Section 2: Internal Controls

Section 4: Financial Management Systems

Issue Description:
In 1985 the Bureau's Executive Staff recognized overcrowding as a material weakness. The overcrowding rate grew through 1990 to a high of 69% over the Bureau's rated capacity. As of September 30, 2000, the overcrowding rate was 32% over rated capacity. The Bureau continues to rely on funding for construction and the acquisition of additional facilities to keep pace with a growing inmate population and to gradually reduce our overcrowding rate, thereby ensuring the manageable operation of the system.

The Bureau's institution based population was 125,560 as of September 30, 2000, an increase of 8265 inmates over the 117,295 inmates housed on September 30, 1999. It should be noted that the total Bureau population (including contract facilities) increased by 11,436 during FY 2000. In last year's report, we indicated FY 1999 was the largest one year increase ever experienced by the Bureau. The FY 2000 increase surpassed FY 1999 by 63 inmates. The population projections were revised during January 2000 based on the Office of Research's analysis of data provided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

The Bureau's overcrowding rate increased by 1% to 32% during FY 2000. We project the population will continue to grow and should reach 162,654 by September 30, 2005. Through the construction of new facilities and expansion projects at existing institutions, our Long Range Capacity Plan projects a rated capacity of 120,368 beds by September 30, 2005. Should new construction and expansion plans continue through FY 2005 as planned, overcrowding is projected to be 35% over the projected rated capacity.

What We Will Do About It:
Increase the amount of beds in the Bureau to keep pace with the projected increases in the Federal inmate population. Efforts to reach this goal include expanding existing institutions, acquiring surplus properties for conversion to correctional facilities, constructing new institutions, utilizing contract facilities, and exploring alternative options of confinement for appropriate cases.

Milestones:	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
A. Completed Actions/Events Planning estimates called for a rated capacity of 96,154 to be reached by FY 2000. A rated capacity of 94,927 was attained. Despite the difference of 1127 beds between the projected estimate and the actual rated capacity, action on this item is closed.	09/00		09/00
B. Short Term (10-00/10-01) Planning estimates call for a rated capacity of 98,440 to be reached by close of FY 2001.	09/01
C. Longer Term (10-01 and Beyond) Focus the use of limited Community Corrections Center resources to provide relief, as appropriate, to facilities housing low and medium security inmates.	09/93		Ongoing
September 30, 2002 Inmate Population: 139,632 Rated Capacity: 105,286 Overcrowding Rate: 33%	09/02
September 30, 2003 Inmate Population: 147,178 Rated Capacity: 107,393 Overcrowding Rate: 37%	09/03
September 30, 2004 Inmate Population: 153,270 Rated Capacity: 113,895 Overcrowding Rate: 35%	09/04
September 30, 2005 Inmate Population: 162,654 Rated Capacity: 120,368 Overcrowding Rate: 35%	09/05

How We Will Know It Is Fixed: Results are measured as a new institution or expansion project is activated, and resulting increases in rated capacity are established. A corresponding decrease in the overcrowding percentage rate will also be a tangible measurement of the results. Progress on construction projects at new and existing facilities can be validated via on-site inspections of each facility or by review of monthly construction progress reports.

Issue Description:
Detention space for the USMS and the INS has been a management challenge since 1989. Both agencies are experiencing rapid growth in their use of detention space, from an average of 31,966 beds in 1996 to a projected 55,000 to 67,000 beds in 2001. The USMS is experiencing a shortage of detention space near Federal court cities, resulting in the need to transport prisoners to other distant facilities, often in other states. The INS has some discretion on who it detains; however, under IIRIRA, INS is required to detain certain aliens until removal, resulting in long-term detention cases. This, in turn, results in less flexibility for custody determinations on non-mandatory detention cases. This expanding need for detention space places increasingly heavy demands on the INS and USMS infrastructure, including transportation, buildings, communications equipment, and staff. This also increases concerns related to health and safety of detainees and US Marshal Service and INS employees.

What We Will Do About It:
To deal with this multi-agency issue, the Department created a Detention Planning Committee which, in turn, developed a multi-year Federal Detention Plan. DOJ worked with the USMS, INS, and the Bureau of Prisons to update this plan in February 2000. In addition, the Department is requesting the establishment of a Detention Trustee in FY 2001.

The USMS will maintain and expand the use of state and local spaces through the use of IGAs and the Cooperative Agreement Program, and through expansion of the current 5-year contract authority for Service Contracts for contract beds; establish detention management and oversight positions at contract jails housing 200 or more USMS prisoners; and establish a team to handle privatization issues and private jail contracts.

The INS will pursue alternatives to detention based on an evaluation of the results of the Appearance Assistance Program (AAP) demonstration project. The evaluation will address the impact of AAP on improving aliens' appearing at hearings and compliance with Immigration Judge final orders as a means to reduce use of detention space for appropriate categories. INS will continue to review the management of the Detention and Removal Program via the INS Program for Excellence and Comprehensive Tracking (INSpect)and through the newly created Operations Analysis, Training, and Compliance Division. The scope of the review includes facility issues, security and control, detainee conduct and detainee services, transportation and escort, and docket control.

In regards to milestone #5, INS has created a robust detention bed space projection model, in conjunction with an experienced DOJ contractor. This model will help INS manage resources and forecast bed space requirements. This model is district based and will assist the INS in the justification of needed staff, budget and construction requests. These efforts will contribute to the Department-wide model.

Milestones	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
1. Establish a Detention Trustee. (DOJ)	09/30/01	09/30/01
2. Expand the current 5-year contract authority for Service Contracts. (DOJ)	09/30/99	pending FY 2001 approp.
3. Establish detention management and oversight positions at contract jails housing 200 or more USMS prisoners. (USMS)	11/30/99	11/30/02
4. Establish a team to handle privatization issues and private jail contracts. (DOJ)	11/30/99	11/30/02
5. Create a more encompassing model for projecting detainee population. (DOJ)	TBD

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
Comparing the number of bed spaces needed by location for Federal detainees to the number of bed spaces actually available in those locations.

Issue Description:
The INS is experiencing difficulty in collecting breached bonds owed the Government due to (1) inadequate documentation and recordkeeping by operating units, and (2) lack of an INS-wide bond management system to track bonds underwritten by sureties and bill sureties when bonds are breached.

What We Will Do About It:
Milestones #1, 2, and 3 are completed. Milestone #4: The Bond Management Information System (BMIS) interface with the Federal Financial Management System (FFMS) has been completed (01/01/00) but not implemented due to FFMS system issues. The expected implementation date has been postponed until the FFMS issues are resolved. The INS contractors are updating BMIS manuals, implementing additional financial requirements and gathering functional requirements to take BMIS to the field. Milestone #5: Guidelines have been drafted directing every District Office and docket control office to assess the bond processing backlogs and to develop a plan for short-term and long-term backlog reductions. These locations will need to identify the number of bonds that require actions, and develop a plan for making the bonds current. A date for this milestone is to be determined.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
When the analysis is completed on the collection process in terms of number of bonds, dollar value, and timeframe to bill, timeframe to fill, timeframe to collect, dollar amount collected, collection problems, and their impact on lost revenue and costs. Also, when a review is conducted to ensure all bonds are current.

Issue Description:
The Department of Justice (DOJ) increasingly relies on interconnected computer systems and electronic data to achieve its mission. Since the Department's computer systems now hold a majority of sensitive information used in the course of Department business, it is vital that controls be in place to ensure that the data are not destroyed, altered, or disclosed to unauthorized persons and that the integrity and reliability of our computerized systems are not compromised.

Computer security has been designated a material weakness since 1991. Computer security remains a management concern. Specific issues include:

• The DOJ Office of the Inspector General has found that the Department has not adequately planned for the protection of its critical infrastructure in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 63.
• Several major components including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Marshals Service will not complete certification and accreditation of their computer systems by the deadline of December 31, 2000, set by the DOJ Chief Information Officer (CIO) in September 1999. In addition, several other major components, including the Justice Management Division, Drug Enforcement Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service will either just meet or may miss this deadline.
• Because of concerns about the quality and completeness of component certification and accreditation (C&A) efforts, the CIO is requiring an independent verification and validation (IV&V) of the certification and accreditations of major systems.
• Penetration testing conducted by the Justice Management Division and the Office of the Inspector General have consistently found that security controls on Department sensitive but unclassified (SBU) systems are inadequate to thwart rudimentary efforts to "hack" into DOJ systems. Penetration testing has also found password management in most components to be weak and non-compliant with existing DOJ policy.

Audits performed by the Office of Inspector General and the General Accounting Office in the past two years have identified the following weaknesses in DOJ computer security in one or more components:

• Inadequate configuration management practices to maintain system integrity as system updates are performed;
• Inadequate and untested contingency planning to ensure that DOJ operations could continue if a major DOJ system were attacked, failed technically or suffered physical damage; and
• Inadequate computer security training to ensure that users and systems administrators use and operate systems securely.

What We Will Do About It:
The Justice Management Division (JMD) is responsible for computer security across the Department. JMD has divided the computer security program into two segments: the Security and Emergency planning Staff (SEPS) is responsible for computer security for systems that process national security (classified) information; the Information Management and Security Staff (IMSS) is responsible for computer security for systems that process sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information. Both JMD staffs perform similar functions.

To address the issues cited above, JMD is taking the following actions:

Critical Infrastructure Protection Planning

In response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit, JMD has developed a new plan for identifying the Department's critical infrastructure assets, performing the required vulnerability assessment on those assets and developing a corrective actions plan for any asset that does not have satisfactory protections in place. The plan calls for these three steps to be completed by September 2001.

Certification and Accreditation

The first objective is to identify which component systems will not be certified and accredited by December 31, 2000. JMD staff will work with components to identify these systems and develop project plans for the completion of the certifications and accreditations. These plans will be briefed to the Chief Information Officer to ensure adequate component resources are applied to the effort. JMD staff will track the component efforts and brief the CIO until all systems are certified and accredited. The CIO will brief the Attorney General on all plans and progress. Based on input from components, the current target date for completion of this action is July 1, 2001.

JMD has established an independent verification and validation (IV&V) program to assess component certification and accreditation processes and documentation. Components will be required to revise or redo certification and accreditation until they pass the IV&V. Based on input from components, the current target date for completion of this action is September 30, 2001.

After certification and accreditation is achieved for each existing system, the systems must be re-certified and re-accredited every three years. Also, DOJ policy requires that all new systems be certified and accredited prior to becoming operational. JMD will monitor component computer security efforts to determine if components are adhering to these requirements and update the CIO accordingly. This activity will be ongoing.

Ineffective Technical Security Controls

JMD is drafting new security policy for both classified and SBU environments. The policy will establish new requirements for computer security programs within each DOJ component and new minimum standards for technical and physical security measures. Technical standards will address common vulnerabilities identified through penetration testing, audits and risk assessments. The target date for issuing new security policy for SBU systems is March 1, 2001, and March 31, 2001, for classified systems.

JMD will continue to conduct penetration testing to assess the effectiveness of technical controls and determine the extent of compliance with DOJ computer security policy. Results of penetration testing - as well as audits - will be used to modify computer security policy and architecture as appropriate. This will be an ongoing activity.

JMD operates the DOJ Computer Emergency Response Team (DOJCERT), a 24 hour a day service which collects and disseminates information on computer security events and provides assistance and guidance to components during such events. Data collected from DOJCERT will be used to modify computer security policy and architecture as appropriate. This too will be an ongoing activity.

Poor Password Management

DOJ-wide policy on password management already exists. JMD will review the policy, re-issue it and make revisions when appropriate. Enforcement of policy will be accomplished through penetration testing and JMD staff tracking audits conducted by the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office. This will be an ongoing activity.

Configuration Management Practices

Government-wide policy on configuration management already exists. JMD is drafting DOJ-specific policy which will be issued by March 1, 2001. Enforcement of policy will be accomplished on an ongoing basis through JMD staff tracking audits conducted by the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office.

Contingency Planning

Government-wide policy on contingency planning already exists. JMD is drafting DOJ-specific policy which will be issued by March 1, 2001. Enforcement of policy will be accomplished on an ongoing basis through JMD staff reviewing component certification and accreditation activities, independent verification and validation results, and audits conducted by the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office.

Computer Security Training

Government-wide policy on computer security training already exists. JMD is drafting DOJ-specific policy which will be issued by March 1, 2001. The policy will require each component to establish role-based computer security training to distinguish between the knowledge needed for using, administering and securing component computer systems. Enforcement of policy will be accomplished on an ongoing basis through JMD staff review of required reports from components and audits conducted by the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office.

JMD is also looking at the feasibility of developing common training curriculums that components can implement.

JMD will continue to provide periodic special forums on computer security issues of interest to multiple components. Material for these forums will be developed from JMD penetration testing results and reviews of audits conducted by the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:

• DOJ components will have established computer security programs and will have implemented DOJ policy, guidance, and technical assistance.
  
  
• All DOJ component systems will be properly certified and accredited and pass independent verification and validation.
  
  
• Computer security planning will be integrated into the system development life cycle.
  
  
• Penetration testing and Inspector General and the General Accounting Office audits will not discover weak technical controls or non-compliance with computer security policy.
  
  
• The Inspector General will determine that DOJ critical infrastructure planning is adequate.

Issue Description:
In September 1997, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an inspection report on the INS Monitoring of Nonimmigrant Overstays. The report found that, although nonimmigrant overstays (i.e., foreign visitors who legally enter the United States and then do not leave) comprise a significant percentage of the illegal alien population in the United States, the INS has insufficient systems to compile information on the overstay population, and lacks an enforcement policy that specifically targets the overstay population. In its response to the final inspection report, the INS will outline the steps that it will take to implement the recommendations contained in the report.

What We Will Do About It:
Measures have been implemented to improve the current Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS); however, these steps have not yet yielded the necessary improvements needed for the INS to accurately report on arrivals and departures. A new Arrival/Departure Information system (ADIS) is being evaluated to determine if it will improve upon the ability of the INS to report on arrivals and departures. If the new system is successful, the INS will transition from the NIIS system to the ADIS. The Acting Commissioner will be briefed on this system during the second quarter of FY 2001. The enactment of the Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 requires the INS to develop an integrated entry and exit data system to record alien arrivals and departures. With this increase in data collection, an evaluation will be conducted to see how it will impact our system. Milestone #3: The arrival and departure system has been designed to capture data for sea and air arrivals and departures using an automated I-94 form. Pilot testing is taking place at various ports-of-entry. Milestone #4: Until there is full implementation of an automated system for arrival and departure at all ports-of-entry, the INS cannot provide complete information to the State Department to screen visa applicants. Milestone #6: The INS statistics office has completed an analysis of overstay information, and that analysis has been used to develop the final interior enforcement strategy.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
The INS has information systems in place which it can use to analyze the rate of overstays and the characteristics of the overstay population. We will know we are fixing the problem when we can resume the calculation of overstay rate in either NIIS or a replacement system, increase the percentage of departure forms collected by carriers, identify useful information from NIIS and other INS systems that can assist in modifying INS' interior enforcement strategy. If the INS determines that it can modify its interior enforcement strategy to address the overstay problem, these modifications will be implemented.

Issue Description:
In July 1997, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report on its efforts to follow up on a previous INS management report to determine whether steps had been taken to correct some of the most significant management problems identified in its initial report. The GAO found that the INS must take steps to further resolve management problems, to include clarifications of lines of communication, and the dissemination of organizational policies and guidelines through manuals.

What We Will Do About It:
Evaluate roles and responsibilities of organizational entities and reassign duties where necessary; provide written guidance on appropriate relationships, communication methods, and coordination among the INS programs and offices; review staff levels, where necessary; issue comprehensive policy manuals; and periodically review the new deployment planning process. Milestone #5: The field manuals are still on target for the designated target date.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
The INS has improved internal communications, updated policy manuals, efficiently allocated staff resources, and strengthened program planning.

Issue Description:
The Office of Information Resources Management (OIRM) has experienced continuing and longstanding difficulty in providing timely and consistent information about its activities. The OIRM has been cited by the OIG for the lack of adequate management controls and repeatable business processes to efficiently and effectively manage information technology (IT) at INS.

What We Will Do About It:
Implementation of management controls and repeatable processes is a multi-year effort. The OIRM recently tasked the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to conduct an assessment of its IT management practices. The LMI's assessment is completed, and their report issued. This report provides a framework and recommendations for the improvement of IT business practices. Remedial activities began in January 1998 with immediate term actions. The OIRM has moved into the medium- and long-term activities as it continues to improve its IT management practices. In addition, the INS implemented an Information Technology Investment Review Board (Board) to ensure that it has a process for selecting, evaluating, and controlling all of its IT investments, including out-year Operating and Maintenance (O&M) costs. The Board is the formal mechanism for IT owners to plan, request funding, and obtain approval for IT investments. Milestone #1, 2, 3, and 4 are completed. The original Milestone 6 has been deleted since it was duplicative of Milestones 3 and 4.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
The OIRM will perform an internal assessment of the various activities which will be followed up by the OIG in subsequent audits.

Issue Description:
In July 1997, the GAO issued a report on the INS' Institutional Hearing Program (IHP). The report noted that the INS: (1) failed to identify many deportable criminal aliens, including aggravated felons, and initiate IHP proceedings for them before they were released from prison; (2) did not complete the IHP by the time of prison release for the majority of criminal aliens it did identify; and (3) has not realized intended enhancements to the IHP. Milestone #2: Immigration Agent (IA) attrition has increased recently due to hiring restrictions in the Investigation program. Oversight of the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) (nee IHP) will transfer to the Detention and Removal Program beginning the second quarter of FY 2001. This transfer should reduce the number of IA vacancies. The INS is also examining the IA career track to mitigate future attrition problems. Milestone #5: The Criminal Alien Identification System was deployed to all Federal IRP sites in April 2000.

What We Will Do About It:
The INS will improve its internal tracking system, improve its internal controls to ensure aggravated felons are identified and tracked, ascertain what resources are needed for IHP, ensure there is adequate staff, and publish policy on roles and responsibilities of agents involved with IHP.

Milestones 1 through 5 have been completed. The INS has improved its tracking system and internal controls, has determined resource and staff requirements, and has published needed policy. With completion of all milestones, the INS feels it now has the necessary tools to ensure that IRP (nee IHP) proceedings can be initiated and completed.

The OIG plans to audit the IHP in FY 2001 to determine if past recommendations were implemented and assess whether program enhancements can streamline the IHP process. In addition, an OIG inspection is in progress to assess how the INS escorts criminal deportees within and outside the U.S. These deportees are generally aggravated felons who pose a potential danger to the public. UPON POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF THE OIG AUDIT AND INSPECTION, THIS ISSUE MAY BE CLOSED.

Milestones	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
1. Publish policy-clarifying roles and responsibilities of the special agents in the IHP.			10/31/97
2. Identify causes of immigration agent attrition, and take action to ensure adequate staffing is achieved.	09/30/99		09/30/00
3. Develop a workload analysis model to ascertain the need for IHP resources.			06/30/98
4. Establish controls to ensure aggravated felons are identified and tracked, and improve the ability to deport them while they are imprisoned.	04/01/99		07/31/99
5. Incorporate an IHP process module into ENFORCE.	09/30/99		04/30/00

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
When the INS has the ability to identify and track eligible incarcerated criminal aliens so that IHP proceedings can be initiated and completed. When final deportation orders are issued, ensures expeditious deportation of eligible criminal aliens upon release from prison.

Issue Description:
The INS needs to improve accountability of property highly vulnerable to waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation. Additionally, INS has not routinely reported the status of weapons and, as a result, has numerous lost or missing weapons.

What We Will Do About It:
Insofar as improving accountability of property highly vulnerable to waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation, at such time as the OIG issues a final draft report, the Service will evaluate the recommendations, identify those with which we agree, and determine the fixes with milestones and final resolutions. In reference to the INS not routinely reporting the status of weapons, the National Firearms Unit has implemented many of the suggested recommendations.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
Conduct annual Servicewide firearms inventory and account for 100 per cent of the firearms inventory, and decrease the number of firearms reported lost, stolen, or missing.

Issue Description:
Between FY 1997 and FY 1999 the number of apprehended aliens smuggled into the U.S. increased nearly 80 percent. INS predicts that the smuggling will continue to increase and that alien smuggling organizations will become more sophisticated, organized, and complex. GAO studied both the domestic and international components of INS' anti-smuggling strategy, written in 1997, and in a report dated May 2000 (GGD-00-013), GAO listed the following impediments to the domestic component: 1) a lack of inter-program coordination; 2) the absence of an agency wide automated case tracking and management system; and 3) limited performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the strategy.

Additionally, GAO states that INS' Intelligence Program has been impeded by a lack of understanding among field staff on how to report intelligence information, a lack of staff to perform intelligence functions, and an inefficient and cumbersome process of organizing data that does not allow for rapid retrieval and analysis. As a result, INS has limited ability to identify targets for enforcement and to help focus its anti-smuggling resources on efforts that would have the greatest impact.

GAO recommended that INS establish criteria for designating anti-smuggling cases as priority investigations; establishing an automated, agency wide case tracking and management system; establishing performance measures of effectiveness; and requiring that intelligence reports be prepared using a database format.

What We Will Do About It:
To address the GAO recommendations to (see language above) and improve coordination of alien smuggling operations, INS is assessing and revising its 1997 alien smuggling strategy. This ongoing effort is near completion and is being incorporated in FY 2001 operational plans for future investigations. The effective implementation of the strategy will depend on actionable intelligence that identifies alien smuggling organizations and principals, and assesses the scope and nature of global alien smuggling. Effective coordination will also require tools for timely collection, production and exchange of intelligence between offices to support case specific operations and investigations.

To address the GAO recommendations to establish an automated agency wide case tracking and management system and to prepare intelligence reports using a database format, INS has begun the deployment of the Criminal Investigative Reporting System (CIRS) and Law Enforcement Analysis Data System (LEADS®) to field offices conducting alien smuggling investigations. CIRS is a database system that can generate investigative and intelligence reports and manages investigative cases. CIRS data can be uploaded to the INS' national file server so other INS offices can review case reports and conduct link analysis functions. LEADS® is an automated intelligence analysis tool within the ENFORCE System. Combining LEADS® with the CIRS investigation tool gives the INS an automated data collection and analysis capability that will improve the reporting of alien smuggling intelligence, provide a database structure for organizing the information, and enable rapid retrieval and analysis. Using this capability to identify smuggling organizations and develop investigative leads, INS will be able to improve the coordination and focus of its anti-smuggling resources on efforts that would have the greatest impact. These applications will also support INS border control operations and investigations of immigration fraud, document counterfeiting, and other immigration law violations.

In operation, the CIRS data is uploaded to an INS national file server where authorized users can compare that data with other enforcement information utilizing LEADS®. INS is deploying CIRS and NetLEADS® to field offices while providing training for both systems simultaneously. The symbiotic system of NetLEADS® and CIRS uses the existing INS Intranet infrastructure to provide access to virtually all INS officer corps personnel. The primary users of CIRS are investigative personnel.

Personnel within the Border Patrol and Inspections programs not conducting investigations are able to file Intelligence Reports in a database format as well. Utilizing an electronic Intelligence Report (G-392) form, these personnel can provide information that is electronically extracted from the report and loaded into a database, which is then searchable by LEADS®. In this way the database of CIRS information, G-392 information, ENFORCE information and other law enforcement databases as they become available, can be compared and linked using the LEADS® tools.

To measure the effectiveness of the alien smuggling strategy, the INS will produce threat assessments and estimates relating to smuggler usage, smuggler tactics, and smuggling traffic flow. Work is currently progressing to devise a plan for the measurement of changes in the human trafficking community as a result of enforcement activities. The INS deployment of the CIRS and LEADS® automated intelligence tools mentioned above are critical to the conduct of these assessments. Completion of baseline measurements and analysis is now targeted for October 2002. The Alien Intelligence Unit will support this effort at the El Paso Intelligence Center.

Measures of intelligence program effectiveness are defined as the number of personnel trained in intelligence processes, the number of new trans-national smuggling cases identified, the number of investigative leads disseminated, and the number of "special operations," driven by intelligence that are conducted by enforcement units. The intelligence program uses LEADS® as the principal automated tool for identifying trans-national smuggling cases, developing investigative leads, and supporting "special operations."

Milestones	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
1. Develop alien smuggling strategic goals and coordination guidance vis a vis the Migrant Trafficking and Smuggling Coordination Center.	09/30/01
2. Deploy intelligence collection and analysis infrastructure.	09/30/02
3. Develop measurement of alien smuggling "shifts."	09/30/03
4. Assess effectiveness of alien smuggling strategy.	10/01/02

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
When INS enforcement operations target large-scale trans-national alien smuggling organizations, effectively coordinate operations between INS domestic and foreign offices, and effectively engage the support of other US and foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

When automated case tracking and intelligence systems are deployed to INS officers, analysts and program managers who are responsible for planning, coordinating and supporting anti-smuggling investigations. Also, the systems are fully interfaced with other INS information systems, and are used to assess the scope and nature of global alien smuggling activities, review, track and analyze trans-national smuggling cases, and support evidence collection for prosecution and asset forfeiture.

When INS intelligence and anti-smuggling enforcement performance measures reflect the effectiveness of the alien smuggling enforcement strategy and intelligence operations.

Issue Description:
The INS accounting system is inadequate and lacks reliable information in its financial reports. The accounting system cannot fully comply with administrative policies and procedures in regard to fund controls and has significant weaknesses over payments and obligations. The accounting system is outmoded and is comprised of diverse mainframe, manual, and PC-based systems. The various systems are not integrated, have significant internal control deficiencies, and do not provide the INS with useful, timely information.

The INS could not accurately or effectively reconcile differences between accounting records and Treasury's fund balance accounts.

What We Will Do About It:
The INS is implementing a new financial management system, using a phased-in approach and enforcing proper adherence of accrual based accounting standards. Policies and procedures are being developed in coordination with full implementation of the system. INS selected the Federal Financial Management System (FFMS) developed by RELTEK Systems & Design, Inc. However, further review is necessary to determine if the FFMS will meet the INS's long-term automated financial management system needs. A consulting firm has been engaged to assess all current JFMIP-compliant products, including FFMS, to determine if proceeding with FFMS or acquiring an alternative product would be of best interest to INS.

The INS implemented a process for reviewing and correcting unreconciled differences with Treasury's fund balances on an ongoing basis.

 

Milestones	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
1. INS will develop accurate data to support deferred revenue reported on financial statements.	10/31/00		10/31/00
2. Correct unreconciled differences.	01/31/01
3. Implement new financial management system.	10/01/03

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
Accounting data will be reliable and the audit recommendations will be closed.

Issue Description:
The FPI implemented Millennium in May 2000. While the new system is performing basic functions, it does not yet meet all the financial management requirements of OMB Circular No. A-127. System generated reports require thorough review, analysis, and frequent corrections. Additionally, the FPI does not meet all system security requirements of OMB Circular No. A-130.

What We Will Do About It:
The FPI will work with its contractors to modify its system to comply with financial management system and security requirements by March 1, 2001. FPI will also obtain System Security Certification and Accreditation required by the Department.

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
Minimal errors will be found in accounting processing, recording and reporting, and the FPI has received System Security Certification and Accreditation.

Issue Description:
The USMS does not have adequate controls over certain elements of its financial accounting reconciliation process. Auditors concluded that the inadequate controls presented a deficiency in the financial account control system that could adversely impact USMS ability to record, process, and report its financial transactions timely and accurately.

Improvements are needed in the USMS Financial statement preparation process. Due to the extensive effort necessary to prepare, review, and correct account reconciliations, the USMS was not timely in submitting requested financial statement information. Throughout the financial statement process, auditors found technical errors, clerical errors, and inconsistencies in the form and content of the financial statements and associated footnotes. Additionally, there was no documentation of management review of the financial statements.

What We Will Do About It:
The USMS established the Financial Policy Team within the Office of Finance that is tasked with updating existing policies and procedures manuals. The Financial Policy Team will fully document all reconciliation processes.

The USMS has received authority to hire additional staff to assist with operations. With more timely reconciliations and more staff available for compilation of financial statements, the USMS expects to be able to submit timely and materially accurate financial statements for FY 2000. In addition, management will perform thorough management reviews of the financial statements for accuracy and completeness.

Milestones	Original Target Date	Current Target Date	Actual Date of Completion
1. Document all reconciliation processes.	09/30/01
2. Hire additional personnel and management review of financial statements.	09/30/01

How We Will Know It Is Fixed:
Minimal errors will be found in accounting processing, recording and reporting and the audit recommendations will be closed.

Issue Description:
DEA has not maintained a system that accurately and completely accounts for property and equipment. DEA also should clear fund balances with the U.S. Treasury, improve its financial reporting process, charge full cost for Controlled Substance Act Registration fees, and improve automated security.

What We Will Do About It:
Revise property management policy and procedures, properly classify property in the general ledger and financial statements, implement an automated interface for purchase card data to clear fund balances with the U.S. Treasury. To improve the financial reporting process, develop administrative officer training program, draft comprehensive financial statement preparation procedures. DEA will adjust rates for Controlled Substance Act Registration fees to charge for full cost and recertify financial system users.