[Federal Register: November 15, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 219)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 65523-65528]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr15no04-5]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2002-NM-153-AD; Amendment 39-13859; AD 2004-23-04]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A319 and A320 Series
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes, that
requires a modification and replacement affecting all fuel tanks. All
affected airplanes require the installation of fuses in the wiring of
the fuel quantity indicating probes of all fuel tanks. Some affected
airplanes also require replacement of the high-level sensors of the
additional center tanks (ACTs) with new sensors. For all affected
airplanes, these actions are necessary to prevent overheating of the
fuel probes due to a short circuit. For some affected airplanes, these
actions are necessary to prevent fuel leakage due to inadequate space
for thermal expansion within the ACTs. Such conditions could result in
fuel vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source and/or consequent
fire/explosion in the center fuel tanks. These actions are intended to
address the identified unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective December 20, 2004.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the
[[Page 65524]]
regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of
December 20, 2004.
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac
Cedex, France. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html
.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425)
227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149.
Relationship of This AD to SFAR 88
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in
recent fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes,
including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of
airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance
practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we
issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements'' (67 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new
airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance
requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation
No. 88 (SFAR 88).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in
combination with another latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
Based on this process, we have determined that the actions
identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition
sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel
vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Proposed AD
A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is
applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes was
published in the Federal Register on November 17, 2003 (68 FR 64823).
That action proposed to require a modification and replacement
affecting the center and wing fuel tanks. All affected airplanes would
require modification of the wiring of the fuel quantity indicating
probes of the center and wing fuel tanks. Some affected airplanes would
also require replacement of the high-level sensors of the additional
center fuel tank with new, improved sensors.
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
Supportive Comments
One commenter supports the proposed AD; one commenter supports the
intent of the proposed AD.
Requests To Extend Compliance Time
One commenter notes a large disparity between the two limitations
in the proposed accomplishment time of ``Within 4,000 flight hours or
30 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever is first.'' The
commenter suggests that the FAA consider changing the timeline to
flight hours or a calendar month, which is more closely tied to actual
airplane utilization. The commenter adds that utilization of these
airplanes could be as high as 9,000 flight hours during the proposed
30-month compliance time. The commenter asks that the compliance time
be changed to 9,000 flight hours or 30 months, whichever is first.
Another commenter also recommends that the compliance time be changed
to 9,000 flight hours or 30 months, whichever is first, and provided no
justification for the recommendation.
A third commenter states that, based on airplane utilization, the
flight-hour threshold will occur first, and result in a 14-month
schedule for completion. The commenter adds that, based on the
instructions outlined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1087,
accomplishment of the actions is possible only during a base
maintenance visit. The commenter notes that the compliance limits will
penalize operators with long-to-medium-range missions. The commenter
recommends that the compliance time be extended to 5,500 flight hours
or 30 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs
first. The commenter states that this will allow operators to utilize
routine base maintenance visit opportunities where appropriate tooling,
ground equipment, and qualified skill set are available.
A fourth commenter states that including a flight-hour limit in the
compliance time suggests that the failure mode being addressed by the
mandatory activity is sensitive to flight hours in service. The
commenter notes that the failure mode addressed by Service Bulletin
A320-28-1087 (wiring insulation breakdown/damage) is primarily related
to calendar age. The commenter adds that, while the flight-hour limit
may have value, it is not the crucial parameter. The commenter's in-
service airplanes average about eight hours of flying per day, which
means that the 4,000-flight-hour limit would require that the actions
be done on all affected airplanes within about 500 days. This period is
55 percent of the calendar time afforded by the compliance time, and is
less than the C-check interval. The commenter states that doing the
actions on all airplanes within 4,000 flight hours would put an
additional burden and cost on its operation. The commenter suggests
extending the compliance time to 6,000 flight hours, which will not
compromise the level of safety.
We do not agree with the commenters. In developing an appropriate
compliance time for this action, we considered the safety implications,
operators' normal maintenance schedules, and the compliance time
[[Page 65525]]
recommended by the airplane manufacturer for the timely accomplishment
of the required actions. The compliance time is based on airplane
utilization overall. In addition, operators provided no data to support
that a compliance time extension will ensure safety. In consideration
of these items, we have determined that compliance within 4,000 flight
hours or 30 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever is
first, will provide an acceptable level of safety and is an appropriate
interval of time wherein the required actions can be accomplished
during scheduled maintenance intervals for the majority of affected
operators. However, according to the provisions of paragraph (b) of
this AD, we may approve requests to adjust the compliance time if the
request includes data that justify that a different compliance time
would provide an acceptable level of safety. No change to the AD is
made in this regard.
Request To Delay Issuance of the Proposed AD
One commenter states that it previously elected not to do the
actions required by the proposed AD on affected airplanes (reference
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, Revision 02). This was because the
Direction G[eacute]n[eacute]rale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is
the airworthiness authority for France, found the Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' Amendment 21-78, and
subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83) compliance solution proposal
submitted by Airbus to be sufficient for compliance with French
airworthiness directive 2002-220(B) R1, dated October 15, 2003;
although further discussions with the FAA and the DGAC were necessary.
These discussions were expected to include the possibility of a
requirement to install transient suppression units. Correspondence
between the commenter and Airbus confirmed that, in the event that
transient suppression units were specified in future rulemaking, the
fused adapter/connection installation specified in the service bulletin
would be revised. The commenter adds that, according to its cost model,
the proposed AD would cost over $500,000 for its fleet. The commenter
objects to spending the money if the solution is only interim, with
introduction of transient suppression units to follow. The commenter
strongly encourages a permanent solution to be introduced and
regulated, and is not aware of any in-service data that would suggest
that airplane safety could be compromised by delaying the interim
solution until introduction of a permanent solution.
We do not agree with the commenter that an alternate solution is
necessary, as the modification required by the proposed AD is not an
interim action. We have examined the underlying safety issues involved
in fuel tank explosions on several transport airplanes. As a result of
those findings, we issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel
Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and
Inspection Requirements.'' In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included SFAR No. 88. Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain
type design holders to perform design reviews, and to develop design
changes and maintenance procedures if necessary. We intend to adopt ADs
to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions
identified during these reviews. Based on this process, we have
determined that the modification required by this AD is necessary to
address the identified unsafe condition.
Request To Clarify Summary Section
One commenter states that the Summary section of the proposed AD
has significant inaccuracies due to the assimilation of two independent
unsafe conditions, as identified in the referenced French airworthiness
directive. The unsafe conditions require mandatory action, which is
achieved by applying the two service bulletins referenced in the
proposed AD. The commenter notes that the reason there are two service
bulletins, and only one French airworthiness directive, is to minimize
the cost impact on the three airplanes requiring correction of both
unsafe conditions.
Additionally, the commenter states that the Summary section does
not properly distinguish between additional center tanks (ACTs) and
center wing tanks, which could lead to misinterpretation of any
corrective action necessary. The commenter notes that Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-28-1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002 (cited in
the proposed AD as an appropriate source of service information for
accomplishment of certain actions), affects the ACTs on the three
airplanes specified above only. The commenter adds that the identified
modifications reposition the high-level sensors to ensure there is a
minimum of two percent expansion space in the applicable ACT, and
correct a non-compliance to Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR) 25.969.
This non-compliance issue could result in fuel overflowing from the ACT
to the left wing surge tank in the event of thermal expansion of the
fuel in the ACT. The commenter also adds that the bracket that the
high-level sensor is attached to, not the high-level sensor, is the
part that has been improved.
The commenter also states that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003 (cited in the proposed AD as an
appropriate source of service information for accomplishment of certain
actions), affects all fuel tanks (all wing tanks and all ACTs), on the
affected airplanes. The modification identified is to install fuses in
the fuel quantity indicating (FQI) harnesses at or near the fuel tank
walls, which corrects a non-compliance with JAR 25.981. This non-
compliance issue could result in the ignition of flammable fuel vapors
in a fuel tank in the event of a short circuit between the FQI wiring
and an unprotected 28-volt supply.
In conclusion, the commenter states that the Summary section should
clearly distinguish between these two unsafe conditions and should
provide certain wording to more clearly define the two unsafe
conditions.
We agree with the commenter and have changed the applicable
sections in this AD, for clarification, to separate the two unsafe
conditions.
Request To Change Paragraph (a) of This AD
In following up on his request to distinguish the two unsafe
conditions, the commenter requests the following changes, which would
include a new paragraph (b):
``(a) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective
date of this AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. Accomplishment of the
modification before the effective date of this AD per Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-28-1087, dated July 17, 2001, or Revision 01, dated March
3, 2003; is acceptable for compliance with the corresponding action
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1087,
Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003: Modify the wiring of the fuel
quantity indicating probes of all the fuel tanks by doing all the
actions specified in paragraphs 3.A. through 3.D. (including
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment
Instructions of the service bulletin. Any applicable repair must be
done before further flight.
(b) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective date
of this
[[Page 65526]]
AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this AD. Accomplishment of the replacement before
the effective date of this AD per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086,
dated November 30, 1999; as applicable; is considered acceptable for
compliance with the corresponding action specified in paragraph (b)(1)
of this AD.
(1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086,
Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002: Prior to or concurrent with
accomplishment of paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, replace the high-level
sensors of the additional center fuel tanks by doing all the actions
specified in paragraphs 3.A through 3.D. (including operational testing
and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment Instructions of the
service bulletin. Do the actions per the service bulletin. Any
applicable repair must be done before further flight.'' The commenter
provided no justification for the requested changes.
After reviewing the commenter's suggested changes to paragraph (a)
of the proposed AD, we find that specifying ``all the fuel tanks''
instead of ``the center and wing fuel tanks,'' is the only significant
change. We also find that moving the service bulletin references
around, as suggested by the commenter, does not clarify the
requirements of that paragraph. Therefore, we have changed the wording
in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD to specify ``all the fuel tanks,'' for
clarification; we made no further changes to paragraph (a) of this AD.
Request To Clarify Certain Sections in the Preamble
The same commenter reiterates certain wording regarding compliance
with JAR 25.989, as specified in the Discussion section of the proposed
AD, and notes that the wording is incorrect. The commenter states that
the referenced testing is specific to some ACTs that can be fitted only
to Model A319 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 28238
installed, and does not relate to other ACTs fitted to Models A319 and
A320 series airplanes, or to center (wing) tanks. The commenter adds
that the correct reference is JAR 25.969, not 25.989. The commenter
notes that the high-level sensor is not improved and has no regulatory
deficiency, and adds that it is the bracket that the sensor is attached
to that is improved to provide the required expansion space. In
addition, the commenter states that there is no connection between
changing the high-level sensor position and the overheating of the FQI
fuel probes in the event of an external 28-volt short circuit to the
FQI fuel probe wiring. The commenter adds that there is no risk of the
high-level sensor overheating in the event of an external 28-volt short
circuit to its wiring.
The commenter also states that there is no risk of fuel spillage
resulting from inadequate expansion space, which could result in fuel
vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source, and/or consequent fire/
explosion in the center fuel tank. Any fuel spillage will be contained
within the fuel vent system until the left wing surge tank is
overfilled and subsequent limited fuel spillage from the surge tank
through a flame arrestor could occur. The commenter adds that in the
event of fuel spillage from the surge tank, and in the presence of an
ignition source on the ground, a ground fire could be ignited. In the
event of a ground fire, the flame arrestor installed for this purpose
will eventually protect the fuel tank.
The commenter notes that the section titled ADDRESSES incorrectly
identifies the airplane manufacturer as ``Airbus Industrie.'' The
airplane manufacturer should be identified as ``Airbus.''
The same commenter states that the Explanation of Relevant Service
Information section in the preamble of the proposed AD is unclear in
identifying which tanks apply to Service Bulletin A320-28-1087,
Revision 02. The commenter states that the text should read, ``Airbus
has issued Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, Revision 02, which describes
procedures for modification of the wiring of the FQI probes of all fuel
tanks.'' The modification includes the following:
Installation of fused plug connectors for the FQI probes
of the wing tanks; and
Installation of fused adapters between the external wiring
harness and the in-tank wiring of the connectors on the ACT and center
wing fuel tank walls.
The commenter notes that the term ``center tank'' is imprecise, as
it could be interpreted to mean the center wing tank and not the ACT.
This could lead to the exclusion of necessary corrective action for
some fuel tanks. The fact that the modification is applicable to all
fuel tanks is explicitly described by using the word ``all.''
We acknowledge and agree with the commenter's remarks on the
preamble of the proposed AD; however, most of the sections referred to
are not restated in this final rule. The name of the airplane
manufacturer specified in the ``ADDRESSES'' section has been changed to
Airbus. No other change to the AD is made in this regard.
Inadequate Technical Information Provided in the Service Bulletins
One commenter states that it is apparent that the information in
the service bulletins lacks adequate technical detail for the commenter
to form an opinion relative to the content. The commenter adds that
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087 specifies adding fused connectors/
adapters to protect the fuel gauging lines from hot shorts to 28 volt
direct current that enter the fuel tanks. However, there is no
information regarding compliance with Advisory Circular (AC) 25.981,
which provides guidance for the overall safe design of fuel systems
under certain conditions. The commenter notes that compliance with the
AC may require a different design approach, in which case issuance of
the proposed AD, although improving the level of safety, would be
premature and would cause an unnecessary financial burden for
operators. The commenter is unable to render a sound technical opinion
as to the accuracy of the proposed AD, due to insufficient data.
We appreciate the commenter's concerns; however, it is not standard
practice to provide technical details for design changes in service
bulletins. The modification required by this AD is intended to prevent
excessive currents from entering the FQI probes. Investigations have
shown that a short of 28-volt direct current to the probes could cause
certain parts of the probe to heat up to a temperature in excess of 200
degrees centigrade. Additionally, all FQI probe wiring installed on
Model A319 series airplanes is co-routed with 28-volt direct current.
The service bulletin was issued to provide procedures to modify the
airplane to the approved type design. We do not agree that this AD is
premature. In this case, we find that to withdraw this AD and initiate
new proposed rulemaking (providing for public opportunity to comment)
would significantly delay the rulemaking process and would be
inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe condition. We have
determined that issuance of this AD is appropriate and warranted.
Request To Revise Cost Impact Section
One commenter states that there are presently no airplanes
registered in the U.S. for which Service Bulletin A320-28-1086 applies
(Models A319-115 and A319-133 series airplanes). The commenter requests
that the Cost Impact section of the proposed AD be revised to provide,
for future imported
[[Page 65527]]
airplanes, accomplishment of the proposed actions through a Certificate
of Airworthiness.
We do not agree to provide for accomplishment of the proposed
actions through a Certificate of Airworthiness for future imported
Models A319-115 and A319-133 series airplanes. We do agree that those
airplanes are not U.S.-registered; therefore, we have added a new
paragraph to the Cost Impact section to provide the estimated costs for
those airplanes should the airplanes be imported and placed on the U.S.
Register in the future.
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described
previously. We have determined that these changes will neither increase
the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.
Cost Impact
We estimate that 468 Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -131, and -
132 and Model A320 series airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected
by this AD.
It will take between 10 and 22 work hours per airplane to
accomplish the modification, at an average labor rate of $65 per work
hour. Required parts will cost between $670 and $5,750 per airplane.
Based on these figures, the cost impact of the modification required by
this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be between $617,760 and
$3,360,240, or between $1,320 and $7,180 per airplane.
If an operator is required to replace the high-level sensors, it
will take about 80 work hours, at an average labor rate of $65 per work
hour. Required parts are free of charge. Based on these figures, the
cost impact of the replacement required by this AD is estimated to be
$5,200 per airplane.
The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
Currently, there are no affected A319-115 and A319-133 series
airplanes on the U.S. Register. However, if an affected airplane is
imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future, the required
modification would take between 10 and 22 work hours per airplane, at
an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts will cost
between $670 and $5,750 per airplane. Based on these figures, we
estimate the cost of this AD to be between $1,320 and $7,180 per
airplane.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
``ADDRESSES.''
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2004-23-04 Airbus: Amendment 39-13859. Docket 2002-NM-
153AD.
Applicability: Model A319 and A320 series airplanes,
certificated in any category; as listed in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-28-1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003; and Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-28-1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent overheating of the fuel probes due to a short
circuit, and fuel leakage due to inadequate space for thermal
expansion within the additional center tanks, which could result in
fuel vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source, accomplish the
following:
Modification/Replacement
(a) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective
date of this AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions
specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. Accomplishment
of the modification before the effective date of this AD per Airbus
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, dated July 17, 2001; or Revision 01,
dated March 3, 2003; or accomplishment of the replacement before the
effective date of this AD per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086,
dated November 30, 1999; as applicable; is considered acceptable for
compliance with the corresponding action specified in paragraph
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003: Modify the wiring of the
fuel quantity indicating probes of all the fuel tanks by doing all
the actions specified in paragraphs 3.A. through 3.D. (including
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment
Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the actions per the service
bulletin. Any applicable repair must be done before further flight.
(2) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002: Prior to or concurrent
with accomplishment of paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, replace the
high-level sensors of the additional center fuel tanks by doing all
the actions specified in paragraphs 3.A through 3.D. (including
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment
Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the actions per the service
bulletin. Any applicable repair must be done before further flight.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(b) In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, the Manager, International
Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, is authorized
to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD.
Incorporation by Reference
(c) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions shall be
done in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086,
Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002; or Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-28-1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003; as applicable. This
incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part
51. For copies, contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707
Blagnac Cedex, France. Inspect copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate,
[[Page 65528]]
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the
availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go
to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html
.
Note 1: The subject of this AD is addressed in French
airworthiness directive 2002-220(B) R1, dated October 15, 2003.
Effective Date
(d) This amendment becomes effective on December 20, 2004.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 1, 2004.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 04-24933 Filed 11-12-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P