed to agree with the gentleman from
New York that the committee could not, by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 366.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2290
reporting a privileged bill through the basket proceed to take
advantage of its own wrong and acquire rights which otherwise it would
not have. To the Chair the principal question is whether this is a
privileged resolution or not. The language of the rule is very clear.
It is limited to bills for the reservation of the public lands for the
benefit of actual and bona fide settlers, and it seems to the Chair
that the distinction that the gentleman makes, that this is not a
resolution providing for the reservation of public lands, is well
taken, since it merely provides that where there is a reservation an
additional privilege shall be granted. The Chair thinks on that ground
that the committee was right in not reporting this resolution from the
floor, but placing it in the basket.
The general rule is that when a privileged bill includes something
not privileged, that takes away from it its privilege. That, however,
raises an intricate question, which it is not necessary to consider
here, because the Chair thinks this does not come strictly within the
language of the rule, and it is not a resolution purely for the
reservation of public lands for the benefit of actual and bona fide
settlers.
Accordingly, the Chair overrules the point of order.
2290. A bill providing for agricultural entries of coal lands in
Alaska was held to be privileged as a reservation of the public lands
for actual settlers.
Discussion of the privilege of the Committee on Public Lands to
report at any time.
On October 24, 1921,\1\ Mr. Dan. A. Sutherland, of Alaska, by
direction of the Committee on Public Lands, submitted as privileged a
report on the bill (H. R. 7948), providing for agricultural entries on
coal lands in Alaska.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, asked if the report was
privileged.
The Speaker announced that he would hear arguments on that question
at some future time.
Thereupon Mr. Nicholas J. Sinnott, of Oregon, was granted leave to
extend his remarks by including an argument in favor of the privilege
of the bill.
Mr. Sinnott's argument, after quoting from the precedents, concludes
as follows:
Examining H. R. 7948 in the light of these decisions, it is apparent
that the bill is entitled to a privileged character. Section 1 of the
bill grants actual settlers a surface homestead right on public lands
containing coal, oil, or gas, which are not now subject to homestead
settlement. Section 1 enlarges the area of the public domain subject to
homestead settlement. Section 2 of the bill provides for the issuance
of a patent with a reservation to the United States of all the coal,
oil, or gas in the land patented. Section 2 further protects and
safeguards the rights of the homestead settler by restricting the
operations of the coal, oil, or gas permittee or lessee in the interest
of the homestead settler; it also requires the permittee or lessee to
give a bond for the payment of damages to the crops or improvements on
the land. It will be remembered that the coal, oil, or gas deposits in
the land covered by H. R. 7948 are now subject to disposition under the
Alaska coal leasing act of October 20, 1914 (38 Stat., 741), and the
oil leasing act of the Sixty-sixth Congress, Public Law 146, approved
February 25, 1920, United States Statutes at Large, volume 41, page
437. Said acts provide for the removal of said minerals by permit or
lease.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, the main provisions of section 2 are to
insure to the settler the fullest use of the homestead with the least
possible molestation from the permittee or lessee; the means for
accomplishing this object are by requiring a bond or undertaking
against damages to crops and improvements, also by restricting the
permittee or lessee to so much of the surface only as may be reasonably
required for his mining operations. Without such safeguards and
restrictions the privilege of the homestead settler would be bootless
and nugatory. This proposition is well stated in that part of Speaker
Carlisle's decision on H. R. 7901, Fiftieth Congress, first session,
not quoted in Hinds' Precedents, section 4633, and which I shall read:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6686.
Sec. 2290
``The Chair supposes that a bill reported from this committee might
include matters having no relation to the public lands or to the
privileged subject mentioned in the rule, and thus might lose its
privilege; but the Chair will state that in such a bill all provisions
relating tot he preservation of the public lands for actual settlers,
and providing the means for accomplishing that object are certainly
privileged; otherwise the privilege would amount to nothing.''
Subsequently,\1\ the bill was, on motion of Mr. Sinnott, by unanimous
consent, recommitted to the Committee on Public Lands, and on October
27,\2\ the bill H.R. 8842, of similar tenor, was reported from the
floor as privileged by Mr. Sutherland.
Mr. Garrett reserved all points of order.
On November 1, 1921,\3\ Mr. Sinnott moved that the House resolve
itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union
for the consideration of the bill.
Mr. Garrett made the point of order that the bill was not privileged,
and argued:
Mr. Speaker, I have no opposition to this bill. But I do not think it
ought to be considered as a privileged bill unless it really be
privileged, and I do not believe that the history of the rule, as cited
by the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Sinnott, would cause the philosophy
of this bill to square with the rule.
The rule under which the House is operating provides that the
following-named committees shall have leave to report at any time on
the matters herein stated, namely, the Committee on the Public Lands,
on bills for the forfeiture of land grants to railroad and other
corporations, bills preventing speculation in the public lands, and
bills for the reservation of the public lands for the benefit of actual
and bona fide settlers.
I take it that what was in thought in the adoption of this rule was
to preserve the public domain. Now, this bill is to open up the public
domain for settlement, as I understand it. It is not for the forfeiture
of any land grant to a railroad or other corporation. It is not for the
purpose of reserving the public domain for future settlement. As I
understand the purpose of the bill, it is to open up the country to
settlement. I take it that that word ``reservation'' has and now has a
technical meaning. If the rule had said ``to provide for opening up
public lands to settlement,'' of course that would be the end of the
matter; but the rule says ``reserving the public lands for
settlement.''
The Speaker \4\ held:
The Chair has investigated the question as to whether the bill is
privileged, and has considered the very elaborate and thorough argument
of the gentleman from Oregon.
The Chair comes to the conclusion very readily that these precedents
and the logic upon which they were founded clearly show that this bill
is a privileged bill under the rule which allows the Committee on the
Public Lands to report from the floor bills for the reservation of
public lands or for the benefit of bona fide settlers. The Chair
confesses that the ingenious argument of the gentleman from Tennessee
as to the meaning of the word ``reservation'' struck the Chair as
forcible, but against that the gentleman from Oregon retorts that it
reserves them against mineral claimants, and therefore is accurate. The
Chair thinks beyond that that the word ``reservation'' has been so
construed in the past. Speaker Carlisle said, over 30 years ago:
``In other words, as part of the land which can now be taken up under
existing law as timber-land or mineral land or desert land, if this
bill passes, be subject to entry hereafter under the homestead law
only.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Record, p. 7053.
\2\ Record, p. 6896.
\3\ Record, p. 7133.
\4\ Fredrick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2291
Accordingly, Speaker Carlisle held the bill privileged. The Chair
thinks the precedents are to the effect that this bill is one which the
Public Lands Committee has the right to report form the floor, and
therefore is privileged, and overrules the point of order.
2291. General pension bills reported by the Committee on Invalid
Pensions are privileged for consideration at any time.
The term ``general pension bills'' is construed to refer to bills or
legislation general in character as distinguished from bills or
legislation of a private character or bills restricted in their purpose
or effect.
A bill authorizing monthly payment of pensions in lieu of quarterly
payments was classified as a general pension bill and held to within
the privilege accorded the Committee on Invalid Pensions to report at
any time.
The right to report legislation at any time carries with it the right
to consideration at any time when not in conflict with other rules of
the House.
On a Friday set aside for the consideration of business on the
Private Calendar it is in order to call up business privileged under
the rule authorizing certain committees to report at any time.
On Friday, June 21, 1921,\1\ Mr. Oscar E. Bland, of Indiana, moved
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2158) to
provide for the monthly payment of pensions.
Mr. Eugene Black, of Texas having raised a point of order against the
privilege of the bill, the Speaker pro tempore \2\ ruled:
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Black, makes the point of order that
the bill reported and called up by the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Bland, is not a privileged bill under the rule, and therefore that the
motion that he has made is not in order at this time.
The rules of the House give to certain committees the right to report
certain bills within their jurisdiction at any time. Among the
committees that have that privilege is the Committee on Invalid
Pensions, to report general pension bills. In the reporting of private
bills the jurisdiction of the Committee on Invalid Pensions is
restricted to cases over which jurisdiction is not given to the other
pension committee, the Committee on Pensions. But in giving the
Committee on Invalid Pensions the right to report at any time specific
reference is made to general pension bills.
The Chair construes that to mean bills or legislation general in
character, as distinguished from bills of a private character, or
restricted in their purpose or effect.
The precedents seem to hold that the right to report legislation at
any time carries with it the right to have it considered at any time,
provided it is not in conflict with other rules of the House governing
the procedure and precedence of legislation. The Chair upon examining
the provisions of this bill finds that while it deals chiefly with the
administration of the Pension Bureau, in that it authorizes the
payments to be made monthly on the fourth day of each month beginning
not later than July, 1921, as distinguished from quarterly payments, as
has heretofore prevailed for some time, yet this provision seems to be
general in its character. It is not restricted to any particular class
of cases. Furthermore, by its second section it repeals legislation
which has heretofore been enacted which may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this bill, seemingly dealing with general legislation
which is now in force covering the same subject.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 2858.
\2\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2292
The Chair feels that under a strict and fair construction of the
rule, having in mind the idea that the rule when adopted was evidently
so framed and phrased as to expedite the business of the House, this
bill can fairly be considered as a general pension bill, being general
in its character, and therefore comes within the provisions of the rule
conferring authority upon the Committee on Invalid Pensions to report
at any time general pension bills, and the Chair overrules the point of
order.
2292. A ``general'' pension bill was defined as a pension bill
affecting a class of proposed beneficiaries and not certain specific
individuals.
A bill to extend the provisions of pension law to State militia was
held to be a general pension bill and privileged when reported by the
Committee on Invalid Pensions.
A privileged motion to proceed to the consideration of a general
pension bill reported by the Committee on Invalid Pensions is in order
on Friday as on other days.
On June 9, 1922,\1\ Mr. John W. Langley, of Kentucky, from the
Committee on Invalid Pensions, moved that the House resolve itself into
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the bill (H. R. 211) to extend the provisions of the
pension act of May 11, 1912, to the officers and enlisted men of all
State militia that rendered service to the Union cause during the Civil
War for a period of 90 days of more.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, made the point of order that
the bill was not priviledted and said:
The point of order is that the motion of the gentleman is not
privileged under the rules of the House. To-day is the second Friday of
the month. Under clause 6, Rule XXXIV, providing for the consideration
of bills on the Private Calendar, we find the following language:
``On Friday of each week, after the disposal of such business on the
Speaker's table as requires reference only, it shall be in order to
entertain a motion for the House to resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House to consider business on the Private Calendar in the
following order: On the second and fourth Fridays of each month
preference shall be given to the consideration of private pension
claims and bills removing political disabilities and bills removing the
charge of desertion.''
I wish to call the attention of the Chair to the fact that the bill
for which the gentleman asks unanimous consent for consideration in the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union is a public
bill, not on the Private Calendar, it being found on the Union
Calendar, and therefore does not come within the provisions of clause
6, Rule XXXIV, providing for consideration of business on the Private
Calendar.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ held:
The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Stafford, makes the point of order
that the motion of the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Langley, namely,
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for the consideration of H.R. 211, is not in
order at this time, and he directs the attention of the Chair to the
provision in clause 6 of Rule XXIV, which provides in substance that on
Friday of each week, after the disposition of such business on the
Speaker's table as requires reference only, it shall be in order to
entertain a motion that the House resolve itself into Committee of the
Whole House to consider business on the Private Calendar in the
following order: On the second and fourth Fridays of each month
preference shall be given to private pension claims and bills removing
political disabilities and bills removing desertion charges, and on
every Friday except the second and foruth Fridays the House
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 8482.
\2\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 2293
shall give preference to the consideration of bills from the Committee
on Claims and the Committee on War Claims, alternating between the two
committees.
The attention of the Chair also has been directed to the provision of
clause 56 of Rule XI, which provides that ``the following-named
committees shall have leave to report at any time on the matters herein
state: The Committee on Rules on rules, joint rules, and order of
business''; then, after enumerating several others, ``the Committee on
Invalid Pensions, general pension bills.'' The fact that this is the
second Friday of the month would not make this motion in order under
the provisions of clause 6 of Rule XXIV.
This bill, however, was reported by the Committee on Invalid Pensions
on March 27 last the Chair is advised, as a privileged bill reported
from the floor with all points of order reserved. It deals with the
pension act of May 11, 1912, by extending its provisions, not to
certain specific individuals but to a class of proposed beneficiaries
who heretofore have not come under the law relating to pensions.
The present occupant of the chair had occasion to pass upon a
question somewhat akin to this when the bill relating to the monthly
payment of pensions was reported. A point of order at that time was
made, that it was not in order to move to resolve the House into
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of that bill, because that proposed legislation was not
within the purview of the language of clause 56 of Rule XI. The Chair
at that time held that that language in the rule, namely, ``general
pension bills,'' meant ``bills or legislation general in character, as
distinguished from bills of a private character or bills restricted in
their purpose or effect. The precedents seem to hold that the right to
report legislation at any time carries with it the right to have tat
legislation considered at any time, provided it is not in conflict with
other rules of the House covering the procedure and precedence of
legislation.''
The Chair has examined the provisions of this bill--H.R. 211--and is
of opinion that it si general in character, in that it adds another
class to come within the benefit of the laws heretofore enacted for the
payment of pensions; and that while it is not in order under the
provisions of clause 6, Rule XXIV, it having been reported from the
floor as a privileged bill under the provisions of clause 56, Rule XI,
which would seem to be somewhat in conflict with clause 6 of Rule XIV,
this latter rule should, in the view of the Chair, be held superior.
This being a privileged bill, the gentleman from Kentucky in the
judgment of the Chair, is entitled to make the privileged motion to
resolve the House into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union for its consideration. The Chair therefore overrules the point of
order.
2293. While the Committee on Invalid Pensions is privileged to report
at any time on general pension bills, this right does not extend to the
Committee on Pensions.
On May 18, 1921,\1\ Mr. John M. Robsion, of Kentucky, proposed to
report from the floor the bill (H. R. 4.) pensioning soldiers and
sailors of the War with Spain, Philippine insurrection, and Chinese
Boxer rebellion campaign.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, raised a question of order and
inquired if a bill from the Committee on Pensions could be so reported.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The Chair thinks not. The Chair thinks it comes through the basket in
regular order. This is not from the Committee on Invalid Pensions. It
is from the Committe on Pensions. The rule specifies the Committee on
Invalid Pensions, but not the Committee on Pensions.
2294. Construction of the rule granting privilege to the Committee on
Printing.
In passing upon the privilege of resolutions reported by the
Committee on Printing the number of copies specified can not be
considered
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 1537.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2295
in determining the question as to whether such copies are for the use
of the House.
On January 14, 1909,\1\ Mr. Charles B. Landis, of Indiana, from the
Committee on Printing, reported as privileged this resolution:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That there be printed for the use of the House of Representatives
2,000,000 copies of the debate and proceedings in the House of
Representatives Friday, January 8, 1909, concerning that portion of the
annual message of the President relating to the Secret Service, to be
delivered through the folding room, excepting, 2,000, which shall be
assigned to the document room.
Mr. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, made the point of order
that it was not permissible by concurrent resolution to amend a statute
and, further, that the resolution was not privileged for the reason
that the number of copies specified was proof that all were not for the
``use of the House or two Houses,'' as required by the rule.
The Speaker \2\ decided:
Rule XI makes this report privileged. In the concurrent resolution
submitted it purports to be for the use of the House. That settles the
question in the opinion of the Chair as to the first point of order
that the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Gardner, makes.
Paragraph 4 of the act approved March 1, 1907, reads:
``Orders for printing extra copies otherwise than herein provided for
shall be by simple, concurrent, or joint resolution. Either House may
print extra copies to the amount of $500 by simple resolution; if the
cost exceeds that sum, the printing shall be ordered by concurrent
resolution except when the resolution is self-appropriating''--
And so forth.
Now, the gentleman's second point of order, it seems to the Chair, is
not well taken, for the reason that to sustain the point of order the
Chair would have to determine that the 2,000,000 copies were not for
the use of the House. If the Chair had that authority, to put an
extreme case, the Chair might hold that the printing of 2 or 2,000
copies, or any other number, was not for the use of the House. It is a
question of privilege under the points of order that the Chair passes
upon, and, in the opinion of the Chair, it is a matter as to the
propriety on the merits of the resolution for the House to pass upon.
Therefore the Chair overrules the points of order made by the gentleman
from Massachusetts.
2295. While reports from the Committee on Printing pertaining to
``printing for the House or two Houses'' are privileged, that privilege
does not extend to a bill providing for revision of the printing laws.
On May 2, 1914,\3\ Mr. Henry A. Barnhart, of Indiana, from the
Committee on Printing, proposing to report the bill (H. R. 15902) to
amend, revise, and codify the laws relating to the public printing and
binding and the distribution of Government publications, inquired of
the Speaker if the bill could be reported from the floor as within the
privilege of the committee to report at any time.
The Speaker \4\ held that the bill did not come within the privilege
conferred by the rule.
2296. The printing of hearings before a committee of the House was
held to be ``printing for the use of the House,'' and a resolution
authorizing
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 921.
\2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 7622.
\4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2297
such printing was construed to come within the privilege of the
Committee on Printing to report at any time.
On December 18, 1924,\1\ Mr. Edgar R. Kiess, of Pennsylvania, from
the Committee on Printing, presented, as privileged, the report of that
committee on the following resolution:
Resolved, That the hearing held before the Committee on the
Judiciary, Sixty-eighth Congress, first session, on the proposed child
labor amendments to the Constitution of the United States be printed as
a House document, and that 2,000 additional copies be printed for the
use of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
The Speaker \2\ ruled:
The Chair does not see why it does not come within the rule. Clause
56 of Rule XI provides:
``The following-named committees shall have leave to report at any
time on the matters herein stated, viz''--
Then the rule gives the list of committees. The rule mentions the
Committee on Printing and provides:
``on all matters referred to them of printing for the use of the
House or the two Houses.''
The Chair overrules the point of order.
2297. Privilege conferred on bills reported by the Committee on
Printing is confined to provisions for printing for the two Houses, and
an appropriation for such purpose destroys the privileged character of
the bill.
On April 30, 1930,\3\ Mr. Edward M. Beers, of Pennsylvania, by
direction of the Committee on Printing, proposed to call up as
privileged the following joint resolution:
Resolved, etc., That the Secretary of Agriculture be, and is hereby,
authorized to have printed, with illustrations, and bound in cloth
130,000 copies of the Special Report on the Diseases of Cattle, the
same to be revised and brought to date, of which 90,000 shall be for
the use of the House of Representatives, 25,000 for the use of the
Senate, and 5,000 for the use of the Department of Agriculture; and to
carry out the provisions of this resolution there is hereby
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the sum of $60,000, or so much thereof as may be
necessary.
Mr. Earl C. Michener, of Michigan, having questioned the privilege of
the bill, the Speaker \4\ said:
From the reading of the resolution, the Chair observes it carries a
direct appropriation, which destroys its privilege.
The Chair understood this was one of the ordinary privileged
resolutions; on the contrary, it carries a large appropriation, and of
course is not privileged, because the Committee on Printing has no
authority to report a resolution carrying an appropriation. Under the
circumstances the Chair will ask the gentleman to withhold his request
for the time being.
2298. Reports from the Committee on Printing when on provisions for
printing for the use of the Congress are privileged.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 785.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 8083.
\4\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 2299
On May 21, 1929,\1\ Mr. Edward M. Beers, of Pennsylvania, by
direction of the Committee on Printing, offered as privileged the
following resolution previously referred to that committee:
Resolved, That the address of President Hoover on law observance
delivered in New York City on April 22, 1929, at the annual luncheon of
the Associated Press in New York be printed as a House document and
that 10,000 additional copies be printed for the use of the House
document room.
Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, questioned the privilege of the
resolution.
The Speaker \2\ held that its provision came within the restrictions
of ``printing for the use of the two Houses,'' and overruled the point
of order.
2299. The privilege of the Committee on Accounts is confined to
resolutions making expenditures from the contingent fund.
The inclusion of matters not privileged destroys the privileged
character of a resolution.
Directions to the Postmaster of the House specifying the number of
mail deliveries was held to destroy the privilege of a resolution
reported by the Committee on Accounts.
On January 15, 1908,\3\ Mr. James A. Hughes, of West Virginia, from
the Committee on Accounts, presented, as privileged, the following
resolution:
Resolved, That the Postmaster of the House is hereby directed, in
pursuance of Rule VI, to deliver and collect mail at the offices of
Members, officers and employees of the House, and at committee rooms
not less than four times per day until otherwise ordered by the House:
Provided, That Members may also have mail delivered in the manner now
provided so far as may be desired; and such additional number of
messengers, not exceeding five, as may be necessary, in the discretion
of the Postmaster, to carry out the provisions of this resolution,
shall be employed by him during the sessions of the Sixtieth Congress,
to be paid out of the contingent fund of the House, at the rate of $100
per month each, until otherwise provided for by law.
Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, raised the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
The Speaker \4\ ruled:
This resolution provides that the Postmaster of the House be
directed, in pursuance of Rule VI, to deliver and collect mail at the
offices of Members, offices of employees of the House, and at committee
rooms not less than four times per day until otherwise ordered by the
House. That is one proposition. It is also provided that Members may
have mail delivered in the manner now prevailing, so far as may be
desired, and also that such additional number of messengers, not
exceeding five, as may be necessary, in the discretion of the
Postmaster, be employed to carry out the provisions of this resolution
during the session of the Sixtieth Congress, those messengers to be
paid out of the contingent fund, etc. Rule VI provides that the
Postmaster shall superintend the post office kept in the Capitol for
the accommodation of Representatives, Delegates, and officers of the
House, and be held responsible for the prompt and safe delivery of
their mail.
Clearly the latter part of this resolution, standing alone, is
privileged. It provides for the payment out of the contingent fund, and
it is for the service provided for by Rule VI. The Chair is perfectly
clear that if the first provision, which is mandatory for the
distribution of mail four times per day, were left off this resolution,
the resolution would be privileged, or if the resolu-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Journal, p. 211; Record, p.
1625.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 735.
\4\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 2300
tion provided under Rule VI for the performance of the duty of the
Postmaster, as provided in Rule VI, and there stopped, and then
provided for messengers, it seems to the Chair it would then be a
privileged matter.
Here is positive direction equivalent to a new rule of the House, or
at least providing that there should be so many distributions a day.
The Chair is inclined to think that destroys the privilege of the
resolution. The Chair reads from the Manual:
``The privilege of the Committee on Accounts is confined to
resolutions making expenditures from the contingent fund of the House.
* * * A resolution from the Committee on Accounts, relating to
management of the House restaurant, was not received, as a matter of
privilege.''
The Chair is inclined to think the question of privilege is destroyed
by the first provision of the resolution. By unanimous consent, if the
House desires to grant it, it is in the power of the House to consider
the resolution.
2300. The fact that a resolution reported by the Committee on
Accounts authorizes an expenditure from the contingent fund does not
necessarily render it privileged.
Legislative propositions relating to subjects within the jurisdiction
of other committees are not privileged when reported by the Committee
on Accounts because involving disbursements from the contingent fund.
Authorization of publications in connection with the service of the
House is a subject belonging to the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Printing and not the Committee on Accounts.
Unprivileged matter in a resolution otherwise privileged vitiates the
privilege of such resolutions.
On September 24, 1918,\1\ Mr. Frank Park, of Georgia, by direction of
the Committee on Accounts, proposed to report as privileged, this
resolution:
Resolved, That the preparation and publication of the Weekly
Compendium and Monthly Compendium, compiled and edited by W. Ray
Loomis, assistant superintendent of the document room of the House, is
hereby authorized to be continued, published, and distributed as
heretofore; and the Clerk of the House is hereby directed to pay out of
the contingent fund of the House, until otherwise provided for, extra
compensation to said Loomis at the rate $125 per month, from and after
December 31, 1917, the date when the preparation and publication of
said compilations began.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, raised a point of order and
said:
As I gleaned from hearing the resolution read, it involves an
authorization of some publication that has not heretofore been
authorized. The gentleman from Georgia presents this as privileged,
saying that it involves expenditures out of the contingent fund. That
does not necessarily mean that everything involving expenditures out of
the contingent fund shall be privileged. It involves matters relating
to the jurisdiction of other committees, and, as I heard it read, the
resolution authorizes a publication that has not heretofore been
authorized and properly should go to the Committee on Printing. The
Committee on Accounts should not take jurisdiction of matters that
relate to the Committee on Printing, even if it involves expenditures
out of the contingent fund.
The Speaker \2\ decided:
The point of order made by the gentleman from Wisconsin is well
taken. The resolution involves nonprivileged matter which vitiates the
privilege of the resolution.
2301. In exercising the right to report at any time the Committee on
Accounts may not include matters extraneous to its jurisdiction.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 10706.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 2301
Propositions limiting or enlarging the powers and discretion of
officers of the House in the discharge of administrative duties are not
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Accounts and nullify the
privilege of resolutions reported by that committee even though
associated with expenditures from the contingent fund.
Directions to the Clerk of the House to classify books and documents
in the House library and dispose of any surplus in conjunction with the
chairman of the Committee on the Disposition of Useless Executive
Papers and the Librarian of Congress was held to be a subject not
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Accounts.
Propositions relating to the convenience of Members of the House, as
the installation of elevators, were held to belong to the jurisdiction
of the Committee of Accounts, and privileged for report at any time in
connection with disbursements from the contingent fund.
On July 26, 1921,\1\ Mr. Clifford Ireland, of Illinois, for the
Committee on Accounts, offered as privileged this resolution:
Resolved, That the Clerk of the House is hereby directed to make a
survey and classification of the books and documents in the House
library and of the reserve stock stored in the House Office Building,
and to dispose of such excess volumes through the Superintendent of
Documents as provided by law, as, in the judgment of the Clerk, the
Librarian of Congress, and the Chairman of the Committee on Disposition
of Useless Executive Papers, may not be necessary as a reserve library
with which to supply the Hall Library. And the Clerk is further
directed, in conjunction with the Architect of the Capitol, to remove
the contents of the rooms now occupied by the House library, and to
refit and make ready said rooms for the occupancy of the journal clerk,
tally clerk, chief bill clerk, enrolling clerk, and their respective
assistants, and of such other employees of the Clerk's office as may
therein be accommodated. All expenses in connection with the execution
of this resolution, including labor, additional clerical assistance,
and equipment not exceeding $25,000 shall be paid out of the contingent
fund of the House upon vouchers approved by the Committee on Accounts.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, in raising a point of order said:
I make the point of order that this is not a privileged resolution.
It clothes the Clerk of the House with authority that he does not now
have either under the law or the rules of the House. It brings into the
determination of what is probably a legislative question the chairman
of the Committee on Disposition of Useless Executive Papers. It does
not bring in the committee, but just the chairman. Then it directs the
Clerk further, in conjunction with the Architect of the Capitol, to
remove the contents of the rooms now occupied by the House library. The
Clerk has no jurisdiction over the House library. It directs him to
refit and make ready said rooms. The Clerk of the House has no
jurisdiction under the law over the matter of refitting the rooms.
I venture to direct the attention of the Speaker to the fact that the
Committee on the disposition of Useless Papers is not a committee
created by the rules of the House alone. It is a committee created by
statute.
This resolution undertakes to confer upon the chairman of the
committee created not alone by the rules of the House but by law the
functions which ought to be performed by the full committee, if
performed at all.
The Speaker \2\ held:
The Chair is somewhat perplexed by this proposition. It has been held
in a number of cases that a proposition relating to the convenience of
Members of the House is privileged, such as the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 4316.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2302
building of elevators, and so forth. But the right to dispose of
documents is provided by law, and this does seem to change it by saying
that the Clerk shall dispose of them, not as now but with the
concurrence of the chairman of the Committee on the Disposition of
Useless Papers and the Librarian of Congress. It seems to the Chair
that that does change the power the Clerk now has by law, and so the
point of order is sustained.
2302. A resolution fixing salaries of House employees was held not
privileged when reported by the Committee on Accounts.
On February 17, 1920.\1\ Mr. Clifford Ireland, of Illinois, by
direction of the Committee on Accounts presented a report on the
following resolution:
Resolved, That the salary of one special employee of the House be
$2,800 per annum: Provided, That the said salary be paid out of the
contingent fund of the House of Representatives until otherwise
provided for by law.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, speaking to the point of order said:
The resolution is not privileged. The Committee on Accounts does not
have jurisdiction to fix the salary of employees. It can not report a
privileged resolution fixing a salary. The Committee on Accounts could
provide that there should be a certain amount paid out of the
contingent fund, which would increase the salary of this employee.
Automatically under the rules of the House, that would authorize the
Committee on Appropriations to provide an appropriation at an increased
salary. But this is legislation; it fixes the salary of the employee at
$1,800 and is not privileged.
The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order.
2303. A resolution providing for the employment of a designated
individual at a stated salary to be paid out of the contingent fund was
held to be privileged when reported by the Committee on Accounts.
On February 17, 1920,\3\ the Committee on Accounts reported a
resolution which the Clerk read as follows:
Resolved, That James Clark be appointed special messenger to serve in
and about the House under the direction of the Doorkeeper, at a salary
of $125 per month, to be paid out of the contingent fund of the House,
until otherwise provided for.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, having raised a question of order
against the resolution, Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, said:
Mr. Speaker, it provides for a new position, naming the incumbent,
the compensation to be payable out of the contingent fund of the House,
which is the very purpose of the Committee on Accounts. They have the
right to bring in resolutions of that kind.
The Speaker \4\ overruled the point of order.
2304. A resolution enlarging the powers and increasing the duties of
a standing committee through the employment of a clerk to be paid from
the contingent fund was held not to be within the privilege given the
Committee on Accounts to report at any time.
A resolution against which a point of order has been sustained is no
longer before the House and amendments thereto are not in order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3013.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3013.
\4\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2305
On February 7, 1922,\1\ the Committee on Accounts proposed to report
as privileged the resolution:
Resolved, That pending the election and qualifications of a successor
to the late Hon. J. K. Kalanianaole, Delegate from Hawaii, the
Committee on the Territories of the House of Representatives is
authorized to maintain and conduct the office of the late Delegate; and
for that purpose the chairman is authorized to employ a clerk at a
salary of $266 per month, the same to be paid from the contingent fund
of the House: Provided, That such payments shall cease on the day that
a new Delegate from Hawaii takes office.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, submitted that the resolution
contained matter which destroyed its privileged character.
The Speaker \2\ ruled:
The Chair thinks the resolution is subject to that point of order,
because the first part of it says that ``pending the election and
qualification of the successor to the late Hon. J. K. Kalanianaole,
Delegate from Hawaii, the Committee on the Territories of the House of
Representatives is authorized to employ a clerk.'' It makes the whole
resolution subject to a point of order.
Mr. Ireland said:
I maintain that it should not lose its privileged status simply
because of the additional legislation therein. Whether it makes an
appropriation for one month or for three months is immaterial. The
language transferring the jurisdiction to the Committee on the
Territories is perhaps surplusage. It would come under their
jurisdiction in any event, and possibly it was an error to include
that.
The Speaker said:
The Chair thinks it was an error to include it if it was intended to
make the resolution in order, because it is a well-settled principle
that where something not privileged is joined with matter that is
privileged the whole loses its privilege thereby, and the Chair thinks
the first part of the resolution is clearly not privileged, and
therefore that the whole resolution loses its privilege. The opinion of
the Chair has not been changed. The Chair is quite clear that the first
part of the resolution is not privileged, and therefore that takes away
the privilege of the whole resolution. The Chair suggests that the
resolution might be presented in such form that it would be in order.
Thereupon, Mr. Ireland proposed to amend the resolution by striking
out the following:
The Committee on the Territories of the House of Representatives is
authorized to maintain and conduct the office of the late Delegate.
The Speaker said:
The gentleman can offer a new resolution.
2305. A resolution providing additional compensation for employees of
the House to be paid from the contingent fund, when reported by the
Committee on Accounts, was held to come within the privilege given that
committee to report at any time.
On April 22, 1926,\3\ Mr.Clarence MacGregor, of New York, by
direction of the Committee on Accounts, reported as privileged a
resolution directing the Clerk of the House to pay out of the
contingent fund additional compensation to certain employees of the
House.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Second session, Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 2238.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 7982.
Sec. 2306
Mr. Eugene Black, of Texas, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
This form of resolution has been the practice for a number of years.
The Chair would think that the Committee on Accounts would not
undertake to add additional employees, but it certainly has been the
practice for a great many years to increase salaries by resolution. The
Chair overrules the point of order.
2306. The jurisdiction of the Committee on Accounts does not extend
to the contingent fund of the Senate and a resolution providing for
joint payment from the contingent funds of the two Houses was held not
to be privileged for report at any time.
On April 22, 1924,\2\ Mr. Clarence MacGregor, of New York, by
direction of the Committee on Accounts, called up, as privileged, the
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 19) authorizing the Architect of
the Capitol to contract for the extermination of pests in the Capitol
and in the Senate and House Office Buildings, and containing the
following:
That the expenditures in carrying out the contract be paid from the
contingent fund of the House and Senate in equal proportions and upon
vouchers authorized by the respective committees having control of the
contingent funds of the Senate and House of Representatives and
approved by the chairman thereof.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that reports
from the Committee on Accounts were privileged when relating to the
contingent fund of the House only.
The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order.
2307. The requirement that reports to printed was construed not to
preclude consideration before printing.
Failure of printed report to conform to report as originally
presented to the House was held not to prevent consideration.
When a standing committee reports on subject matter referred to it,
jurisdiction over it ceases unless recommitted.
The right of a Member to his seat may come up at any time as a
question of privilege, even though the subject may have been referred
to a committee.
On December 15, 1922,\4\ Mr. Frederick W. Dallinger, of
Massachusetts, from the Committee on Elections No. 1, called up the
contested election case of Paul v. Harrison, from Virginia.
Mr. R. Walton Moore, of Virginia, made the point of order that the
report had not been printed as required by the rules and said:
The report was sent to the Government Printing Office. It was placed
in type and the proof was turned over to the chairman of the committee.
That document, thus dealt with, is the only report that has ever been
brought into this House within the meaning of the rule. When
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 6900.
\3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\4\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 533; Journal,
p. 59.
Sec. 2307
the chairman received the proof he undertook to change the report. He
changed it elaborately. He changed it substantially and materially. For
example, the report having declared that certain precincts should not
be counted but disregarded altogether, the chairman changed that
feature of the report and varied the number of precincts to be treated
in that way. The chairman went further and added two independent
important sections, something like three to five hundred words, in
which he embodied calculations as to what would occur in the result on
this or that hypothesis. That paper was substituted for the original
paper and without any permission from the House. That paper went to the
Government Printing Office and was printed and distributed, and that is
what purports to be the report of the committee that is before us now.
The gentleman from Massachusetts called his committee together again,
and that committee proceeded to give its approval to this second paper,
which is now designated as a report. That action was taken without the
authority of this House.
There was an original reference to the committee of the case and
there was never any subsequent reference, and the central suggestion I
wish to submit is that when the committee presented here the first
paper that was agreed upon it exhausted its authority. Thereafter the
Committee on Elections was powerless to go a step further. That would
seem to be the view based upon common sense. If that is not a correct
view, then this House is under the control of a committee, however
arbitrarily it may choose to act.
Mr. Frank Mondell, of Wyoming, said in explanation:
The chairman of the committee can verify my statement. I am simply
stating my understanding of the case. The only changes made in the
original print were, I am told, changes made in order to include in the
print certain matter that was in the report as presented by the
chairman of the committee and omitted, probably by mistake, by the
printer, and there is nothing in the report now before the House that
was not in the original report. While a statement of this fact is not
necessary to the decision of the point of order, I think it best that
the fact be stated.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
The statement just made by the gentleman from Wyoming, Mr. Mondell,
of course, puts a new aspect upon the case, but it is not necessary for
the Chair to rule upon the discrepancy of fact. The Chair, to save
time, is ready to assume that the facts are as stated by the gentleman
from Virginia. If that is true, it is clear that the committee which
had jurisdiction to report this resolution, which the gentleman from
Massachusetts calls up, reported it.
The report was submitted to the House and this resolution went upon
the calendar, having been reported by the committee. That put it in the
care of the House. The Chair thinks that the gentleman from Virginia is
correct in arguing that the committee's authority was then exhausted
and the committee could not then make a new report without having the
matter again referred to it by the House. But it does not follow, it
seems to the Chair, that a point of order can be made against
consideration of the resolution because the provision of the rule which
requires the report shall be printed was not carried out. It is
undoubtedly desirable for the convenience of Members that they shall
have sufficient copies of the report at the time the matter comes
before the House.
In this case the Chair will assume that this report, which is before
the House, was not the same report that the committee made. But, of
course, no harm has ensued to anybody. A full report is simply the
argument of the committee. This is the report which the minority had
before them and which their statement of views answered. It is the
report that expressed the latest views of the committee. Apparently the
committee supposed they had the right to correct and amplify their
first report. As a matter of equity there could be no claim that this
report should not be considered as the valid report of the committee.
The only claim can be that, as a matter of strict technical law, the
fact that the report which the committee first made was not printed
prevents this resolution being in order.
There was here no improper vote, such as was referred to in the case
in Hinds', volume 4 section 3117. The report was properly made, and
this being an election case it is not even neces-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2308
sary that there should be any report at all to make it in order. It has
been held--Hinds', third volume, section 2584--that when an election
case was before the committee, and a Member in the House, without
waiting for the committee to report at all, moved a resolution on that
case, a resolution similar to the one that the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Dallinger, moves now, that even then, without any
report from the committee, that motion was in order. Much less, then,
in this case, where the committee did make a report to the House, as is
admitted, does such a point of order lie against the consideration of
the resolution. The Chair overrules the point of order.
2308. The requirement that reports be printed is not interpreted as
making the printing of a report a condition precedent to the
consideration of the bill on which made.
On January 5, 1926,\1\ Mr. Louis C. Cramton, of Michigan, by
direction of the Committee on Appropriations presented the report of
that committee on the Interior Department appropriation bill, which was
referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.
Subsequently, on the same day, Mr. Cramton moved that the House
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union for the consideration of this bill.
Mr. Fiorella H. LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that
the report had not yet been printed as required by the rules and the
bill was therefore not in order for present consideration.
The Speaker \2\ ruled:
The Chair is quite prepared to concede that as a general rule it is
better procedure in reporting a bill of grave importance like this--an
appropriation bill--to permit it to lie over for one day. The Chair is
not called upon to rule on that question, however. If he were, on this
particular occasion he would say that the most abundant fairness is
given to every Member of the House, in view of the statement of the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Cramton, in charge of the bill, that there
will be three days of general debate; but the Chair is not called upon
to decide that question. The only question before the Chair is whether
under the rules it is in order to bring up for consideration a
privileged bill on the day on which the bill and the report are
presented. There is no question in the Chair's mind on that point at
all. There is nothing in the rules that provides that a bill of this
sort, a privileged bill, shall lie over for one day. Even in the case
of bills not privileged there is nothing in the rules which provides
that while the report and the bill must be printed they can not be
considered on the day they are reported. The Chair does not think there
is any possible doubt about the situation in this case. The Chair,
therefore, overrules the point of order.
2309. On January 18, 1907,\3\ Mr. Lucius Nathan Littauer, of New
York, by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, reported the
bill (H. R. 2454) the deficiency appropriation bill.
Later, on the same day, Mr. Littauer moved that the House resolve
itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union
for the consideration of the deficiency bill.
The point having been raised that the report had not yet been printed
and consideration of the bill was not in order until the report had
been printed as provided
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, pp. 1507, 1525.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\3\ Second session Fifty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 1348.
Sec. 2310
by the rules, the Speaker \1\ held that the only essential requirement
before consideration was that the report be in writing, and this being
complied with it was not necessary to wait until it also had been
printed.
2310. Ordinarily the House proceeds to the consideration of a
privileged question only on motion authorized by the Committee
reporting thereon.
The privilege of a question is not affected by the nature of the
report thereon and a resolution privileged under the rule occupies the
same status when reported adversely as when reported favorably.
A point of order having been made, all points of order on the same
proposition should be submitted before decision on any.
By an exceptional decision it was held that a resolution of inquiry
was privileged for consideration only on motion authorized by the
committee having jurisdiction.
A resolution of inquiry asking for ``reason'' and ``cause'' was held
to ask for opinions rather than facts.
On December 13, 1924,\2\ Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York,
proposed to call up the resolution (H. Res. 365) requesting the
Secretary of the Treasury to furnish to the House of Representatives
certain information regarding Robert J. Owens, a prohibition agent.
Mr. L. C. Dyer, of Missouri, made the point of order that the
resolution had been reported adversely by the Committee on the
Judiciary and that Mr. LaGuardia, not being a member of that committee,
was not authorized to call it up.
Mr. Everett Sanders, of Indiana, inquired if other points of order
against the privilege of the resolution should be presented immediately
or deferred until the pending point of order had been disposed of.
The Speaker thereupon recognized Mr. Sanders and Mr. Nicholas
Longworth, of Ohio, to submit further points of order.
Mr. Sanders, submitted the further point of order that the House had
by special order set aside the day for the consideration of business on
the Private Calendar otherwise in order on the preceding Friday.
Mr. Longworth made the additional point of order that the resolution
in asking for cause and reasons asked for opinions rather than facts.
In debating the question as to whether authorization by the committee
was requisite, Mr. Louis C. Cramton, of Michigan, said:
Mr. Speaker, I am not interested in the subject matter of the
resolution. I am, however, somewhat jealous of the protection of the
rights of Members and the protection of the rights of minorities with
reference to resolutions of inquiry. If it should be held that the
point of order made by the gentleman from Missouri is correct it means
to do away with the right which a minority heretofore has had with
reference to resolutions of inquiry.
The point of order of the gentleman from Missouri is that a report
having been made upon the resolution, that report having been adverse,
that no one now can call up that resolution and the report on it except
a member of the committee. I did not see where they get the authority
for the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\2\ Second session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 605.
Sec. 2310
statement that no one but a member of the committee can call up the
resolution in view of an adverse report. The only provision of the
rules that has to do with this subject is as follows:
``All resolutions of inquiry addressed to the heads of executive
departments shall be reported to the House within one week after
presentation.''
Under that rule has grown up the practice of the House giving to the
resolution of inquiry a privileged status. All that the rule definitely
requires is that the committee shall report, but the report of the
committee is an idle ceremony unless it does lead to possible
consideration by the House. If it is to be held that the resolution
itself when reported has no privilege, then it is easy to see how a
majority in this House can entirely put the lid on resolutions of
inquiry. The majority in the House having control of the Rules
Committee, having a majority on the committees, can secure an adverse
report upon a resolution of inquiry. Is it to be understood that that
adverse report absolutely prevents the getting up of a resolution for a
vote by the House?
If it is to be so held, then a minority no longer can get a vote in
this House upon a resolution of inquiry perhaps addressed to an
administration that is politically opposed.
It would be strange, indeed, if a man who introduces a resolution
shall be held to lose the right to call it up in this House--a right
equal to that of any other Member--unless there is something explicit
in the rules to that effect, and there is not.
There is a rule that provides that when there is an adverse report
upon any bill, that bill shall lie upon the table, unless within three
days some Member of the House--not only a member of the committee, but
some Member of the House--asks to have that bill put on the calendar,
where it belongs, and any Member of the House has the right to have
that bill put on the calendar, notwithstanding an adverse report. Show
me a line here that restricts to a member of the committee the right to
call up a bill on which there has been an adverse report.
Where is there in the rules any statement restricting to a member of
the committee the right to call up a bill or resolution on which there
is an adverse report?
If there is any restriction as to the rights of the gentleman it is
incumbent upon those who allege such restrictions to point them out. In
the absence of them, if they are to hold that an adverse report from a
committee on a resolution of inquiry shall deny to its introducer an
opportunity to get a vote of this House upon the resolution, then you
have done away with that outlet, which has been in this House historic
as to the protection of the rights of the minority. Logically it would
be an idle ceremony to require a committee to report within seven days
and then not give an opportunity for consideration of the report after
it should be made.
So, Mr. Speaker, I repeat. I am not concerned about the resolution. I
assume that I shall not vote for it if it comes up for consideration,
but I do not want a ruling that will put an end to any opportunity of
Members or of a minority to call upon the administrative heads for
information.
The purpose of the resolution of inquiry, its very nature, is to be
used by the minority. The majority in harmony with the administration
can get information, but if you are to hold that an adverse decision of
a committee of this House shall prevent the House itself from having
the right to decide the question, then you have done away with the
resolution of inquiry.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
It seems to the Chair that this question is rather academic. It is
certainly so if what the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Dyer, states is
the fact, that in the report are given the full reasons of the
department. But it is none the less to be decided.
Three points of order are made. As to the day, the Chair finds that
the order yesterday was simply that bills on the Private Calendar,
reported from the Committee on Claims, be in order for consideration
tomorrow. It seems to the Chair that does not prevent the consideration
of other privileged business, if the House so desires.
The second point of order is: Can it be brought up by the gentleman
from New York, Mr. LaGuardia, he not being a member of the committee,
which made the report? This rule was adopted in 1880, and when it was
first reported by Mr. Randall it simply provided that any motion of
inquiry should be referred to a committee. Then it was contended by
some Members
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2311
that there should be some constraint on that committee, and, therefore,
the addition was made that such committee should report within one
week, and since then, without any special provision in the rule, it has
been held that if the committee did not report within that week the
Member who offered the resolution should have the right to bring it up
as a matter of privilege. There is no special reason, given in any
decision the Chair has been able to find, for establishing that right,
but the Chair supposes it is to compel the committee to do its duty. It
is logical, if the committee does not do its duty, that the House
should have the right, without the action of the committee, to
immediately proceed to consider the subject. But there is nothing in
the rule which provides what shall be done when the committee does
report, and consequently it has been held that such a report is
privileged, and, it seems to the Chair, it must stand just like any
other privileged report of a committee. The Chair can see no reason for
any difference in the privilege, whether it is adverse or whether it is
favorable. But the Chair is unable to see any reason why this case
should be held by decision to be different from all other cases. It is
always held that the only person who can bring up a bill is the Member
authorized by the committee. There are some privileged bills now on the
calendar which are subject to be brought up, but nobody can bring them
up except the member of the committee authorized to do so, and in the
absence of any expression in the rules or of any precedents by a
decision the Chair does not feel authorized to hold that there is any
different right in this case than in any other case.
Then as to the point that is made by the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Longworth, the rulings have been continuous that such a resolution must
call simply for the facts and not for opinions. It does seem to the
Chair that calling for the reason why the act was done is calling for
an opinion by the official who performed that act. It is asking his
motive. Of course, the language could be drawn so as to ask the facts
on which he based his action, but to ask the motive and the reason of
his action, it seems to the Chair, also makes this resolution subject
to the point of order. So the Chair sustains the point of order.
2311. A standing committee, unlike a select committee, is not
discharged from consideration of a subject within its jurisdiction by
reason of having reported thereon.
A standing committee having reported a bill relating to a subject
within its jurisdiction is not thereby precluded from reporting other
bills subsequently referred to it dealing with the same subject matter.
The fact that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries had
reported a bill relating to radio communication was held not to prevent
it from reporting a further bill on that subject and calling it up for
consideration in preference to the bill first reported.
There being no question as to the facts affecting the validity of a
report the Speaker decided that it should be received.
The Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries has general
jurisdiction over radio matters.
On March 12, 1926, \1\ during the Calendar Wednesday call of
committees, Mr. Frank D. Scott, of Michigan, from the Committee on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, called up the bill (H. R. 9971) for the
regulation of radio communications.
Mr. Tom D. McKeown, of Oklahoma, made the point of order that the
bill was improperly on the calendar for the reason that the committee
having previously reported a similar bill (H.R. 9108) had been thereby
automatically discharged from consideration of the subject matter.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 5477.
Sec. 2312
After debate, the Speaker \1\ ruled:
The Chair has followed with interest the ingenious argument of the
gentleman from Oklahoma, which was well thought out, carefully
prepared, and well delivered, but the Chair finds himself quite unable
to follow the logic of the gentleman from Oklahoma in this case.
What are the facts? In the mind of the Chair, they are extremely
simple. On February 27, 1926, Mr. Scott, chairman of the Committee on
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, reported House bill 9108, a bill for
the regulation of radio communications, and for other purposes.
Subsequently, on the 3d of March, Mr. White, of Maine, introduced a
bill which was referred to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, and reported to the calendar on March 5, 1926. That bill
differed in some number of details from House bill 9971. In the
judgment of the Chair, the argument advanced by the gentleman from
Oklahoma could only hold in one of two cases, either that the Committee
on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries was a select committee or that the
action taken by the committee was an actual reconsideration of the
action taken on House bill 9108. Of course, the Committee on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries is a standing committee. There is some
reason for the rule that where a select committee is appointed for a
certain purpose it loses jurisdiction entirely over the subject matter
after it reports a certain bill because it is automatically dissolved,
but there can be no question that no rights are taken away from any
standing committee as to its jurisdiction by the reporting or
nonreporting of any particular bill.
It is plain in the mind of the Chair that the action taken with
regard to House bill 9971 was in no manner a reconsideration of the
action taken on House bill 9108. Though it differs in detail it is just
as much within the jurisdiction of the committee as was House bill
9108. In House bill 9971 section 4 of House bill 9108 does not appear,
and besides there are other amendments; but the Chair thinks the bill
is very greatly altered by the elimination of section 4, which, in the
opinion of the Chair--although this is a matter that it is not
necessary for the Chair to decide here--is a matter probably not within
the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
but of another committee. However, the fact is, and it is undenied,
that the House bill which the chairman of the committee has just called
up for consideration is a different proposition from a bill which the
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries previously reported, and
there is no question in the world but that on Calendar Wednesday it is
within the province of any committee to call up any bill reported by
it.
The Chair thinks there is no question of the right of the gentleman
from Michigan to call up House bill 9971 and to consider it in the
House under the rules applying to Calendar Wednesday. The Chair,
therefore, overrules the point of order.
In response to an inquiry from Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New
York, the Speaker added:
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries has general
jurisdiction over radio matters; there is no question about that.
2312. A report when presented is not debatable unless privileged for
immediate consideration.
A motion for rereference of a bill comes too late after the bill has
been reported to the House.
A report when presented may be withdrawn by unanimous consent only.
On March 23, 1921, \2\ Mr. Halvor Steenerson, of Minnesota, presented
the following report from the Committee on the Post Office and Post
Roads:
The Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, to whom was referred
the petition (Exhibit A) signed by Joseph Dixon and 19 other citizens
of the city of St. Louis, in the State of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\2\Second session sixty-sixth Congress, Record, P. 4746.
Sec. 2313
Missouri, charging Colin M. Selph, the duly appointed and acting
postmaster of the city of St. Louis, a United States post office of the
first lass, with certain high crimes and misdemeanors in office,
therein specified and set forth, and which, if found to be true,
constitute grounds for impeachment, together with a petition (exhibit
B) signed by Joseph Dixon and other citizens of the city of St. Louis,
in support of said charges, and a further petition (Exhibit C) signed
by Robert J. Ebrecht and other citizens of the city of St. Louis,
report the same back with the recommendation that said charges and
papers be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, with directions
to investigate the same and take such action as may be proper in the
premises.
The report having been read by the Clerk, Mr. Steenerson was
proceeding to debate it when Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, made the
point of order that the report not being privileged was not in order
for consideration and Mr. Steenerson could not be recognized to debate
it.
The Speaker\1\ sustained the point of order.
Mr. Steenerson then proposed to move that reference of the matter be
changed from the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that after
the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads had reported it was too
late to offer a motion for change of reference.
The Speaker sustained the point of order.
Whereupon Mr. Steenerson asked unanimous consent to withdraw the
report. Mr. Garner objected and the report was referred to the
calendar.
2313. An instance wherein a committee filed a supplemental report.
On January 13, 1921,\2\ Mr. Edward C. Little, of Kansas, by direction
of the Committee on Revision of the Laws, submitted by delivery to the
Clerk a supplementary report\3\ on the bill (H.R. 9389) to consolidate,
codify, revise, and reenact the general and permanent laws of the
United States in force March 4, 1919, which said report was ordered to
be printed.
2314. A member of the minority party on a committee is sometimes
ordered to make the report.
Under exceptional circumstances a minority member of a committee has
sometimes presented the report of the committee to the House.
On May 8, 1922,\4\ Mr. William F. Stevenson, of South Carolina, a
minority member of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes
of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the joint
resolution (S. J. Res. 132) to provide for the continuance of certain
Government publications, by direction of that committee, presented the
conference report, which was thereupon considered and agreed to.
2315. On January 23, 1924, Mr.\5\ Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, a
minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means, by direction of
that committee, presented to the House a report on the bill (H. R.
5557) to authorize the settlement of the indebtedness to the Republic
of Finland to the United States of America.
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\1\ Frederick H. Gillette, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Third session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 1392.
\3\ Report No. 781, Part 2.
\4\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6522.
\5\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Report No. 89.
Sec. 2316
On May 3, 1924,\1\ Mr. Crisp, by direction of the committee,
submitted a report on the bill to authorize the settlement of the
indebtedness of the Kingdom of Hungary; on December 12, 1924,\2\ a
similar report on the bill for the settlement of the indebtedness of
the Republic of Lithuania; on December 13, 1924,\3\ on the indebtedness
of the Republic of Poland; on January 8, 1926,\4\ on the indebtedness
of the Kingdom of Italy; on January 7, 1926,\5\ reports on the
indebtedness of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republics of Estonia, and
Latvia, and the Kingdom of Rumania.
2316. The ordinary motion to discharge a committee from the
consideration of an unprivileged legislative proposition is not
privileged.
A motion for disposition of a resolution is not admissible while a
point of order against the privilege of its consideration is pending.
Motions to discharge committees from consideration of questions
privileged under the Constitution, as the right of a Member to his seat
or the right to consider a vetoed bill, frequently have been held in
order.
A charge that a committee has been inactive in regard to a subject
committed to it does not constitute a question of privilege.
Dicta to the effect that a resolution and preamble proposing
investigation of charges of corruption against the membership of a
committee or a Member of the House is privileged.
On June 14, 1910,\6\ Mr. Choice B. Randell, of Texas, offered, as
affecting the privileges of the House, the following preamble and
resolution:
Whereas a bill (H. R. 24318) entitled a bill ``To prohibit the giving
or receiving of gifts, employment, or compensation from certain
corporations by Senators, Representatives, Delegates, or Resident
Commissioners in the Congress of the United States, or Senators,
Representatives, Delegates, or Resident Commissioners elect, and the
judges and justices of the United States courts, and prescribing
penalties therefore,'' was duly introduced in the House of
Representatives and on April 9, 1910, was referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary and is now before that committee; and
Whereas said bill (H. R. 24318), among other things, contains
provisions making it unlawful and penal for Members of the Congress of
the United States, during their term of service, to receive any free
transportation of person or property, or frank, franking privilege, or
money, or other thing of value, or to directly or indirectly hold or
take any office, employment, or service, or to receive any salary, fee,
or pay as officer, agent, representative, or attorney from any railroad
company, or ship, express, telegraph, telephone, or sleeping-car
company, or any public-service corporation, or any corporation
chartered by an act of the Congress of the United States, or any firm,
company, or corporation organized or conducted in violation of the
antitrust laws of the United States, or any corporation engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce, or any person, firm, or corporation
interested in legislation or other business of Congress; and
Whereas the controlling membership on said Judiciary Committee, and
especially the chairman of the committee and the chairman of the
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, to which said bill (H. R.
24318) has been referred by the full committee, are personally
interested in the subject-matter of said bill (H. R. 24318) and have
been, and are now, receiving gifts, franks,
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\1\ Report No. 654.
\2\ Second session Sixty-eighth Congress, Report No. 1045.
\3\ Report No. 1046.
\4\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Report No. 63.
\5\ Reports Nos. 47, 48, 49, 46.
\6\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 8064.
Sec. 2316
employment, and compensation of great and pecuniary value, such as
would be prohibited by the terms of said bill (H. R. 24318) if the same
should become a law; and
Whereas the said Judiciary Committee, on account of personal
interest, is incompetent and disqualified from justly and properly
considering and acting upon said bill (H. R. 24318), and have failed to
report said bill (H. R. 24318) back to the House of Representatives,
either favorably or unfavorably, and have failed to make known to the
House their disqualification by reason of personal interest to pass
upon said bill (H. R. 24318); and
Whereas the retention of said bill (H. R. 24318) by the Judiciary
Committee is contrary to public propriety and policy, and, by reason of
the personal interest of its members adverse to the provisions of said
bill, directly affects the rights of this House collectively, and the
safety, dignity, and integrity of its proceedings: Therefore be it
Resolved, That the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives be, and it is hereby requested and instructed to
immediately report back to the House said bill (H. R. 24318) for the
further action and consideration thereon by this House.
Mr. George R. Malby, of New York, made the point of order that the
resolution was not privileged.
Pending the decision of the Speaker, Mr. Albert Douglas, of Ohio,
moved to strike out the preamble.
A point of order by Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, that no motion
relating to the resolution was in order while the question as to its
privilege was pending, was sustained by the Speaker.\1\
Debate on the point of order having been concluded, the Speaker
ruled:
The Chair listened to the reading of this resolution. In its preamble
it makes very serious and grave charges against the personnel of the
Committee on the Judiciary, and then winds up, not with a resolution to
investigate those charges by a standing or select committee to see
whether they be true or not, but with a resolution as follows:
``Therefore be it resolved, That the Judiciary Committee of the House
of Representatives be, and it is hereby, instructed to immediately
report back to the House said bill for further action and consideration
thereon by this House.''
Now, there are some cases where a motion to discharge a committee is
in order. There are some questions of high constitutional privilege on
which it is in order for the House to proceed without reference to a
committee. Amongst that class are the right of a Member to his seat in
the House and the right to consider a vetoed bill. Those are questions
of privilege arising under the Constitution, and a motion to discharge
a committee from consideration of a privileged resolution of that class
has been frequently held in order. But in that case the subject that it
was proposed to take from the committee was privileged.
Now, it is proposed to take an unprivileged subject from the
Committee on the Judiciary, for the House to deal with that question
after the committee is discharged, and the gentleman, as a foundation,
puts in his whereases, and commences the resolution with ``Therefore be
it resolved.''
Now, while the gentleman presents, so far as the preamble is
concerned, a question that might grow into a question of privilege, so
far as the substance of the resolution is concerned he presents an
entirely unprivileged question. There are many precedents, of which the
Chair will cite one:
``A resolution relating to matters undoubtedly involving privilege,
but also relating to other matters not of privilege, may not be
entertained as of precedence over the ordinary business in regular
order.
``A privileged proposition may not be amended by adding thereto
matter not privileged or germane to the original question.''
The precedents are many, under Speakers Reed, Crisp, and Henderson,
and made by the recent occupant of the chair, and, therefore, made in
all these cases by the House.
Now, a charge that a committee has been inactive in regard to a
subject committed to it was decided not to constitute a question of
privilege. That is a decision by Mr. Speaker Crisp, and is along the
line of many other precedents that the Chair will not take the time of
the House to refer to.
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\1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 2317
If this motion to discharge the committee that has charge of a matter
that is not privileged under the Constitution is privileged, then there
are, in round numbers, 20,000 other matters pending before committees
which are privileged, and under the gentleman's theory the motion to
discharge the committee from consideration of a bill, for inaction or
otherwise, would require a session of Congress lasting into several
decades to dispose of them all.
The gentleman seems to have brought in a number of whereases here to
bolster up, seemingly, unsubstantiated charges against a committee of
the House, concluding with a ``therefore'' to pull through that which
is not in order. If the gentleman really wanted to discharge this
Committee on the Judiciary from further consideration of this bill,
there is a motion that is in order immediately after the reading of the
Journal. By unanimous consent first, or by direction of another
committee, it is in order to move to discharge a committee from the
consideration of any bill and refer it to another committee. That has
very frequently been resorted to in the history of legislative
proceedings. Back in the time of Mr. Speaker Carlisle a motion was made
by the Committee on Agriculture to discharge the Committee on Ways and
Means from consideration of what was known as the oleomargarine bill.
And while, in the opinion of many, the Ways and Means Committee had
jurisdiction under the rules of the House, a majority of the House,
under a parliamentary motion, voted to take the bill from the Ways and
Means Committee and refer it to the Committee on Agriculture. So that
the gentleman, if he merely desires to change this bill from one
committee to another, has full power to make a motion under the rules
any day after the reading of the Journal. If the gentleman desires,
however, to introduce privileged matter making charges against the
membership of the committee, or against any Member of the House from
the standpoint of corruption, the proper way is to propose
investigation by a resolution for that purpose, and such a preamble and
resolution would, in the opinion of the Chair, be privileged. But a
preamble suggesting improper conduct by the committee can hardly be
made a vehicle for carrying through a procedure not in order under the
rules affecting a bill not privileged above other bills. The Chair
sustains the point of order.
An appeal from the decision of the Chair by Mr. Randell was laid on
the table, yeas 121, nays 20.
2317. The report of a joint commission constituted by law, with
minority views thereon, was received and, with a bill recommended by
the commission, was referred to the Union Calendar.
On June 3, 1924,\1\ Mr. Carl E. Mapes, of Michigan, by direction of
the Joint Committee on Reorganization, presented from the floor the
report \2\ of that committee.
This joint committee, consisting of three Members of the Senate and
three Members of the House, was created by joint resolution (S. J. Res.
191) agreed to in the third session of the Sixty-sixth Congress.
The committee, being authorized to report ``by bill or otherwise,''
submitted with their report a bill, the title of which was read by the
clerk as follows:
A bill (H. R. 9629) to provide for the reorganization and more
effective coordination of the executive branch of the Government, to
create a department of education and relief, and for other purposes.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton inquired if it would be in order to reserve
points of order on the bill.
The Speaker \3\ replied in the negative, and referred the report,
with minority views and the bill recommended by the committee, to the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. No further
action on the bill appears.
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\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 10329.
\2\ Senate Document No. 128.
\3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.