

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

THE NSA

DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAM (U)

Doors Open Legally on Past U.S. Cryptologic Activities (U)

Help Wanted

Position: Immediate openings for persons to review for declassification purposes U.S. cryptologic records of the past 60+ years. *Qualifications:* Persons with past cryptologic experience, preferably WW II vintage, who possess long and excellent memories and are willing to plow through approximately 10-20 million records. Must have strong hands for opening boxes and good eyesight for hours of reading. *Contract:* One year, with option for renewal. *Fringe benefits:* Excellent—shorter work week, friendly atmosphere.

(U) While this is not an actual job advertisement for the declassification group which was formed in 1975, it describes the type of people needed in order to comply with downgrading-declassification action of Executive Order 11652 of 1972 and its successor, E.O. 12065 of 1978. Under the 1972 executive order, government documents that were thirty years old or older would be automatically declassified after December 1975 unless: (1) The department head personally reviewed the document(s) and certified that declassification and release would adversely affect the national security of the United States, or (2) the declassification and release of the document(s) would jeopardize a person's life.

(U) After Executive Order 11652, came the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of November 1974, which was intended to make it easier for the public to gain access to government records. On top of this came the book, *The Ultra Secret*, by F. W. Winterbotham, which whetted the public's appetite for information on World War II cryptography and cryptanalysis. Soon NSA began to receive requests for information pertaining to Sigint activities of the military departments, particularly World War II doc-

uments. Many requests were not easily dealt with since they were not specific—a request would be received for “all of the Japanese Comint produced during World War II,” the requestor not realizing that there were literally thousands of records in this broad category. The request would have to be narrowed in scope to determine exactly what was wanted. Then a search to locate the information had to be made. All in all, this was a very time-consuming task.

(U) As a consequence of the executive order and the FOIA requests, several actions were taken. Since NSA could not comply with the executive order to declassify 30-year-old records by the end of 1975, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld granted NSA an extension to December 1980. A systematic means of locating, inventorying, and indexing the cryptologic records had to be developed before any reviewing could take place. Storage facilities were needed and a retrieval system had to be developed. Thus came into being the NSA Archives and Archival Holding Area—but *that* is another story. Once the records were located, they had to be inventoried and indexed, then a time schedule had to be set for completion of the review and declassification.


~~(S-CCO)~~ The job of preparing a plan for the declassification and review of NSA's records fell to (b) (3) - P.L. 86- (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36 of D4. A list of cryptologic categories was developed: histories, signals intelligence raw materials, signals intelligence reports, signals intelligence operational documents revealing intelligence sources and methods, research and development reports which reveal intelligence sources and methods, research and development reports pertaining

to U.S. cryptography, documents revealing communications security information, and equipment used for cryptography, cryptanalysis, and signals collection. This plan took into account the UK/USA Sigint Agreement of 1946, still in effect, [redacted]


A number of these records revealed sources and methods of Sigint operations currently in use, which still need to be protected. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Next came the problem of finding qualified people to review and declassify the records. Since no full-time billets were authorized, the people to do the reviewing would have to be part-time employees. Where was the expertise on World War II cryptologic activities? Most of it was gone with those who had retired. A decision was made to ask some of the Agency's senior employees, now retired, to come back as re-employed annuitants to undertake this task. These retirees had the qualifications necessary to review past cryptologic records—experience gained in cryptography and cryptanalysis from their military service during World War II and/or an active role in the management of cryptologic activities at AFSA/NSA or with the SCAs. Fortunately for the Agency, many of the retirees were willing to be a part of the



Declassifiers opening a box of old cryptologic records to be reviewed for declassification action. Left to right: [redacted]



(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

declassification program and took pride in the fact that a subject once unmentionable outside NSA's walls would be given the attention and recognition it had so long been denied publicly. The role that Sigint played in the Battle of the Atlantic¹ would be just one of the many cryptologic accomplishments declassified and made available to historians and scholars.

(U) The NSA declassification and review group began its work in 1975. William Gerhard, a full-time employee, headed the group and Sam Hall and Frank Steinmetz, both re-employed annuitants, were the first declassifiers. They began to review the records of INSCOMM's predecessor, Signal Security Agency, for possible declassification.

~~(C-CCO)~~ From the categories established in the declassification plan approved by Secretary of Defense, four priorities were set:

- Priority 1 U.S. Sigint histories. U.S. Sigint of World War II-- German and Japanese military and diplomatic communications. December 1980
- Priority 2 World War I--U.S. Sigint from German communications. December 1981
Pre-World War II--no categories identified since NSA believed very few Sigint records existed for the period between WW I and WW II.
- Priority 3 Korean conflict. Under consideration: U.S. Sigint histories and U.S. Sigint products from [redacted] December 1983
- Priority 4 Vietnam conflict. Under consideration: U.S. Sigint histories and U.S. Sigint products from [redacted] December 1990

~~(C)~~ Since the greatest interest, from the public's standpoint, centered around World War II records, work began on declassification of the Sigint derived by the U.S. from Japanese and German military and diplomatic communications. Declassification review of the Sigint history of events leading up to Pearl Harbor and the Sigint aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic was also undertaken at that time.

(U) A sizeable dent has been made in reviewing and declassifying World War II cryptologic records. Work has been completed on Japanese army and air force communications as well as the Japanese and German diplomatic summaries. These records have been turned over to the National Archives, and NSA has made some of the records available, upon request, to historians and scholars. A few of the specific items offered to, and accepted by, the National Archives are:

The Role of Communications Intelligence in Submarine Warfare in the Pacific, January 1943-October 1943 (8 volumes, 2,442 pages).

History of U.S. Strategic Air Force Europe vs. German Air Force, June 1945 (386 pages).

Translations of Japanese Army Messages, June 1943 to November 1944 (4,113 pages).

"MAGIC" Background of Pearl Harbor, 14 February 1941 to December 1941 (4 volumes, 3,064 pages).

Marshall Letter to Eisenhower on the Use of Ultra Intelligence, Author, G. C. Marshall, 15 March 1944 (4 pages).

(U) A complete set of the declassified cryptologic history documents released to the National Archives is available in the NSA Circulation Library (T1212).

(U) Some of these cryptologic records have been the basis for books and articles on the role of cryptography and cryptanalysis played in World War II. Among these are:

The Battle of the Atlantic, by Terry Hughes and John Costello, The Dial Press/James Wade, New York, 1977.


The Trail of the Fox, by David Irving, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1977.

"The Influence of Ultra in World War II," by Dr. Harold C. Deutsch, appeared in *Parameters*, the Journal of the U.S. Army War College.

Hitler's Spies, by David Kahn, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1978.

(U) ¹ See "Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic" (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 *Cryptologic Spectrum*, Volume 8, Winter 1978.

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Re-employed annuitants Captain Harold Joslin, USN (Ret.), (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 **discussing some cryptologic records of the**
past.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) From a staff of two part-timers in 1975, the declassification group has grown tenfold. The current group is composed mainly of re-employed annuitants, but also includes some part-time NSA employees, and full-time employees on limited detail from P and S. The work of this group is divided into three categories: review of military communications, review of diplomatic communications, and review of 30-year permanent records and cryptologic histories. Informal interviews with a few of the declassifiers revealed some of their current accomplishments as well as their past cryptologic experiences.

~~(FOUO)~~ One of the present declassifiers is (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 a re-employed annuitant, who declassified a series of navy reports based on ENIGMA decrypts which told the story of the Battle of the Atlantic. At (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 so one of several who worked on declassifying the MAGIC Summaries. Under the control of G-2, Military Intelligence Service established the "MAGIC Summary" as a daily means of reporting decrypts of diplomatic communications during World War II. These summaries were published throughout the World War II period and were distributed by the War Department to top officials of the U.S. Govern-

ment. Dave and others have evidence that there was a European version of the MAGIC Summaries; they have traced every lead available to find these summaries, but have found only (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36, his career as a German linguist with Army counterintelligence during the war; afterwards, he left to work in private industry until he saw a notice in 1951 in a Chicago newspaper which turned out to be a job with AFSA. He worked in GENS 5, served in NSAEUR, and later served as the Deputy, (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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~~(FOUO)~~

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36; worked on research requests and requests from military and defense schools for information on World War I and II. She and fellow re-employed annuitant, (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 reviewed and declassified the records of the American Expeditionary Forces in France during World War I (some 55 boxes of records) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 in her career as a civilian cryptanalyst in 1943 at ASA working on the Japanese army and water transport communications. Before retiring, she worked in the TAREX program in D33 and (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 a history enthusiast, served as the G-2 Liaison Officer to ASA, AFSA, and NSA before he became the DIA Liaison Officer to NSA.

~~(FOUO)~~

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 is a cryptanalyst in naval intelligence during World War II and afterwards

served in OP-20-G as well as AFSA and NSA. During the mid-1950s, he served a tour in Japan. Working in declassification since 1978, he is now inventorying and indexing additional World War II records, after having completed the reproduction from microfilm to hard copy of the Japanese army water transport traffic of World War II, which is being reviewed for eventual submission to the National Archives.

(U) The goal of these cryptologic veterans is to ensure that as much information as can be declassified is released to the National Archives. At the same time, they must guard against releasing any information which would be injurious to NSA's performance of its mission. Each box of records that confronts them presents a special challenge. As they meet this responsibility, day by day, they gradually uncover what can safely be revealed about U.S. cryptologic operations and accomplishments of the past sixty years.

(U) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 began her career with NSA in 1960 on R Staff. Since then she has had assignments with the Office of Research and Engineering, USCSB Secretariat, and the Office of COMSEC Doctrine and Threat Assessment.

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 currently assigned to the D4 History and Publications Staff.