The original EFSA policy provided little guidance about how the
analytical requirements were to be undertaken. A generic paper
template was provided, but local units (forests, parks, etc.)
could modify and adopt the form they judged best. As a result,
the earlier EFSA process was not standardized. Since the EFSA
process was not computerized, it was often a listing of evaluation
criteria, goals, and objectives, along with rough ratings of the
relative importance of each. These ratings sometimes were numerical,
but often were simply check marks (e.g., more checks for more
important criteria). Decision alternatives were generally described
straightforwardly as fire suppression tactics, and a typical EFSA
might list three alternatives as, for example, direct attack,
indirect attack, and direct/indirect attack. Each alternative
would then be evaluated by a rating scale of “pluses” and “minuses”
for how well it performed in terms of the evaluation criteria.
Accompanying each alternative was an estimate of suppression costs
and occasionally an estimate of the economic impact on the land.
An important aspect of the early EFSA was the general guidance
about when the EFSA should be completed. The policy stated that
the process should be completed when the fire exceeded initial
attack. Since most fires exceed initial attack in the late afternoon
or early evening, the analysis was often done late at night.
As it took about three hours to complete, EFSA’s were often done
under extreme time pressure.
The EFSA changed to WFSA in the late 1990’s as part of a shift
in national fire policy. The most significant change was the
development of a computerized version of WFSA by John Anderson
(Balance Technologies, Missoula, MT), a private software developer
who prepared a version of WFSA that could operate on a standard
PC. The initial version of the “PC-WFSA” was piloted on the Willamette
NF, and quickly adopted by other forests in Forest Service Regions
5 and 6. The effort was funded by the developer, and WFSA software
was purchased by federal units as a commercial product. In approximately
1998, the Pacific Southwest Research Station purchased rights
to the software from the developer.
The evolution of WFSA to the PC-WFSA affected its implementation
in several ways. First, it provided a standardized “form” for
the analysis and simplified the documentation aspects. It also
permitted units to “front load” or “template” parts of WFSA that
are generic to classes of fire or fire situations that are typical
of the unit, thereby reducing the workload associated with completing
a WFSA. In addition, it provided WFSA a more powerful analytical
framework and the ability to incorporate cost-related databases.
At the same time, however, WFSA became more complex and less transparent
to its users.
From a cost-control perspective, the early EFSA required the
user to estimate and “consider” suppression costs as well as economic
impacts to the land management unit. However, it provided no
specific tools or processes to make such estimates. Cost-control
was largely a matter of awareness and incorporation of cost factors
into decision making as part of expert judgment and evaluation
of suppression alternatives. WFSA, because of its computerized
implementation, now incorporates more cost-related elements into
the analysis, including suppression cost estimation as well as
economic impacts to the natural resources reflected in National
Fire Management Analysis System (NFMAS) values. However, neither WFSA nor its EFSA
predecessor provides a means for including the monetary value
of private inholdings and/or communities threatened by wildland
fire. From a cost perspective, WFSA limits its economic analysis
to elements under direct control and management by the federal
agency.
Structure
of the WFSA process
Currently, WFSA is synonymous with the computer program by which
it is implemented. This need not necessarily be the case, because
its fundamental principles may be followed even without using
a computer. Using these principles, WFSA prioritizes alternatives
according to three different approaches: (a) how well each alternative
meets land and fire management objectives, (b) the suppression
costs of implementing each alternative, and (c) the economic impact
of each alternative on the natural resource base.
Values, goals and objectives in WFSA. In the early stages
of the analysis, the user identifies evaluation criteria used
to compare the decision alternatives. The software structures
these into four distinct categories of value: Safety, Economics,
Environmental, and Social. A fifth category called “Other” is
provided to include factors not covered in the four preset categories.
These value categories are further divided into subcategories.
For example, “Safety” is divided into firefighter, aviation, and
public. The user can specify additional subordinate categories.
Each category should reflect the related contents of the land
management plan for the unit. In practice, however, relevant
and specific data from the land management plan and expertise
on the natural resource areas involved may not be available when
the WFSA is being prepared.
In this initial phase of preparing WFSA, the user assigns priority
values, on a 1-10 scale, to each of the categories. The software
prompts the user to specify an overall objective for the category.
The same process applies for each of the subordinate categories.
In principle, subcategories not relevant to the analysis are not
included even if the overall land management plan for the unit
may contain related land management objectives. For example,
an incident occurring on a unit that has Threatened & Endangered
Species land management objectives would not include that category
if the fire was not expected to burn into areas where those resources
could be harmed.
The numerical ratings for each of the categories and sub-categories
are weighted in WFSA relative to the roles that each will play
in evaluating the alternatives. The priorities and weights reflect
the relative importance of the objectives included in the analysis,
and are used to “score” each decision alternative.
Decision alternatives in WFSA. The analyst then specifies
alternative strategies for managing the wildfire incident. Each
strategic alternative is given a name and description. Refinements
of WFSA software have included greater direction for users by
providing example strategies—such as “minimize fire size” or “protect
high value areas”—that can be selected from a menu. The structure
of the problem is represented in a decision tree, such as the
one shown in Figure G-2. The decision tree structure in WFSA
is currently limited to two “options,” with a maximum of three
possible final outcomes: successful, successful fallback, and
worse case outcome. For each outcome, the analyst provides a
definition in terms of acres burned, time to control, and time
to contain. The analyst specifies a probability of success for
each, which the computer program automatically partitions into
success and failure.
Figure G-2. Example of the
decision tree representation of alternative fire management strategies
in WFSA. In this example, Loss values were set to zero. Therefore
the Expected Cost + Loss values shown in the example are for suppression
costs only.
Although the analyst may specify any number of alternatives,
only three or four are generally used. A minimum-cost strategy
is encouraged but not required.
The analyst then works through the branches of the decision trees
(strategies) to evaluate how well each outcome meets the fire
management objectives previously identified, and assigns a rating
on a 1-10 scale, with 1 = “worst” and 10 = “best.”
Estimating suppression costs in WFSA. The analyst determines
a suppression cost for each outcome associated with a given alternative
strategy. Two different methods are provided for making this
determination. One method selects individual suppression resource
items from a menu that shows their unit cost. The program compiles
the selected items and calculates their total cost, somewhat like
a “shopping cart” approach. A second method uses average costs
per acre. The program multiplies the acreage estimated for each
outcome by these cost factors. The resulting dollar value is
an estimate of suppression costs. If the user selects individual
resource items, instead, the total cost for each outcome is shown
and compared with a cost per acres estimate. The user can reconcile
the two estimates to produce a final suppression cost estimate.
Suppression cost estimates in WFSA are not considered as budgets,
but rather as projections of suppression costs for comparing the
cost efficiency of alternative suppression strategies.
Economic evaluation in WFSA. In addition to comparing
alternatives in terms of suppression costs, WFSA also evaluates
alternatives in terms of their economic impact on the natural
resource base using a table of NVC or “Net Value Change” figures
obtained through NFMAS.
NFMAS values represent the monetary impact of fire on the natural
resource base, either in terms of loss or Net Value Change. These
values are imported when the WFSA begins, and are unique to the
land management unit. NFMAS values are expressed as monetary
impacts per acre, and are multiplied by the estimated number of
burned acres.
This aspect of WFSA can be confusing to analysts not familiar
with NFMAS values. For example, though users are free to change
the NFMAS values to better suit local circumstances, few have
confidence in how they would explain such changes. Though some
NFMAS values have a clear underlying rationale because they are
based on market values (e.g., timber) others may be less so because
the basis for their monetary value is not clear (e.g., threatened
and endangered species protection).
NFMAS values are limited to their direct impact on resources
managed by the federal agency. This restriction means that values
at risk not managed by the agency, such as private inholdings,
will not be included in monetary form in WFSA even if they have
a market valuation (e.g., residential homes). This does not mean
that such values at risk are not taken into consideration as part
of WFSA process, but rather that they are not directly considered
in monetary form and are not calculated by WFSA.
Evaluation of decision alternatives in WFSA. The evaluation
of decision alternatives in WFSA is a complex process based on
the principle of “expected value.” Outcomes are weighted by their
probability of occurrence and are added to produce an overall
score on which the various alternatives leading to those outcomes
can be compared. The decision tree shown in Figure G-2 illustrates
this process. The figure shows two hypothetical fire management
strategies, one labeled Alternative A, and the other labeled Alternative
B. Both strategies are shown as they would be represented in
a WFSA, with a successful outcome, a successful fallback, and
a worst-case outcome.
This example of the evaluation approach taken in WFSA considers
only suppression costs. It considers each outcome as the leaf
on a tree, and each leaf has associated with it an estimate of
fire size. The suppression resources needed for each outcome
are determined. Then, starting with the most distant branches
(i.e., successful, fallback, and worst case), the suppression
cost estimates are multiplied by their respective probabilities
to produce an expected suppression cost for that branch. This
is the expected cost for the entire branch. The expected cost
of the overall strategy is obtained by multiplying the suppression
cost of a successful outcome by the probability of success, and
adding it to the expected cost of the fallback branch multiplied
by the probability of failure. The resulting monetary value represents
the expected cost of the strategy and, when done for both strategies
in the example, serves as a basis for their comparative evaluation.
The same general scheme is used to obtain expected NVC values,
but here the calculations become more complex because each outcome
has associated with it several NVC values, representing specific
resources at risk in this fire. The program aggregates across
NVC values for each outcome to produce a total NVC per acre.
These values, then, are fed back according to the expected value
calculations. The end result provides the same relative monetary
comparison as in the suppression cost case.
A third evaluation score provided in WFSA is based on the priority
ratings the analyst provides at the beginning, as well as the
ratings of the impact of each outcome in an overall strategy.
This approach is more complex than either of the two discussed
above, but still utilizes the principle of expected value to derive
an evaluation “score” for each alternative. To determine the
score, the subjective ratings attached to each outcome are multiplied
by their respective probabilities. The resulting expected values
are then weighted by the relative coefficients associated with
the various value categories. Then, they are added up to produce
an aggregate score for each outcome. The same process of feedback
through the decision tree for each alternative yields an expected
value score to show how well each strategy meets, in a relative
sense, the multiple objectives considered in the analysis.
Complexity analysis in WFSA. WFSA also helps its user
to conduct an “Incident Complexity Analysis.” The complexity
analysis consists of a checklist based on eight categories of
factors that contribute to the complexity of an incident. The
user is guided through a menu system for each category and indicates
which of the factors are present in the current situation. The
checklist has 38 factors. After the checklist is completed, the
user assigns an incident type to the fire, ranging from a low
of “4” to represent Initial Attack, to “1” to represent a Type
1 incident. The assignment of an incident type to a WFSA fire
is judgmental and is not based on a computational model within
WFSA. The complexity analysis may tend to overweight the various
factors in the complexity analysis, leading to more Type 1 incidents.
However, no research is available on this matter. If such research
did show such a bias, this could lead to additional fire costs,
since Type 1 incident teams typically carry more management expenses
than Type 2 teams, which also cost more than Type 3 teams. However,
it should also be noted that the larger, more capable teams, if
justified by the complexity of the fire, may help to hold costs
down through more efficient management of the fire.
Implementation
of WFSA in the Field
WFSA has faced several implementation challenges. While there
are a large number of fires each year, only a very few require
that a WFSA be done. Estimates of WFSA fire frequency suggest
that less than 1% of all fires require a WFSA; by some estimates
the percentage is as low as 0.25% to 0.5%. Forests that have
a relatively high fire frequency may have several WFSA fires in
a year. However, forests with low fire frequency may encounter
WFSA fires rarely, perhaps one every three or four years. Some
agency administrators never have to prepare a WFSA on their unit.
This means that the experience needed to prepare a WFSA is variable.
Given the complexity of the tool, even a well-trained user may
have difficulty maintaining proficiency in WFSA skills.
One objection to WFSA is the pressure to complete the analysis
quickly after determining that a fire is beyond local management
capabilities. Several factors contribute to this viewpoint.
The WFSA process draws upon a broad diversity of land and fire
management expertise. In addition to the agency administrator,
WFSA requires inputs from a fire management officer and from natural
resource specialists qualified to judge the impact of the fire
on the unit’s natural resources. Thus, preparation of a WFSA,
though the responsibility of the agency administrator, is a team
effort that calls upon the breadth of the unit’s land and fire
management expertise. However, this range of expertise may not
be available at the time WFSA is conducted. Indeed, WFSA is often
required at a time when most of the expertise needed is in the
field dealing with the fire situation. WFSA is typically conducted
in an “atmosphere of defeat,” and during a time when human resources
are the least available.
The challenges imposed on users to provide meaningful inputs
to WFSA are exacerbated in stressful situations. As an analytical
tool, WFSA is better situated to a less pressured situation.
Furthermore, many users do not have a sufficiently deep understanding
of the WFSA model to know how the process will utilize their various
inputs, and how changes in the information and judgments the user
makes will affect the output of the analysis.
A related issue is the knowledge-level that users have about
the thought processes that are needed to provide meaningful judgments
and estimates in WFSA. For some parts of WFSA, users may not
understand a particular judgment that WFSA requires, leaving them
with questions about how best to make ratings on subjective scales,
or what the meaning of such ratings would be in light of one another.
For example, one of the most confusing aspects of WFSA for most
users is probability assessment. These assessments are a key
element of the WFSA process because they support the weighting
of coefficients by which decision outcomes are aggregated to compare
the alternatives. In the case of suppression cost evaluations,
probability assessments determine how expected costs are calculated.
Systematic errors in these assessments can have a significant
effect not only on the alternative supported by WFSA, but also
on its anticipated costs. Many users have reported that this
aspect of WFSA is one of the least sound aspects of the analysis,
despite its criticality to the process. Users of WFSA generally
have little knowledge of probability theory, and are unfamiliar
with probability assessment techniques or how to apply them in
the context of fire management decision analysis.
Similar difficulties are faced by users in other areas of WFSA
where the quality of the WFSA process is dependent on the user’s
judgmental skills and understanding of the processes needed to
produce the best quality inputs. These include the use of priority
ratings to produce the weights used by WFSA in evaluation, judgments
and estimates of suppression costs associated with each outcome,
and the structuring of the decision tree associated with the various
fire management strategies being analyzed.
The WFSA process tends to frame the decision problem for the
user. Sometimes the effect of this framing is not fully appreciated.
For example, WFSA’s structure presents issues in a certain order.
Thus, when users enter WFSA at a certain point, they tend to carry
through the analysis to the end, a linear approach to analysis
that does not benefit from reconsideration of the underlying assumptions.
In addition, few users understand the principles of sensitivity
analysis and how it can be applied to WFSA to develop helpful
ranges of outputs related to ranges of key input variables such
as variance in probability assessments, relative importance of
objectives, and cost-related factors such as suppression cost
estimates and NFMAS values.
One area where the structure of WFSA may bias the analysis is
in how the decision trees for alternatives in the analysis are
constructed. In structuring a decision alternative, users are
prompted to build the decision tree by first considering a successful
outcome for the strategy, followed by a successful fallback outcome,
and then a worst-case scenario. This can tend to lead users to
think in terms of success, and anchor their subsequent judgments
of other possible outcomes on the success scenario. Alternatively,
users could consider the worst-case scenario first, and then develop
other outcomes by working backward from that scenario. Both directions
are valid approaches, but both involve different perspectives
on how a given strategy may play out over time.
For example, the success-first approach tends to frame outcomes
in terms of consequences of success, while the latter frames outcomes
in terms of the consequences of failure. While neither perspective
has an exclusive claim to correctness, the two perspectives may
have different implications for cost factors and may bias cost
projections in different ways. A success-oriented problem structuring
may yield lower suppression cost estimates, but be highly contingent
on the accuracy of a high probability of achieving the projected
outcome. If the probability assessment is biased upward, then
other outcomes in the alternative may be under-weighted and appear
to result in lower costs. Similarly, if each WFSA began with
a least-cost scenario, it might bias cost projections downward.
These kinds of approaches to analysis are within the capability
of WFSA, but are dependent upon a knowledgeable user who understands
how to approach such problems using the tool to produce a “well-analyzed
fire management decision.” These
uses of WFSA are less dependent on improvements or changes to
the software, and more dependent on developing users’ analytic
skills.
Efforts to solve WFSA problems. Various efforts have
been undertaken to address the problems posed by WFSA. The software
version of WFSA resulted from an effort to ease the process of
producing the documentation associated with the paper-and-pencil
version. The current version of WFSA provides a more standardized
analysis than the older EFSA. It also permits better technical
analysis of cost factors and improved capability for projecting
suppression costs.
A review of the unusually costly 1994 fire season (i.e., Truesdale
Report) recommended improvements to the EFSA that included (a)
emphasizing its importance and timely completion, (b) requiring
revised EFSA’s to analyze an alternative with minimum suppression
actions for fires not contained in five burning periods, (c) reviewing
the risk analysis process in the EFSA to determine its effectiveness
in decision making, and (d) assuring that fire suppression objectives
are measurable and associated with specific costs for attainment.
A 1997 study also identified problems associated with WFSA. Based on interviews and survey responses
of 71 senior agency administrators, fire management officers,
and natural resource area specialists, the study documented perceptions
of WFSA, including training deficiencies and needs. That study
found that the majority of WFSA training was on the job, with
many of the study participants having received no or inadequate
formal training. Recommendations from the study included the
need to review and evaluate current WFSA training practices and
to explore the potential of developing WFSA proficiency standards
with periodic review and retraining if necessary.
A subsequent WFSA-related research effort was undertaken in conjunction
with the Pacific Southwest Research Station to develop a decision
skills course for fire and natural resource managers. The result of the effort was a three-day
decision skills course that used a combination of classroom and
case-study techniques, and that emphasized five key decision science
elements: value structuring and prioritization, representation
of decision alternatives, probability assessment, economic values,
and sensitivity analysis. Elements of the course have been included
in a number of WFSA training exercises. However, the course itself
is now taught on an ad-hoc basis and is not regularly offered.
WFSA training also occurs at the local unit level, and is often
conducted by agency personnel who have more WFSA experience than
others.
The Role of
WFSA in Fire Management Decision Making
Figure G-1, which shows the policy direction that defines how
a WFSA is to be done, also illustrates that WFSA includes a combination
of analysis, reporting, and review functions. The reporting and
review functions of WFSA are outside of the analysis support provided
by the software, and relate to its communication function. There
is little empirical research to show how WFSA is used in the fire
management decision-making process. According to the policy direction,
the analytic aspects of WFSA are intended to support the delegation
of authority and review functions, with periodic updating to ensure
that the fire management strategy chosen on the basis of WFSA
is still appropriate.
From interviews and other anecdotal evidence, however, it appears
that WFSA is frequently either conducted or supervised by a unit’s
FMO (Fire Management Officer), or their assistant. In some cases,
this may be because the local agency administrator responsible
for WFSA does not have a sufficient level of experience with fire
management to be comfortable with the task. Agency administrators
in units with infrequent fires may have never experienced a WFSA
fire, and WFSA can present too steep a learning curve for them.
Because of inexperience and thinness of qualified fire personnel
on many land units, the initial WFSA may outline only the higher
priority fire management objectives and only minimal analysis
of a small set of alternative strategies. In such situations,
the incoming incident team may refine the WFSA in conjunction
with the local unit. Very often the incident team brings greater
fire management experience and better WFSA expertise. On longer-running
fires, WFSA may be developed cooperatively between the local unit
and the incident team and refined over time. However, most WFSA
fires do not go beyond the first WFSA, which means that the strategic
alternative selected is the “official” guidance for managing the
fire throughout its run. On large, complex, or long-running,
fires as many as six (or more) WFSAs may be prepared to respond
to changing conditions.
As the number of WFSA’s on a long-running fire increases, the
tendency is for WFSA to “track” the fire. In these cases, WFSA
may be less of a decision analysis tool and more of a decision
documentation tool. Though the application of WFSA is
sometimes faulted for “failing to get out in front of” large fires,
from a cost-control perspective this reality of how WFSA is applied
may present opportunities for introducing “trigger points” when
preset suppression resource expenditure levels would initiate
a review of WFSA to help meet cost objectives. Currently most
of the reviews of WFSAs are done to evaluate how well a current
strategy meets fire management objectives, without direct reference
to monetary costs. However, the policy does not preclude the
agency administrator from calling for a cost-related WFSA review.
Strategic vs. tactical direction. Comments are in order
about the relationship between strategy and tactics as they pertain
to WFSA and to fire management decision-making. WFSA enables
and encourages analysis of fire management strategies, apart from
fire suppression tactics. This orientation of WFSA reflects its
intended linkages to the land management and fire management planning
processes, both of which provide overarching direction concerning
land management goals and objectives. WFSA is, in principle,
a direct extension of these planning frameworks to an emergency
incident.
From interviews and observations in
WFSA training exercises, it appears that many personnel involved
in preparing WFSAs have difficulty developing and articulating
fire management strategies that are not descriptions of fire management
tactics. One function of WFSA is to provide an incoming incident
team with a higher level of strategic direction based on land
and fire management planning goals for the local unit. These
are goals, which the incoming teams would not be aware of without
some form of local communication. How those strategic objectives
are to be achieved is a matter of tactical decision-making on
the part of the incident team. To the degree that the incident
team is provided clear strategic direction, they may be in the
best position to achieve the fire management objectives contained
in WFSA in the most cost-efficient manner. To the degree that
WFSA provides tactical rather than strategic direction, the incident
team may not be aware of what the local unit would most like to
accomplish, thereby underutilizing abilities they may have to
provide cost-efficient suppression.
Several measures can be taken to help improve the quality of
strategic direction in WFSA. Education in WFSA principles and
potential uses can place increased emphasis on the strategic aspects
of the analysis, thereby providing local unit analysts with the
skills they need to express locally-defined land and fire management
planning in terms of strategic guidance. Since the development
of strategic guidance takes time and human resources, WFSA could
be “pre-prepared” by developing WFSA’s prior to a unit’s anticipated
fire season. Though some units do this type of WFSA pre-work,
there is not a consistent effort to do so, nor are there adequate
guidelines.
To the degree that WFSA overemphasizes tactical direction in
fulfilling its role in fire management decision-making, this may
reflect too heavy involvement of fire expertise in its conduct.
WFSA would benefit from being more closely tied to the land management
planning process and the fire management planning process. Fire
management plans need to be developed that can directly lead to
fire management strategies considered in a WFSA.
Wildland Fire
Cost Factors & Their Relationship to WFSA
Many factors enter into the costs of wildland fire, some of them
are included directly in WFSA, some indirectly, and others not
at all. Cost factors directly included in WFSA have been previously
discussed, particularly suppression resource costs and impacts
to the land management base as represented by NFMAS values. However,
the WFSA decision support process is also influenced by broader
factors. It is important to consider how well these factors are
included in WFSA, and how their influence is accounted for.
Some of these broader cost factors relate to the rules and regulations
with which agency personnel must comply. For example, air quality
standards imposed by federal, state, and local agencies are often
the basis for WFSA objectives. Meeting such objectives can be
expected to influence costs, though WFSA does not identify to
what degree suppression cost estimates are attributable to attaining
such objectives. For example, a post fire review that examines
WFSA to learn how air quality standards may have impacted the
suppression resources used would have difficulty allocating those
costs to the WFSA objectives even though WFSA preparers may have
considered constraints imposed by the air quality objectives.
Because WFSA does not link its cost estimates for suppression
to its objectives, it cannot identify the contributions that these
factors make to suppression costs.
A similar statement can be made concerning “downstream” costs
associated with fire, such as rehabilitation costs. While the
WFSA analysts are free to take these costs into consideration
in developing fire management objectives and in developing alternative
fire management strategies, these costs are not specifically monetized
in WFSA in the way that NFMAS values monetize impacts to the land
management base.
However, the WFSA framework is sufficiently broad to potentially
encompass appropriate rehabilitation costs, if available in a
form compatible with WFSA.
A difficult category of costs to represent in WFSA are those
associated with the effects of “social factors.” These are often
among the most important factors that determine the strategies
used to manage wildland fires, particularly when incidents occur
at or near the wildland-urban interface. They include such things
as the protection of high-valued resources, including private
property and historical artifacts, as well as public concerns
about both fire effects and the effects of fire fighting. However,
they are the most difficult to represent in WFSA, because they
are complex and difficult to quantify. To the degree that these
factors are reflected in the WFSA objectives, they will potentially
influence WFSA’s evaluation and selection of alternatives. However,
the current form of WFSA does not consider such cost effects systematically.
Moreover, the economic values used by WFSA do not include the
value of these non-agency, private resources. To the degree that
these factors enter into a WFSA, they do so subjectively and indirectly.
Potential
Enhancements to WFSA
This analysis suggests the following six opportunities to improve
WFSA.
Emphasize strategic decision making in WFSA. Typically,
users learn about WFSA through a process of training and practice.
Most training has focused on the software and how to use it.
Users may not need more such training in WFSA, but most do need
education in the underlying principles and potentials for improving
the analysis of fire management problems and making strategic
decisions. Some steps have been taken in this direction, but
more are needed. Using WFSA more effectively requires placing
greater value on the role of analysis, planning, and development
of strategic decision alternatives. As society places ever-increasing
value on external accountability and a quantitative rationale
for public decisions, the need to improve strategic analysis abilities
of those involved in WFSA continues to grow.
Integrate WFSA with fire management and land management planning.
One of the recurring recommendations for improving WFSA is to
remove it from the three-hour performance environment, and place
it in closer proximity to a unit’s land and fire management plans.
WFSA relies on the land management planning process for its guidance
and direction. Without this guidance, there is no consistent
relationship between planning for the unit and the actions taken
on a fire. The practical way to achieve this goal is to “template”
or “front load” WFSA by conducting the process for either hypothetical
or historically significant fires on specific land units. This
practice would lead the units to develop their own database of
land management guidance within WFSA when they have the time and
human resources to do so. Guidelines need to be developed and
implemented for doing this in such a way that the practice WFSA
can be readily modified to fit the details of an actual fire incident
when it occurs.
Consider defining a larger, formal role for the IMT in improving
and refining a WFSA. In many cases, WFSA is incomplete at
the time an incident management team arrives. WFSA policy strongly
implies that a WFSA will be completed as a basis for determining
the level of team assistance required, and therefore implies that
the analysis will be completed before the IMT arrives and will
serve as a basis for the delegation of authority. In practice,
incoming incident teams bring with them additional expertise in
the analysis of fire management problems that could be used to
develop higher quality WFSAs. Consideration should be given to
defining a larger, formal role for the IMT in improving and refining
the WFSA. This could include clarifying the current WFSA procedures
to better identify how the local unit would work cooperatively
with the IMT. In addition, the potential for periodic WFSA monitoring
and evaluation, to incorporate preset cost “triggers,” should
be explored.
Develop standards for WFSA qualification and certification.
At present, no training or proficiency standards exist for WFSA
users. While the PC-WFSA improved the standardization of the
document, standardization of the analysis remains to be attained.
At one time, WFSA for a given fire had no life beyond the unit
in which it was created. However, in recent years WFSA has taken
on a greater role outside of its unit and even outside of the
agency. For example, WFSA has been required to be appended to
the final fire report. This opens the opportunity to conduct
research on the relationship between fire parameters, suppression
actions, cost factors, and the WFSA process. Some Forest Service
regions are currently using WFSA as part of priority setting for
suppression resource allocation, further accentuating the need
for a standardized proficiency. The feasibility of developing
a WFSA proficiency standard should be explored, including identification
of the specific analytical skills required by WFSA and a program
of education and training to support attainment of those skills.
Integrate WFSA with other decision support tools and processes,
and to cost-relevant databases and models. WFSA is currently
a “stand alone” decision support tool. Although it uses the NFMAS
database and a suppression resource cost database to support its
internal analysis, it is not directly linked to other computerized
tools and processes that have relevant outputs. In practice,
many of the computerized tools for fire and land management decision-making,
such as fire behavior models, are developed for the PC platform.
Although they can be operated independently, they do not directly
link to one another, and so do not provide an integrated analytical
capability. WFSA is supported by a very powerful analytical engine
that can be adapted to a wide range of problems. In its current
form, it can most readily accept new cost-relevant information
through NFMAS. With modifications, it can incorporate additional
cost-relevant databases. Other modifications could enable it
to run more models in the background and utilize their outputs
in its analysis. These modifications and extensions are all technically
possible. Consideration should be given to research aimed at
integrating WFSA with other analytical tools and databases that
are relevant for fire management decision-making.
Conduct research to determine the relationship between WFSA
estimates, assessments and judgments, and actual outcomes of WFSA
fire incidents. Despite the central role that WFSA plays
in setting the strategic direction for fire management, there
is no systematic study of the relationship between the various
judgments and estimates made in WFSA and the actual outcomes of
the fire incidents in which it has been applied. Without such
research, it is difficult to make good assessments of where the
WFSA process needs improvement and how such improvements should
be made.
