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Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs U.S. Government White Paper, released February 13, 1998
Overview
The Gulf War damaged Saddam Hussein's biological, chemical, ballistic
missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council and accepted by Iraq
following the war to eliminate and verify the destruction of Iraq's
biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for
dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further, the United Nations
established sanctions to prevent the purchase of equipment and
materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad's WMD programs and
inspections to find remaining elements of these programs and deter
further research or production related to WMD.
On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the world's experts
conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and
enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to
resume development and production of WMD. They believe Iraq maintains
a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and
biological munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect
biological and chemical weapons production.
This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD
declarations, Iraq's continued obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and
monitoring activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of
"sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and Saddam's efforts to
end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests
that Baghdad has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is making
every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has also enhanced indigenous
capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's
strategy in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged: he is actively trying to
retain what remains of his WMD programs while wearing down the will of
the Security Council to maintain sanctions.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring activities have severely
curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of
operational missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads would
pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces
in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other
delivery systems. Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military
purposes against Iran, and to suppress rebellious segments of his
population in Kurdish-held areas.
Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and the IAEA
Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM inspections and has
taken an increasingly hard line since March 1996 when the United
Nations began inspecting security facilities suspected of concealing
WMD-related documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these
facilities because Iraq admitted after Husayn Kamil -- Saddam's
son-in-law and former head of Iraqi military industries -- defected in
August 1995 that security organizations were involved in concealing
material from the United Nations:
-- Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all
aspects of its WMD programs 15 days after the Security Council enacted
the resolution in 1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and
inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations covering
chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs.
-- Baghdad has modified each declaration several times to accommodate
data uncovered by UNSCOM of the IAEA and provides new information only
when confronted with direct evidence. For example, Baghdad revised its
nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of its
initial submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six
different biological warfare declarations to date, each of which
UNSCOM has rejected.
Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from inspecting numerous
facilities since March 1996, mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive"
and the inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has applied
the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities -- on one occasion
security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq
has sought to limit U.N. access to Special Republican Guard garrisons
that are responsible for executing the highest priorities of Saddam's
inner circle:
-- Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of reach. UNSCOM and
the IAEA have detected Iraqi officials removing documents and material
from buildings, and even burning documents to prevent them from being
evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities
cleaned out after their entry was delayed for several hours.
-- Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's ability to monitor
elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid
production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country in
November 1997.
-- Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi
escort have endangered U.N. helicopter flights supporting inspections
by harassing the pilot and grabbing the flight controls. Security
guards have harassed inspectors on the ground.
Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of cooperation while
working hard to conceal essential information on the scope and
capabilities of its WMD programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor
dormant WMD production facilities and has provided incomplete
documentary evidence to support its claims. For example, Iraq
dramatically disclosed nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents
following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant information was
buried within a massive volume of extraneous data all of which was
intended to create the appearance of candor and to overwhelm UNSCOM's
analytic resources:
-- For example, Iraq released detailed records of how many ball-point
pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but it has not provided records of
how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it
destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering biological and
chemical agents.
-- UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of the documentary material
and concluded that, despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did
not release its most important WMD-related documents.
Biological Weapons
No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare
program was available until August 1995, when Iraq disclosed, after
Husayn Kamil's defection, the existence of an offensive biological
warfare (BW) capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had
produced the BW agents anthrax/1 (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin/2
(19,000 liters), and aflatoxin/3 (2,200 liters) after years of
claiming that they had conducted only defensive research. Baghdad also
admitted preparing BW-filled munitions -- including 25 Scud missile
warheads (five - anthrax, 16 - botulinum toxin, four - aflatoxin),
aerial bombs (157), and aerial dispensers -- during the Gulf war,
although it did not use them. Iraq acknowledged researching the use of
155mm artillery shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol
generators to deliver BW agents:
-- UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production equipment, seed
stocks, and growth media claimed by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
-- UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its production of
biological agents, and could be holding back such agents which are
easily concealed.
Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for
nearly one year after disclosing in 1995 that it manufactured more
than 500,000 liters of BW agents at the facility between 1989 and
1990. UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in the summer of
1996:
-- Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate civilian facility
designed to produce single-cell proteins and biopesticides.
-- Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of Baghdad) and the
security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was
intended to be a BW production facility from the outset.
Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support claims that it
destroyed all of its BW agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman
Richard Butler stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration,
submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely credible
account of Iraq's biological weapons program:"
-- In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on Ricin, but did
not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years
later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced the
biological agent Ricin.
-- Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a small-scale BW program
at known facilities that currently produce legitimate items such as
vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. Without effective U.N. monitoring,
Baghdad could probably begin production within a few days. For
example, Iraq can convert production of biopesticides to anthrax
simply by changing seed material.
Chemical Weapons
Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used
extensively against Iran and against its own Kurdish population during
the 1980s. Iraqi forces delivered chemical agents (including Mustard 5
agent and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun/6) in aerial bombs, aerial
spray dispensers, 120-mm rockets, and several types of artillery both
for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of
the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical munitions
and had a major production capacity.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW munitions
(28,000 filled and 12,000 empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents,
1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors, and eight different types of
delivery systems -- including ballistic missile warheads -- in the
past six years. Following Husayn Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed
that it:
-- Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX/7 than it previously
admitted. Iraq acknowledged, despite previous claims that it only
conducted research, that it had conducted pilot production of about 4
tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
-- Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf
war -- an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends
the shelf life of chemical agents.
-- Perfected techniques for the large-scale production of a VX
precursor that is well suited to long-term storage.
UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small stockpile of CW
agents, munitions, and production equipment. Baghdad has not supplied
adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its
CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much as 200 metric tons
of chemical precursors, 70 Scud warheads, and tens of thousands of
smaller unfilled munitions has not been verified.
-- Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW production. In
the absence of UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq could restart limited mustard
agent production with a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin
within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels --
including-VX -- within two or three years.
-- Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it once used to
produce chemical agents and has the capability to shift smaller
civilian facilities to CW production.
Ballistic Missiles
Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819
operational Scud B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the Soviet
Union, an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and modify its
warhead (e.g., the Al-Husayn with a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with
a 950-km range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and
indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq also had programs to
indigenously produce long-range missiles (e.g., the Condor) that never
entered the production phase:
-- UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type
missiles, 10 mobile launchers, 30 chemical and 18 conventional
warheads, and related equipment.
-- UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction of only 83
Scud-type missiles and nine mobile launchers. Iraq has tried to
account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by
having fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, or used in static tests
or for training.
Unmonitored unilateral destruction and discrepancies in Iraqi
accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of
Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and
launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but two of the
original 819 Scud missiles imported from the former Soviet Union. Iraq
has not adequately explained the disposition of important missile
components that it could not produce on its own and may have removed
before destruction. There are still many gaps on the scope of Iraq's
indigenous missile programs:
-- Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of missiles by
integrating guidance and control systems it concealed with
indigenously produced parts.
-- Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes, and warheads
before the war, but UNSCOM has not verified claims that it destroyed
all of these components.
-- Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts through
clandestine procurement networks. In 1995, Jordan interdicted
missile-guidance equipment (gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad
admitted under UNSCOM questioning that it received a similar shipment
earlier in 1995.
-- In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously undeclared SS-21
short-range ballistic missile launcher it acquired from Yemen before
the Gulf war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major elements of
missile systems from UNSCOM inspectors.
Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger, longer-range
missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered numerous Iraqi design drawings,
including multistage systems and clustered engine designs, that
theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have uncovered
evidence that Iraq has continued missile research since the imposition
of sanctions. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire
enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles,
perhaps within one year.
-- Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs -- within the
U.N.-allowed 150-km range limit -- serve to maintain production
expertise within the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently
flight-tested the Al-Samoud -- which UNSCOM describes as a scaled down
Scud -- successfully. Iraq probably will begin converting these
programs into long-range production as soon as sanctions are lifted.
-- Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al
Haytham -- currently used to support its authorized missile programs.
Two new fabrication buildings at the facility are spacious enough to
house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
-- Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended
to be computer and administrative facilities is inconsistent with the
facility's inherent size and capacity.
Nuclear Weapons
Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before
the Gulf war that was focused on building an implosion-type weapon.
The program was linked to a ballistic missile project that was the
intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Iraq
retreated from its longtime claim that its nuclear program was
intended only to conduct research:
-- Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium enrichment
techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope
separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
-- Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991 by using
IAEA-safeguarded highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied
reactors.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear program, but
Baghdad's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons has not
diminished:
-- Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and
technicians who are the foundation of its nuclear program. We have
concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research
that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq
acquire sufficient fissile material.
-- Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment
techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of
Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external
assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to
withhold documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear
program, experimentation data, and accounting.
-- Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction between its nuclear
program and its ballistic missile program.
The Husayn Kamil Connection
Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the pre-eminent
military industries official and a fundamental player in Iraq's
efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to
Jordan in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil took charge
of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head
of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990,
he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's
development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the
successful development of the Al-Husayn missile -- an indigenous
modification of the Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil
directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological weapons on
Iranian prisoners of war.
-- After the Gulf war, Kamil -- first from his position as Minister of
Defense and then as the director of the Ministry of Industry and
Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization -- led
Iraq's efforts to conceal its WMD program from international
inspectors.
-- Husayn Kamil's influence over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is
largely responsible for using Saddam's security services -- of which
he was a member in the early 1980s -- to hide proscribed materials and
documents from the United Nations.
Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program did not die with his
defection and subsequent murder, as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn
-- Saddam's second son -- has assumed many of the responsibilities for
concealing the proscribed programs. In addition, many of the leading
scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are
still associated with the regime:
-- Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi -- who serves officially as a presidential
adviser and is a leading official in Iraqi relations with UNSCOM --
was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially
served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a doctorate in chemical
engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and
non-conventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi received rare
public praise from Saddam for his role in the development of the
Al-Husayn missile.
-- Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur -- currently Minister of Culture
and Information -- is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former
head of its nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close associate
of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally serves as an interlocutor with
the IAEA, leading an Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in
October 1997.
-- Jafar Dia Jafar is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear scientist and
served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Organization. Jafar now officially serves as a presidential adviser,
but his position -- unlike that of Sadi -- appears to be largely
nominal.
-- Dr. Rihab Taha is the leading official in charge of Iraq's
biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop
anthrax and botulinum toxin and directed testing on animal subjects.
Taha is also politically well-connected -- she is married to the
Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps direct Iraqi relations
with UNSCOM.
February 13, 1998
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