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# Toward an Estimate of the Soviet Worldview

## Part I

During the 14 years of Leonid Brezhnev's rule, the Soviet Union's international position and the international setting in which it exists have altered considerably. One of the most significant alterations has been the growth of the Kremlin's international prestige and influence. Soviet leaders have pointed out that few major international issues exist today in which the Kremlin's voice plays no role, an observation with which Western leaders reluctantly concur. As the Soviet Union draws near the end of the Brezhnev era and confronts the problem of political succession once again, it is time to assess the state of the world as the aging Soviet leader and his colleagues view it.

The Soviet worldview (*Mirovozzrenie*) has immediate pertinence to the ongoing Western debate over Soviet capabilities and intentions. While it belabors the obvious to point out that numerous factors influence Soviet foreign policy behavior, it must not be overlooked that one of the more significant influences inevitably is the Kremlin's view of the international system and the place which the Kremlin believes it occupies within that system. This essay seeks to develop an estimate of the Soviet *Mirovozzrenie*.

### *Problems and Pitfalls*

When one attempts to determine the Soviet perception of an issue, event, or situation, the question inevitably arises of how "real" perceptions may be separated from propaganda. This is a legitimate and serious concern, and no simple answer is possible. Any attempt to determine a Soviet perception must take into account the foreign, domestic, ideological, and material situations that exist at a particular time,

and must additionally involve open Soviet communications, particularly speeches of leaders, articles in major journals and newspapers, and media broadcasts. Changes in Soviet policy — foreign, domestic, military, economic, and so forth — provide one means of observing possible alterations in Soviet perceptions, as do the "clues," as Donald S. Zagoria calls them, that exist within open Soviet communications.<sup>1</sup> Still, changes and clues may be caused by myriad factors other than changed perceptions. Thus, despite one's best efforts, a totally objective separation of real perceptions and propaganda is impossible.

A degree of subjectivity is consequently inevitable in any assessment of Soviet perceptions. This limits the accuracy — and consequently the use — of such efforts. Nonetheless, to declare that "we don't really know what the Soviets think," as one Administration planner recently did,<sup>2</sup> is to overstate the case. It is possible to develop a rough estimate of the Soviet point of view. While this estimate will never be foolproof, it nevertheless will give a better understanding of the Kremlin's perspective.

The problem of developing an understanding of Soviet perceptions is compounded by the apparent growth of specialized interest groups within the Soviet bureaucracy, each with its own parochial viewpoint. Both Soviet and Western observers have commented on this phenomenon. The secretive nature of the Soviet decision-making process consequently makes it impossible to know whether and to what degree a

<sup>1</sup> For a deeper discussion of these clues, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 30-34.

<sup>2</sup> Murrey Marder, "U.S., Soviets Seen at Vital Juncture in Policy Conflict," *Washington Post*, 26 March 1978, p. 1.

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particular Soviet policy is influenced by the perceptions of a dominant interest group within the Soviet elite, or by the best compromise available between or among those interest groups. Thus, an additional degree of uncertainty is added to any Western discussion of Soviet perceptions.

Numerous other pitfalls appear when Soviet perceptions are assessed. Raymond L. Garthoff has listed ten fallacies common to Western analysis of Soviet intentions.<sup>3</sup> These fallacies may be extended to apply to Western efforts to determine Soviet perceptions. According to Garthoff, these fallacies are: (1) when in doubt, assume the worst; (2) never estimate intentions, only capabilities; (3) the mirror image, i.e., the Soviet leaders' strategic perceptions and intentions are the same as those of the United States; (4) the double mirror image, i.e., the Soviet leaders' strategic perceptions and intentions are necessarily different from those of the United States; (5) the Soviets never mean what they say, or always mean what they say;<sup>4</sup> (6) U.S. national security means military security against the Soviet Union; (7) Soviet capabilities are larger than needed for deterrence; (8) the Kremlin seeks military superiority; (9) reliance on irrelevant, misleading, or overly selective quantitative indicators; and (10) "bad news" is public news, i.e., only alarming developments or estimates should be brought to light.

No analyst can avoid all the problems and pitfalls inherent in the analysis of Soviet perceptions. Some subjectivity will inevitably remain, and some interpretations will undoubtedly be influenced by the analyst's own biases. Every analyst, however, if he wishes to contribute to an objective understanding of the Soviet point of view, must keep these difficulties in mind, and seek to minimize their influence on his work.

With these cautions foremost in mind, we now turn to a brief history of the Soviet worldview.

### *The Evolution of the Soviet Worldview*

The Soviet leadership's perception of the international system and the place the Soviet Union occupies in it has undergone considerable change since Lenin and the Bolsheviks began to forge the first socialist state. Lenin himself developed the original "Soviet" worldview in his 1916 work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in which he argued that as

<sup>3</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," *International Security*, Winter 1978, pp. 22-32.

<sup>4</sup> This fallacy is particularly common and is accentuated by analysts who by selecting only Soviet statements or actions that support their argument seek to "prove" that the Soviet Union's intentions toward or perceptions of the West are either malicious or benign.

capitalist states divided the world into colonial areas, competition for colonies would inevitably lead to war between the capitalist states, thereby creating the objective historical conditions requisite for a socialist revolution.

The Bolshevik Party's seizure of power in Russia in 1917 influenced Lenin to update his worldview. Writing in 1919, the Soviet oracle proclaimed:

We live not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end occurs, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.

In essence, Lenin had created the "two-camp" thesis — one camp socialist, one camp capitalist — and prophesied that conflict between the two was inevitable. Stalin further elaborated the two-camp thesis with his theory of "capitalist encirclement," in which the Soviet Union was viewed as besieged by capitalist states intent on its destruction. Although this thesis fell into disuse during World War II, it was formally readopted by the Soviet Union in 1946 during Zhdanov's celebrated speech at the 29th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution. Even so, the postwar two-camp thesis was considerably different from the prewar version. Before World War II, the socialist camp was more accurately an outpost occupied only by the Soviet Union. Following the war, the socialist camp had become a "commonwealth of nations," albeit created through force of Soviet arms.

This Soviet worldview remained essentially unchanged until 1956 when Khrushchev declared that war between socialist and capitalist states was no longer fatalistically inevitable, and that socialism could be developed by individual nations following national paths. These revisions were fundamental; according to Khrushchev, socialism could now peacefully coexist with capitalism, with the eventual peaceful rather than violent triumph of socialism becoming a possibility. At the same time, at least in theory, socialist states no longer had to conform to the Soviet model of development. Additionally, new independent developing states could pursue "noncapitalist roads of development" which, to Khrushchev, placed them in opposition to the capitalist world. Thus, if Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders so desired, nonsocialist states could be defined as pro-Soviet and anti-imperialist.

Since Khrushchev's time the Soviet worldview has continued to change as it seeks to conform to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of reality. Unlike their predecessors, however, Brezhnev and his colleagues

have not seen fit to codify the transformation of their worldview in a single document or speech. Nonetheless, through analysis of Soviet statements and actions, it is possible to develop a detailed estimate of the current Soviet worldview.

During the Brezhnev era Soviet spokesmen have defined world outlook as "generalized notions of the world as a whole, of human society, and one's place in it, of social ideals, and ways to achieve them."<sup>5</sup> Especially during the 1970s, it has been argued that the "correlation of forces" has increasingly been shifting toward socialism and the "world revolutionary movement" as the contemporary "general crisis of capitalism" worsens. Sources from all sectors of Soviet society concur in this assessment.<sup>6</sup> Further, the Kremlin argues that the changing correlation of forces between the two social systems has been "the decisive factor determining the acceleration of the fundamental restructuring of international relations."<sup>7</sup> Brezhnev himself revealed that the Soviet leadership had evaluated the shifting forces and concluded that there was a "real possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international situation." Peaceful coexistence falls within the rubric of that changing international situation; it is generally viewed as a form of class struggle that excludes direct military confrontation but not other forms of competition — economic, ideological, social, political, and so on.

The broad and sweeping terms that the Soviet leadership regularly uses to describe its view of the contemporary international situation — "correlation of force," "crisis of capitalism," "restructuring of international relations," "relaxation of tension" (rather than *détente*), and "peaceful coexistence," to list the more prominent — gloss over and conceal a rather sophisticated matrix of Soviet logic that seeks to explain the international environment in Marxist-Leninist terms. While the more general terms on occasion seem to present a Soviet worldview replete

with contradictions, a detailed examination of those terms removes most if not all of those contradictions.

#### *The Brezhnev Mirovozzrenie*

What, then, do the broad terms of the Soviet politicostrategic vocabulary seek to convey? To answer this question each doctrinal formula must be examined in turn. Though none of the concepts are new, their meanings and interrelationships are often unclear. Because the "correlation of forces" acts as the driving force behind much of the contemporary Soviet analysis of the international environment, we will begin our examination there.

The correlation of forces, to the Soviets, is a tool for measuring the relative capabilities of competing forces or groups of forces. It is a multifaceted concept, and does not refer solely to military forces. Indeed, Soviet sources specifically cite numerous socioeconomic, political, ideological, and "international movement" criteria in addition to military factors. Within the economic sphere, gross national product, productivity of labor, and economic growth rates are some of the numerous measures. Within the political sphere, breadth of the social base of government, the procedure of relations between the government and legislative bodies, and the possibility of making operative decisions rank as a few of the more important considerations. In the area of international movements, the quantitative composition, overall influence, and norms of relations among their component parts must all be considered. Finally, in the military arena, quantity and quality of armaments, military firepower, and the combat and moral quality of the soldiers are some of the more significant factors.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the factors involved, but it does illustrate that both quantitative and qualitative considerations play a role in determining the overall correlation of forces. It must be pointed out, however, that correlation of forces calculations take place on several levels, including (1) the global relationship between the capitalist and progressive worlds; (2) regional relationships between movements, alliances, or other groups of countries; and (3) specific relationships between individual countries. When Soviet spokesmen declare that the correlation of forces is inexorably shifting to favor the socialist world, they are commenting on their assessment of the long-term trend of the aggregate of global quantitative and qualitative factors. Thus, one must be cognizant of the many interpretations the concept may have. Their view is that when a particular type of correlation is being analyzed — for example, a regional quantitative measure — it cannot be accurately examined in

<sup>5</sup> A. Dmitrev, "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the Army Is an Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, July 1975, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> For just a few of the examples, see D. Tomashevsky, "Toward a Radical Restructuring of International Relations," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia*, January 1975, pp. 3-12 (hereafter cited *MEMO*); V. Matveev, "The Struggle for Peace in the Contemporary World," *MEMO*, December 1971, p. 71; G. Arbatov, "On Soviet-U.S. Relations," *Kommunist*, February 1973, p. 10; G. Profimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, October 1975, p. 38; and A. Migol'at'ev, "The Progress of International Relations and the Opponents of *Détente*," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, November 1975, p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> N. Lebedev, "The U.S.S.R.'s Efforts to Restructure International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, January 1976, p. 6.

isolation from other factors that may impinge on it. These other factors include quantitative measures on both the national and global level, and qualitative measures on any of the three levels. Thus, uncertainty and subjectivity are injected into all assessments of the correlation of forces.

This multidimensional interpretation permits the Soviets to minimize the importance of unfavorable events and situations and maximize the significance of favorable events and situations. While national or regional correlations may temporarily move against the Marxist-Leninist tide on either quantitative or qualitative levels, the aggregate global correlation of forces cannot. To the Kremlin, this is a maxim, an article of faith.

Soviet commentators argue that a significant shift in the correlation of forces has occurred during the Brezhnev era.<sup>8</sup> Some specifically link this shift to the growth of Soviet military capabilities, particularly the attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States. According to this view, Soviet attainment of strategic nuclear parity forced the United States to accept the U.S.S.R. as its military equal, i.e., as a superpower, and to renounce its policy of acting "from a position of strength." As a result, the Soviets contend that intersystemic competition shifted from the military to socioeconomic, political, and ideological planes.

From the Kremlin's perspective, public U.S. acknowledgement of the existence of strategic nuclear parity and American recognition of parity's constraining influence on U.S. foreign policy initiatives were as important as the fact of parity itself. Nonetheless, the alleged shift in the global correlation of forces involved more than the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it extended beyond the growth of overall Soviet military capabilities and embraced the "intensification of the general crisis of capitalism" and the expansion of the power and influence of the "world revolutionary movement."

These twin phenomena occur independently of each other, but at the same time reinforce each other. In essence, the Kremlin believes that the interrelationship between the capitalist world and the world revolutionary movement is a zero-sum game with, in the long term, one side inevitably winning and the other inevitably losing. The global correlation of forces is a measure of that interrelationship.

However, as will be discussed in detail later, the intensification of the "general crisis of capitalism" does not necessarily imply an absolute growth of power and influence for the socialist commonwealth and the Soviet Union. Rather, as the Soviet Union and its socialist allies are only one of three streams within the world revolutionary movement, losses suffered by the capitalist world may accrue to the accounts of either of the other two streams of the world revolutionary movement, the national liberation movement, or the international workers and Communist movement. Thus, capitalist losses inevitably strengthen the world revolutionary movement in an absolute sense, but may only strengthen the socialist commonwealth and the Soviet Union in a relative sense.

Soviet ideologues view the general crisis of capitalism and the world revolutionary movement within a broad context. The general crisis of capitalism is but the latest stage of development of the contradictions allegedly an inherent part of the capitalist system, and includes economic, political, social, and ideological elements.

The Kremlin's spokesmen point to numerous indications that the general crisis of capitalism is intensifying. Within the economic sphere, decreased growth rates, high unemployment, unrestrained inflation, the energy crisis, large-scale resource dependency, more numerous disagreements between labor and management, and growing trade deficits in many Western countries all receive prominent coverage. Scandals involving high government officials, including Watergate and the Lance affair; lower voter turnout; deadlock and disagreement between different branches of government; and general political apathy are viewed as indications of the political malaise which besets capitalism. Socially, rising crime rates, poor race relations, bourgeois "mass culture," and the difficulties faced by urban areas are a few of the more prominent problems facing capitalist society that the Kremlin regularly lists. Finally, ideologically, the undermining of the "cold war philosophy" and increased doubt about the legitimacy of "anti-Soviet attitudes" are two of the more recent failures of capitalism's ideology, at least as far as the Kremlin is concerned.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, even as the general crisis of capitalism allegedly intensifies, each of the three streams of the world revolutionary movement gathers momentum. These streams are all working together "for the defeat

<sup>8</sup> This is the third radical shift of the correlation of forces since 1917. The first occurred in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Soviet state. The second occurred following World War II with the defeat of Germany and the emergence of a Communist Eastern Europe.

<sup>9</sup> For example, see I. Guryev, "The General Crisis of Capitalism: Stages of Intensification," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, March 1978, p. 69; and K. Mikulsky, "The Advantages of Socialism and the Ideological Struggle," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, March 1978, pp. 71-73.

of imperialism."<sup>10</sup> In the Soviet view, these streams are becoming increasingly unified. This reputed movement toward unity is occurring because of the "common interests" of the three streams and the "need to repel imperialist intrigues."<sup>11</sup>

Still, this does *not* imply that the three streams of the world revolutionary process are coequal. Numerous Soviet spokesmen have made it abundantly clear that despite the "growing unity," the socialist commonwealth and the international workers and Communist movement are the predominant streams of the revolutionary process.<sup>12</sup> Brezhnev himself has emphasized that the greatest contribution the peoples of the socialist countries can make to the revolutionary cause is "the development and strengthening of the world socialist system." Speaking at the 24th Party Congress, the General Secretary asserted that the struggle against imperialism "largely depends on the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces, above all of the world Communist movement." More recently, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have been described as "the mainstay of the world revolutionary process."<sup>13</sup> The national liberation movement may thus be described as a second-class citizen of the world revolutionary process. Indeed, according to one source, "the role and place of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process depends greatly on its interaction with the world Communist movement, the key political force of our time."<sup>14</sup> The rationale for this will be discussed below.

The socialist commonwealth itself, as far as the Kremlin is concerned, is founded on "principles of socialist internationalism, comradely mutual assistance, respect for equality and sovereignty of states, and noninterference in foreign affairs."<sup>15</sup> Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia,

and Yugoslavia are more often than not listed with the Soviet Union as members of the commonwealth. Within the commonwealth, the Kremlin argues a "gradual drawing together" (*sblizhenie*) is occurring that is evening out their levels of development and that will eventually lead to an indefinite form of integration. Nonetheless, despite this *sblizhenie*, Moscow maintains that national historical experiences play a significant role in building socialism within a particular country. This presents a somewhat contradictory picture of a socialist commonwealth theoretically moving toward integration while at the same time preserving national characteristics of its constituent components. The Kremlin unceasingly stresses, however, that following national paths of socialism does not invalidate the universal character of the laws of societal development.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union consistently pictures itself as leading the socialist commonwealth. As the first and oldest socialist state — or the "state of mature socialism" as it is being increasingly called — the Soviet Union is regarded as the foremost ideological, economic, political, social, and military component of the socialist commonwealth. Again not surprisingly, when one examines the second major stream of the world revolutionary process — the international workers and Communist movement — it is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that emerges preeminent.

The international workers and Communist movement consists of anti-imperialist laborers throughout the world. The movement itself is led by Communist parties, with the CPSU as the senior and most authoritative party being viewed as the most powerful entity within the stream. Shared class interests serve as the unifying element behind the "proletarian internationalism" that reputedly exists within this stream.

The third and final stream of the world revolutionary process — the national liberation movement — is by far the most diverse and complex. Because the national liberation movement is composed of "a fusion of almost all classes and social strata into broad political coalitions,"<sup>16</sup> it does not share all the objectives of the socialist commonwealth and Communist parties, but only that of eliminating imperialism. In a sense, the national liberation movement is "impure." Despite its identification with the world revolutionary process, its "impurity" makes it the least significant stream in the process, at least according to Soviet ideologues.

Nonetheless, it is still a fundamental part of that process. Indeed, some Soviet authorities maintain that

<sup>10</sup> "Toward New Victories in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy, and Socialism," *Kommunist*, July 1974, p. 86; N. Kovalsky, "Growing Unity of Revolutionary Forces," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, December 1975, p. 56; and G. Mirskii, "Developing Countries and World Capitalism," *MEMO*, March 1976, p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> Kovalsky, p. 58.

<sup>12</sup> Y. Zhukov, et al., *The Third World: Problems and Prospects* (Moscow: Progress, 1970), p. 18; V. Abel and B. Tolan, *La Lutte pour la Paix et le Mouvement de Liberation Nationale* (Moscow: Novosti, 1975), p. 1; and B. Ponomaryov, "Socialism's Role in the Present Day World," *World Marxist Review*, January 1975, p. 15.

<sup>13</sup> Y. Solodukhin, "The Fraternal Alliance: From Strength to Strength," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, January 1978, p. 79.

<sup>14</sup> Y. Tarabin, "The National Liberation Movement: Problems and Prospects," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, February 1978, p. 63.

<sup>15</sup> N. Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, February 1978, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Zhukov, p. 18.

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the national liberation movement is moving increasingly from anti-imperialism to anticapitalism, thereby becoming more closely aligned with the socialist commonwealth and communism. Events in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia are pointed to as proof of the argument. Even so, because of its diverse composition, the Kremlin argues that a part of the national liberation movement may abandon the revolutionary line when "some of [a country's] leaders betray the cause of socialist orientation."<sup>17</sup> In these cases, the Soviet Union has a ready-made answer for instances in which a national liberation movement sides with imperialism. If a movement disagrees with Soviet positions, then the Kremlin may claim that "reactionary proimperialist" forces dominate it. On the other hand, if a movement sides with or is influenced by the Soviet Union, then Moscow may assert that "progressive anti-imperialist" forces predominate. Within this construct, Soviet spokesmen maintain they have a dynamic methodology with which to explain the vagaries of political, social, and economic developments throughout the Third World.

The ongoing conflict between world capitalism and the three streams of the world revolutionary process takes place on many planes including political, economic, social, ideological, and military ones. In the past, the capitalist world undertook actions against the various streams on any of these planes depending on time, location, and circumstances. However, the recent changes in the correlation of forces have forced the capitalist world to lessen its reliance on military force as the final arbiter of conflict with the world revolutionary process. Capitalism's options for action against the three streams have been reduced, thereby leading to increased possibilities for success by the revolutionary process. Because capitalism's military strength was used most often against the weakest stream — the national liberation movement — it is this stream that receives the most immediate benefit from capitalism's decreased latitude for use of military force. Indeed, as one Soviet author has said, "imperialism's chances for aggressive action [against national liberation] have been considerably reduced."<sup>18</sup>

Capitalism's decreased latitude for the use of military force is just one of several elements that constitute the so-called "restructuring of international relations." The concept itself emanates from the

objective reality, in Soviet eyes, of the increased power of the socialist world and the decreased power of the capitalist world. According to this Soviet view, international relations are increasingly being influenced by the socialist commonwealth, with this increased influence gradually assuming a dominant role in defining the scope and method of relations between nations. Thus, when the Kremlin argues that capitalism no longer has great latitude for military action against national liberation movements, it is because "realistic" politicians in the capitalist countries realize that the socialist nations in general and the Soviet Union in particular are assuming a dominant power position. Socialist might has in essence restructured international affairs, according to Moscow.

The Soviet concept of the restructuring of international relations extends beyond limiting the utility of capitalist military coercion. It also includes the "gradual reduction in the relative importance of military force in the hierarchy of means of insuring security"<sup>19</sup> and the establishment of "just international economic relations" in places of exploitation.<sup>20</sup> In essence, the Kremlin views current successes of the restructuring of international relations as including Western nonintervention in Africa, price and product dislocations in the international market place, and Western willingness to cooperate with the socialist commonwealth. To be sure, from the Kremlin's perspective, international relations *have* been restructured, at least when compared to the 1950s and 1960s.

Two final components of the Kremlin's worldview bear direct relation to the previously discussed Soviet terminology, and themselves are integrally linked. "Peaceful coexistence" and the "relaxation of tensions" have long been standard Soviet rhetorical terms, but can only be properly understood within the confines of the Kremlin's broader theoretical constructs. Put simply, peaceful coexistence refers only to relations between the two opposing social systems. It reduces the possibility of direct military conflict between the two systems, and at the same time permits other forms of competition — economic, ideological, social, political, and so forth — to continue. Inevitably, with the movement of direct intersystemic competition from the military plane to the other places, a relaxation of tensions follows.

Both concepts revolve around the key phrase, "between the two opposing social systems." When direct

<sup>17</sup> V. Solodovnikov and N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Tendencies of Non-Capitalist Development," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, March 1976, p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> Ye Dolgoplov, "The Liberation Struggle in the Context of Detente," *Soviet Military Review*, March 1978, p. 52.

<sup>19</sup> D. Proektor, "Socialism and International Security," *Kommunist*, May 1977, pp. 109-120.

<sup>20</sup> Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," p. 10.

relations between the two systems are not under consideration, peaceful coexistence and the reduction of tensions are not operant. More specifically, they "do not extend to relations between imperialism and the peoples liberation movement."<sup>21</sup> The U.S.S.R. consequently draws "a clear line of distinction between the area in which the peaceful coexistence principle operates" and areas where it does not.<sup>22</sup> Capitalist-socialist relations exist on one side of that boundary; capitalist-Third World and socialist-Third World relations exist on the other. Peaceful coexistence "prevents imperialism from openly using force against the emergent states,"<sup>23</sup> but does not prevent the Soviet

Union from extending verbal and material support to selected movements and nations. Both peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tensions may thus be viewed as limited concepts existing within a much broader theoretical construct.

(To be continued)

<sup>21</sup> *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 20 December 1973; *Izvestiia*, 29 November 1975; and *Pravda*, 8 December 1975; also "Contemporary Imperialism in the Light of Lenin's Doctrine," *World Marxist Review*, March 1976, p. 72.

<sup>22</sup> A. Sovetov, "Peaceful Coexistence — A Real Factor in International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, September 1972, p. 14; see also G. Kallai, "Main Force of the Revolutionary Forces," *World Marxist Review*, November 1972, pp. 5-14.

<sup>23</sup> D. Volsky, "Behind the Conflict in Angola," *New Times*, September 1975, p.8.

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