

# Alaskan Region Welcomes New FAASTeam Manager

My name is James Wilkinson and I am the Manager of the new Alaskan Region Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Team, or "the FAASTeam." I want to introduce myself and tell you a little bit about me and about the FAASTeam because in the very near future, you may be part of it.

I have been with the FAA for 20 years and first arrived in Alaska in 1976 as a pilot. My aviation career has taken me into the classroom as a ground instructor, into airplanes and helicopters as a pilot and flight instructor, to a major airline jet as a Captain, and several FAA offices. I have been a General Aviation and Air Carrier Operations Safety Inspector and managed training at the FAA Academy for five years. My most recent trip to Alaska was as a first level manager in the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) where I supervised three operational units, including the Anchorage International Field Unit. I was selected to become the Manager of the new Alaskan Region FAA Safety Team in July 2005 and was tasked with the responsibility to make the transition from the current Aviation Safety Program to the Safety Team during the next year.

So how did we get here? As you may know, the FAA implemented the Aviation Safety Program in response to an acceptably high number of accidents and fatalities in general aviation. In 1966, there were 5,712 accidents, 573 of which were fatal to 1,515 people. For the next year, the FAA studied the feasibility of creating a national accident prevention program and a joint FAA/Industry program called the "General Aviation Accident Prevention Program" was initiated in 1968. The program was



designed to be an educational initiative based on the principle that improving attitudes and increasing knowledge of general aviation pilots could reduce the accident rate.

The plan and hope was that by making individual pilots, flight and ground instructors aware of their own actions and decision-making, the accident rate would drop. The FAA created new positions called "Accident Prevention Specialist" from among the staff of Aviation Safety Inspectors in the Operations (pilot) specialty. In 1968, each FSDO was assigned one Specialist who held the lofty title of "Assistant Supervising Inspector for Accident Prevention." Over the next couple of years, the positions and the Accident Prevention Program were modified and tweaked nationally.

Back then, the Accident Prevention Specialist (APS) was a 40-year old male who held an Airline Transport Rating (remember those?) and had extensive ex-(*Continued on page 4*) **FAA Alaskan Flyer** is published by the Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Division, Alaskan Region.

FAASTeam Manager—Alaskan Region Jim Wilkinson (907) 229-3439

james.m.wilkinson@faa.gov

Alaskan Region Safety Program Manager Kieran O'Farrell (OPS) (907) 790-7373 (800) 478-2231 kieran.ofarrell@faa.gov

Anchorage District Safety Program Manager Tony Fischer (OPS) (907) 271-2000 (800) 294-5116 tony.fischer@faa.gov

Fairbanks District Safety Program Managers David Karalunas (A/W) Ken A. Thomas (OPS) (907) 474-0276 (800) 294-5119 ken.a.thomas@faa.gov david.karalunas@faa.gov

Juneau District Safety Program Manager Patricia Mattison (OPS) (907) 790-7308 (800) 478-2231 patricia.mattison@faa.gov

This Issue Edited by: Laurel Davis

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# POTUS visits lead to successful TFAR

On Veteran's Day, Friday November 11, 2005, a team of inspectors from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) was mobilized to take action concerning a Presidential visit to Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB), scheduled for Monday, November 14, 2005. The team included supervisor Bruce Walker and inspectors Michael Yorke, Bill Bohman, Charlotte Luckett, Scott Schweizer, and John Steuernagle.


On Saturday, November 12th, Inspectors Yorke and Schweizer assembled informational documents to provide all team members with needed materials for this mission. Phone calls were made to local Part 135 operators in the area to advise them of the scheduled Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR). Also, flyers were posted at Palmer (PAQ), Birchwood (BCV), and Merrill Field (MRI) airports to alert general aviation pilots of TFR information. The TFR information was also emailed to pilots who are registered with **faasafety.gov**.

On Monday, November 14, 2005, FAA inspectors were on scene at Kenai (ENA) and Palmer airports, and Elmendorf AFB. FAA inspectors worked closely with North American Air Defense (NORAD) personnel, personnel at Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage Center Air Traffic Controllers (ATC), and Regional Operations Center (ROC) staff.

Due to the proactive conduct of FAA inspectors from Anchorage FSDO the Presidential visit transpired with no violations of the restricted airspace, even though weather conditions at the time of the TFR were VFR. This was accomplished as a result of outstanding coordination on the part of the team at the ANC FSDO and the support of the aviation community.

The President of the United States (POTUS) returned to Elmendorf Monday morning, November 21st, and another TFR was in effect during that time.





# **Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) Associations in Alaska** For more information, please contact:

Anchorage Bowl Association

**Mark Paine** 

Interior Alaska Flight Instructors Association Jim Drew Kenai Association

**Dean Eicholz** 

907-479-2212

jimd@gci.net

907-262-3872

akfly@alaska.net

# Lost and Found

by Hugh Keith Aviation Safety Counselor & retired FAA Airworthiness Inspector

Let me tell you a story. In the 1960's Wien Airlines ran a Fairchild F-27 scheduled flight from Fairbanks, to Whitehorse, Juneau, and return. One day just before one of these flights a mechanic was working up inside the right landing gear wheel-well. One tool he was using was a 3/8-inch speed wrench. He set it aside in the wheel-well when he was done with it, and forgot it when he was done with the job.

When the mechanic was putting his tools away he missed his tool and immediately advised his supervisor, but it was to late too stop the flight departure. It was decided to allow the flight to continue; as there was no reported problem, it was assumed the tool had fallen out, or would fall out on the gear extension at Whitehorse. If it was still there it could be retrieved on landing.

The flight crew called back to Fairbanks that the right gear would not lock down on approach to Whitehorse. All attempts - recycle, emergency extension, pulling a few "G's" - failed to lock the gear. The crew was told to fly back to Fairbanks, and a frantic call was made to the aircraft manufacturer in Hagerstown, MD, for assistance, but they could think of nothing else to try. They advised it was probably best to land gear-up in the grass next to the Fairbanks runway and hope for the best.


The flight crew, Captain George Clayton and First Officer Peter Merry (still living in Fairbanks), did not think much of a gear-up landing and decided to try one more thing. They made a long slow approach to the runway and made several bounces of the uncooperative gear along the runway while keeping up the aircraft flying speed. They got a down-lock light and landed okay on the next goaround. Their skill and innovation saved the day. The only damage was a bent wrench. The "lost" tool was "found" jammed in the landing gear door mechanism.

Lessons learned? One, the aircraft should not have been released until the maintenance tool inventory had been completed (that should be part of the job). Two, the aircraft should have been called back instead of continuing on (maybe the tool had not jarred loose yet).

You want more? A good article on Tool Control can be read in the Transport Canada newsletter, "Aviation Safety Maintainer," issue 3/2003 (as well as other articles) at:

## www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/SystemSafety/menu.htm

Also good reading at the same site is "Aviation Safety Letter," which is mostly for pilots and operators.



"It's only the inspiration of those who die that makes those who live realize what constitutes a useful life." - Will Rogers

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#### (Continued from page 1)

perience as a flight instructor and charter or corporate pilot. The "normal" APS had 20 years of aviation experience and had logged over 8,000 flight hours. The FAA hoped to capitalize on this extensive background and couple it with specialized training in human factors and communication to enable them to build relationships with the pilots in their assigned areas. They would spend 95% of their time getting to know the individual pilots, their habits — good and bad — and help them change the bad ones. The result was a very personal relationship between the APS and "their" pilots.

In 1988, the one-on-one relationship was de-emphasized as the general aviation population expanded. In its place, the FAA focused on managing the safety program. To reflect increased duties, the Accident Prevention Specialists (APS) became Accident Prevention Program Managers (APPM) and the program activities were expanded between 1988 and 1995. The well known PACE program and remedial training as an alternative to legal enforcement action also were implemented and after a period of adjustment, became very successful programs. More regional and national newsletters and publications were published and the responsibilities of the Aviation Safety Counselors (ASC) were increased.

A very significant change happened in 1993 with the addition of Airworthiness Inspectors to the aviation safety program. The first Airworthiness Inspectors selected were volunteers until the position description was approved in 1997. Another title change happened as the FAA recognized that there is more to "aviation safety" than just reducing accidents — the Accident Prevention Program Managers became the current Safety Program Managers (SPM) and took on additional training and responsibilities. The focus continued to shift from personal involvement by the SPM's to one of educational outreach focusing on increasing professionalism in all certificated airmen and to increase aviation safety awareness among flight, ground, and maintenance schools in hopes of creating a safety culture.

A major change occurred in 2001 when FAA executives mandated a change in the FAA's aviation safety program. The final result of that change was the creation of the FAA Safety Team, the so-called "FAASTeam." The change came about for two core reasons: (1) In spite of studies that indicated a general ineffectiveness, the FAA has never measured the true effectiveness of its aviation safety program to focus resources on reducing accidents, so we didn't really know how much success we were getting for the effort; and (2) the FAA has been making the transition to a performance-based organization which requires measuring performance against specific standards. The FAASTeam will contribute by using effective decision-making based on risk analysis. Simply put, we will put data-based decision-making processes in place — as opposed to the old 'shotgun' approach — to determine what works and what doesn't work. We will ask the new FAASTeam Program Managers to use a new skill set — including more program and project management skills than the previous SPM's used — and to make their decisions based on justifiable, clearly identified risks.

And we will continue to rely more heavily and on the expertise in the aviation community. We will work hard to develop effective partnerships with our industry experts, large and small. We have already begun to do that by working closely with local groups to improve and advance CFI initiatives in the major areas of our state and we work closely with the Medallion Foundation.

There will be more name changes, of course, as our aviation safety continues to crystallize. As the Aviation Safety Program moves toward its sunset next September, the SPM's will disappear. Over the next several months, I will be seeking to find qualified, motivated individual to fill the new FAASTeam Program Manager positions. The name "Aviation Safety Counselors" will change to "FAASTeam Representative" to reflect more clearly the relationship between the FAA and their industry partners.

So what will the FAASTeam Reps do?

The FAASTeam Program Managers will call on the FAASTeam Representatives to be more specific in their duties and areas of expertise and in turn, the FAASTeam Reps will have more say in what they do. For example, they will work with one of a number of national FAA Safety Team *Lead* Representatives to write their own guidance documents instead of receiving it from the FAA. The Reps may get into areas not previously touched by the old Aviation Safety Program — large and small air carriers and repair stations are two areas that will be developed. Of course, the main focus will be on data-based decision making to increase aviation safety and reduce the accident rate in Alaska.

I will have more about the FAASTeam Representatives in later FLYER issues and on www.faasafety.gov — I would encourage <u>anyone</u> interested in aviation safety to register as a user. Holding an airman certificate of some kind is NOT a requirement. And I hope to present my vision of the new FAASTeam in person at events as my schedule allows. I look forward to the future as we make the transition to the new FAASTeam.

### www.faasafety.gov

#### FAA Alaskan Flyer

# **Recipe for an Accident**

## By

# Bruce Walker Operations Supervisor, Anchorage FSDO

#### **Reprinted from FAA Alaskan Airmen News February 1994**

Many years ago as a young aviator in Alaska, I had just made captain for a Part 135 commuter airlines. Therefore, I promised myself to be safe. My first IFR flight was from Anchorage flying to Valdez. I had 16 passengers and baggage. A check of the weather indicated icing conditions were expected. I was trained and informed that the aircraft I was flying could legally operate continuously in icing conditions. After all, it was quipped with deicing boots and propeller heat. Other pilots were flying this same aircraft in ice. It was certified by the FAA for flight into known icing conditions. Little did I

understand that these types of deicing equipment are on the aircraft to allow the pilot a little time to get out of icing conditions – not operate continuously in moderate or severe icing.

I departed runway 6L at Anchor- • age, flying the standard instrument departure procedure. At 1,500 feet the aircraft started to ice up. At 10,000 feet and on the airway fly-

ing the Valdez, the aircraft propellers started slinging ice off, which was striking the fuselage. A passenger came forward; he was concerned about the noise. I explained that the ice was being removed from the propellers. It sounded like the aircraft was cracking in half to the passenger. He suggested we get out of the ice. I assured him all was well. During our climb, Anchorage Approach Control was busy assisting another aircraft returning from Valdez with an engine failure. I later learned that his engine failure was due to ingestion of ice. At 50 miles from Anchorage, our airspeed was down to VYSE (best single-engine rate of climb). Both en-

The gines were at maximum power. aircraft was barely sustaining flight. It was ice." carrying "moderate I informed the co-pilot to turn around and return to Anchorage. During the 180 degree turn the aircraft's stall warning was going off. I was taught to pull the circuit breaker when this happens. We completed the turn, however, our altitude was now below the minimum on route altitude. Air traffic control knew we were in trouble and suggested we climb to 11,000 feet. They gave a pilot report that

indicated no ice at 11,000 feet and I explained to air traffic control that our aircraft was in a controlled descent. They gave us radar vectors over to Turnagain Arm (keeping us clear of the terrain).
The weather at Anchorage was 100 overcast and 1800 RVR with freezing rain. The aircraft windows were covered with ice. The alcohol, which was designed to remove ice from the windows, was worthless. Because I
couldn't see land, I had to open the side window and scratch the ice off with my

white knuckles. We were able to land by a very thin margin but without a major incident.

This experience taught me that before flying in icing conditions, make sure you obtain a good weather briefing, take time with your preflight planning, and use good judgment. Also, make sure that all aircraft deicing equipment is working properly before takeoff. I continued to fly in Alaska for another 12 years and during this time I could always get out of icing. Remember, the aircraft equipment is there to help the pilot get out of icing conditions, not to continuously fly in it.







Every year pilots from all over the United States plan and prepare for that once-in-a-lifetime dream trip...flying their airplane to Alaska. They pack up families, friends, and fly North to the Great Land. Every year some of these pilot's trips end in an accident; some end tragically, with loss of life. Alaska is a land of extremes, and thus planning a flight up here requires extra care and preparation. Every pilot knows that flying requires preparation. The need for a thorough flight plan could not be greater than for a trip to or across Alaska. The scarcity of roads and facilities, the rough terrain, and vast distances between communities demand forethought and planning. Emergency gear, an emergency locator beacon, and an alternate route are essential if one is to deal with the changing weather conditions and other circumstances that may arise.

For all of us that fly up here or may know of someone from the lower 48 planning a flight up to Alaska, we now have a 'Flying To and in Alaska' website:

The website has some excellent information, along with useful links such as the **Alaska Weather Camera's**, **The Alaska Airmen's Association**, and important **Canadian links** complete with up to date border crossing information. Click on the website and check it out. We always welcome additional suggestions to make this website the best possible. Just e-mail any of your Safety Program Managers on the front of the FLYER.

http://www.alaska.faa.gov/flyak/



# THE "H" Word

by Kieran O'Farrell

Very often "*Help*" is a word that has difficulty getting past the lips of aviation professionals, be they pilots, maintenance technicians, or controllers.

Being hopelessly lost in foggy conditions and not asking if a DF (direction finder) steer is available does not make sense, and is too seldom considered. Asking ATC to clarify instructions that seemed unclear may be uncomfortable, but can be lifesaving. Asking a pilot to repeat his or her location, altitude or heading, may seem a bit awkward, but it too can be lifesaving.

All of these things have led to a **BRUSH** with disaster. Here is a formula to think about:

**Busy** ~ never be too busy to ask for clarification "I was too busy to do what I should have done; sought the help of a senior mechanic to help with lead duties as I made the computer input." NASA's CALLBACK Safety Bulletin, July 2005

**Reluctant** ~ please resist being reluctant to ask for help, for fear of sounding clueless. We have all been there. "*Next time I will be more aware of the signs on the airport and I will not be reluctant to ask for help."* NASA's CALLBACK Safety Bulletin, July 2005

**Unwilling ~ do not be unwilling to ask for help, we all need it from time to time.** *"[A] Contributing factor was...my unwillingness to ask for help when I realized I was disoriented. At any point, I could have asked ATC for help, but I did not."* NASA's CALLBACK Safety Bulletin, July 2005

Self-conscious ~ do not fall prey to that philosophy, "better stay quiet and let people think you are stupid, rather then opening your mouth and removing all doubt". Aviation professionals are there and eager to help. "I realize that I should have admitted my mistake to approach control...but truthfully I was too self-conscious about admitting that I could not find the airport...I know they will do everything they can-if one simply asks for help." NASA's CALLBACK Safety Bulletin, July 2005

Hesitant ~ a moment changes all things, when in doubt *ask*. This is not the time for ego. " There was too much traffic for one controller to handle. I should not have hesitated to ask for help..." NASA's CALLBACK Safety Bulletin, July 2005



## FAA Alaskan Flyer



"A single lifetime, even though entirely devoted to the sky, would not be enough for the study of so vast a subject.

A time will come when our descendants will be amazed that we did not know things that are so plain to them." — Seneca, Book 7, first century AD




A student became lost during a solo cross-country flight. While attempting to locate the aircraft on radar, ATC asks, "What was your last known position?"

## The response:

"When I was number one for takeoff!"





A British Overseas Airways Boeing 707 is seen in its last stages of being torn apart by clear air turbulence over Mt. Fuji, Japan. The plane flew into a mountain wave after the captain decided to give the passengers a close-up view of Mt. Fuji. All 124 people aboard were killed. (March 3, 1966)



Something to think about, as dazzling, winter scenes settle over our north country, offering staggering views and breathtaking vistas. Our passengers are impressed enough with a safe flight by a professional to their desired destinations."

Kieran O'Farrell

# TWAS THE NIGHT BEFORE CHRISTMAS

Twas the night before Christmas and all on the ramp Not a plane was stirring, --- not even a Champ The Cherokees and Cessnas were lined up with care, In hopes that spring soon would be there. The operators were buried deep in their books, glaring at red, While visions of rich tourist danced in their heads; The pilots in their sorrels, and mechanics in their caps. had just settled down for a much deserved nap, When out on the ramp there rose such a clatter, they sprang from their chairs to see what was the matter. Away to the window they flew like a flash, dropping their snacks and tripping over the trash, The wild North winds horizontally blew the new fallen snow, obscuring the visibility below, when, what to all wondering eyes should appear, but the FAA King Air, stirring much fear.

With a little old pilot, quick with his 110A, The pilots knew him to be an Inspector from the FAA, More rapid than eagles his stories they eame, as he looked at all the pilot's and called them by name, "I've seen your version of 500 & 2, and stared in disbelief at what you call CAVU," As dry leaves before the wild Southeasters fly, the talked about how they flew the De thavillands all over the sky the drew a breath and heaved a great sigh, "Now if I could just get you to know all of that weight, and tie down every bit of that freight, my Christmas Day would be just great!

If not for budget cuts he would have been assisted by elves, and laughed when he thought of it, there by himself, "Now its true I'm your friendly Fed, but believe me when I say, you have nothing to dread" Between you and I, I know it to be so, The year 2006 can be our best show, Safety is the reason, that puts joy in our season, And all of you are the best of the best, so this year lets not give vigilance a rest!" Back in the King Air away he did fly, into that dark, starry Alaskan December sky, But ATC heard him exclaim as he drove out of sight, "Merry Christmas to All, and to All a Good Night!!"





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# From the Aircraft Discrepancy Logs...

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P = The problem logged by the pilot. S = The solution logged by the mechanic.	
<ul><li>P: Left inside main tire almost needs replacement.</li><li>S: Almost replaced left inside main tire.</li></ul>	P: Air S: Air up, fly
P: Test flight OK, except auto-land very rough. S: Auto-land not installed on this aircraft.	P: Rac S: Rep
P: No. 2 propeller seeping prop fluid. S: No. 2 propeller seepage normal. Nos. 1, 3 and 4 propel- lers lack normal seepage.	P: Mo S: Cat
P: Something loose in cockpit. S: Something tightened in cockpit.	P: Rac S: Pea
P: Dead bugs on windshield. S: Live bugs on backorder.	P: Scr S: Cor
P: Autopilot in "altitude-hold" mode produces a 200-fpm descent. S: Cannot reproduce problem on ground.	P: Fun S: Pilo
<ul><li>P: Evidence of leak on right main landing gear.</li><li>S: Evidence removed.</li></ul>	P: Air S: Air
<ul><li>P: DME volume unbelievably loud.</li><li>S: DME volume set to more believable level.</li></ul>	P: #3 e S: #3 e
P: Friction locks cause throttle levers to stick. S: That's what they're there for!	P: #3 e S: #3 e
P: Transponder inoperative. S: Transponder always inoperative in OFF mode.	P: Bra S: Doi
P: The T/C ball seemed stuck in the middle during my last turn.	P: Rac S: Rer
S: Congratulations! You've just made your first coordinated turn.	P: Wh S: Gro
P: Suspected crack in windscreen. S: Suspect you're right.	P: Firs S: Co- more
<ul><li>P: Number 3 engine missing.</li><li>S: Engine found on right wing after brief search.</li></ul>	P: Eleo S: Paio
	11

rcraft handles funny. rcraft warned to straighten y right, and be serious.

dar hums. programmed radar with words.

ouse in cockpit.

t installed.

dio switches stick

anut butter no longer served to flight crew

- reaming sound in cabin at start-up
- mpany accountant deplaned
- nny smell in cockpit ot told to change cologne
- rcraft 2,400 lbs over max weight
- rcraft put on diet of 92 octane

engine knocks at idle

engine let in for a few beers

engine runs like it's sick

- engine diagnosed with hangover
- akes howl on application
- on't step on 'em so hard!
- dio sounds like a squealing pig
- moved pig from radio. BBQ behind hangar tomorrow
- hole aircraft smells like BBQ ound Checks OK

st class cabin floor has a squeak -pilot told not to play with toddler toys in cabin any-

- ectrical governor is broke
- id off governor's debt to Jimmy "The Fish" Galvano





FAA Alaskan Flyer

# Local Pilot's Page

## **The Day I let an Ugly Passenger in my Cockpit** Tyler Robinson

Usually when I pick up a new aviation magazine, like most pilots, the first thing read is the accident profiles, not to read about the unfortunate happenings to others, but to learn, and better myself as an aviator. I like to try to analyze and dissect the events that lead up to the accident, and I try to file those away in my memory so I might use them at some point in the future, with that in mind, I would like to share what happened to me.

I am a commercial pilot and have been flying part 135 Southeast Alaska for the better part of 20 years. Most of my company's work encompasses about a hundred-mile radius from our main base, very, very familiar terrain to me. I was flying our Cessna 206 equipped with amphibious floats. I have about 3500 hours in this particular airplane, and I am very familiar and comfortable with it, and my abilities to fly it. I know what the airplane is capable of and what its limits are, as well as my own.

My first flight that day I flew for 1.4 hours and did three water landings and one airport landing. My next flight was .5 hours and consisted of one water landing and one airport landing. My last flight would be 1.2 hours and two airport and 1-water landings. A very routine, but somewhat slow day. As I departed on the second leg of my last trip, I climbed to about 3000 ft and made a direct course to the bay I had dropped people at earlier that day for wildlife viewing. This leg would be about 30 minutes, and I found myself thinking about a function I was going to attend about an hour later with my grandson. The weather was good with very light winds and I was anticipating no problems at my destination. I had worked this bay probably hundreds of times over the years and knew it well. With current conditions, a straight in landing would probably work well. I would be able to pick up my passengers and return to town with about 10 minutes to spare. Piece of cake.

About 10 miles out, I began a descent and aligned the airplane for a straight on landing, checked fuel selector, landing gear, and 10-degrees of flaps. Since I was landing directly into the bay, my planned touch down spot was about a half mile out so I would be on the water before an aborted landing would not be possible. Full flaps now, and a very shallow approach, I knew this was going to be a greaser, and I would continue to step taxi closer to the beach. Holding the airplane in a perfect landing attitude I



was waiting for the thumping of the floats as they touched water. Something did not feel right, too much drag and I was still too high above the surface. Instantly I knew what was wrong and immediately tried to correct with full aft elevator but it was too late. I could feel my body being thrown forward against my shoulder harness as the airplane rapidly decelerated and slowly nosed over. At this point, I realized no amount of aft elevator would help now and instinctively released my seatbelt and opened the cabin door and climbed onto the bottom of the fuselage as the airplane was sinking. As the fuselage went under, I climbed further up onto the bottom of the left float. Of course, as I realized at the last instant, there was my landing gear down and locked for an airport landing. Help arrived almost immediately and the airplane was recovered the next day.

So, even months later, the question still haunts me, "How could I have possibly let this happen?" After much soul searching, I have a few ideas, and have asked myself many questions.

If I had passengers on board would this have happened? I like to think not, as passengers traditionally do not fare very will in accidents of this sort. However, the atmosphere in the cabin is usually one of excitement and anticipation when going to watch wildlife at this destination. Not the old daily routine in a familiar environment.

What if I was landing at a bay, I was not familiar with? I probably would have circled once, planning my landing as well as my departure. Calculating, analyzing the area, and focused on the task at hand. What if the weather was marginal? Again, I think I would have been more focused.

Looking back, I remember thinking about that important event I was to attend thru my descent and landing - yes- I was daydreaming.

Routine, familiarity, being overly comfortable with my environment and the airplane I was flying, for me, lead to complacency that day. I have over 14,000 hours of flying time with 8000 hours in amphibious aircrafts. I let my guard down, and I got bit. Unknowingly, I let an ugly passenger into my cockpit that day. Don't let it happen to you.

US Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center Airmen Certification Branch, AFS-760 PO Box 25082 Oklahoma City, OK 73125

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