Fighting the "Big Lie"
The experience in the Balkans shows that the international community must play an early and active role in fostering independent media voices in transitional societies, experts conclude.
April 2003
Kemal Kurspahic
Information is power. Ultra-nationalist governments in the Balkans knew this. They used media—particularly television—to fan the flames of ethnic hatred.
A Current Issues Briefing at the Institute on March 4 explored this issue, as described in Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace (USIP Press) by former Institute senior fellow Kemal Kurspahic, who was editor of the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjene in the 1990s. Besides Kurspahic, the briefing featured Roy Gutman, Institute senior fellow and chief diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek; Richard Kauzlarich, director of the Institute's Special Initiative on the Muslim World and former U.S. ambassador to Bosnia; and Sanford Ungar, president of Goucher College and former director of the Voice of America.
Kurspahic explained that during the Cold War, Balkan media propagated the ideas of a "one man/one party" regime: the Tito government. More recent Balkan leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, employed media to propagate hatred among neighbors.
Kurspahic said that while Milosevic did eventually control the media, it was powerful individuals in the media that in large part "gave birth" to Milosevic's regime. During the Serbo-Croatian war, media on both sides manipulated and distorted information—even to the point of fabricating stories.
Kurspahic also spoke of the missed opportunities of the post–Dayton Accord years, noting that there was no mention of media in the Dayton agreement except for an annex regarding free and fair elections. Control of the media was left to the nationalist parties on both sides of the conflict.
In 2000, after Milosevic's fall, there were new beginnings and hopes for change. This change, though, is not happening fast enough. "Seven years after Dayton," said Kurspahic, "there is still an unstable media landscape."
Gutman drew on his own experience as a journalist to confirm the book's description of journalism and nationalism in the Balkans. The Balkans, he said, provided a "colorful tapestry of some of the worst practices of modern journalism." Gutman went on to describe the "big lie" of war-time reporting, citing an example from Kurspahic's book in which the management of a Serbian television affiliate posted an official notice instructing editorial staff to identify all corpses shown in war reports as "Serb victims" no matter their actual identity. The most troubling thing, Gutman said, is how easily some reporters moved from journalism to propaganda.
Three points stood out for Kauzlarich: the personal responsibility of Milosevic and Tudjman; the failure of the international community in the Balkan war; and the mistaken belief that people like Milosevic and Tudjman were the ones to make peace. Kauzlarich highlighted four of Kurspahic's policy recommendations.
- Independence is costly but vital.
- Education of media managers in the business of journalism is critical.
- Donor strategies should be refocused and made more flexible to respond to the medium-term financial needs of media.
- Media markets must be explored and developed.
Ungar explored broader implications for international media. He noted that journalists are knowledgeable observers and therefore face a temptation to take sides. But can or should the media intervene to put an end to conflict? "We need to be humble about what we think we can do," answered Ungar. He also noted that these efforts might not lead to the desired outcome. He described the professional training by the U.S. Information Service provided to Rwandan radio personnel. Later, radio was a powerful tool in mobilizing the 1994 genocide. The international community can foster independent media and good journalistic practices, he concluded, but must be careful not to overstep.
